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POWER, COMMUNICATION, AND POLITICS IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES 
The Nordic countries are stable democracies with solid infrastructures for political dia-
logue and negotiations. However, both the “Nordic model” and Nordic media systems 
are under pressure as the conditions for political communication change – not least due 
to weakened political parties and the widespread use of digital communication media. 
In this anthology, the similarities and differences in political communication across the 
Nordic countries are studied. Traditional corporatist mechanisms in the Nordic countries 
are increasingly challenged by professionals, such as lobbyists, a development that has 
consequences for the processes and forms of political communication. Populist polit-
ical parties have increased their media presence and political influence, whereas the 
news media have lost readers, viewers, listeners, and advertisers. These developments 
influence societal power relations and restructure the ways in which political actors 
communicate about political issues. 
This book is a key reference for all who are interested in current trends and develop-
ments in the Nordic countries. The editors, Eli Skogerbø, Øyvind Ihlen, Nete Nørgaard 
Kristensen, and Lars Nord, have published extensively on political communication, and 
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Preface
Skogerbø, E., Ihlen, Ø., Kristensen, N. N., & Nord, L. (2021). Preface. In E. Skogerbø, Ø. Ihlen, N. N. Kristensen, & L. 
Nord (Eds.), Power, communication, and politics in the Nordic countries (pp. 7–9). Gothenburg: Nordicom, University of 
Gothenburg. https://doi.org/10.48335/9789188855299-p
Is there a Nordic model for political communication? This is the question we 
pose in this anthology. It seems simple enough, but there are many answers. 
When we first invited our Nordic colleagues to this book project, we asked 
them to reflect on the changes that challenged the Nordic welfare states and 
their infrastructures for political dialogue and negotiations. We pointed to the 
technological shifts, the hybridisation of the media structures, and the fact that 
the Nordic countries had different experiences and handled crises differently in 
the recent past. While this book was in its final stages, a new crisis hit. During 
the global Covid-19 pandemic, both striking differences – such as differences in 
crisis management and crisis communication of the Nordic governments – and 
deep-seated similarities – such as the high trust level between governments and 
citizens – came to the fore. As the chapters of this book explore, if anything, 
the key to understanding Nordic political communication is to keep in mind 
both aspects: the systems are similar, but there are considerable differences 
between the countries in terms of history, cultures, languages, demography, 
and contemporary politics. 
The aims of the book are threefold. First, we want to present an updated 
and broad picture of Nordic political communication. In this respect, this book 
updates and expands Communicating Politics: Political Communication in the 
Nordic Countries, edited by Jesper Strömbäck, Mark Blach-Ørsten, and Toril 
Aalberg in 2008, which brought a much-needed systematic comparative per-
spective to Nordic political communication. Second, we aim to go beyond the 
comparative media models perspective. The media models remain important, 
but at the same time, we seek to explore and disclose the dynamics that under-
lie the theoretical framework. In order to do so, this book expands the field 
by including new actors, themes, theories, and research questions in Nordic 
political communication.
The third objective is to show that both more comparative studies and more 
in-depth analyses are essential to understand the similarities and differences 
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between the Nordic countries. It is precisely the similarities and differences 
that create the conditions for Nordic politics and political communication. To 
the degree that there is a Nordic political communication model, it is flexible 
and pragmatic and takes both the similarities and the differences within the 
Nordic region into account. To unpack the fundamental elements of Nordic 
political communication, we challenged leading Nordic researchers to compare 
their research and insights. The ambition was to bring scholars from several 
Nordic countries together in each chapter – an effort that resulted in brand 
new collaborations we hope will inspire and facilitate Nordic cooperation in 
the future.
It has been a true pleasure and privilege to edit this anthology. Owing to 
many factors, it has been in process for a while, and there are many people to 
thank for the fact that the book is now available to you in different formats. 
First, the authors should be thanked for their contributions to the anthology. 
Without you, it would not be here. Many of the authors, including the editors, 
have never worked together before. They were asked to form authorships across 
borders and fields and have responded to the challenge with much enthusiasm 
and dedication. They have generously explored and shared knowledge in their 
special fields and met the challenge of comparing insights from the different 
Nordic countries that make up Nordic political communication research. 
Further, we thank the POLKOM group and network and our home insti-
tutions for taking part in this effort. The group has its base at the Department 
of Media and Communication (IMK) at the University of Oslo and has been 
supported financially and administratively by this department. The POLKOM 
network includes scholars, many of whom authored chapters in this book, 
working with political communication in institutions all over Norway and 
the other Nordic countries. Thanks also to everyone who has commented and 
discussed drafts, conference papers, and ideas for chapters.
And finally, some key people and organisations have been crucial to the 
process of making this book. Some of them, the reviewers of the chapters, must 
be thanked anonymously – you know who you are. Thank you for devoting 
the time and effort to improve the book. Research and editorial assistant Anja 
Vranic at IMK has been invaluable in the process of finishing the book. She 
has assisted in the completion of all chapters – diligently, efficiently, and al-
ways helpful with any possible and impossible issue tied to the completion of 
every chapter. Our publisher, Nordicom, has taken all challenges and delays 
with an everlasting patience. Special thanks to Ingela Wadbring and Jonas 
Ohlsson who believed in the project; academic editor Johannes Bjerling who 
has read and commented on every chapter; technical editor Kristin Clay who 




Last, and very important, the research network UiO Norden funded a semi-
nar where the ideas for the book were discussed, and the Norwegian Research 
Council has – through funding the POLKOM research group – contributed 
significantly to the funding of the book.
Oslo, Copenhagen, & Sundsvall, 9 December 2020
Eli Skogerbø, Øyvind Ihlen, Nete Nørgaard Kristensen, & Lars Nord
© 2020 Nordicom and respective authors. This is an Open Access work licensed under 
the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 
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Chapter 1
Introduction
A Nordic model for political communication?
Eli Skogerbø, Nete Nørgaard Kristensen,  
Lars Nord, & Øyvind Ihlen
Abstract 
The Nordic countries have been termed a supermodel for political and economic 
governance. This anthology explores how and why the political communication 
systems contribute to explaining and understanding why the Nordic countries stand 
out as stable, democratic welfare states. The state and nation-building processes of 
these small European countries were not at all identical, but the ensuing political 
systems show many similarities. Yet, there are also considerable differences. Part 
One of the anthology explores developments in the media structure and relation-
ship between media and politics in the five Nordic countries. The chapters are 
co-authored by scholars from political communication, media, and journalism 
from each country and emphasise particular national traits. Part Two studies and 
compares political communication across the Nordic countries within particular 
domains, such as political journalism, local journalism, lobbyism, elections, and the 
spread of fake news, with a specific eye for similarities and differences between the 
Nordic countries. We conclude with the argument that Nordic political communi-
cation is and should be international and comparative. Still we want to highlight 
the need to also continue with in-depth national or Nordic comparative studies.
Keywords: Nordic political communication, Nordic media model, hybrid media 
system, welfare state, political communication
Introduction
This anthology is about political communication in the Nordic countries – 
Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden – taking as its starting point 
that the political systems and media and communication systems in this region 
stand out as quite similar. The notion of the “Nordic model(s)” (Knutsen, 2017) 
has been heavily discussed in political science and economy. In media studies, 
the five Nordic countries have, by some authors (Syvertsen et al., 2014), been 
subsumed under the label of a media welfare state model and by others noted 
to share characteristics with other Northern European countries and termed 
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democratic corporatist media systems (Hallin & Mancini, 2004, 2016), or 
even North American media systems (Ohlsson, 2015). This anthology adds to 
these ongoing debates by focusing specifically on the characteristics, if there 
are any, of Nordic political communication. The anthology applies two overall 
perspectives: first, it urges the importance of, on the one hand, international 
comparison between and beyond the Nordic realm, and, on the other, in-depth 
national studies; second, it points to the need for taking both changes and 
continuities into consideration when analysing political communication, rather 
than focusing on either change or continuity. Part One explores developments 
in the media structure and relationship between media and politics in each of 
the five Nordic countries. The chapters are co-authored by political commu-
nication scholars, media scholars, and journalism scholars from each country, 
emphasising particular national traits. Part Two studies and compares political 
communication across the Nordic countries within particular domains, such 
as political journalism, local journalism, lobbyism, elections, and the spread of 
fake news, with a specific eye for similarities and differences between the Nordic 
countries. These themed chapters emphasise the interplay of new and old types 
of political actors such as governments, lobbyists, bureaucracies, political par-
ties, and journalists, and various arenas for political communication, including 
institutionalised news media, alternative media, social media platforms, election 
campaigns, local media, cultural political communication, and political rhetoric. 
In the concluding chapter, we sum up and draw conclusions on the status of 
political communication in the Nordic countries, whether we can actually speak 
of a Nordic political communication model today, and if so: What is it? And 
how does it impact the political, economic, social, and cultural development 
and resilience of the Nordic countries? The last question became particularly 
relevant when this anthology was about to be finished, as the final production 
phase collided with the Covid-19 pandemic in the spring of 2020.
The Nordic region
The Nordic region consists of five small states – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, 
Norway, and Sweden – and four territories with different types of home rule: 
Greenland and the Faroe Islands (Denmark), Åland (Finland), and Svalbard 
(Norway) (Hilson, 2008). The Finnish, Norwegian, and Swedish states 
have also allocated some degree (not identical) of self-determination to the 
indigenous Sámi populations through the Sámi Parliaments (read more in 
Part One; Josefsen & Skogerbø, Chapter 10). The Nordic countries have a 
reputation of being generous welfare states with widespread gender equality 
and high social equality. Indeed, they have been labelled a “supermodel” for 
political and economic governance (The Economist, 2013). The countries 
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generally have high scores on measures of citizen happiness and democratic 
governance – in the 2019 World Happiness Report (Helliwell et al., 2019), 
Finland ranked first, Denmark second, Norway third, Iceland fourth, and 
Sweden seventh. These accounts tell stories of a region in which state- and 
nation-building processes were not at all identical, but where the ensuing 
political systems show many similarities (Brandal et al., 2013; Heidar, 2004), 
though also considerable differences (Bengtsson et al., 2013; Piketty, 2014). 
Yet, there are many reasons for questioning this somewhat idyllic image, as, 
for instance, Teigen and Skjeie (2017) do in their analysis of the Nordic gender 
equality model. In a set of analyses, they show that although Nordic women 
have succeeded in entering the highest levels of politics and organised society, 
they have been much less successful in the business sector. Jónsson (2014) 
questions the applicability of a Nordic consensual model to Iceland, arguing 
that Icelandic politics are more adversarial than the other Nordic countries, 
whereas Ólafsson (2020) points to the importance of size to explain why 
Iceland is often left out of comparative analyses, even in the Nordic context 
(see also Ólafsson & Jóhannsdóttir, Chapter 3). The observant reader will 
find that this is also a relevant point for this anthology: only a few of the 
chapters include Iceland in the comparisons, and few include all five Nordic 
countries, thereby underlining both the differences between the countries and 
the need for increased Nordic comparative research.
Further, crises and changes take place even in the peaceful corners of the 
world and make up, as Davis (2019) has discussed extensively, particular chal-
lenges for political communication – the key focus of this anthology. The global 
tendencies of increasing economic and social differences (Piketty, 2014) have also 
reached the Nordic region (Nordic Co-operation, 2018). Over the past decades, 
they have been through the same global upheavals as other regions, including 
the financial crisis from 2008 onwards and following lasting high numbers of 
unemployment in some social groups, reductions in public income and taxes, 
increasing climate challenges, and, most recently, the Covid-19 pandemic in 
2020. These challenges, however, have not had the same effects in each of the 
countries. Iceland (see Ólafsson & Jóhannsdóttir, Chapter 3) suffered substan-
tially more from the financial crisis and the collapse of the banking system than 
did Norway, whose huge tax income from the oil industry worked as a buffer. 
In Sweden, the reductions in public incomes have had more severe effects on 
the funding of the extensive welfare state than in Denmark and Norway.
The similarities in terms of culture, politics, and communications between 
the countries are nevertheless notable, as the following chapters show. Suffice 
to say that Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden have majority languages 
that are closely related and, to some degree, mutually understandable. The 
majority language in Finland is fundamentally different, but Finnish is spoken 
by national minorities in Norway and Sweden, and Swedish is the largest 
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minority language in Finland. Other historical minority languages are spoken 
across some of the countries, such as Sámi, Romani, and Yiddish. Over the past 
decades, all the Nordic countries have changed demographically both in terms 
of an aging population and immigration. Since the mid-1990s, all five countries 
have been part of the free movement of European Union citizens, opening up 
for (relatively) free labour migration in Europe. These policies, combined with 
increased immigration from other parts of the world, have made the countries 
markedly more multicultural than two generations ago. Having noted this as 
a change in all five countries, there are also major differences between Sweden 
– which over the past decades had liberal immigration policies – and its Nor-
dic neighbours, that in the same period had strict restrictions on immigration 
regions outside of the European Union.
These economic and demographic changes have also given rise to new con-
flicts, shifted political power among the parties in parliament, and made for the 
creation of new political parties and new media outlets (see Part One; Herkman 
& Jungar, Chapter 12; Ihlebæk & Nygaard, Chapter 13). They have also given 
rise to new media genres that – to some extent – have addressed social and cul-
tural challenges and gained Nordic perspectives international attention beyond 
the political context. Popular culture offerings such as bestseller novels, films, 
and quality television series have become global phenomena, including Nordic 
Noir, political fiction, and teen drama (e.g., Hansen & Waade, 2017; Sundet, 
2020), with titles such as Wallander, The Bridge, and Trapped (crime fiction and 
film adaptations), Borgen, Invisible Heroes (television series), and Skam [Shame] 
(multiplatform and web-series). Successful Nordic television series, for example, 
have pointed to the role of public service media in fostering quality drama for 
a broad audience, but also in showcasing the ideals of the welfare state ideol-
ogy. The political drama series Borgen, produced by the Danish public service 
broadcasting company (DR) and running for three seasons (2010–2013) with 
a fourth season scheduled for 2022, is an interesting case in point. The series’ 
portrayal of how a fictional female prime minister, Birgitte Nyborg, navigates 
political powerplays and everyday life in Denmark and paints a quite different 
– progressive and positive – picture of the political scene than does American 
television series such as The West Wing (1999–2006) and House of Cards 
(2013–2018). Andersen and colleagues (forthcoming) argue that such popular 
culture expressions may keep alive “the myth of the utopian Nordic welfare 
model”. Bondebjerg and colleagues (2017: 230) find that the international ap-
peal of cultural expressions, such as Nordic Noir, relates to them coming “from 
modern welfare states with a lifestyle, social system and importantly gender 
equality that critics and audiences abroad found to be intriguing to explore 
through fiction”. At the same time, these fictional universes also criticise some 
of the social and political realities of the very same welfare systems (Bondebjerg 
et al., 2017). Such international successes within popular culture have added to 
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the international attention devoted to the Nordic context during the past decade, 
also within political communication.
The Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 highlighted the critical importance of study-
ing and reflecting on political communication in times of crisis. Indeed, Davis 
(2019) argues that crisis is defining the “fourth age of communication”, echoing 
the revised version of the periodisation of political communication set out by 
Blumler and Kavanagh (Blumler, 2016: 28; Blumler & Kavanagh, 1999). Blumler 
(2016: 28) argued that “the bifurcated political communication system of the 
fourth age is quite different from its predecessors. Where a relative uniformity, 
coherence and simplicity once prevailed, now everything seems to be laced with 
complexity, multiplicity, variety and cross-currents”. At the bottom of these 
changes lies digitalisation as the transformative technological driving force, which 
is also the starting point for Davis’s rather grim analysis of the state of politics 
and political communication in 2019. Along with Davis, Bennett and Pfetsch 
(2018) point to factors such as increasing complexity of politics, fragmentation 
of audiences, information overload, and weakening of state institutions as in-
dications of crisis. Another and particularly relevant factor, highlighted by the 
2020 Covid-19 pandemic, is the problems caused by the spread of unreliable 
news and the problems of verifying sources, a concern that is also pointed out in 
this anthology (Kalsnes et al., Chapter 14). Nevertheless, as much as we admit 
that global crises are highly relevant, this anthology also shows that the Nordic 
countries – individually and regionally – differ from Davis’s account of crisis on 
important indicators. The level of trust in the news media and political institu-
tions are, for instance, high in all the Nordic countries (Newman et al., 2019), 
and despite major transformations of news production and a massive increase 
in the number of digital channels, public media institutions have retained solid 
positions. Whereas voter volatility has increased and party systems started frag-
menting decades ago – two of Davis’s crisis indicators – the Nordic democratic 
systems have remained stable (see Part One; Hopmann & Karlsen, Chapter 11). 
Although right-wing parties have gained considerable attention in all Nordic 
countries except Iceland, the nationalist challenges are less pronounced than 
elsewhere (see Herkman & Jungar, Chapter 12). 
Power, communication, and politics in the digital age
What exactly do we refer to when we say we study political communication? 
The literature is abundant with definitions, as Jamieson and Kenski (2014) show 
when they differentiate between old and new ones and discuss which elements 
need to be present. Their approach is to include work that discusses exchange 
and interpretation of symbols tied to “shared exercise of power”. Davis (2019: 
9) takes McNair’s (2017: 4) definition of political communication as “purposeful 
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communication about politics” as a “starting point as good as any”, but draws 
attention to the limitations concerning which actors count as political – typi-
cally political parties, politicians, governments, and media and their coverage 
of elections – and what types of communication or messages count as political. 
Ihlen and colleagues (2015: 12–13) also discuss the variety of definitions found 
in previous works and the limitations as a starting point for their own definition, 
which we also follow here: “politics is about the governance of society and the 
handling of cooperation and conflict, values and interests. Any use of symbols 
and any attempts at influencing the outcome of political processes, we will call 
political communication”. The benefits of using a wide definition are that it 
allows, first, for political communication to have many forms. The main focus 
in this anthology is on mediated political communication in news media, social 
media, and other platforms, yet we recognise that politics has many expressions 
and symbols, among them cultural expressions such as music, clothing, and 
drama (see Kristensen & Roosvall, Chapter 9; Josefsen & Skogerbø, Chapter 
10). Second, and in line with most other recent defintions (McNair, 2017; Ja-
mieson & Kenski, 2014; Strömbäck et al., 2008), we emphasise that political 
communication has at its roots that it is shared and communicated. Third, 
this anthology also draws attention to the fact that political communication 
is not only about communicating true and rational information about politics 
and political governance. On the one hand, there is also a need for knowledge 
about how “fake news” and mis- and disinformation thrive on social media 
(see Kalsnes et al., Chapter 14). On the other hand, we recognise that political 
communication is structured by both constitutional and regulatory measures, 
as well as social and cultural characteristics, which provide social groups with 
different and unequal opportunities for voicing their interests (see, e.g., Ihlen et 
al., Chapter 15; Josefsen & Skogerbø, Chapter 10). Fourth, similar to, among 
others, Norris (2000) and Norris and colleagues (2008), we apply a broad and 
inclusive definition of political actors, seeing them as anyone – individual, group, 
or organisation – that seeks to influence political decision-making. Although 
much attention, also in this anthology, is centred on the communication between 
the “usual suspects” – in other words, political parties, politicians, and voters 
(Hopmann & Karlsen Chapter 11; Herkman & Jungar Chapter 12; Beyer et al., 
Chapter 17) and news media and journalists (Allern et al., Chapter 7; Lindén et 
al., Chapter 8), we also include other actors who seek to influence outcomes or 
are concerned by the outcome of political processes. Such actors include alterna-
tive media (Ólafsson & Jóhannsdóttir, Chapter 3), indigenous people (Josefsen 
& Skogerbø, Chapter 10), cultural actors (Hopmann & Karlsen, Chapter 11), 
bureaucracies (Figenschou et al., Chapter 16), and lobbyists (Ihlen et al., Chapter 
15). More importantly, we do not argue that this is an exhaustive list. 
Following from our definition is the fact that power and influence, or the 
lack thereof, are always at the centre of political communication, whether we 
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research elections and election campaigns, perhaps the most classical theme 
of political communication studies (see Hopmann & Karlsen, Chapter 11), or 
whether we seek to understand the dynamics of political rhetoric (see Kjeldsen 
et al., Chapter 18). Whatever the specific issue at focus, political communication 
research in the Nordic countries analyses how different groups, movements, 
organisations, and sometimes individuals, benefit – or not – from having access 
to channels of influence; manage to influence public opinion or voters; or use 
particular techniques, forms, or strategies to obtain influence. 
Nordic political communication research  
– looking back in brief
Nordic communication research as a regional field can be dated back to the first 
Nordic conference in Oslo in 1973, at that time gathering about 80 scholars, 
many of whom were involved in what we today would term political commu-
nication studies (Nordenstreng et al., 2014). Many leading Nordic scholars 
among these could be highlighted, but one of the most marked participants 
was Karen Siune. She was not only one of the very few women in the field at 
the time but also a leading scholar of Danish (Siune, 1991) and European com-
parative political communication and media policy for several decades (Bakke 
& Siune, 1972; McQuail & Siune, 1998; Siune et al., 1984). As has been the 
case with many scholars working in Nordic political communication, Siune’s 
work always slid between studies of political communication and studies of 
the changing media structures and media policies making up shifting structural 
conditions for the communication of politics (Truetzschler & Siune, 1992). This 
approach has been exemplary but, as shown by Kristensen and Blach-Ørsten 
in Chapter 2, not necessarily a path followed by later political communication 
scholars in Denmark.
We find the same preoccupation with media systems as a framework for 
political communication research in later publications. One anthology has 
been particularly important as a forerunner for the current one. In 2008, Jesper 
Strömbäck, Mark Ørsten, and Toril Aalberg published Communicating Politics: 
Political Communication in the Nordic Countries, a collection of chapters on 
Nordic media systems and political communication that has been highly influ-
ential for well over a decade. As with the current anthology, the 2008 anthology 
held both country overviews and a collection of themed articles. It placed Nordic 
perspectives within international political communication research, replying 
to the increasing demands for comparative research, for highlighting some 
specific themes such as “mediatisation” of politics, and for more cooperation 
among Nordic researchers (Strömbäck et al., 2008). Although the anthology 
did not really come through as a collection of comparative studies – as only the 
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introduction and conclusion compared the Nordic countries – the collection 
brought strong ambitions to the field and, moreover, the editors have, over the 
following decade, contributed markedly to European comparative research 
projects (Aalberg et al., 2012; Benson et al., 2012; Pollack et al., 2018; Rein-
emann et al., 2017). 
Communicating Politics took as its main starting point Hallin and Mancini’s 
now seminal book Comparing Media Systems (2004), which suggested that the 
media systems of the Nordic countries could be categorised as belonging to one 
particular type of system, the “democratic corporatist” media systems model. 
Hallin and Mancini set out to compare media systems to uncover patterns 
and clusters and explain differences and similarities. They did so by launching 
an analysis of Western countries based on a holistic theoretical approach and 
a historical perspective, reviewing existing literature, drawing on a plethora 
of methods and analyses, and proposing four key analytical dimensions: the 
degree of political parallelism, the degree of journalistic professionalism, the 
role of the state, and the structure of the media market. In the opening chapter 
of their book, Hallin and Mancini argued for the need for comparative studies 
in media research, as they found that few studies of media systems at the time 
took on a comparative approach. Rather, the field was dominated by empirical 
studies originating from one country only, or by volumes mainly presenting 
country studies, such as the studies of the Euromedia Group. Strömbäck and 
colleagues’ (2008) book was a first take on testing whether Hallin and Mancini’s 
classification of media systems worked in the Nordic context. Communicating 
Politics systematically applied the framework for the democratic corporatist 
model to each of the five Nordic states – in different chapters – and found that 
there was no “perfect match” (e.g., Esmark & Ørsten, 2008; Moring, 2008). 
As could be expected, when tested closely, none of the countries actually fitted 
the ideal type. Furthermore, as Ørsten and colleagues (2008) noted in the con-
cluding chapter, not only were there notable differences between the Nordic 
countries, the systems were rapidly changing as the Internet, new media, and 
other technological changes made inroads into advertising and audience markets, 
user habits, and journalistic production and distribution. In other words, the 
systems that Hallin and Mancini described and classified had already changed 
fundamentally in relation to the dimensions they used for classification – an 
observation that many authors, including those of this anthology, have made. 
Despite these shortcomings, which have been noted time and again by many 
different authors both within and beyond the Nordic context (e.g., Flensburg, 
2020; Ohlsson, 2015), Hallin and Mancini’s typology has, as noted, thoroughly 
influenced Nordic research on media systems and political communication. This 
is evident also in this anthology. Hardly any of the chapters avoid a reference 
to the book – and particularly to the democratic corporatist model – although 
there is scant consensus on the validity of the typology. Still, the models seem 
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to retain their face-value relevance as they point to some systematic similarities, 
albeit that some are historic more than contemporary. It may, to some extent, 
be a matter of convenience that Hallin and Mancini retain some of their pop-
ularity, but it may also be that the model is flexible and adaptable enough to 
cater to both changes and continuities, at least to some degree. The argument 
that Nordic media policy-formation relies on a cooperative and corporatist po-
litical system is still, to quite a large extent, true, even if new and international 
market actors, such as the global tech companies, do not take part in these 
processes. However, the relevance of Hallin and Mancini’s models is highly 
contested, and so is the discussion on whether the Nordic media systems have 
specific characteristics or not. 
In the mid-2010s, two significant Nordic publications drew quite opposing 
conclusions about the state of the Nordic model, emphasising its resilience 
and instability, or even decline, respectively. In their book The Media Welfare 
State, Syvertsen and colleagues (2014) argued that the Nordic media systems 
are strongly anchored in the welfare state systems in the region, and that this 
explains the continued survival of the key pillars of the Nordic media model, 
both at the level of media policy and in empirical reality. In line with this, they 
criticised Hallin and Mancini’s democratic corporatist model for being too 
broadly defined, thereby disregarding the distinct Nordic characteristics. In-
stead, Syvertsen and colleagues argued that policy values such as universalism, 
equality, strong editorial freedom, close links between media and cultural policy, 
and cooperation or consensus in media policy-making continued to distinguish 
the Nordic countries. This was supported empirically, as diversity continued to 
characterise the content of print and digital newspapers and public service media 
in the Nordic region. Further, news and information provided by such media 
institutions continued to be part of many peoples’ media repertoire, even at a 
time of increasingly fragmentated media use. These empirical trends suggested 
that public service media and national newspapers upheld a strong position 
among Nordic populations. Several historical and empirically based publications 
have supported this argument (e.g., Brüggemann et al., 2014; Enli et al., 2018). 
At approximately the same time as Syvertsen and colleagues’ work was 
published, Ohlsson (2015) published a distinctly different analysis which 
concluded that the Nordic media systems were not converging towards each 
other but towards a global system. In his report, The Nordic Media Market, 
he pointed to increasing differences between the Nordic countries, and thus 
to a destabilisation of the Nordic media market. One evidence was the steady 
decline of newspaper circulation and advertising revenues, another the weaken-
ing of political parallelism between newspapers and political parties with the 
fall of the party press during the twentieth century. Changes in Nordic public 
service funding during the past decade, such as conversion from licence fees to 
taxation, was a third example of the weakening not only of the Nordic model 
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but also of the relevance of Hallin and Mancini’s models. These two publica-
tions testify to the continued importance of comparing the many dimensions 
of political communication within in the Nordic region with an eye to both 
similarities and differences, and changes and continuities.
Communicating Politics was published just as social media disrupted the 
(Nordic) media systems and made their way into political communication, turn-
ing them into “hybrid media systems” (Chadwick, 2017). Although digitisation 
was addressed, in 2008 no one could quite foresee the impact that Facebook, 
Twitter, and eventually a range of other channels would have on campaigning, 
journalism, and political communication at large over the next decade. Further, 
since 2008, the Nordic countries – along with the rest of the world – have, as 
indicated, been through major crises and changes that have had, and continue 
to have, long-lasting impact on political and economic systems. To mention 
only some of the major events: the financial crisis in 2008 onwards; the rise 
of populist and anti-democratic politicians, parties, and movements in many 
countries, among them Sweden, the US, Brazil, and Hungary; Brexit 2016–2020; 
the 2015–2016 migration crises; reinforced climate protests, spectacularly led 
by Swedish teenager Greta Thunberg since 2018 and coupled with an increasing 
number of natural catastrophes on a global level; and, concerning digitalisa-
tion, the Cambridge Analytica scandal and the ensuing raised attention on 
surveillance and market control by a few global actors. Latest, the Covid-19 
pandemic has ravaged the globe since the winter of 2019 and spring of 2020. 
These events have had immense impact on politics, on the practices of political 
communication, and on the power relations that are always present in political 
communication. 
What we can conclude so far from the different analyses – as many of the 
chapters in the current anthology will also show – is that there are observable 
path dependencies in the way Nordic media systems continue to develop: pub-
lic service broadcasters remain important – particularly so in crisis situations. 
Further, cooperative and corporatist systems are still instrumental in media 
regulation and policy-making. Despite the many arguments that media systems 
are disrupted and totally changing because of digitalisation, market upheavals, 
and entrance of the giants in the global media industries, the current systems 
are hybrid (Chadwick, 2017). They carry traits of the news media system of 
previous decades that Hallin and Mancini built their analysis on, and of a new 
and transformed digital communication system (Flensburg, 2020). The digital 
system offers new and old media actors, political players, and industries, an 
array of platforms for political communication. Former gatekeepers, such as 
journalists and editors, have lost some of their power, while new ones, such 
as Facebook, have become very powerful. New producers of content – of all 
qualities and kinds – have entered the digital media market, but at the cost of a 
fragmented public space, where it is increasingly difficult to attract attention. At 
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the same time, in 2020, reinforced by the Covid-19 crisis, the already shattered 
business models of many media houses continue to be undermined. Political 
actors – such as parties, politicians, voters, and journalists, to mention only 
some – operate on many platforms, traditional as well as newer ones. Hybrid-
ity is a descriptive more than an analytical model, and it is more of a political 
communication model than a media systems model. For the Nordic countries, 
it fits quite well. In this anthology, however, the important question is not so 
much whether we can pin down exactly what makes up the Nordic model or 
models as it is to understand whether – and if so, how and why – political com-
munication patterns contribute to maintaining sustainable Nordic democracies.
The Covid-19 crisis
Before concluding this chapter, let us briefly return to the Covid-19 pandemic, 
as this crisis highlighted some of the tensions in the Nordic media model. The 
production of this anthology was in its final phase in the spring of 2020 as the 
Covid-19 crisis swept the globe. The pandemic, caused by the rapid and seem-
ingly uncontrollable spread of the virus SARS-CoV-2, disrupted society as we 
know it, causing not only a global health crisis but also political, financial, and 
social turmoil. Governments and populations responded differently to the crisis 
and at varying speeds. This was the case in the Nordic region, too. At a relative 
early stage, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, and Norway introduced strict measures 
to curb the spread of the virus. The measures varied somewhat between the 
countries, but included closing of borders and public institutions, social and 
physical distancing, and rigorous restrictions on populations’ free mobility and 
basic rights for the sake of public health. Sweden applied a more moderate and 
pending strategy from the start: instead of lockdown, the Swedish government 
issued recommendations and trusted citizens, businesses, and civil society to act 
responsibly. The crisis thus revealed the same pattern in the Nordic region as 
elsewhere: the measures taken were largely national – not regional or global – 
and the recommendations from the World Health Organisation were, somewhat 
unexpectedly, not implemented identically in the Nordic countries (Strang, 2020). 
From a Nordic political communication perspective, the crisis points to 
at least two important debates: the role of publicist media and the role of 
information technology and digital communication infrastructures in times of 
crises. The Covid-19 crisis was, not surprisingly, very high on the agenda of 
all national news media in the Nordic region. They served as key components 
in the crisis communication by reporting from the governments’ nearly daily 
press conferences and broadcasting healthcare guidelines from authorities in a 
top-down, almost paternalistic manner, known from the time of public service 
monopolies. Simultaneously, the news media sought to exercise critical journal-
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ism and hold politicians, decision-makers, and experts accountable by question-
ing their strategies and motives; and they aimed to provide trustworthy facts, 
at a time when mis- and disinformation spread almost as quickly as the virus 
(Brennen et al., 2020); they provided space for the public to raise their concerns 
and ask questions from the bottom up; and they tried to gather the nation by 
organising singalongs, concerts, and live television shows. At the same time, 
many media institutions and journalists experienced the financial consequences 
of the Covid-19 pandemic up-front, as advertising revenues vanished instantly 
due to the crisis, forcing media to reduce staff.
Advanced information technology and solid digital media infrastructures also 
played key roles during the crisis, as physical and social distancing became the 
new normal. Though pressure was put on these technologies and infrastructures, 
they quickly helped the restructuring and rethinking of many professional and 
mundane activities that had to be moved online. Furthermore, digital media 
platforms served as fora for sharing everyday experiences in the lockdown, for 
testimonials and appeals from healthcare workers, and heated debates about 
political decisions, the heroes and villains of the pandemic, and human, social, 
and economic co-responsibility, or the lack thereof. 
The 2020 Covid-19 crisis amplified and put to the test many of the char-
acteristics typically associated with the Nordic welfare societies, and for our 
purpose specifically, the Nordic media model, where a versatile news media 
landscape, anchored in a public service ethos and a professional, critical 
watchdog approach, and strong (digital) communication infrastructures are 
considered public goods. In that sense, the Covid-19 crisis put a spotlight 
on the resilience of the Nordic model – a point that we will return to in the 
concluding chapter. 
Conclusion
This anthology does two main things. First, it updates and showcases Nor-
dic political communication as a vivid and internationally recognised field 
of scholarship. Within that framework, the chapters of the anthology show 
that Nordic researchers apply a diversity of approaches and topics. Second, 
the anthology urges us to not forget the continued importance of in-depth 
national or Nordic comparative studies. In 2008, Strömbäck and colleagues 
called for more comparative political communication research within and 
beyond the Nordic context in order to flesh out the specificities of the Nordic 
political communication model in a broader international perspective, which 
resonated well with the comparative political communication research agenda 
emerging internationally at the time (de Vreese, 2017). Since then, this agenda 
has fostered numerous descriptive and explanatory comparisons of political 
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communication beyond the nation-state, focusing not only on comparing me-
dia systems at macro- and meso-levels, but also on comparing news coverage 
of national elections, European Union elections, political journalists, political 
actors, and political communication cultures (for overviews see, e.g., Pfetsch & 
Esser, 2014; de Vreese, 2017). As part of this comparative turn, Nordic political 
communication scholars have focused less on national and Nordic specificities 
and differences and more on the Nordic in a Western or global context. The 
internationalisation of Nordic media research has clearly been beneficial to the 
development of the field, yet, if we want to avoid reproducing potential myths 
about the homogeneity of the Nordic region, we need to flesh out the condi-
tions and characteristics that describe and explain the continued resilience and 
possible increasing differences of the Nordic political communication model 
or models, which is exactly what this anthology is about.
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Chapter 2
Media and politics in Denmark
Nete Nørgaard Kristensen & Mark Blach-Ørsten
Abstract
In this chapter, we point to some of the changes and continuities that have char-
acterised the interplay between news media and politics in Denmark during the 
last two decades. The chapter has three main focus areas: first, we present key 
institutions and players within the Danish political and media systems; second, we 
point to some of the theoretical approaches that have dominated political com-
munication research in Denmark since the early 2000s, among them institutional 
and sociological perspectives; and third, we conclude by suggesting some of the 
differences between political communication in Denmark, as both practice and 
research field, compared to the other Nordic countries. We aim to balance the 
chapter between a media studies approach and a political science approach to 
political communication, but, contrary to much other Danish political communi-
cation research, the chapter especially takes its point of departure in the former.
Keywords: Denmark, corporatism, media subsidies, mediatisation, welfare state
Introduction 
This chapter introduces political communication in Denmark, focusing especially 
on changes and continuities in the interplay between news media and politics 
from the early 2000s until today. First, we outline the main institutions and 
players within the Danish political system and media system. In regards to the 
political system, the chapter points to the weakened link between political parties 
and interest organisations, challenging the Danish corporatist structure, and to 
the increased splitting of the Danish political system into centre-left and centre-
right blocs, challenging the tradition for broad consensus in Danish politics. In 
regards to the media system, a main focus is the mix of publicly and privately 
funded news media, including the most recent changes in Danish media policy 
and public news use, which suggest weakened political support for key public 
service institutions but increased attention to private news media.
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Second, we introduce some of the theoretical perspectives that have informed 
Danish research about political communication since the early 2000s, especially 
institutional and sociological perspectives to news and politics. One key ap-
proach is mediatisation theory, which has especially influenced the intersection 
of media studies and political communication. Part of this research concerns the 
interconnected professionalisation of political communication (including public 
relations, spin, and lobbyism) and of political journalism (including journalism 
as an increasingly professionalised type of media labour). Audience studies is 
another approach that has played an increasingly significant role in Danish 
political communication research since the early 2000s. A common denomina-
tor across these perspectives is that Danish political communication research 
has long been, and still is, informed by two relatively separate approaches – a 
media studies approach and a political science approach with little collabora-
tion and interplay. Though we aim to balance the two, this chapter especially 
takes its point of departure in the first approach.
Third, we conclude by pointing to some of the aspects that set political 
communication in Denmark, as both practice and a research field, apart from 
Sweden, Norway, and Finland. In terms of practice, a key difference is that 
politicians and political journalists in Denmark are in a state of “permanent 
campaign” due to the organisation of the national election terms. In terms 
of research, the continuous silos between media and journalism and political 
science perspectives make political communication a much more fragmented 
endeavour in Denmark compared to the other Nordic countries. 
The political system 
Denmark is a parliamentary democracy, and since 1953, Folketinget [the Danish 
Parliament] has consisted of only one chamber. Elections to the Danish Parlia-
ment are based on proportional representation and held at least every four years, 
but it is within the power of the prime minister to call elections sooner, if they 
wish to do so (Esmark & Ørsten, 2008). The parliament has 179 members, 
including 4 elected from Greenland and the Faroe Islands, which belong to the 
commonwealth. Denmark is divided into three electoral regions (Metropolitan 
Copenhagen, Sealand-Southern Denmark, and Northern and Central Jutland) 
and ten multi-member constituencies subdivided into 92 nomination districts. 
The distribution of seats takes place at two levels, a multi-member constituency 
level and a national level. The first 135 seats of the parliament are allocated 
among the ten multi-member constituencies, while the 40 remaining seats are 
distributed in a compensatory fashion at the higher tier of the national level 
(Esmark & Ørsten, 2008; Blach-Ørsten et al., 2017a). 
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Key characteristics of the Danish political system
Denmark practices what is known as negative parliamentarianism, in which the 
government does not need to have a majority in the parliament, but it must not 
have a majority against it either. If there is a majority against the government, 
it must resign. The system of negative parliamentarianism allows Denmark to 
be run by a minority government. In fact, many Danish governments have been 
minority governments holding less than 90 of the 179 seats in the parliament.
Another central characteristic of the Danish political system is its corporat-
ist structure and tradition for consensus politics (Campbell & Pedersen, 2014; 
Christiansen & Rommetvedt, 1999; Esmark & Ørsten, 2008). Denmark has, 
just as Finland, Sweden, and Norway, a long tradition of corporatism, un-
derstood as the organised negotiations and deliberations between the state, 
employer associations, and unions (Campbell & Pedersen, 2014; Vesa et al., 
2018). Traditionally, the Nordic countries have been regarded as some of the 
most corporatist liberal democracies in the world. At the heart of the corpo-
ratist structure is the so-called committee system. From the 1950s to about 
the mid-1980s, the system consisted of several hundred permanent tripartite 
committees – committees with members from the state, unions, and employee 
organisations – and focused on both policy development and policy implemen-
tation (Blom-Hansen, 2000; Campbell & Pedersen, 2014). 
Turning to the party system, Denmark also fits the image of a multi-party 
system of consensus politics, as opposed to the dominance of two-party sys-
tems in majoritarian politics. The oldest Danish parties are the Conservatives 
(historically called Højre [right]) and the Liberals (now called Venstre [left]), 
which were formed among members of parliament in the decades following 
the ratification of the Danish constitution. The Danish Social Democratic 
Party was founded in 1871 and obtained its first seats in parliament in 1884. 
In 1905, the Social-Liberals broke away from the Liberals, completing the list 
of four parties usually considered the “grand old parties” in Denmark (Esmark 
& Ørsten, 2008). Since then, several political parties have come and gone, for 
instance, the Danish Communist Party that was founded in 1919 and gained 
representation in parliament from 1945–1960 and again from 1973–1979, but 
not since (Campbell & Pedersen, 2014). Traditionally, parties were linked closely 
to the labour market associations, with the Social Democrats closely linked to 
unions, and the Liberal Party and Conservatives closely linked to business and 
agricultural interest organisations.
Recent developments in Danish politics
Today there are ten parties in the Danish Parliament making up two political 
blocs; the red and blue blocs. On the left, the red bloc includes the Social Demo-
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crats, the Social Liberals, the Socialist People’s Party, the Red–Green Alliance, 
and the Alternative Party. On the right, the blue bloc includes the Liberals, the 
Conservatives, the Danish People’s Party, the Liberal Alliance, and the New 
Liberal Party. In a Nordic context, an important aspect of Danish politics is 
that the Social Democrats have not been as dominant as in Sweden and to some 
extent in Norway. Thus, power has shifted back and forth between the red bloc 
and the blue bloc in post-war Denmark (Esmark & Ørsten, 2008). 
Even though the Danish political system is basically very stable, there have 
been several changes in recent years. Esmark and Ørsten (2008) point to 
Europeanisation as one of the important changes to the Danish political and 
administrative system from 1973 (when Denmark entered the Common Market) 
and onwards. Another trend points towards a slow process of de-corporatisation 
starting from the mid-1980s and leading to fewer committees and a lesser focus 
on tripartite negotiations (Blach-Ørsten et al., 2017b; Blom-Hansen, 2000; 
Rommetvedt et al., 2013). According to studies by Blom-Hansen (2000) and 
Öberg and colleagues (2011), corporatism in Scandinavia peaked in the 1970s 
and 1980s and has declined, or weakened, in most sectors ever since. A study 
on corporatism in Finland by Vesa and colleagues (2018) suggests that corpo-
ratism has persisted there into the 2010s, while a study by Christiansen (2017) 
argues that though corporatism has weakened in Scandinavia, the corporatist 
structures still play a part in policy implementation.
In Denmark, corporatism is still considered to have peaked around 1980 and 
then declined (Blom-Hansen, 2000). The reasons for the decline are thought to 
be multiple, but both decentralisation of politics to the level of local government 
and the earlier-mentioned Europeanisation of politics have played a role. Other 
important factors that contribute to the decline of corporatism include more 
power to the Danish Parliament due to a more assertive opposition, financial 
cutbacks, and more fragmented unions experiencing declining membership 
(Blach-Ørsten et al., 2017b; Öberg et al., 2011). As corporatism declines, at 
least in most of the Nordic countries, lobbyism is considered to be on the rise 
(Christiansen & Rommetvedt, 1999). But whereas corporatism describes a 
highly institutionalised way that organised interest and political actors may 
interact – boards, councils, committees, hearings, and so on – lobbyism is 
characterised by a much more informal, and mostly ad hoc, form of interaction 
(Christiansen & Rommetvedt, 1999; see also Ihlen et al., Chapter 15). Despite 
these differences, lobbyism and corporatism should not be viewed as oppo-
sites, but more as two opposite ends of a continuum of the different ways in 
which the interaction of organised interest and political actors may take place 
(Christiansen & Rommetvedt, 1999). Resourceful organisations, of course, may 
utilise both forms of interaction, should they wish to maximise their influence. 
It is possible to distinguish between several types of lobbyism: parliamenta-
ry, governmental, bureaucratic, and media (Blach-Ørsten & Kristensen, 2016; 
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Blach-Ørsten et al., 2017b). Scandinavian studies of lobbyism are still few, how-
ever. In the case of Norway, Ihlen and Gullberg (2015) conclude that lobbyism 
has increased from the 1970s and onwards and that lobbyism has likely become 
more professionalised. In Sweden, Möller (2009) concludes that there is regular 
contact between politicians and lobbyists but that politicians are split in their 
views on lobbyism. In Denmark, a report by the communication agency Advice 
(2012) concludes that contacts between politicians and lobbyists are frequent 
for politicians in the Danish Parliament, and 60 per cent of the politicians 
surveyed answered that they had contacts with lobbyists several times a week.
For Danish political parties, the switch from traditional party voting to 
issue voting is one of the most significant changes in recent years. This switch 
has led to increased competition on a few central political issues, primarily 
immigration, which has been the focus of many recent Danish elections (Borre, 
2005; Green-Pedersen, 2006). The trend towards more issue-based voting rather 
than more traditional party voting dates back to the 1970s, especially the 1973 
election, where the Danish Progress Party won a landslide victory and paved 
the way for a more issue-based and populist approach to politics. Since then, 
the switch has led to increased competition between the political parties on a 
relatively small number of issues, such as the economy and immigration, which 
has helped boost populist politics (understood as loud rhetoric and simplified 
solutions to complex problems) across both the red and blue blocs. Indeed, 
as Blomqvist and Green-Pedersen (2004) argue, the growing importance of 
issue- rather than class-based voting is one of the biggest changes for political 
parties in Scandinavia to navigate when competing for voter support. They also 
argue that this shift has especially affected the Social Democrats in Denmark 
and Norway, whereas the Social Democrats in Sweden have been less affected.
Outside of electoral studies, research has found the same transformation 
of political orientations and participation from the field of ideology and pro-
grammatic politics to specific policy issues and ad hoc political projects. Such 
projects are typically based in the practical and “everyday” experience of the 
individual citizen, but can also take the form of identity politics, in which the 
fight for recognition of highly particular rights to specific political groups take 
focus, as opposed to a focus on the “classes” of conventional politics (Esmark 
& Ørsten, 2008). This is also evident in the rise of political populism in Den-
mark most often associated with the success of the Danish People’s Party and 
its rise to power (Bächler & Hopmann, 2017). The recent focus on so-called 
identity politics have not been as prominent in Denmark as in the US and 
Sweden, where issues such as sexuality and recognition have become a still 
larger part of politics. A recent study of political scandals in the wake of the 
#metoo movement, however, shows that both Sweden and Norway have had 
scandals focusing on politicians accused of sexual harassment, improper sexual 
behaviour towards young women, and the sharing of pornographic images, 
34
NETE NØRGAARD KRISTENSEN & MARK BLACH-ØRSTEN
whereas neither Denmark nor Finland have seen such scandals (Pollack et al., 
2018; see also Kristensen & Roosvall, Chapter 9). 
The Danish media system 
The Danish media system is part of what has, in recent years, been labelled “the 
media welfare state” (Syvertsen et al., 2014) and “the Nordic media market” 
(Ohlsson, 2015). Such terms have emerged in response to Hallin and Mancini’s 
(2004) grouping of the Nordic countries under “the democratic corporatist 
model” with a range of other Northern European countries. Though the Nordic 
media model shares many traits with media in these countries (e.g., Strömbäck 
et al., 2008), scholars have also emphasised its distinctiveness, as media in the 
Nordic region are seen as key pillars of “the Nordic welfare model” (Ahva et 
al., 2017; Ohlsson, 2015; Syvertsen et al., 2014). This is epitomised by the 
central role of public service broadcasters and the considerable indirect and 
direct subsidies also for privately-owned media in the Nordic region, such as 
printed and digital newspapers. In the following, we outline how continuities 
and changes within the Nordic media model take shape in the Danish context, 
especially from the turn of the twenty-first century and onwards, focusing on 
media regulation and news consumption. 
Freedom of the press and media liability
Section 91 in the Danish Constitutional Act of 1849 (Rigsarkiv, n.d.) represents 
an important landmark in regards to freedom of expression, as it instituted Dan-
ish citizens’ freedom to publish their thoughts in print and marked the end of 
censorship, even though individuals could be held responsible for their printing 
in a court of law. Already at this early stage, indirect subsidies were granted to 
newspapers in the form of reduced postal rates with the aim of supporting the 
emerging party press and, more broadly, freedom of expression (Flensburg, 2015: 
88). The 1953 adjustment of the constitutional act (Ministry of the State, 1953: 
§77) rearticulated the issue of freedom to print to citizens’ liberty “to publish his 
ideas in print, in writing, and in speech” – the formulation applying today. These 
freedom rights must still be exercised in accordance with criminal law, prohibiting 
libel actions or utterances threatening national security, among others. 
For quite some time, no exact reference was made to the liabilities of the 
press or institutionalised news media, but in 1992, the Media Liability Act 
(Engell, 1991) was introduced with the aim of specifying who is to be made 
responsible for media content in case of libel actions (criminal liability and li-
ability for damages). The act also marks the establishment of the Danish Press 
Council, an independent council responsible for ruling in cases of published 
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content conflicting with sound press ethics. Overall, Denmark is considered 
among the most advanced in terms of media accountability, as many media 
organisations have formulated specific ethical guides in accordance with the 
overall Danish principles of sound press ethics, legitimised by the Media Li-
ability Act (Blach-Ørsten et al., 2015). 
Nonetheless, the media’s “freedom of expression with responsibilities” 
regularly stirs public debate about which rights are more important – freedom 
of expression, and by extension the press, or considerations of, for instance, 
individuals or other matters. A recent case is the conviction by the high court 
of the national newspaper Politiken and its editor-in-chief, Christian Jensen, in 
February 2020 to pay a considerable fine for publishing most parts of a book 
about the Danish Security and Intelligence Service in the newspaper in 2016. 
The 2020 conviction was a tightening of the ruling by the district court in 2019. 
The publishing of the book, partly based on interviews with a former head of 
the service, had been hindered by the court due to its sensitive and confidential 
content. Politiken printed the book in view of its public importance and because 
the injunction of the court was seen as limiting freedom of expression and the 
press (C. Jensen, 2016).
Main media policy characteristics
A key characteristic of the Danish media system and its news provision is hy-
bridity (Kammer, 2017), as public service broadcasters and private printed or 
digital news media co-exist. This hybridity is an outcome of both social demo-
cratic and liberal democracy lines of thinking informing Danish (media) policy 
(Esmark & Ørsten, 2008). Regulation of public service broadcasters as well 
as a subsidy system to support the commercial press have been an important 
political issue since the mid-twentieth century, in accordance with the emer-
gence of the welfare-state ideology (Esmark & Ørsten, 2008). A main goal of 
Danish media policy has been to ensure a diverse portfolio of media outlets and 
the production of quality media content and journalism and, by extension, to 
ensure the corner stone of Danish democracy, an informed citizenry (Kammer, 
2016). Accordingly, public service has been a key principle in Denmark since 
the 1920s, with the introduction of radio (1926) and later television broad-
casting (1951), epitomised by the Danish Broadcasting Corporation (originally 
Statsradiofonien, later renamed Danmarks Radio [DR]) and long financed by 
license fees. Today, DR is a large media organisation, spanning numerous televi-
sion and radio channels as well as a website. In 1988, TV 2 was introduced, a 
state-owned television broadcaster, also serving public service goals, but since 
2004 financed by advertising and, later on, subscriptions as well. TV 2 includes 
a line of segmented channels and seven regional channels, the latter of which 
are funded by licence fees. 
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Newspapers in Denmark are private enterprises, but the public service line of 
thinking also permeates their ethos and increasingly also the political actions put 
in place to subsidise these news media (Flensburg, 2015). While indirect media 
subsidies – such as zero-taxation on revenues and reduced postal charges for 
the distribution of newspapers – have a long tradition in Denmark, direct media 
subsidies for private news media are a newer phenomenon and include support 
of operational costs, subsidies for media with financial problems, distribution 
subsidies, and so on. Such initiatives have emerged during the 1990s and 2000s 
and signal increased political attention to a broader portfolio of media types, as 
the boundaries between public service, publicist, and commercial media have 
become increasingly blurred since the late twentieth century (Flensburg, 2015; 
Hjarvard & Kammer, 2015). 
With these changes also followed increased political attention to the content, 
quality, and societal role of public service as well as private media. Public service 
contracts were, for example, introduced in the early 2000s, outlining various 
requirements that especially DR must fulfil, such as giving priority to Danish 
culture, children, and young adults. Similarly, in the second half of the 2000s, 
current affairs, politics, economics, and culture were stipulated as key areas 
for print and digital newspapers to cover to qualify for subsidies. Though an 
arm’s-length principle has long characterised Danish media policy (e.g., Kam-
mer, 2017) – both in regards to publicly funded public service broadcasters and 
privately-owned newspapers – this increased political attention to the contours 
of the media content can be viewed as a shortening of the distance between 
politicians and media content providers. Nonetheless, Søndergaard and Helles 
(2014: 41) argue that the key values of Danish media policy have remained 
quite constant, in other words, the aim of “securing the freedom of expression 
and pluralism of voices by actively supporting both private and public media”. 
Recent media policy changes
Danish media policy is still under the purview of the Danish Ministry of Culture, 
which signals a cultural policy approach to Danish media policy, as also exem-
plified by the named key values still being intact and by the increasing support 
to private newspapers as well (Flensburg, 2015). Nonetheless, the heated public 
and political debates about the most recent, major media policy regulations – 
the media subsidy reform in 2013–2014 (Ministry of Culture, 2013) and the 
Media Agreement for 2019–2023 (Ministry of Culture, 2018) – signal change: 
While media regulation and media support continue to be key pillars of Dan-
ish cultural policy, competition between various types of media has increased. 
As a consequence, audience and business interests are gaining grounds in the 
political thinking about the media. More broadly, this showcases that media 
policy is a highly politicised area in Denmark today. 
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Overall, the Law of Media Subsidy, phased in from 2014, marks a change 
from distribution subsidies, based on circulation numbers, to production 
subsidies, based on the journalistic content production measured by “the 
number of ‘journalistic full-time equivalents’ employed” at the given news 
media (Hjarvard & Kammer, 2015: 121). Or put differently, a change from 
indirect to direct subsidies. In this way, the law also marks a change from 
subsidising particular media platforms, the printed press in particular, to a 
“platform neutral” approach (Hjarvard & Kammer, 2015), taking the digital 
media environment and its new media types and platforms into consideration, 
for example, online-only news media. In addition, the Law of Media Subsidy 
reserves money for media innovation, allocated to new media start-ups or 
the development of existing media turning digital. A main focus is on written 
Internet-based outlets, and such new initiatives have to comply with the broad 
content requirements in terms of covering political, societal, and cultural issues. 
While international research has pointed to a turn towards a more liberal media 
model in many Western countries (e.g., Hallin & Mancini, 2004), Flensburg 
(2015) argues that the Law of Media Subsidy points in the opposite direction 
by showcasing a change from economical compensation to publicist motiva-
tion, precisely because private media, either digital or in print, can also receive 
direct subsidies today if their content production qualifies for it. Furthermore, 
the introduction of funding for media innovation signals a modernisation of 
Danish media policy, even though the more specific requirements may present 
some limits to actual innovation, according to Kammer (2017). Private news 
media have, however, also become increasingly dependent on these subsidies, 
as only very few Danish newspapers would have a surplus without them today 
(Schrøder & Ørsten, 2018). 
Denmark has a variety of newspaper titles – approximately 10 national 
newspapers published daily and around 20 local or regional newspapers (Gal-
lup, 2018). Notwithstanding the smaller population and geographical area, 
these numbers are considerably lower compared to the other Nordic countries 
(Esmark & Ørsten, 2008). Especially the national newspapers play an agenda-
setting role in the production and circulation of news in Denmark, whereas local 
newspapers have experienced challenges in recent years in terms of circulation, 
advertising, and public attention. Svith and colleagues (2017), for example, show 
that much local journalism is not about the local environment and involves 
little investigative journalism, which challenges the broader democratic role 
of these newspapers in Danish society. In addition, many of the newspapers 
with high circulation are owned by the same few, larger corporations – some 
being foundations targeted at making money to produce media content (e.g., 
JP/Politikens Hus and Jysk-Fynske Medier), others commercial and publicly 
traded businesses producing media content to make money for their investors 
(e.g., Berlingske Medier, owned by De Persgroup) (see also Kammer, 2017). In 
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terms of newspaper titles, there is thus relative diversity and external pluralism, 
since most titles have a distinct and segmented profile (e.g., Schultz, 2007), but 
in terms ownership, the Danish newspaper market is characterised by some 
concentration.
Another example of the increased political support to private news media in 
Denmark is the Media Agreement for 2019–2023 (Ministry of Culture, 2018), 
adopted by the rightwing coalition government and the Danish People’s Party 
in the spring of 2018. A key element of the agreement is a 20 per cent reduc-
tion of the funding for DR over five years, including the closing of several DR 
television and radio channels. More specifically, the broad range of cultural 
topics and events, including sports and entertainment, that have formerly been 
part of DR’s repertoire will be reduced. Key examples are that two television 
channels, DR2 and DRK, devoted to societal and cultural issues will be merged 
to one; DR3, a television channel targeted at young adults, and DR Ultra, a 
television channel targeted at tweens, will only be available online; a number 
of cultural and lifestyle television programmes will no longer be produced; and 
three radio channels devoted to different music genres – P6 Beat, P7 Mix, and 
P8 Jazz – will no longer exist.1 In broader terms, this reflects a political ambition 
of changing DR from a media institution with a broad repertoire of offerings 
across a range of platforms – television, radio, and the Internet – to a distinct 
cultural institution with a narrower repertoire focusing on news, information, 
culture, and education, and with special attention to children and young people. 
This could be regarded as a media historical return to the cultural and societal 
role formerly occupied by DR. 
Another significant change prompted by the Media Agreement for 2019–
2023 is the replacement of the licence fee by a direct taxation, potentially mak-
ing public service media more susceptible to political trends and fluctuations. 
While these changes may be seen as a weakening of Danish public media, and 
DR in particular, they are also a means of strengthening the private media play-
ers, which have for several years complained that DR has distorted especially 
the digital news market by providing free online news. In addition to the DR 
cutbacks, private digital news media will, for example, enjoy tax exemption on 
revenues in similar ways as printed news media, thus furthering the equaling of 
the conditions for print and digital news media initiated by the 2013–2014 Law 
of Media Subsidy. More funding is also allocated to the public service pool, 
distributing subsidies to, typically, private production companies producing 
Danish television drama and documentaries. 
Danes’ media use
These policy changes link to changes in the Danish public’s media use dur-
ing the past decades, but also to the continued importance of Danish media 
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in the public’s daily media diet. Especially public service institutions, such as 
DR and TV 2, have been relatively successful in maintaining a large audience 
despite increased competition from international media players and newer 
platforms. Danes, for example, mainly watch public service television (rather 
than non-public service television) (Agency for Culture and Palaces, 2018), two 
in three Danes access news via public service media platforms every week, and 
national quality media brands, such as public service providers and national 
newspapers, enjoy the trust of the population (Schrøder et al., 2018). Internet 
penetration in Denmark is among the highest worldwide (97%), and the use 
of digital media, including digital news consumption, is high, even though still 
relatively few Danes are willing to pay for digital news (15%) (Schrøder et 
al., 2018). As in most other countries, audiences and circulation numbers for 
printed newspapers have declined considerably during the 2010s, even if the 
decrease has stagnated in recent years (Agency for Culture and Palaces, 2018). 
The newspapers’ digital platforms are news sources for many Danes, not least 
the tabloid newspapers. At the same time, social media, especially Facebook, 
have become an increasingly important source of news and other information 
for younger news consumers (Schrøder et al., 2019). 
In summary, the regulatory changes during the 2010s suggest actions to 
sustain a varied portfolio of national media that can meet the changed pat-
terns of media consumption among the Danish population in the digitalised 
and increasingly competitive media market, including actions to further 
media innovation and start-ups. While the policy actions point to weakened 
political consensus about the importance of public service broadcast media, 
they also suggest increased political support to private media. Overall, much 
public funding is still vested in regulating the Danish media market, indicating 
continuity in Danish media policy in terms of continued public support to the 
media. In 2019, DKK 4.9 billion were allocated to Danish media, including 
410 million to printed and written Internet-based media and 3.6 billion to 
DR (Ministry of Culture, 2018). At the same time, the arm’s-length principle 
is challenged.
Main theoretical perspectives in  
Danish political communication research
In the democratic-corporatist model, the link between news media and de-
mocracy is stated much clearer than in the liberal model (Hallin & Mancini, 
2004). As mentioned, news media are seen – and regulated – as an important 
institution in society in Denmark. Thus, Danish research has long focused on 
how the news media fulfil their larger role in society. 
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Mediatisation of politics, culture, and society
In the 1970s, Danish media research was inspired by Habermas’ theory of the 
public sphere, which often led to criticism of the news media for being part of 
the capitalistic system and not focusing enough on the plight of the working class 
(M. B. Andersen & Poulsen, 1974; Bondebjerg, 1976). More recently, a focus on 
the institutional role of the news media has been expressed in the development of 
an institutional and media central approach to mediatisation theory (Hjarvard, 
2008). A key focus in this approach is to view mediatisation as a long-term 
structural transformation where media – understood as television, news media, 
social media, and so on – have become omnipresent, or part of almost all aspects 
of society – from political cross-media campaigning to children’s play on tablets. 
Such studies of mediatisation have focused on the mediatisation of politics, but 
also of religion, parenthood, sports, culture, and so on. A main take-away from 
most of these studies, whether focusing on politics or culture, is that the media 
have become a central way of experiencing everyday life for most Danes. News 
media, such as public service radio and television, and social media, such as 
Facebook, are, as mentioned, a great part of most Danes’ media diet. 
A key aspect of the mediatisation of politics concerns the increasing profes-
sionalisation and mediatisation of election campaigns and politicians’ interplay 
with journalists. Siune and Borre (1975) and Siune (1982, 1993) are among the 
first scholars to study the modern mediatised political campaign, both regarding 
national elections and European elections. In the late 1970s and early 1980s, 
these studies concluded, among other things, that politicians and political parties 
set the agenda and that journalists followed up, and questioned, the political 
agenda setting (Siune, 1982). Election studies of European, national, regional, 
and local elections have since been a main fixture in Danish political science 
(e.g., Albæk et al., 2010; J. G. Andersen et al., 2005; Elmelund-Præstekær et 
al., 2010; Hansen & Kosiara-Pedersen, 2015; Lund & Ørsten, 2004; Thomsen, 
2001; see also Hopmann & Karlsen, Chapter 11). In recent years, studies of 
the mediatisation of politics have especially focused on the interplay of (news) 
media logics and political logics but increasingly also on social media logics in 
political communication. The Internet and social media have come to play an 
increasingly important role during national elections in Denmark, for example, 
both in politicians’ communication strategies and in the public’s accessing of 
political information and news (e.g., J. L. Jensen et al., 2016).
The professionalisation of political communication  
and political journalism
In 2000, Danish scholars from several disciplines launched a new focus on po-
litical communication and political journalism. They concluded that there were 
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only loose couplings between the political administration and professionalised 
media management at the time (Pedersen et al., 2000). This soon changed, 
however, as Danish politicians hired an increasing number of press and media 
advisors during the 2000s, inspired by the spin-doctor wave in British and 
American politics in the 1990s. This instigated several public committees in 
Denmark, put in place to scrutinise the changed interplay between the Danish 
political system and the news media (e.g., Ministry of Finance, 2004, 2013). 
The most recent committee (Ministry of Finance, 2013) concluded that today 
such special advisors not only offer counselling on media management but 
also political-tactical advice (Kristensen & Blach-Ørsten, 2015), exemplifying 
the increasing intertwinement or mutual adaption of media and politics, a key 
argument in the literature about the mediatisation of politics. The question of 
the professionalisation of political communication has recently been extended 
to include other political actors such as think tanks (Blach-Ørsten & Kristensen, 
2016; Kelstrup, 2016) and lobbyists working in public relations firms and 
interest organisations (Blach-Ørsten et al., 2017b). The underlying argument 
is that both mediatisation and de-corporatism has opened up more space for 
lobbyism, including so-called media lobbyism, where political actors try to use 
favourable media exposure to create attention and sympathy for the clients and 
their causes (Aagaard & Blach-Ørsten, 2018; Binderkrantz, 2012). 
The research debates about the professionalisation of political communi-
cation in Denmark has also focused on the professionalisation of journalism 
(e.g., Albæk et al., 2015; Kristensen, 2000, 2003). Though journalism is not a 
profession in the traditional sense, applying sociological theory about profes-
sions has illuminated the increasingly professional traits of Danish journalists. 
A key characteristic of the democratic-corporatist model, including the Nordic 
media model, is a high degree of professionalism among journalists. In Den-
mark, such professional traits emerged during the twentieth century, especially 
in the second half, as journalists increasingly detached themselves from political 
ideologies and developed strong professional norms, gradually became more 
organised and educated, and adopted self-regulatory ethical standards. With 
the decline of the party press and the emergence of the omnibus press as well 
as public service media, Danish journalists adopted norms such as objectivity, 
autonomy, a public service ethos, and the role conception of the watchdog. 
Objectivity continues to be a key norm of Danish journalists, even if it is also 
contested and primarily an ideal. For Danish journalists, objectivity especially 
concerns striking a balance between various viewpoints and basing stories on 
facts (Albæk et al., 2015). Danish journalists also identify strongly with the 
watchdog role (Ahva et al., 2017) and, overall, feel freedom when choosing and 
reporting stories, as they experience little pressure from political authorities or 
business interests (Skovsgaard et al., 2012), or in other words, they experience 
autonomy in their professional practice. 
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These professional norms and values have been cultivated through education. 
Like in the other Nordic countries, journalism education in Denmark is based 
on an integrated model, combining theory and practice (Ahva et al., 2017), but 
the field has also experienced an academisation during the past decades. The 
first, longer formalised journalism programme emerged in the early 1970s and 
was of a vocational nature, but it was accompanied by academic journalism 
programmes in the late 1990s. Today, seven in ten Danish journalists have a 
journalism education – the number is even higher for political journalists (nine 
in ten) (Albæk et al., 2015). This academisation goes hand in hand with the 
increasing institutionalisation of journalism studies as a discipline of its own 
in Denmark from the early 2000s. Approximately 26,000 people are employed 
in the Danish media sector today, or 18,000 full-time equivalents (Agency for 
Culture and Palaces, 2016).2 The large majority is organised in the Danish Union 
of Journalists, established in 1961 as a merger between a number of smaller 
organisations. Today, the union organises more than 18,000 people (Danish 
Union of Journalists, 2019) and is a strong player in the Danish media and 
communication industry. Contrary to its Norwegian and Swedish counterparts, 
the union organises not only journalists and professionals providing content to 
the media industry but also professionals working in the public relations and 
communication sector. This signals that the professional boundaries between 
journalism and strategic communication are somewhat blurred in Denmark 
(Kristensen, 2003), which occasionally stirs professional debates, especially 
among journalists. At the same time, the union has played an important part 
in harmonising the professional standards of Danish journalists and, in recent 
years, in supporting a sound ethical conduct (Blach-Ørsten et al., 2015). Thus, 
even though the professional title of “journalist” is not protected, Danish jour-
nalists have become increasingly professionalised. 
Audience perspectives 
A last perspective to be highlighted in Danish political communication research 
is audience studies, including the public’s use of media, and news media in par-
ticular, to be informed political citizens. From early on, audiences’ response to 
the offerings of especially DR has been a focus point among scholars, politicians, 
and the Danish media industry (e.g., K. B. Jensen, 2001). Of particular interest 
from a political communication perspective has been the news cast of DR, TV-
Avisen, for years viewed as the “big brother” of news in Denmark (e.g., K. B. 
Jensen, 1995: 16). While some studies have focused on how people make sense 
of news and the social and political role that news play in audiences’ everyday 
life (e.g., K. B. Jensen, 1988), others have pointed to how the public’s perception 
of the political is very much based on media discourses or framings (e.g., Phillips 
& Schrøder, 2004). Studies, however, also showcase public commitment to the 
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news media, as being an informed citizen is considered important, normatively 
and in everyday interaction with colleagues, friends, and family (e.g., Nielsen 
& Schrøder, 2014). 
Since the early 2010s, two important, empirically driven contributions to 
the field have emerged, indicating a turn from qualitative to quantitative ap-
proaches: Since 2014, annual reports from the Agency for Culture and Palaces 
have provided important data about Danes’ media use across legacy media 
and social media, as well as more specialised reports about particular media 
trends, such as the influence from global media players on the Danish media 
market or the role and economy of influencers on social media. In addition, 
the annual Reuters Institute Digital News Report, which compares the use 
of various digital media to access news in an increasingly large number of 
countries, includes a country report about Denmark, produced by Danish 
media scholars (e.g., Schrøder et al., 2018). While these studies continue the 
empirical tradition in Danish audience research, which is of both a qualitative 
and quantitative nature, especially the reports by the Agency for Culture and 
Palaces testify to the continued political attention to the public’s media use, 
as these reports are funded as part of the media agreement. Furthermore, the 
Reuters Institute Digital News Report testifies to the increasingly comparative 
nature of much political communication research in Denmark. Overall, the 
findings of these empirical studies document Danes’ continued high attention 
and commitment to national quality media brands of both a public service 
and private nature, even if social media, especially Facebook, has also become 
an important component. 
Conclusion: Differences from the other Nordic countries 
and future research paths
This chapter has pointed to some of the historical traits and more recent devel-
opments in the interplay between media and politics in Denmark, highlighting 
recent media political changes in view of a reconfigured media landscape and 
changed patterns of media use as well as recent changes within the political 
system.
If looking beyond the Danish context to the neighbouring Nordic countries, 
a common trend across the Nordic region in terms of media policy seems to 
be the switch from financing public service radio and television via a licence 
fee to taxation. In Finland, the licence fee was replaced by a tax in early 2013, 
which was the case in Sweden in 2019 and in Norway in 2020. In Denmark, 
there will be a gradual change from a licence fee to taxation from 2019–2021, 
to be fully implemented in 2022. The recent political decision in Denmark to 
reduce the budget of the key public service provider DR by 20 per cent seems, 
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however, to be less in sync with the other Nordic countries. Despite switching 
from licence fees to a media tax in Sweden, the ambition is that the budget for 
public service should remain relatively stable (Harrie, 2019). In Finland, the 
most recent media policy agreement (2018–2023), for example, involves few 
changes and states that the budget for the media will remain stable for the pe-
riod. For now, it seems that in Denmark the political involvement in how media 
institutions should perform has increased with implications for especially the 
offerings of DR, thus challenging the arm’s-length principle between the media 
and the political system, perhaps more so than in the other Nordic countries. 
This points to media policy, including the implications of changed policy ac-
tions at both the national and the Nordic level, as a pertinent topic for future 
research, as Denmark seems to be taking different paths than the other Nordic 
countries in some regards.
Turning to the political system, the shift towards issue voting, especially with 
a focus on immigration as a dominant issue, seems to have affected Denmark 
more than the other Nordic countries, although immigration has also become 
a central issue in Norway and in the most recent Swedish election. With four 
years between elections, but no fixed election date, the Danish political system 
also seems to be highly suited for permanent campaigning with the questions 
of when the next election will happen often being floated by politicians as well 
as political commentators. Notwithstanding, the two most recent elections 
have been called at the end of the formal four-year election period. National 
and Nordic research about the implications of such – on the face of it, differ-
ent – conditions for political communication and political campaigning might 
be worth pursuing.
Regarding research, Danish political communication research has mainly 
been addressed from either a humanities and partly sociological perspective 
or the perspective of political sciences, but more rarely from a combination 
of these. Research informed by the humanities and sociology has focused on, 
among other things, public sphere theory, epitomised by the Habermasian ap-
proach, and the sociology of professions, including spin and public relations, 
whereas research stemming from political science has traditionally had a special 
focus on elections, both national and European. The more recent study of the 
professionalisation of political communication and the mediatisation of politics 
and other institutions of society are perhaps the only examples of “schools” 
or research approaches that have been able to attract scholars from both the 
humanities and political sciences. Despite this, Danish research into news media, 
political communication, and media policy remains more fragmented than (we 
think) is the case in the other Nordic countries. A challenge for Danish research 
is thus that political communication is a growing research field, for example, 
in terms of the number of academic institutions and scholars engaging in such 
research. At the same time, this research lacks coordination and collaboration 
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across disciplines and universities, which potentially leads to research gaps as 
well as overlaps.
Notes
 1. See DR’s overview of the implications of the reductions here: https://www.dr.dk/nyheder/
indland/overblik-disse-dr-programmer-og-kanaler-lukker (last accessed March 23, 2019). 
The closing of P6 Beat and P8 Jazz has been postponed to the end of 2020.
 2. Approximately 8,900 people (5,600 full-time equivalents) work in the Danish newspaper 
industry, and 6,500 people (5,600 full-time equivalents) work in the television industry 
(Agency for Culture and Palaces, 2016).
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Chapter 3
Media and politics in Iceland
Jón Gunnar Ólafsson & Valgerður Jóhannsdóttir
Abstract
This chapter outlines the political and media landscapes in Iceland in compari-
son to the other four Nordic countries. The political communication literature 
routinely groups the Nordic countries together and defines them in terms of a 
Nordic model. Iceland has, however, seldom been included in this literature, and 
research on political communication in the country is scarce. The chapter shows 
that the Icelandic media and political systems differ in significant ways from 
those in the other Nordic countries. Corporatism is less developed in Iceland, as 
is journalistic professionalism, and remnants of political parallelism have carried 
over to a highly commercial media system. This has operated without the public 
service requirements or support for private media that characterise the other 
Nordic countries. Iceland was particularly impacted by the 2008 financial crisis, 
and the years following have seen various changes regarding media and politics. 
Recent developments indicate that the Icelandic system might be becoming more 
similar to the other Nordic countries. 
Keywords: Iceland, Nordic model, media system, political communication, 
journalism 
Introduction
This chapter introduces developments and changes in the media structure in 
Iceland in recent years and examines the relationship between media and pol-
itics in the small country. First, we introduce the main actors and institutions 
in the political and media systems in Iceland. We illustrate how the established 
four-party system has recently given way to a more fragmented and fluid political 
system following the 2008 financial crisis. We also show how rapid economic, 
political, and technological changes have impacted the Icelandic media landscape.
Second, we demonstrate how the Icelandic political and media systems differ 
from the other Nordic countries. Iceland is routinely ignored in political com-
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munication research, and when mentioned, it is often simply grouped together 
with Denmark, Sweden, Norway, and Finland and defined as some sort of 
“Nordic model”. We show that this is problematic. Available studies and data 
focusing on the Icelandic case paint a picture of a highly commercial media 
system, but with less-developed journalistic professionalism and without the 
public service requirements or public support of private media that characterise 
the other four Nordic countries. Remnants of political parallelism from the past 
have carried over to a new media system moving closer to the liberal model, 
and Iceland shares similarities with the polarised pluralist countries when it 
comes to a tight bond between the political and business spheres and a weak 
media regulatory body. 
Third, we outline the existing political communication research on Iceland. 
It is difficult to define specific theoretical perspectives in relation to this re-
search, since political communication is an under-developed field of study in 
Iceland. Much of the scarce research that does exist has focused on mapping the 
structural landscape and catching up with foundational research that has been 
carried out in the other Nordic countries in recent years and decades. Recently, 
however, more scholars have entered the field with new insights on media and 
politics. Finally, we discuss the challenges to political communication research 
in Iceland and highlight areas for future studies. 
The political landscape 
Iceland is a parliamentary republic. It became a sovereign state in 1918 but 
remained in a royal union with Denmark until 1944, when it adopted its repub-
lican constitution. Alþingi, the Icelandic legislature, is a unicameral parliament. 
It consists of 63 members who are elected in six multimember constituencies by 
two-tier proportional representation (the d’Hondt method). Fifty-four members 
are elected according to constituency results whilst the nine remaining supple-
mentary seats are allocated on the basis of national results amongst the parties 
obtaining at least 5 per cent of the national vote (Harðarson, 2008).
Historically, there have been four main parties in the Icelandic party system 
that took shape between 1916–1930. The traditional four types of parties are 
easily recognisable when compared to similar European parties. They consist of 
a conservative party (the Independence Party), an agrarian or centre party (the 
Progressive Party), a social democratic party, and a left-socialist or communist 
party. A restructuring has regularly taken place on the left side of the political 
spectrum, and the two parties to the left are now called the Social Democratic 
Alliance and the Left-Green Movement. In addition to these four parties, there 
have usually been one or at most two other smaller parties represented in the 
Icelandic parliament (Harðarson, 2008; Önnudóttir & Harðarson, 2018). 
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The 2008 financial crisis and its aftermath shook the foundation of Icelan-
dic politics, including the four-party system. The collapse of all major banks 
in Iceland caused economic and political turmoil and spurred massive protests 
in the country, often referred to as the “pots and pans revolution” (Bernburg, 
2016). Although the economy has recovered remarkably well (Jónsson & 
Sigurgeirsson, 2017), there is still considerable political instability, witnessed 
recently by early elections following the Panama Papers scandal in 2016 and 
early elections again in the autumn of 2017 (Jóhannsdóttir & Ólafsson, 2018). 
Trust in various institutions in Iceland collapsed following the crisis. In Febru-
ary 2008, a few months before the crisis hit, 42 per cent of Icelanders said they 
trusted the Icelandic parliament – a year later, trust had plummeted to only 13 
per cent. In 2012, trust in the parliament hit an all-time low of 10 per cent, 
and the most recent poll in 2020 measured it at 23 per cent (Gallup, 2020). As 
Bjarnason (2014) illustrates, trust in most institutions fell particularly sharply 
in Iceland in comparison to other countries. Various studies have shown that 
public trust is more likely to fall in countries that go through an economic crisis 
when compared with countries that do better in economic terms. This is not 
necessarily suggesting causation, but this correlation has been shown in various 
studies, as Bjarnason illustrates. 
The years following the financial crisis have seen a substantial change in 
the vote share of the four established political parties, as well as the number 
of political parties represented in the Alþingi. Until the election of 2013, the 
four parties usually received a total of around 85–90 per cent of the vote in 
parliamentary elections. In 2013, the four parties received 75 per cent, and 
this shrunk even further to 63 per cent in 2016 and 65 per cent in 2017. The 
established parties appear to have lost their dominant status following the crisis, 
creating a vacuum for new political parties and voices to emerge. Since the 2009 
election, there have been six new political parties in the Icelandic parliament. 
Four of them – the Pirate Party, the People’s Party, the Centre Party, and the 
Reform Party – won representation in the parliament in the 2017 election. This 
means that there are currently eight political parties represented in the Alþingi 
– a record number. The Icelandic Election Study (ICENES) illustrates that the 
proportion of partisan voters has been declining. In 1983, the proportion of 
respondents who said that they supported a particular party was 50.2 per cent, 
but in 2016, this number had almost halved, with only 29.5 per cent claiming to 
support a party (Önnudóttir & Harðarson, 2018). Put simply, there are more 
political parties now than ever before, and Icelandic voters are more willing to 
switch their support than they were previously. 
In general, neoliberalism has been more influential in Icelandic politics and 
policy-making than in the other Nordic countries (Jónsson, 2014; Ólafsdóttir 
& Ólafsson, 2014). This is not surprising considering the historically dominant 
role of the conservative Independence Party. Iceland deviates from the Scandi-
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navian norm of strong social democratic parties. The Independence Party has 
been by far the most dominant political force in the country, enjoying around 
40 per cent of the votes in the pre-crisis four-party era. It has also been the 
most dominant party in government; in the 76 years since the foundation of 
the republic, the party has been in government for 57 years. It has been “the 
party of officialdom and the establishment of Iceland” (Kristinsson, 2012: 189). 
However, in the post-crisis era, the vote share of the Independence Party has 
shrunk substantially, with the party winning 25.2 per cent of the vote share in 
the 2017 election (Statistics Iceland, 2017a). 
Iceland has a multiparty system and proportional representation, but power 
sharing, compromise, and cooperation between opposing forces is not a very 
fitting description of Icelandic politics, unlike Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) 
description of the Nordic system (Harðarson, 2008; Jónsson, 2014; Kristins-
son, 2018; Skogerbø et al., Chapter 1). Jónsson (2014: 11) notes that the main 
division of power has not been between the legislative and executive branches 
of government, “but between the majority and minority in Parliament”. Kris-
tinsson (2018: 5) argues that privileged access to state power was crucial in the 
patronage network of parties and politicians that characterised Icelandic politics, 
which in return “encouraged political conflict and competition for power”. 
Unlike the other Nordic countries, minority governments have usually not been 
tolerated (Jónsson, 2014) as there have only been four minority governments 
in Iceland since the foundation of the republic in 1944. 
The distinction between majority and consensus rule is connected to the 
political role of interest groups in society, or in other words, the level of cor-
poratism. Corporatism developed late in Iceland and only in limited areas of 
policy. Jónsson (2014) argues that this can largely be explained by the political 
weakness of the social democrats and the left. Nonetheless, the media system in 
Iceland in the twentieth century bore more resemblance to organised pluralism 
– typical in both the democratic corporatist countries and the polarised pluralist 
countries – than the individual pluralism prevalent in the liberal countries. Or-
ganised pluralism is associated with external pluralism and political parallelism 
in the media, and the Icelandic press had strong ties to political parties until 
the end of the twentieth century. Each of the national newspapers was affili-
ated to one of the four main political parties (Harðarson, 2008). The political 
parties dominated most spheres of society, including foreign trade, banking, 
literature, housing, and jobs in the government and the media (Jóhannsdóttir, 
2019; Kristinsson, 2012). This is a characteristic that Iceland shares with the 
polarised pluralist countries, where clientelism was strong through much of the 
twentieth century and whose legacy Hallin and Mancini (2004: 58) claim “is 
still important to understanding the media system in that region”. The Icelandic 
media system, similar to the political one, in some ways differs from the systems 
in the other four Nordic countries. 
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The media landscape 
In the 1970s and onward, the political parties’ hold on society in general – 
and the media in particular – began to subside. Political parallelism in the 
media gave way to more market-driven media. The political parties’ hold on 
the publicly funded National Broadcasting Service (RÚV) started to lessen in 
the last decades of the twentieth century (Guðmundsson, 2009; Harðarson, 
2008). In 1997, the last political party newspaper ceased publication, and the 
first Icelandic online news publication appeared in 1998 (Friðriksson, 2000). 
At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the first free daily newspaper was 
launched (Karlsson, 2004). 
The media system that emerged in Iceland in the beginning of the twenty-
first century was characterised by a high supply of all forms of media. The 
quantity and diversity are perhaps greater than might be expected in a country 
of around 360 thousand people (Statistics Iceland, n.d.). At the time of writing 
in 2020, there are two national daily newspapers, two weeklies, one biweekly, 
and several online news sites with no links to traditional media, all of which 
play an increasingly prominent part in the provision of daily news. There are 
also some specialised publications, as well as regional and local papers, but 
most of them are small, and local media have always been weak in Iceland 
(Guðmundsson, 2006; Statistics Iceland, n.d.). The Icelandic media market is 
dominated by four media companies, in terms of revenue, audience share, and 
number of journalists employed: RÚV and three private media companies, 
Torg, Sýn, and Árvakur. 
The Icelandic media market has been in turmoil in recent years and mergers 
and takeovers have been frequent. Until 2017, the company 365 Media was by 
far the biggest private media company in Iceland, operating several television and 
radio stations, newspapers and online sites, as well as magazines and telecoms. 
However, in March 2017, the broadcasting part of 365 Media was sold to Sýn 
(Vodafone Iceland), which is now the only private actor in broadcasting that 
has its own news operation, Channel 2 (Stöð 2) and radio Bylgjan. Sýn also 
took over Vísir,1 the second most-read online news site in the country. The free 
paper Fréttablaðið, the most-read newspaper in Iceland, and an online news site 
of the same name,2 was part of 365 Media and is now owned by the company 
Torg. The company also publishes the tabloid newspaper DV and its online 
counterpart.3 DV has had a somewhat rocky past; its ownership has changed 
hands several times and so has its publication frequency, now published once 
a week (B. Þ. Guðmundsson, 2017). Torg also owns the talk show television 
station Hringbraut and its online counterpart.4
The third large private company is Árvakur. It publishes Morgunblaðið, Ice-
land’s oldest newspaper, with historical links to the conservative Independence 
Party. The paper dominated the newspaper market for most of the twentieth 
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century, both in terms of circulation and revenue. However, it lost its leading 
position when free papers entered the scene. Morgunblaðið’s website, Mbl,5 
on the other hand, has been the most-read online news site in Iceland since 
its foundation in 1998. Árvakur was near bankruptcy after the 2008 financial 
crash and was consequently taken over by one of the banks and sold to a group 
of investors with ties to the fishing industry in 2009 (Guðmundsson, 2013; 
Kolbeins, 2015). 
In addition to these private companies, there is the public broadcaster RÚV, 
which has maintained a strong and stable position in the media market despite 
increasing competition, not least by online media (Ohlsson, 2015). In 2020, 
RÚV was, as the other Nordic public service corporations, funded by a broad-
casting tax (Ohlsson, 2015; Schweizer & Puppis, 2017) and allowed to carry 
advertisements and advertising sales amounting to approximately one-third of 
its revenue (RÚV, 2015). In this sense, RÚV has also always been a commercial 
station (Broddason & Karlsson, 2005), but it is not permitted to sell advertise-
ments online. Its share of the total revenue of the media in Iceland is around 
20 per cent and has been stable since the turn of the century (Jóhannsdóttir & 
Ólafsson, 2018). 
In addition, the Icelandic news media market encompasses one weekly 
business paper, Viðskiptablaðið, one weekly free paper focusing on news and 
culture, Mannlíf, and two small national media outlets, Stundin6 and Kjarninn.7 
Both were founded by journalists and, though not the most-read news sites 
in the country, have been quite influential and often cited in the mainstream 
media. Stundin is subscription based and is also published in print twice a 
month.  is financed by advertising and its content is open to everyone, 
but it also receives substantial revenue from a monthly voluntary subscription 
(Jóhannsdóttir & Ólafsson, 2018). In addition to its online news site, Kjarninn 
publishes the weekly magazine Vísbending, focusing on business and economics. 
It is a distinctive characteristic of the Icelandic press market that it has 
“produced neither elite-oriented quality papers nor extremely populistic tab-
loids” (Karlsson, 2004: 242). In a market as small as the Icelandic one, there is 
little room for readership segregation based on purchasing capacity and other 
socioeconomic divisions, and Icelandic newspapers mostly cater for reader-
ship among the general population. The strong position of the free papers in 
the Icelandic media market is also somewhat unique. In 2010, Iceland and 
Luxemburg were the only European countries where the penetration of free 
newspapers was higher than that of their paid-for counterparts (Bakker, 2013; 
see also Karlsson, 2009). The free papers have been general-purpose papers 
with serious coverage of domestic and international news, not down-market 
tabloids, and delivered to people’s homes (Bakker, 2008).
Newspaper circulation and readership in Iceland has traditionally been very 
high, but it is declining. The publication of the free paper Fréttablaðið in 2002 
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did increase newspaper penetration, or at least postponed its decline, but its 
circulation is also dwindling (Harrie, 2017). Whilst newspaper readership has 
been in steady decline for a long time, online news reaches increasingly more 
people. By far the most-read online news sources are Árvakur’s website Mbl 
and Sýn’s Vísir. As in the other Nordic countries, the Internet is ubiquitous, 
with 99 per cent of Icelanders between the ages of 16 and 74 using the Internet 
regularly (Internet World Stats). Facebook is by far the most popular social 
media platform – with a total of 93 per cent using it regularly – and more Ice-
landers are on social media compared to their Nordic cousins (Jóhannsdóttir 
& Ólafsson, 2018).
In economic terms, Icelandic media expanded tremendously towards the 
end of the past century and in the first years of the twenty-first century. From 
1995 to 2008, television revenue more than doubled, and the revenue growth 
in radio and newspapers were 56 and 51 per cent, respectively (online editions 
included) (Karlsson, 2009; Statistics Iceland, 2018). The new media system 
that emerged at the beginning of the twenty-first century was, however, not 
only characterised by a high supply of all forms of media but also by increasing 
commercialisation, convergence, and intense ownership concentration in private 
media (Harðarson, 2008). Also, with the Media Act of 2011, a new administra-
tive commission was established (the Media Commission), which carries out 
the supervision of the media market and attends to day-to-day administration 
in the fields covered by the law (Act no. 38, 2011).
The financial crisis that rocked the economies of countries in Western Eu-
rope in 2008 was a blow to a media industry already in turmoil. Iceland was 
particularly impacted by the financial crisis. The ensuing political and economic 
turmoil in the country has received substantial academic attention from political 
scientists, economists, sociologists, and historians, among others (Bernburg, 
2016; Indriðason et al., 2017; Jóhannesson, 2009; Johnsen, 2014; Jónsson, 
2009). Less attention, however, has been paid to investigating developments 
in the Icelandic media in the aftermath of the crisis, even though the crisis af-
fected the media in many ways (with the notable exception of Jóhannsdóttir 
& Ólafsson, 2018). 
Between 2007 and 2010, the revenues of media companies in Iceland de-
clined by approximately a quarter, and in 2018, they were still 17 per cent 
lower than before the financial crisis (Statistics Iceland, 2018). According to 
Friðrik Þór Guðmundsson (2016: 41) the total turnover of the five largest me-
dia companies “almost halved between the years 2007 and 2009, measured in 
fixed prices”. The advertising revenue of the media fell by 68 per cent from its 
peak in 2007–2009, calculated in 2015 fixed prices (Statistics Iceland, 2017b). 
As a result, some publications ceased to exist, and others downsized. Almost a 
third of the journalist population was laid off, among them many experienced 
journalists (Jóhannsdóttir, 2015; Kolbeins, 2012). 
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As noted earlier in the chapter, trust in various institutions fell drastically 
following the financial crisis. Trust in the media was not measured regularly in 
Iceland before the crisis, but Markaðs- og miðlarannsóknir [Market and Media 
Research] has measured trust in the media since December 2008 (Markaðs- og 
miðlarannsóknir, n.d.). At this time, only 23 per cent of Icelanders said that 
they trusted the media as a whole. Seven other institutions were less trusted, 
including the government (19%), the parliament (18%), the Financial Super-
visory Authority (5%), and the banking system (5%). In a comparable survey 
conducted in May 2009 (following the “pots and pans” protests and the fall of 
the government in February of the same year), trust in the media as a whole had 
fallen from 23 per cent to 15 per cent. In the years following, trust in the media 
has never reached higher than 19 per cent (Jóhannsdóttir & Ólafsson, 2018). 
Trust in “the media” or “the press” as an institution is one thing, and trust 
in individual media outlets is another. As seen in Table 3.1, trust in most in-
dividual Icelandic outlets is considerably higher than in the media as a whole 
from 2009–2016. Trust in RÚV has remained consistently the highest during 
this whole period, from 69–79 per cent. 
Table 3.1 Trust in Icelandic media outlets (per cent)
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2016       
RÚV news 70 79 72 75 77 71 69       
Channel 2 news 36 44 42 45 44 41 41       
Mbl 54 52 50 51 50 47 41      
Morgunblaðið 52 46 43 45 46 41 37       
Fréttablaðið 34 35 37 41 39 35 30       
Vísir 24 30 33 35 35 34 33      
Viðskiptablaðið 22 26 26 33 31 26 27       
Stundin – – – – – – 26       
Kjarninn – – – – – 27 31       
DV 4 9 9 10 10 14 7       
Comments: The figures show the share of respondents who state they trust the outlets “very much” or “fairly 
much”. Figures following 2016 have not been released by the company at the time of writing.
Source: Market and Media Research, n.d.
Iceland: A (not so) Nordic system?
Nordic media is often used as an example of media industries that have been 
able to provide users with socially relevant content and at the same time flourish 
as successful businesses. Furthermore, Nordic citizens repeatedly rank high in 
international comparisons of political knowledge (Curran et al., 2009; McQuail, 
1992). The media system in Iceland has in many respects developed in a way 
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similar to the other Nordic countries, but there are also important differences 
(see Skogerbø et al., Chapter 1). 
Harðarson (2008) previously analysed the Icelandic media system, using 
Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) framework, and placed the country within the 
democratic corporatist model. He made a distinction between the old system, 
which in some ways shared features with the polarised pluralist model, and 
the new media system of the twenty-first century, which “clearly has moved 
towards the liberal model in many respects” (Harðarson, 2008: 79). Other 
Nordic academics have argued that neoliberalism has been more influential in 
Iceland than in the other Nordic countries and that its media system has moved 
closer to the liberal model (Ahva et al., 2017; Syvertsen et al., 2014). 
Corporatism is less developed in Iceland than in the other Nordic countries, as 
outlined earlier in the chapter in relation to Icelandic politics. State involvement 
has been limited to RÚV whilst all other media outlets are based on commercial 
grounds. Private media has not been subject to regulation or requirements aimed 
at ensuring media pluralism and public service journalism, like private media in 
the other Nordic countries has (Guðmundsson & Kristinsson, 2019; Harðarson, 
2008; Jóhannsdóttir & Ólafsson, 2018; Karlsson & Broddason, 2018). The 
press does not receive any direct subsidies, and the state’s involvement in the 
newspaper industry has been very limited. “To this extent, Iceland does not fit 
into the model of an active state vis-a-vis the media that is commonly used to 
describe the Nordic media system”, according to Ohlsson (2015: 27).
Karlsson (2004: 227–228) notes that in Iceland “there has strangely enough 
been virtually unanimous agreement across the political spectrum from the 
right to the left, contending that the press and the private media in general 
should be left to themselves”. Before the 2008 financial crisis, that was also 
the prevalent view of private media companies and the Union of Icelandic 
Journalists. However, this view has changed. A committee established in 
December 2016 to examine the economic situation of private media in Ice-
land concluded that it was worrying in light of the media’s important role 
in democratic societies; the committee put forward several proposals to ease 
the difficulties (Mennta- og menningarmálaráðuneytið, 2018). In autumn 
2019, legislation proposing press subsidies for private media was tabled in 
the parliament. According to the bill, news media companies that fulfil certain 
requirements, such as publishing regularly for the general public, producing 
diverse content of societal importance, and reporting original content at least 
in part, will be eligible for a refund of up to 18 per cent of their production 
cost (Mennta- og menningarmálaráðuneytið, 2019). The ministry looked to 
the arrangement of press subsidies in the other Nordic countries. The new 
bill would constitute a major change in Icelandic media policy. It was met 
with considerable opposition, both from parties outside the government, as 
well as from the Independence Party, one of the three parties currently in 
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government. The bill did not become law before the parliamentary recess in 
early summer of 2020.
There are indications of increased partisanship – or instrumentalisation – of 
the media in the last decade. Owners of private media companies have openly 
claimed that their objective was to influence public opinion. In 2009, a group of 
investors with interests in the fishing industry acquired the publishing company 
Árvakur. In an interview, a shareholder stated that an objective of the invest-
ment was to influence public debates and political decisions. Another example 
is the decision by Exista (a big investment company) in 2007 to invest in the 
business paper Viðskiptablaðið. One of the owners claimed this was necessary, 
as almost all other media outlets were in the hands of two other main business 
blocks (Jóhannsdóttir & Ólafsson, 2018). 
Guðmundsson (2013) argues that elements of political parallelism have car-
ried over into the new era of commercial media. The perception of a connection 
between traditional media and political parties is deep-rooted, and politicians 
in particular appear to have very little confidence in journalistic professional-
ism or the impartiality of the news media. Guðmundsson (2013: 510) also 
states that the historical proximity of political parallelism, a relatively recent 
professionalisation of journalists, an unregulated media environment, and an 
“extreme ownership concentration of the media, where ownership powers and 
political parties became mixed with each other”, have led to the development 
of a “politically commercial media system”. Ohlsson and Facht (2017: 93) also 
remark that the Icelandic media market is “characterised by a comparatively 
tight bond between the political sphere and the domestic enterprise sector” 
and associations with external stakeholders contribute “to the relationships in 
the media market being more problematic than they are in the other Nordic 
countries”. 
Iceland has a history of the state playing a large role in the economy (Kris-
tinsson, 1996), just like the states in polarised pluralist countries in Southern 
Europe. A weak media regulatory body is another element Iceland has in com-
mon with polarised pluralist countries (Hallin & Papathanassopoulos, 2002). 
The Icelandic Media Commission has broad functions and duties but has been 
underfinanced and understaffed from the very beginning: its board of five and 
staff of three are responsible for supervising the Icelandic media market, both 
private media and RÚV, in accordance with Iceland’s media legislation. This 
includes collecting and publishing data about the media market as well as 
handling complaints about the conduct of individual media outlets. The com-
mission’s role is also to promote media literacy and diversity in the media and 
to guard freedom of speech and the public’s right to information, to name but 
a few of its many duties (Jóhannsdóttir & Ólafsson, 2018). 
RÚV holds a very strong position in the media market in Iceland, appears 
to retain a high level of legitimacy, and enjoys far more trust than other me-
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dia in Iceland, as outlined earlier. Hallin and Mancini (2004: 167) posit that 
the Nordic countries tend to organise their public service companies in “the 
direction of the professional model, according to which the running of Public 
Service Broadcasting is left to professionals in order to avoid political involve-
ment”. Moe and Mjøs (2013: 88) also argue that the “running and supervi-
sion of Public Service Broadcasting in the Nordic countries are characterized, 
although in different ways and to varying degrees, by a separation between the 
institutions and the political powers”. However, these studies did not include 
Iceland, and Jóhannsdóttir (2019) argues that the Icelandic system of broadcast 
governance, in effect, resembles more what Hallin and Mancini (2004: 48) call 
the “government model”. 
RÚV enjoys less institutional autonomy than public service broadcasting 
companies in the other Nordic countries and has been subject to more political 
interference. Policy and regulations around the Nordic public service broadcast-
ing companies have generally been rather stable, whereas legislation regarding 
RÚV has been subject to frequent changes, depending on the composition of 
the political majority in parliament at the time (Karlsson & Broddason, 2018). 
Kristinsson’s (2012) study of party patronage in Iceland illustrates attempts 
by political parties to gain control over not just RÚV but also private media 
companies, since the media is seen as being of strategic importance in politics. 
RÚV was made a state-owned limited company in 2013. This was said to in-
crease its autonomy from the legislative and executive powers. However, some 
argue that the change from a license fee to a broadcasting tax to finance RÚV’s 
operations has created a very unclear situation for the company and made it 
more dependent on the state (Engblom, 2013). 
Political communication research in Iceland 
We have outlined differences between Iceland and the other four Nordic coun-
tries in terms of its media and political systems. Another important difference 
concerns the few political communication studies in Iceland when compared to 
Denmark, Norway, Sweden, and Finland. It is difficult to define specific theoreti-
cal perspectives in existing research in Iceland, since political communication 
is a minor field of study in the country. The same applies to studies of media 
and communications more generally. 
Much of the scarce political communication research that does exist has fo-
cused on mapping the structural landscape and, to some extent, catching up with 
foundational research that has been carried out in the other Nordic countries 
in recent years. In relation to this, Icelandic academics have used the work of 
Hallin and Mancini (2004) to analyse the political and media systems in Iceland 
and how they differ from those in the other Nordic countries (Guðmundsson, 
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2013; Harðarson, 2008; Jóhannsdóttir & Ólafsson, 2018). Jóhannsdóttir’s 
(2019) findings suggest that the Icelandic media system does not fit neatly with 
any of the three models in Hallin and Mancini’s typology and is best described 
as a mixed case or a hybrid system (see also Guðmundsson, 2019). 
Three studies have been conducted that examine media content in Iceland 
through the frameworks of soft news and entertainment, and hard news. Karls-
son (2004) found that commercialisation had increased considerably around the 
turn of the century, not least due to the arrival of free papers, and argued that 
this had led to a definite trend towards more entertainment news. Guðmunds-
son (2012) came to a similar conclusion in a study of the three main Icelandic 
newspapers published from 2008–2010. The proportion of soft news in major 
printed newspapers had increased considerably from previous years. The find-
ings from a study of hard and soft news coverage in Fréttablaðið and Morgun-
blaðið, and their online counterparts, indicated that the daily press published 
less political and economic news in 2013 than in 2005, whereas the amount of 
soft news had increased significantly, particularly online (Jóhannsdóttir, 2018).
Election coverage has only been examined in one study. In her analysis of the 
2013 parliamentary election coverage, Kolbeins (2016) found a clear tendency 
for horse-race stories. Guðmundsson (2013) also examined the 2013 elections, 
but his focus was on examining political candidates’ attitudes towards political 
parallelism and professionalism in the media. His findings suggest that politicians 
have little faith in professionalisation, impartiality, and balance in the news 
media in Iceland. In a recent study of how political candidates assessed and used 
different types of social, local, and news media for election campaign purposes, 
Guðmundsson (2019) found that several types of media logics coexisted. The 
study sought to unveil the use of Snapchat in relation to other media and dis-
closed clear age differences in use; but, candidates’ use of Snapchat and other 
social media did not preclude valuing traditional media highly and vice versa.
Another area of study concerns journalists. Professionalism in journalism 
began to develop in Iceland somewhat later than in the other Nordic countries. 
The reasons are primarily rooted in the stronghold of the party press, which 
meant that politics and political views were an important indicator of a person’s 
ability to work in the media, whilst professionalism was not held in particularly 
high regard in the field. This changed rapidly as the politicians’ hold on the 
media began to weaken (Guðmundsson, 2013). The education of journalists 
has greatly improved, and just over two-thirds of Icelandic journalists have a 
university degree (Kolbeins, 2012); however, in an international context, this is 
not particularly high. Data from the Worlds of Journalism Study shows that in 
53 of the 67 countries studied, 75 per cent or more of the journalists have some 
form of university education. Furthermore, formal education in journalism is not 
nearly as common in the Icelandic media as it is in the other Nordic countries. 
A quarter of Icelandic journalists have a formal degree in journalism or media 
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studies, compared to 56 per cent in Finland, 64 per cent in Norway, 68 per 
cent in Sweden, and 82 per cent in Denmark (Jóhannsdóttir & Ólafsson, 2018). 
According to Ahva and colleagues (2017), journalists in Iceland (like their 
Nordic colleagues) consider objective reporting to be very important in their 
work and see themselves as detached watchdogs. Their professional identity is 
also one of autonomy, experiencing little influence from politics or economic 
forces in their daily work (Ahva et al., 2017; Kolbeins, 2012; Nord, 2008). 
Guðmundsson and Kristinsson (2019: 1700) showed that although oriented 
towards public service, journalists “are undermined by the realities of the media 
market”. They identified four factors that intensified the pressure journalists 
experience in their everyday work, including the technological competence 
required, increasing time spent on interacting with users, the growing pro-
fessionalisation of special interests and public relations pushing content to 
the media, and, not least, the increasing competition and commercialisation 
pushing journalists to consider what might sell. The authors conclude, as do 
Strömback and Karlsson (2011) in their study, that the changes in the news 
media environment may have decreased journalists’ influence over their own 
practices and increased the influence of media owners.
Journalists in small media systems can be seen to be less autonomous than 
journalists in larger countries. Small audience markets and small advertising 
markets translate into small job markets, which in general means fewer em-
ployers, fewer senior positions, and fewer alternatives in terms of career routes 
and progression (Örnebring & Lauk, 2010). All Icelandic media companies 
are small in international comparison, and as Harðarson (2008: 80) states, 
“staff-shortages seriously limit Icelandic journalists’ possibilities for high-class 
journalism”. Journalists are seldom specialists, which may make them more 
dependent on their sources, including high-level politicians, and the small job 
market can make them less resistant to commercial pressures and ownership 
power. 
Ólafsson (2019) conducted 50 interviews with Icelandic politicians and 
journalists in Iceland and surveyed the public. His work focuses on examining 
perceptions concerning routine political coverage in the Icelandic media, the 
relationship between journalists and politicians in Iceland, as well as interactions 
between journalists, politicians, and the public on social media, particularly 
Facebook. The study illustrates how Iceland’s smallness impacts political dis-
semination and that existing political communication frameworks need to be 
expanded in order to examine the Icelandic case and other small states, both 
offline and online. Moreover, Ólafsson shows how small states like Iceland can 
be seen as particularly exaggerated cases concerning recent media and political 
developments (Ólafsson, 2020). As such, they can provide us with important 
clues concerning where the larger democracies of the world are heading.
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Conclusion
We have illustrated that the Icelandic system is unlike the systems in the other 
four Nordic countries in several ways. To some extent, it can be described as a 
hybrid of the three models identified by Hallin and Mancini (2004). The avail-
able studies and data paint a picture of a highly commercial media system with 
less developed journalistic professionalism than in the liberal countries and 
without the public service requirements and public support of private media 
that characterise the democratic corporatist countries. Remnants of political 
parallelism from the past have carried over to a new liberal media system. Ice-
land also shares similarities with polarised pluralist countries when it comes 
to a weak media regulatory body and a tight bond between the political and 
business spheres. 
Political communication research in Iceland is scarce. There are few Iceland-
ers who study media and communication, and political scientists in Iceland 
have focused little on studies of political communication. Another challenge for 
research in Iceland concerns the lack of available data. Statistics concerning the 
structure and development of the media industry are more limited in Iceland 
than in many other European countries. Public authorities do not monitor the 
media market to the extent that other Nordic countries do, nor has the industry 
itself agreed upon the gathering of common key indicators (Ohlsson, 2017). Yet 
another challenge is that Iceland is routinely ignored in comparative research. It 
was, for example, the only Nordic state left out of Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) 
study, and it is also the only Nordic state excluded from the annual Reuters 
Digital News Report (Newman et al., 2020).
There are many important areas of future research on the Icelandic case. Since 
this is an anthology on the developments in the Nordic countries, we would like 
to encourage Nordic scholars to include Iceland in their future studies. Political 
communication research concerning all aspects of it is needed. In particular, 
we would highlight that more studies should be directed towards the impact 
Iceland’s smallness has on political dissemination and the media market. If press 
subsidies for private media outlets are taken up in Iceland, it is important to 
examine the impact that they have. This is an area that would be interesting 
for us to study in collaboration with Nordic colleagues. We are living in times 
of great change when it comes to public service broadcasters and the digital 
landscape, which would also be an interesting area to explore in collaboration 
with academics in the Nordic countries. Iceland is a case that differs to some 
extent from the other four Nordic countries, and we hope that future research 
including this small state will enrich the political communication discipline, 
both from a Nordic perspective and more generally. 
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Chapter 4
Media and politics in Finland
Kim Strandberg & Tom Carlson
Abstract
This chapter depicts developments in Finland during the last decade regarding 
the interplay between the political system and the media system, both in general 
and in conjunction with elections. We also suggest central theoretical perspectives 
through which the developments in Finland can be understood. The theoretical 
lenses that are discussed as most relevant for the Finnish case are mediatisation 
and hybrid media theory. Additionally, we provide an overview of the foci and 
methodological developments within the field of political communication research 
in Finland. Essentially, as in most of the Nordic countries that this anthology 
addresses, all three of these areas have undergone changes in Finland during the 
last decade. Finally, the chapter points out future challenges for Finnish political 
communication research.
Keywords: Finland, media, political communication, journalism, hybrid media 
Introduction
In Finland, the most recent decade has been one of swift and rapid changes 
when it comes to the political landscape, the structure of the media sector, 
media consumption habits, journalistic practices, and political communication 
research. Concerning the political landscape, Finland has, like the other Nordic 
countries, seen a new rise of electoral support for populist parties. Starting in 
the 2011 parliamentary elections, the Finns Party (previously named the True 
Finns Party) suddenly surged in popularity and gained a strong foothold in 
parliament. This trend continued in the next election in 2015, and the Finns 
Party was included in the government for the mandate period 2015–2019, 
followed by a strong election in 2019 too. As we shall discuss, this has broken 
the long tradition of the Finnish party system being dominated by a “big three” 
of the Social Democratic Party, the Centre Party, and the conservative National 
Coalition Party (Karvonen, 2014; Karvonen et al., 2016).
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Among the democratic corporatist media systems in the Nordic countries, 
the Finnish media system is arguably the closest to Hallin and Mancini’s (2004) 
liberal model, albeit with clear elements of the democratic corporatist model; 
however, several aspects have recently changed. The structure of the media sector 
is increasingly moving from analogue outlets to digital formats. In many ways, 
one could say that a hybridisation of the media system has occurred since the 
boundaries between offline and online versions of the same media outlets have 
blurred, which is also manifested in how digital subscriptions and viewer- and 
readership have risen. Ownership of media outlets has become more concen-
trated than before, and the journalistic profession has been forced to adapt to a 
rapidly evolving and less secure situation than ever before. The media audiences 
have also changed their habits from the analogue to the digital, and especially 
the use of social media has surged. This has also been reflected in the extent 
to which social media is prioritised in election campaigning by candidates and 
parties. An interesting point is that the Finns Party was one of the first to realise 
the potential of social media to bypass traditional media in communication with 
voters. The extent to which voters use online sources when seeking information 
in conjunction with elections is also a notable trend. Moreover, the rise of social 
media has been accompanied with elements of what we later discuss as an “elite 
bubble” of journalists, politicians, and academic experts. These newfound ties 
between journalists and politicians in social media arguably represent a return 
to the politics-media coupling of old, albeit with a more critical slant towards 
the political elite (see Eloranta & Isotalus, 2016; Marttila et al., 2016; Ruoho 
& Kuusipalo, 2019; Vanikka & Huhtamäki, 2015).
For political communication scholars, the aforementioned rather quick 
developments in Finland have brought with them both challenges and pos-
sibilities. The old saying of shooting at a moving target has never been more 
accurate, and it challenges scholars to constantly evolve their methodologi-
cal skills. At the same time, the availability of massive amounts of data has 
never been greater. Rather ironically, the challenge is now to understand what 
research questions the data can answer and by which methods it can best be 
studied. Thus, the trends regarding what contemporary political communica-
tion scholars in Finland focus on, and which research methods they employ, 
mirror general societal developments and the rising popularity of social media. 
Regarding these aspects, the role of online filter bubbles and polarisation has 
become a hot topic, and big data automatically collected from social media is 
a commonly used type of research data.
In this chapter,1 we give an overview of these recent developments in Finland. 
We also apply theoretical lenses for understanding media and politics in Finland 
and relate the Finnish context to the other Nordic countries. The chapter has five 
sections and a concluding part. We begin, in the next section, by more closely 
scrutinising the political system, the recent Finnish elections, and the parties.
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The political system, elections, and parties
Finland has often been classified as a semi-presidential system. However, a 
series of constitutional reforms in the 1990s and early 2000s have gradually 
removed power from the president, whereby it is now quite a stretch to call 
Finland a semi-presidential system (see Anckar, 1999; Paloheimo, 2016). In 
fact, Karvonen and colleagues (2016: 14–15) state that contemporary Finland 
is “a parliamentary democracy with a government that is accountable to the 
parliament and a directly-elected president”. Parliamentary elections are held 
every fourth year, presidential elections every sixth year, and elections for the 
European Parliament every fifth year. The national parliament is unicameral, 
with 200 seats. The country is divided into 14 multimember constituencies, 
where the number of seats in parliament from each district is based on the 
population size in that district, and one single-member district (the autonomous 
province of Åland). In presidential and European Union elections, the country 
as a whole is a single electoral district. 
The Finnish multiparty system reflects what has historically been the 
structural foundations and cleavages in Finnish society (Karvonen, 2014; 
Westinen et al., 2016): the left-right dimension (the Left Alliance and the So-
cial Democrats versus bourgeoisie parties, in particular the National Coalition 
Party), the rural-urban (the Centre Party versus the Social Democrats), and, 
to some extent, the position of the Swedish-speaking minority (the Swedish 
People’s Party). However, the structural transformation that changed Finland 
from an agricultural country to a post-industrial society – a process which, 
in a Western European comparison, took place late (1950s–1960s) and was 
dramatically rapid – affected the Finnish major parties’ core value base as 
well as their pool of “own” voters (see Karvonen, 2014). As a case in point, 
the Agrarian Party (now the Centre Party) used to focus on representing rural 
Finland, where farmers were the party’s primary support base. Because of the 
structural changes, less than 3 per cent of the Finnish citizens now work with 
agriculture, effectively eroding the traditional voter base of the Centre Party. In 
conjunction with the socioeconomic structural changes, sociocultural dimen-
sions have over time gained a more predominant role in Finnish society and 
in the party system (Westinen et al., 2016). These dimensions concern issues 
such as attitudes towards immigration, the European Union, globalisation, the 
environment, and minority rights. Thus, parties like the Green League were 
established in the late 1980s without a clear socioeconomic basis. At the same 
time, the traditional socioeconomically based parties have essentially become, 
in the words of Kirchheimer (1966: 190), “catch-all electoral machines”, as 
their traditional bases of voter support have eroded over time. This develop-
ment has had a profound effect on the campaign messages of these parties. In 
short, the messages have become vague: the parties no longer appeal to clearly 
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defined population segments and the use of attacking offensive strategies has 
declined (Carlson, 2001; Karvonen & Rappe, 1991; Rappe, 1996). This trend 
still prevails today. The long tradition of forming majority governments (see 
below) also hampers negative campaigning by the major parties. 
A number of specific features are noteworthy in the contemporary Finnish party 
system (Karvonen, 2014; Karvonen et al., 2016) – the high degree of party system 
fragmentation is chief among these (typically eight or nine parties are represented 
in the parliament). Moreover, no single party is nowadays significantly larger than 
the rest, and no party tends to receive more than 20–25 per cent of the votes, 
which means that broad coalition governments are needed and formed. In fact, 
modern Finnish politics has often been a competition between three major par-
ties: The Social Democratic Party, the National Coalition Party, and the Centre 
Party. In the last three parliamentary elections, though, the populist Finns Party 
has surged in popularity, breaking the traditional “big three”. Table 4.1 depicts 
the election results in the last four parliamentary elections and illustrates the rise 
of the Finns Party (for a longer period, 1945–2011, see Karvonen et al., 2016). 
Table 4.1 Election results, turnout, and governments, 2007–2019
  2007 2011 2015 2019
Finnish Social Democratic 
Party (SDP) 21.4 19.1 16.5 17.7
Finns Party (Fin) 4.1 19.1 17.7 17.5
National Coalition Party 
(NCP) 22.3 20.4 18.2 17.0
Centre Party of Finland 
(Centre) 23.1 15.8 21.1 13.8
Green League (Green) 8.5 7.3 8.5 11.5
Left Alliance (Left) 8.8 8.1 7.1 8.2
Swedish People’s Party in 
Finland (SPP) 4.6 4.3 4.9 4.5
Christian Democrats in 
Finland (CD) 4.9 4.0 3.5 3.9
Blue Reform (Blue) n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.0
Others 2.3 2.0 2.5 5.0
Turnouta 67.9 67.4 66.9 72.0










   a  Per cent of eligible voters living in Finland.
 b The Left Alliance left the government in April 2014 and the Finns Party split into the Finns Party and Blue 
Reform (later Blue Future) in June 2017. 
 c Blue Reform remained in government until the whole government resigned prematurely in March 2019, one 
month before the upcoming elections. 
Source: Ministry of Justice election information service2 
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The recent populist wave is not, however, the first of its kind in Finland. In 
the 1970s and early 1980s, the populist Rural Party experienced several good 
elections that led all the way to a position in two governments in the 1980s. 
The last row in Table 4.1 illustrates the consensus-seeking nature of Finnish 
politics, whereby broad and often oversized majority coalition governments 
have been the norm, in contrast to the other Nordic countries (cf. Karvonen, 
2014).  
Finland has a proportional election system in parliamentary elections. 
The feature of that system that has the most bearing on election campaign-
ing and political communication is that Finland has a fully open-list ballot 
with mandatory preferential voting. Voters have one vote, which cannot 
be cast for a party list; they are obliged to cast the vote on one particular 
candidate that they choose from the parties’ unranked lists of candidates 
running in the constituency (see von Schoultz, 2018). The number of votes 
cast for each candidate determines the ranking order of candidates on each 
party’s list. Consequently, there are two kinds or levels of campaigns (von 
Schoultz, 2018). Firstly, the party organises a collective national campaign 
highlighting campaign issues and themes. Over time, these campaigns have 
become personalised as the party leaders are now one of the most important 
focal points in the Finnish campaigns and elections (e.g., Karvonen, 2010; 
von Schoultz, 2016). Secondly, the candidates invest in personal campaigns 
in their constituencies and usually have their own support groups organis-
ing campaign activities, raising money, and generating publicity, including 
television advertising (Mattila & Ruostetsaari, 2002). These groups gener-
ally operate independently from the parties; the local party organisation may 
function as a background resource and coordinator.  
Regarding the costs of campaigning, von Schoultz (2018: 614) notes that this 
burden has over time “been pushed toward candidates, who collectively spend 
a considerably larger amount on their individual campaigns than the parties 
do on their central campaigns”. Some estimates (e.g., Mattila & Sundberg, 
2012; Moring & Borg, 2005) suggest that the candidates themselves handle as 
much as 75 per cent of the total campaign spending in an election. Candidates 
mostly raise campaign funds from donations and private resources (including 
personal bank loans). This kind of individualised and personalised campaigning 
by candidates – in combination with Finland’s relatively liberal regulation of 
campaign spending (see, e.g., Hofverberg, 2016) – is a bit of an exception in 
the Nordic context. Furthermore, it has driven innovation and development in 
campaigning techniques, especially in the era of the Internet and social media 
(see Strandberg, 2013; Strandberg & Carlson, 2017). 
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The media system and general use of media outlets
Similar to the other Nordic countries, Finland fits within Hallin and Mancini’s 
(2004) typology as a democratic corporatist media system (see also Skogerbø 
et al., Chapter 1). However, Finland has differed from most Nordic countries 
(except, to some extent, Iceland) in the fact that its television system has par-
tially been funded by advertising since the beginning. Looking at daily reach 
among the Finnish population (Statistics Finland, 2019b), the public broadcaster 
Yleisradio (YLE) has a share of 54 per cent of the population and the two main 
private broadcasters, MTV Media and Nelonen Media, have shares of 49 and 
42 per cent, respectively. Concerning daily reach of radio, YLE reaches 38 
per cent of the population while private radio channels together reach 49 per 
cent. A general long-term trend towards increased concentration of ownership 
within all media sectors (print, television, radio, online) has continued in the last 
decade in Finland (see Grönlund, 2016). For instance, the newspaper market 
shares are dominated by Sanoma News and Alma Media, television by YLE and 
MTV Media (and to some extent Nelonen), and the Internet service provider 
market by Elisa, TeliaSonera, and DNA. In November 2019, the European 
Commission approved the proposed acquisition of the Bonnier Broadcasting 
Holding – a television broadcasting company active primarily in Sweden and 
Finland, owning the Finnish MTV Media group – by Telia Company. This affair 
is increasing media concentration in Finland; nonetheless, it is worth noting 
that the media ownership concentration in Finland is, in fact, remarkably low 
in a global comparison (Noam & Mutter, 2016).
Finns have a reputation of being heavy media users, and while that is certainly 
still true today, the latest decade has seen a rapid shift towards digital outlets 
instead of offline outlets. For instance, the circulation of printed newspapers 
per 1,000 citizens has dropped from 577 in 2008 to only 258 in 2017, and the 
number of printed and digital newspaper editions is now virtually the same 
(Statistics Finland, 2019a). In other words, it is only a matter of time before 
digital editions surpass printed newspaper editions. The number of newspapers 
with a weekly circulation of at least four issues was as low as 38 in 2018, which 
is a decline from 49 in 2010 (Statistics Finland, 2019c). Regarding the share 
of time that Finnish citizens spend consuming media per day, the Internet now 
dominates with a share of 47 per cent, followed by television with a share of 24 
per cent. Therefore, traditional media in Finland has, so to speak, gone digital 
in the last decade, which is a trend found in most Nordic countries. A parallel 
development, and one of the explanations for the aforementioned digitalisa-
tion trends, is the rapid growth of online media during the same period. As 
Table 4.2 shows, frequent use of the Internet is as high as 91 per cent among 
the Finnish population, having grown from 71 per cent in 2008, which is the 
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highest share of all media outlets. More than half the population, a share that 
is rapidly growing, also use some form of social media frequently. 






  Onlineb 21
Newspapersa 58
  Printedb 43




  FBc 49
  Twitterd 36
  Instagramd 54
a Statistics Finland, n.d.
b Standard Eurobarometer 90, Data Annex, 2018
c Internetworldstats, 2020
d Users in total, 2019 (from Statista 2019a; 2019b)
An interesting aspect of how Finns use “new media” is that these users have 
clearly matured beyond the early adopter stage. Thus, as Table 4.3 shows, only the 
oldest age group (aged 75–89) seldom use the Internet while all other age groups 
use it to a high extent. Moreover, while the youngest citizens are still those who 
use more advanced online services to the highest extent (e.g., streaming of music 
or video), the share of middle-aged citizens using such services is substantial.
Table 4.3 Use of online media according to age group, 2016 (per cent) 
  16–24 25–34 35–44 45–54 55–64 65–74 75–89 All
Uses the Internet 100 99 100 99 92 74 31 88
Music streaming (or similar) 98 90 79 60 37 24 9 58
Broadcasting companies’ 
online services 78 77 76 67 52 45 17 61
Online streaming services 
(Netflix, etc.) 69 59 42 30 11 4 2 31
YouTube 97 93 88 69 43 25 5 62
Newspapers’ or TV-outlets’ 
online news 88 91 93 84 70 57 21 74
Source: Statistics Finland, 2016 
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In sum, the newspaper sector in particular has had a rough last decade with 
several outlets closing and many others having economic worries. The shift 
towards digital platforms for both printed and visual media is now also in 
full effect, and it is only a short matter of time before online services become 
the default. All major media providers have adapted to these changes rather 
swiftly and, tellingly, Finns are still high media consumers despite these mas-
sive structural changes. 
Contemporary political journalism – trends and challenges 
To date, Finland remains firmly among the world-leading countries in the World 
Press Freedom index. Nevertheless, the aforementioned developments regarding 
ownership and circulation in the Finnish media sector have had a bearing on 
the everyday work of political journalists in Finland whereby the increasing 
tempo, economic troubles, and increasing digitalisation are all aspects that 
journalists experience hands-on in their everyday work (Pöyhtäri et al., 2016). 
On the other hand, amidst all the turmoil, Finnish journalists remain firm in 
their core values where autonomy and professional ethics are at the forefront 
(Väliverronen, 2018).
Over decades, Finnish political journalism has experienced what one might 
call paradigm shifts, ranging from a highly politicised, partisan era, through a 
phase of neutral observers, or watchdogs, into an emerging and ongoing era 
of a more active – albeit politically neutral – journalism (e.g., Niemikari et al., 
2019; Väliverronen, 2018). According to Kantola (2012), these macro level 
shifts are still partially reflected among the views that current Finnish political 
journalists of different generations hold about their profession in relation to 
those in power. Kantola distinguishes between three generations of political 
journalists. The first category is “the solid moderns” (the retiring generation 
of political journalists), often having a political background before becoming 
journalists and holding a strong public-service ethos, seeing their role as inform-
ing the public about relevant events within the political realm. They are more 
or less conveyers of the elite’s message to the people. The second group (who 
became journalists in the early 1980s) is “the liquefying moderns” and can be 
characterised as professional and neutral, non-partisan observers of society. 
They put the profession above all else and place great value in a detachment 
from all things political.
The third generation of political journalists (the current young journal-
ists) is “the liquid moderns”, or as Kantola (2012: 617) also calls them, “the 
project people”. They are accustomed to the fast-paced, ever-changing nature 
of the contemporary profession. They often focus on the man or woman in 
the street rather than the political elite, and one could even say that anti-
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institutional values are commonplace among the liquid political journalists (see 
also Väliverronen, 2018). This new generation thus strongly values autonomy 
from the political realm but is also more prone to have opinions on societal 
matters and feel that journalism can be opinionated (see also Reunanen & 
Koljonen, 2018). Väliverronen’s (2018) study of journalists’ role perceptions 
only partially confirms Kantola’s (2012) analytical groups, and he remarks that 
the “guild” of political journalists in Finland remains rather homogenous in 
its core values and professional ethics. Nevertheless, Reunanen and Koljonen 
(2018) point out that the youngest generation of political journalists appear to 
focus more on opinionated journalism than their older peers do. 
Whereas core values seem rather stable within Finnish political journal-
ism during the last decade, the broader structural changes in the media sector 
and shifting platform preferences from print to digital among news audiences 
have also been felt in the political newsrooms in Finland. Especially the rapid 
growth of social media is, if not outright upending, at least clearly changing the 
way journalists carry out their profession (e.g., Pöyhtäri et al., 2016). Having 
interviewed Finnish political journalists on their views about the growth of 
online media, Pitkänen (2009) extracts several key points where the journalistic 
profession is adjusting to the new digital reality. The first aspect is the increased 
speed of news production. The online world has a much greater need for im-
mediacy that sometimes comes at the expense of journalistic quality. Another 
circumstance that affects the way journalists work is the increased interaction 
with the audience and the growth of user-generated content. In a way, interaction 
is a positive thing, for instance by providing quick feedback on stories, but the 
uglier side of online discussions, such as toxicity and racism, has increasingly 
become a problem in Finland. Accordingly, over time, many Finnish outlets 
have imposed restrictions on anonymous reader comments. Social media and 
the Internet have also brought with them new types of content such as blogs, 
tweets, social media posts, and even Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) that 
often provide political journalists with content for their news stories. A chal-
lenge is evident, though, as journalists seek to maintain their political neutrality 
while at the same time increasingly following and engaging with the political 
elite through social media (e.g., Ruoho & Kuusipalo, 2019). A recent broad-
ranging challenge for journalism is of course the post-truth discourse (e.g., 
fake news), whereby the core notion of news being trustworthy is challenged.
Media and elections
We discussed earlier how the onus to campaigns is mostly on the individual 
candidates in Finland and that this has shown in terms of campaign innova-
tion and rather quick adoption of new campaigning techniques. This has been 
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especially true regarding all forms of online campaigning ever since the Inter-
net rose to broader popularity in the 1990s and later on in the era of social 
media (see Carlson & Strandberg, 2012; Strandberg, 2013, 2016; Strandberg 
& Carlson, 2017). If we consider the main changes in the Finnish campaign 
landscape since the mid-2000s, the overarching observation is that Finnish 
campaigns have increasingly “gone digital”. This is not to say that traditional 
forms of campaigning such as television and newspaper ads, election posters, 
and rallies have vanished; these are still very much a part of Finnish campaigns 
(Carlson, 2017; Moring, 2017; Railo & Ruohonen, 2016). Another mainstay 
of Finnish campaigns that has been unaffected by the digitalisation trend is live 
television debates featuring party leaders, albeit these debates are now part 
of a cross-media landscape rather than isolated to one media outlet (see, e.g., 
Eloranta & Isotalus, 2016).
Nevertheless, it is clear that campaigns in Finland are predominantly mov-
ing more and more online and that the parties and politicians have gradually 
started to think in terms of long-tail campaign logic (Koster, 2009; Strandberg, 
2013). Essentially, the key difference between mass marketing and long-tail 
marketing is that the former seeks to mainly reach a large mass through few 
outlets, whereas the latter builds its “mass” through an array of narrowly 
niched campaigned nano messages disseminated through various channels (see 
Anderson, 2006). Indeed, looking over time at the development of the share of 
candidates having a campaign presence in various online outlets in conjunction 
with parliamentary elections (see Table 4.4), the fragmentation of the online 
campaign sphere is evident. 
Table 4.4 Candidates with online campaign presence in Finnish parliamentary election 











Websites 67 69 61 80 
Blogs 34 55 57 42 
YouTube videos 6 29 10 15 
Facebook – 88 73 87 
Twitter – 19 51 53 
Instagram – – 13 41 
Other social media – – 13 15 
Source: All data is original data collected by Strandberg in conjunction with elections (previous publications, 
e.g., Strandberg, 2009, 2012, 2016). 
For each election, there has been an online outlet which has suddenly surged 
in popularity among candidates running for election: blogs in 2007, Facebook 
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in 2011, Twitter in 2015, and Instagram in 2019. Taking a more detailed look 
at the latest campaign leading up to the April 2019 elections, 12 per cent of 
all candidates used five or more online applications in their campaigns, 38 per 
cent employed either three or four outlets, and half of the candidates used two 
or fewer. Throughout all of these elections, the same factors have predicted 
candidates’ online presence: running for a party with plenty of resources (i.e., 
the traditional big three of the Social Democratic Party, the Centre Party, or 
the National Coalition Party), being an incumbent MP, having a high educa-
tion, being young, and being female. As is the case in most developed countries, 
candidates running for the Greens have been quick to adopt online campaigning 
in Finland and are at the forefront in innovating online campaign techniques 
(see Strandberg, 2006, 2016). The Finns Party has also seized opportunities 
for disseminating its campaign messages via online outlets with highly viral 
campaigns in both the latest parliamentary and European Parliament elections.
An interesting development – which has also occurred in other Nordic 
countries – related to parties’ and politicians’ use of especially Twitter since 
the 2015 elections, is the emergence of what some observers (e.g., Ruoho & 
Kuusipalo, 2019; Vainikka & Huhtamäki, 2015; see also Fuchs, 2014: 199) 
call the Finnish “political Twitter elite”. In a way, this symbiosis has grown due 
to party leaders, other politicians, and journalists gaining from following and 
engaging with each other (Vainikka & Huhtamäki, 2015; see also Eloranta & 
Isotalus, 2016; Marttila et al., 2016; Ruoho & Kuusipalo, 2019). Twitter is a 
particularly effective channel through which journalists can, so to speak, smell 
a news story (e.g., Broersma & Graham, 2012; Verweij, 2012) and corresponds 
to the need of politicians to gain publicity during campaigns. This development 
is also interesting since a decreased political parallelism whereby Finnish jour-
nalists actively distanced themselves from the political elite was a clear trend in 
the late twentieth century. In a sense, this newly surged “Twitter bubble” thus 
represents a shift back towards potentially more political parallelism. Ruoho 
and Kuusipalo (2019) conclude their social network analysis by stating that 
the interdependence of journalists and politicians is increasing and forming a 
mediated elite, which reinforces existing power structures.
As has been evident thus far in this chapter, the general use of online media 
and the use of online outlets by the political elite has surged in Finland. In this 
section, we shed some light on how Finnish citizens use various media sources 
in conjunction with elections. As Table 4.5 shows, the development among 
citizens has been less dramatic than among the political elite.
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(18–24 yrs;  
n = 135)
Old media
TV-news and current affairs 66 68 58 65 39
Election debates or interviews 
on TV 43 53 44 56 36
TV entertainment feat.          
politicians 24 22 19 26 17
TV ads 34 20 19 n.a. n.a.
Newspaper columns or articles 49 54 44 48 37
Newspaper ads 40 32 23 n.a. n.a.
Radio programmes 17 19 18 18 10
New media
Party or candidate websites 7 10 9 12 23
Online election news 12 27 31 29 42
Online election coverage in 
general – – 11 30 44
Voting advice applications 
(VAAs) 13 20 26 32 59
Blogs 3 5 6 6 9
YouTube – 3 8 12 27
Social media – 9 15 24 44
Source: The Finnish National Election Survey datasets for respective election years. Data for 2007–2015 available 
at the Finnish Social Science Data Archive.3
One trend is that the use of traditional information sources is strong and stable 
across time while there is, simultaneously, a clear uptick in the use of online 
sources. Some indications of the aforementioned general media use trend of online 
versions replacing offline equivalents can also be seen in the rise of online news 
sources and online election coverage in general. Among the youngest age group 
(the column furthest to the right), young Finns’ high level of Internet and social 
media use is also reflected in how they seek election-related information. Thus, 
VAAs are the most popular, followed by social media, online election coverage 
in general, and online news. VAAs, which are often provided by both public and 
private news corporations, were adopted earlier in Finland than in other Nordic 
countries, with the first one launched already in the 1999 parliamentary election 
campaign (Mykkänen & Moring, 2006). These have become a popular mainstay 
and one of the focal points of media attention in contemporary Finnish cam-
paigns. The popularity of VAAs in Finland is understandable, since they provide a 
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quick and accessible way for voters to find suitable candidates among the several 
hundred that run for parliament in every electoral district. In fact, 36 per cent of 
all voters and more than 80 per cent of the youngest voters in 2019 stated that 
VAAs had influenced their voting decisions “rather much” or “very much”. As we 
touched upon earlier, Finnish news media often also use the candidate responses 
to VAAs as sources for news during the campaign. Thus, in a sense, VAAs form 
one of the cores of the contemporary Finnish election media ecology.
Theoretical perspectives, research foci,  
methods, and challenges
Hardly surprising, and similar to all Nordic countries, the concept of mediatisa-
tion can be deemed as relevant when seeking a broad theoretical understanding 
of the developments described in this chapter. We argue that the current situation 
in Finland mostly resembles what Strömbäck (2008) depicts as the third phase 
of mediatisation. Accordingly, the role of media logic in politics is important 
but yet to be fully incorporated into everyday politics, and media are still re-
garded as external to political actors. Finnish parties and their politicians clearly 
realise the importance of getting attention, but most of them are, so to speak, 
still learning the ropes regarding the most efficient way to do so. This has been 
accentuated in the social media era where most parties and candidates know 
that campaigning in social media is necessary but not all of them know how 
to get the most out of it. Whether Finland will ever reach Strömbäck’s (2008) 
fourth phase of mediatisation is hard to tell. In a sense, Finnish society as a 
whole is less (or more slowly at least) affected by global megatrends depicted 
in the media – for instance #metoo and #FridaysForFuture – whereby media 
coverage is certainly vast, but the magnitude of impact on the public, except 
for certain urban segments of society, is fairly modest. Tentatively, a full-scale 
mediatisation is therefore unlikely in a society where a certain cultural resistance 
to new mediated events is evident. This situation is even further accentuated by 
how Finnish populist politicians tend to have a more critical or sceptical stance 
towards news media, journalists, and the agenda-setting role of traditional news 
media. In the 2019 campaign, for instance, a leading and successful theme for 
the Finns Party was that there had already been enough talk about the climate 
and that Finland had done more than its share on the issue.
Since the mediatisation thesis is more of a grand theory on the influence of 
media logic in politics and the public space, its applicability is arguably lim-
ited in other areas, for instance in understanding the developments regarding 
the growth of online media usage in general, the shifts from offline to online 
news outlets, as well as the increasing role of the Internet and social media 
depicted in this chapter (see also Schulz, 2014). In that respect, we find that 
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the concept of a hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2017) is better equipped 
to explain the current situation in Finland. Thus, the rapid growth of social 
media has undoubtedly led to the media logic of old and new blending, while, 
at the same time, new media has not replaced the old. Thus, new media prac-
tices working according to crowdsourced bottom-up logics have emerged and 
grown alongside the elite-driven traditional mass media practices with the 
one-to-many logic of communication. To some extent, it is perceivable that 
traditional media power is challenged by these developments. However, the 
Finnish mass media broadcasters of old, such as the public broadcaster YLE, 
other commercial companies, and the bigger newspapers, have adapted rather 
quickly and now maintain modern state-of-the-art online presences which, as 
demonstrated in Table 4.3, have quickly become immensely popular among 
the citizens. Consequently, while still being a society with high levels of news 
consumption, Finland is in a transition concerning where this consumption takes 
place, from offline to online platforms. An important observation is that the 
competition for attention is much more equal in the hybrid media stage than 
it was in the era of mass media. Rather ironically, media actors themselves are 
now competing for attention with citizens and politicians, instead of the latter 
two being dependent on media for being noticed.
In summary, the two broad theories of mediatisation and hybrid media 
systems emanate an understanding of media and politics in Finland with two 
levels, one regarding the impact of media logic in the public space and one 
regarding the contexts of this same space. This forms an analytical framework 
depicted in Figure 4.1. 
Figure 4.1 Theoretical summary of media and politics in Finland























Finland, we argue, is now situated in the middle ground of this interplay be-
tween mediatisation and hybridisation. If any prediction for the future is to 
be made, the obvious development is that the relative influence of the online 
context will grow even stronger.
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We now move from broad theoretical perspectives to what we would call 
a meta-perspective on the Finnish political communication research field. We 
provide an overview of the topical and methodological trends during the last 
decade in Finnish research on political communication. Given how digitalisa-
tion has been the major trend in media usage in general, and regarding the use 
of media in conjunction with elections, it is hardly surprising that the major 
foci of Finnish political communication research is on social media, and cur-
rently especially Twitter. So-called online filter bubbles and their connection 
to societal polarisation have also been key research topics (see Nelimarkka et 
al., 2018), and national funding has been granted on the topic to several com-
munication research projects.4 Nevertheless, there are still studies in which 
broader overviews of election campaigns and the public discourse in the media 
are conducted (e.g., Hatakka et al., 2013; Moring & Mykkänen, 2012; Railo 
& Ruohonen, 2016) as well as studies of traditional campaign communica-
tion such as election posters (Carlson et al., 2017) and political advertising on 
television (Moring, 2017). The general patterns of online electoral competition 
within the theoretical framework of normalisation or equalisation (Margolis & 
Resnick, 2000) are also still studied in conjunction with elections (Strandberg, 
2009, 2016). Likewise, Strandberg (2013, 2016) has also studied how voters’ 
use of online media in conjunction with elections correspond to Norris’s (1999) 
well-known perspective of mobilisation versus reinforcement. Rather interest-
ingly, Strandberg (e.g., 2016) has found that the more online campaigning in 
Finland has matured, the more normalised (i.e., dominated by big parties) it 
has become, albeit with some indication of mobilisation evident among voters.
The recent wave of Twitter studies (e.g., Eloranta & Isotalus, 2016; Marttila 
et al., 2016; Vainikka & Huhtamäki, 2015) has generally focused on describ-
ing the topics and scope of Twitter as a space for public discourse, as well 
as how Twitter mirrors election debates on television (Eloranta & Isotalus, 
2016). There is also some emerging research in which both direct and indirect 
influence of social media on citizens’ political engagement is studied (e.g., Suu-
ronen, 2018). As discussed earlier, the findings indicate that something of an 
elite Twitter bubble is discernible in Finland (Vainikka & Huhtamäki, 2015) 
even though, as Eloranta and Isotalus (2016) note, Twitter is very much still 
a marginal phenomenon in Finland. This echoes findings from other Nordic 
countries (e.g., Larsson & Moe, 2012) and indicates that Twitter is receiving a 
disproportional amount of scholarly attention. Of course, the main reason for 
the hype with Twitter studies is the ease through which massive amounts of 
data can be obtained through the Twitter application programming interface.
This leads us to a second observation regarding the contemporary political 
communication research in Finland: methodological developments. Above all, 
big data studies have become common and Twitter is their main focus (see Laak-
sonen et al., 2013, 2017). In order to study massive amounts of data, several 
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automated methods of both collecting and analysing data have increasingly 
been employed. Two interesting trends are how classic social science methods 
such as network analysis (see Laaksonen et al., 2013) and content analysis (see 
Nelimarkka, 2019) have been adapted to the social media era. An array of 
experimental studies in citizens’ online discussions have also been conducted 
in the last decade (e.g., Grönlund et al., 2009; Strandberg, 2015; Strandberg & 
Berg, 2015; Strandberg et al., 2019). An interesting new development concerning 
data availability is the fact that some media publishers, such as YLE,5 regularly 
release the underlying data from their VAAs for use by the research community. 
Moving forward, it seems to us that big data studies of social media will grow 
even more. The ongoing trend that Finnish political communication scholars 
predominantly focus on digital media will thus continue as well.
There are, however, some challenges that contemporary political commu-
nication research faces. One is, so to speak, to put the “political” back in po-
litical communication research. The abundance of available data has brought 
with it the side effect of making research rather data driven and focused on 
the communication technology. Rather often, actual research questions seem 
to be afterthoughts, and theoretical knowledge of political science guiding the 
analysis of social media data is lacking. A similar backfire effect of the current 
trend of big data in research is that very few scholars look at the depth of po-
litical use of social media. Qualitative methods, which would provide depth to 
the picture of social media in political communication, are seldom used. Other 
challenges for the field are methodological in nature. Data access has become 
more difficult in the wake of the Cambridge Analytica scandal and Facebook’s 
decision to close access to its application programming interface. Likewise, the 
General Data Protection Regulation has imposed restrictions that affect what 
scholars are able to do with social media data.
Conclusion: Same but different? 
In this chapter, we have demonstrated that several broad changes have occurred 
in the recent decade regarding the Finnish parties and election results, the 
media habits of the Finnish people, the channels candidates and parties use in 
campaigns, and the ways in which citizens seek information about elections. 
Moreover, the hybrid media system is very much in effect by now with all major 
media actors being active on cross-platform outlets and Twitter serving as an 
arena for interaction between the political and media elites. Communication 
scholars have shifted most of their attention to social media, and big data 
studies are predominant among younger scholars. However, are these devel-
opments in any way different from the other Nordic countries, and is Finland 
still something of an odd case within the Nordic context? In many ways, most 
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of the abovementioned developments are not unique to Finland. In fact, most 
chapters of this anthology describe similar changes in their respective countries, 
in as much as populists have strong electoral support in all Nordic countries, 
citizens use digital media to an ever-increasing degree, and the coupling between 
offline and online media is continuously growing. Of course, these trends are 
not only Nordic, but global. Where Finland still stands out, we would argue, 
concerns not so much the media-related developments, but the fact that the 
political system remains an exception within the Nordic context. For instance, 
the typical Finnish oversized coalition governments have continued to be the 
norm in the last decade. Moreover, the candidate-centred campaigning, and 
how this is linked to innovation in campaign communication, also stands 
out in a Nordic comparison. Additionally, the current trends within political 
communication research in Finland appear, at least on the surface, to be more 
streamlined than in other Nordic countries. To conclude, on the one hand, 
Finland and all Nordic countries are clearly part of global megatrends that, to 
some extent, render the political communication environments more similar. 
On the other hand, this chapter, like others in this anthology, shows that every 
country is unique and adapts these trends to fit the national culture of politics 
and communication. So, perhaps the political communication systems in the 
Nordic countries are more similar than they were ten years ago, but, at the 
same time, they remain different from each other.  
Notes
 1. We wish to thank professor emeritus Tom Moring for inspiration, some background data, 
and ideas for structuring this chapter. Needless to say, the content is solely our responsibility. 
 2. https://tulospalvelu.vaalit.fi/
 3. 2007 dataset: FSD2269; 2011 dataset: FSD2653; 2015 dataset: FSD3067; 2019 dataset: not 
yet archived (https://www.fsd.tuni.fi/en/).
 4. One example of such a project is “BIBU – Tackling Biases and Bubbles in Participation”, led 
by professor Anu Kantola at the University of Helsinki.
 5. See, for instance, https://yle.fi/uutiset/3-10725384 
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Chapter 5
Media and politics in Norway
Eli Skogerbø & Rune Karlsen
Abstract
This chapter discusses the development of the Norwegian political and media 
systems. Norway is a small, stable, established welfare democracy characterised 
by a constitutional monarchy, unitary structure, parliamentary government, 
proportional representation election system, multiparty politics, and coalition 
governments. The main characteristics of the media system are that it is digital 
and “hybrid”, as literally all legacy media (television, broadcasting, newspapers – 
national, regional, and local) are produced, distributed, and consumed on multiple 
platforms. In this chapter, we discuss Norwegian political communication research, 
emphasising the dominating theoretical strands that can be singled out for this 
particular national research community: election communication, social media 
and politics, political journalism, public-sphere studies, and studies of political 
rhetoric. In conclusion, we discuss some future challenges related to developments 
in the political sphere and media environment, highlighting disruptive changes in 
the media and new political issues. 
Keywords: Norway, political system, media system, political communication, 
Nordic countries
Introduction
In 2020, Norway can be described as a digital society. News media, public 
administration, and civic organisations have implemented digital services that 
are available on the Internet and on mobile platforms and used by a large ma-
jority of the citizens. Political actors such as parties, organisations, media, and 
journalists are seasoned users and producers of digital political news and social 
media, well versed in the still existing media logics, and exploit the options of 
the hybrid media system (Chadwick, 2017).
This chapter takes these observations as a starting point and introduces 
the structures and factors of Norwegian political communications by covering 
four main features. First, we describe the main features of the political and 
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media systems. Then we discuss the different aspects of Norwegian political 
communication research, and finally we address future challenges related to 
developments in the political sphere and media environment. 
We start by outlining the main institutions and actors within the Norwegian 
political system, pointing to the increasing number of political parties that have 
gained representation in parliament and the growing amount of political actors 
that influence agenda-setting and policy-making. Then the media system is out-
lined and discussed. Norway is a clear example of a public media system with 
a strong public service institution: the Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation 
(NRK). NRK has maintained its position into the digital age in combination 
with other privately owned and funded local and nationwide broadcasters and 
newspapers, most of which have grown into multiplatform news providers. We 
see major shifts in the distribution and consumption patterns of all types of 
media content, creating clearer sociodemographic divides in audiences than were 
the case some decades ago. Further, we outline what we regard as some main 
strands of theories that have been applied in political communication research 
(Ihlen et al., 2015), most importantly institutional perspectives on media and 
politics. Among these are the mediatisation perspective (Lundby, 2009) and its 
forerunners (Altheide & Snow, 1979; Asp, 1986; Hernes, 1977). Other, and 
related, perspectives are those tied to election research, political journalism, 
lobbying, and rhetoric. Within these fields we find studies from several different 
disciplines, such as media studies, political science, sociology, social anthropol-
ogy, history, and rhetoric. Throughout the chapter, we point to practices and 
research that distinguish Norway from Denmark, Iceland, Sweden, and Finland. 
The political system 
Norway is a small, stable, established welfare democracy, characterised by a 
constitutional monarchy, unitary structure, parliamentary government, propor-
tional representation election system, multiparty politics, and coalition govern-
ments (Lijphart, 2013). Like Iceland and Finland, Norway has a colonial past 
and a rather short history as an independent state. Independence dates from 
1905, when the union with Sweden was peacefully dissolved, but a separate 
constitution was already in place from 1814, written in a short interlude after 
the Napoleonic wars when Norway was transferred from Denmark to Sweden. 
The Swedish king recognised most parts of the constitution and allowed for 
extensive and increasing Norwegian self-governance, parliamentary government 
(from 1884), and a comparatively strong system of local governance to be set 
up prior to independence (Myhre, 2015). 
In terms of political communication, a rather interesting point is that the 
Constitution Day, 17 May, has grown into a world-famous folk festival and 
93
5. MEDIA AND POLITICS IN NORWAY
media event. The 17 May celebrations attract hundreds of thousands of lo-
cals and tourists all over the country who watch the children’s parades and 
listen to speeches about the value of democratic government, rule of law, and 
freedom of speech. As a media event, 17 May is on all channels, from NRK’s 
multichannel broadcasts that cover both the capital and smaller municipalities 
throughout the entire country, to social media posts and local and hyperlocal 
newspaper coverage. Within the Nordic countries, this massive celebration of 
the democratic political system is unique to Norway, and in Anderson’s (2006) 
now famous phrase, a specific marking of the “imagined community” that the 
Norwegian polity rests on. The Norwegian population is – historically and 
currently – multilingual and multiethnic, with a dominant Norwegian-speaking 
majority, a small indigenous population (the Sámi), and, like the other Nordic 
countries, several other small “national” minorities. Over the past five decades, 
immigration from non-Nordic countries has increased, and thereby also the 
number of cultural and religious minorities, creating a diverse, multilingual, 
and multicultural society. 
Economically and industrially, Norway stands out from the other Nordic 
countries as a major producer of oil and gas. The petroleum industry employs 
– directly and indirectly – around 170,000 people. The main political impact 
of the oil industry, however, can be found in the Government Pension Fund 
Act, which manages the popularly termed “Oil Fund”, which ensures long-term 
management of the petroleum industry’s public revenues for future generations. 
The Oil Fund was established in 1996 and rested on a long-term political con-
sensus that the oil industry should be regulated to secure Norwegian interests 
in the resources and revenues. In 2019, the fund reached a value of NOK10 
billion (Norges Bank, 2020), and is a major asset for Norwegian governments 
for securing and financing the welfare state, mitigating crises, and for inter-
national investmest. Increasingly and expectedly the policies and investments 
in the petroleum industry are causing political conflicts, as it contributes to 
emissions from fossil fuels and climate problems.
Governance and representative systems
Unlike Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, Norway is not a member of the Eu-
ropean Union. Nevertheless, it is, together with Iceland (and Liechtenstein) 
included in the European Single Market through the European Economic Area 
Agreement, meaning that European legislation and regulation concerning all 
matters – including free movement of goods, services, labour, and capital – are 
either directly or indirectly included in Norwegian law and regulation. In the 
media and communications sector, this includes regulations concerning au-
diovisual services, e-commerce, telecommunications, privacy, and many other 
related areas. Like the other Nordic countries, Norway is a member of the 
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European Council and has implemented the European Convention on Human 
Rights into their constitution. 
The parliament, the Storting, has 169 members, elected for four-year periods. 
The electoral system is based on proportional representation, a closed-list sys-
tem, and a modified Sainte-Laguë formula that has been in use since the 1950s. 
The 19 constituencies were, until 2017, identical to the country regions, and 
district magnitude (the number of seats from a district) ranges from 4 to 20. 
Despite recent regional reforms, the constituencies will be kept as they were in 
2017 until 2025 (Regjeringen, 2020). 
Over the second half of the twentieth century, a series of electoral reforms, 
aimed at greater proportionality in representation, were implemented. A pool 
of national second-tier seats were introduced, and from the 2005 election, the 
number of adjustment seats was 19, equalling the number of county constitu-
encies. Parties must obtain 4 per cent of the national vote to be eligible for 
adjustment seats. The overall partisan proportionality has been enhanced since 
the introduction of the adjustment seats (Aardal, 2011).
In national parliamentary elections, which take place on a Monday in Sep-
tember every four years, it is in practice not possible for voters to change the 
ranking of the candidates on the party list, as it requires a high share of voters 
making the exact same changes. Moreover, political parties recruit candidates 
for parliament through nomination processes in which local branch delegates 
meet at county nomination conventions to finalise the list. Recently, however, 
there has been a tendency for some county party branches to open their nomina-
tion process to allow greater participation by registered party members (Narud, 
2008). Still, decentralised decision-making remains the norm in Norway, making 
the county party branches the decisive arena for parliamentary nominations 
(Valen et al., 2002). Hence, candidate selection procedures – in combination 
with the absence of preferential voting – leave parties with considerable control 
over parliamentary nominations. The Norwegian case may thus be regarded 
as more party-controlled than its Nordic neighbours (Narud et al., 2002; see 
also Hopmann & Karlsen, Chapter 11). 
Local and regional elections also take place every four years between parlia-
mentary elections and return representatives to the (from 2020) 356 municipal 
and 10 regional councils. In practice, this arrangement means that Norwegian 
voters experience election campaigns in September every two years. Voters 
choose between parties listing pre-ranked candidates. In local and regional elec-
tions, the regulation allows for preference voting and to some extent results in 
changes in the ranking of candidates. Election campaign periods are in practice 
divided into long-term (6–12 months before an election) and the intense short-
term (the last four weeks before election day) election campaign periods, for 
both national and local elections (Aardal et al., 2004).
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From 1989, the Sámi Parliament, the representative body for the Sámi 
population, is elected on the same day as the national parliament. It has 39 
members representing seven constituencies covering the entire country. The Sámi 
Parliament was established by constitutional amendments and has consultative 
powers and may consider any issue it considers relevant (Josefsen et al., 2017; 
see also Josefsen & Skogerbø, Chapter 10).
The parties
The multiparty system originates from what Rokkan (1967) called cross-cutting 
social and political cleavages in Norwegian society. As in Denmark and Fin-
land, the Nordic five-party model yielded to a more fragmented party system 
long ago. Placed from the political left to the political right, nine parties were 
represented in parliament in 2020: the Red Party (R), the Socialist Left Party 
(SV), the Labour Party (A), the Green Party (MDG), the Centre Party (Sp), the 
Christian Democrats (KrF), the Liberal Party (V), the Conservative Party (H), 
and the Progress Party (FrP). 
Norway’s first two political parties, the Liberal Party and the Conservative 
Party, were formed in 1884. They grew out of the territorial and cultural cleav-
ages between the centre and the periphery. The Conservative Party eventually 
became the party for the growing group of industrial leaders and other business 
people and has always balanced conservative values against liberal business val-
ues (Heidar & Saglie, 2002). The Labour Party, founded in 1887, was based in 
the labour movement and became increasingly central to Norwegian democratic 
politics throughout the twentieth century. The party sat with a majority in the 
Storting from 1945 to 1961 and was central to the development of the welfare 
state. The Christian Democrats was founded in 1933 and has its roots in lay 
Christianity, a movement that to some degree was in opposition to the state 
church, whereas the party in recent decades considers itself a general Christian 
democratic party (Heidar & Saglie, 2002). The Centre Party was formed in 1921 
under the name of the Farmer Party and has particularly defended primary and 
district interests in Norwegian politics (Heidar & Saglie, 2002). The Socialist 
Left Party (first as the Socialist People’s Party) was formed in 1958 based on a 
major disagreement within the Labour Party regarding the NATO issue. The 
party is to the left of the Labour Party (E. Allern et al., 2016), and obtained 
issue ownership on the environmental issue (Heidar & Saglie, 2002). The Red 
Party has its roots in old Norwegian communist parties and was formed in 2007 
through a merger of the Workers’ Communist Party and the Red Electoral Alli-
ance. The Progress Party was formed in 1973 on the basis of a protest movement 
against high taxes and fees. The party is considered a populist right party and 
has since the 1980s profiled itself as a party opposing immigration. Recently, 
the environmental Green Party finally had its parliamentary breakthrough and 
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added to the plethora of Norwegian parties. Table 5.1 gives an overview of the 
electoral success of the political parties since 2005. 
Table 5.1 Election results and voter turnout (per cent), and governments, 2005–2017
2005 2009 2013 2017
Red Party                
(Red Electoral Alliance)a 1.2 1.3 1.1 2.4
Socialist Left Party 8.8 6.2 4.1 6.0
Labour Party 32.7 35.4 30.8 27.4
Centre Party 6.5 6.2 5.5 10.3
Green Party –b 0.3 2.8 3.2
Christian Democrats 6.8 5.5 5.6 4.2
Liberal Party 5.9 3.9 5.2 4.4
Conservative Party 14.1 17.2 26.8 25.0
Progress Party 22.1 22.9 16.3 15.2
Others 1.9 0.9 1.6 1.8
Voter turnout 77.1 76.0 78.2 78.3













a The Red Electoral Alliance dissolved in 2007 and was reorganised into the Red Party in the same year.
b The Green Party is included in Others.
c The Liberal Party joined in January 2018 and the Christian Democratic Party in January 2019. The Progress 
Party left in January 2020.
Source: Valgresultat.no, 2018; Bjørklund, 2005 
Turnout in Norwegian national elections dropped somewhat in the late 1980s, 
but on average, more than three-fourths (about 77%) of the Norwegian elector-
ate participate in parliamentary elections. As discussed in Chapter 11 (Hopmann 
& Karlsen), this is a comparatively high turnout level, but still somewhat lower 
than Sweden and Denmark. 
The traditional left-right conflicts, such as jobs, taxation, welfare issues, 
health, and education, continue to be important in each election (Bergh & 
Karlsen, 2019), but other issues have been instrumental in changing the party 
system. These changes reflect both sociodemographic changes in the electorate 
as well as changing conflict patterns. As mentioned above, increased importance 
of climate and environmental issues has opened for the Green Party. Issues 
concerning immigration or refugee and asylum politics have been returning 
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to the political agenda since the 1980s, despite the fact that Norway has had 
strict immigration laws and, compared to Sweden, received a relatively small 
number of refugees over the past decades. Neither are there any foreseeable 
changes concerning immigration policies, as there is a broad alliance in parlia-
ment supporting the current policies. Nevertheless, the issue continues to have 
mobilising potentials both for the Progress Party and for splitting other parties, 
such as the Labour Party.
Parliamentary government entails that governments are formed based on 
support in parliament. In Norway, a majority is not needed to form a govern-
ment, but the government must resign if a majority expresses no confidence. 
This is labelled negative parliamentarism. Minority governments have been 
the norm in much of the postwar period, meaning that the parties forming the 
Cabinet have to negotiate political outcomes with the opposition in parliament. 
Majority governments were less frequent until 2005, when the Labour Party, 
for the first time, led a coalition including the Socialist Left Party and the Centre 
Party. The coalition remained in power until 2013, when the Red-Green major-
ity lost the election. From 2013 until 2020, the Conservative Party led shifting 
coalitions, for the first time involving the Progress Party, and from 2019 to 
2020, a majority government. The successful cooperation by the non-socialist 
parties in government was long regarded as the breakthrough of bloc politics 
until the Progress Party left the coalition in January 2020.
Coalition-building and compromise-formation – rather than consensus – are 
as typical traits of Norwegian governments as they are of the other Nordic 
countries (see Chapters 2, 3, 4, & 6). The foundation of the welfare state 
relies on the corporatist structure that involves concerned interests in policy 
formation (Pedersen & Kuhnle, 2017). Collaboration, negotiations, and 
agreements between industry, trade unions, and the state form main pillars of 
the welfare state and secure high employment rates among both women and 
men. Although the current importance and strength of the corporatist system 
is disputed – as Rommetvedt (2017) argues in a recent analysis of corporatism 
in the Nordic countries – Norwegian politics in 2020 still show many signs of 
corporate negotiations. A recent example can be found in the report preceding 
the 2019 white paper on media policy (Meld. St. 17 [2018–2019]), prepared by 
a committee which involved all main-sector interests (Mediemangfoldsutval-
get, 2017). Over the past few decades and in line with developments in other 
Nordic countries, lobbying has become more important, both as a channel of 
influence and as a profitable industry. A discussion has ensued regarding the 
relationship between the lobbying channel and the corporatist channel (see 
Ihlen et al., Chapter 15).
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The media system 
On any ranking of freedom of expression, transparency, and journalistic 
autonomy, Norway and the other Nordic countries rank high (Nielsen et al., 
2019). These features are anchored in the constitution (§100) which states that 
it is a state responsibility to secure means for societal dialogue and informa-
tion provision for citizens. A number of legislative and regulatory measures 
have been implemented to secure this along with integration of international 
conventions into the media legislation. As discussed in Chapter 1, Norway 
was placed, with the other Nordic countries, as a democratic corporatist type 
in the now seminal book on comparing media systems by Hallin and Mancini 
(2004). Further, media and communications policies have clear traits of being 
set up within the framework of the welfare state – as particularly Syvertsen 
and colleagues (2014) have argued – and with characteristics shared with the 
other Nordic countries (Ohlsson, 2015; Skogerbø et al., Chapter 1). In 2020, 
the main characteristics of the media system are that it is digital and “hybrid”, 
as literally all legacy media (television, broadcasting, newspapers – national, 
regional, and local) are produced, distributed, and consumed on multiple 
platforms. Whereas most newspapers may be found in print versions, digital 
subscriptions have increased steeply, in contrast to most other countries (New-
man et al., 2019). The broadcasters operate traditional radio and television 
channels, but their offerings are available online and on mobile apps, too. Within 
this hybrid system, NRK has retained – and, it can be argued, strengthened – 
its role as a producer of national and regional news as well as of traditional 
and innovative media content in all genres. Although the traditional role as a 
nation-building institution no longer means standardisation of language and 
culture, the remit of NRK states that the institution has the responsibility to 
provide programmes for the entire population, with specific responsibilities for 
producing programmes in Norwegian and Sámi as well as catering to other 
linguistic, ethnic, and cultural minorities. These demands are met in different 
ways: by maintaining a continuous presence and production of news in all 
regions of the country; by producing shows and entertainment that address 
the diversity of the Norwegian population (e.g., the web-series Skam [Shame] 
and the music competition show Stjernekamp [Star fight]); and by producing 
content that is distributed and streamed on several platforms (e.g., Sakte-TV 
[Slow-TV] productions and the television series Exit). 
The funding and subsidy system and the public service media with “arm’s 
length” distance to the state are among the fundamental pillars of the welfare 
state system. Media subsidies in the form of various support mechanisms make 
up the second main tool for maintaining the media infrastructure. The largest 
subsidies are exemptions from value added tax for print and online newspapers 
(which is an indirect subsidy), and the direct subsidies – before 2020, licence 
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fees, and from 2020 onwards, taxes – that fund NRK. Less in volume but 
attracting more public attention are the direct subsidies that are allocated to 
media, mainly newspapers that have secondary positions in competitive markets 
and small local newspapers or newspapers that serve minority groups (e.g., 
linguistic, ethnic, cultural, or religious). 
Localism and decentralisation make up a considerable part of Norwegian 
political and media history (see also Lindén et al., Chapter 8). Understanding 
the history of local media means understanding the rise and growth of three 
central elements in the formation of Norwegian society: how the media, which 
initially only encompassed local newspapers, have voiced diverse political, 
economic, and cultural interests (Mathisen & Morlandstø, 2019); how the 
welfare state has shaped the communication structures and to some extent vice 
versa (Ahva et al., 2017); and how local media and local journalism have been 
instrumental to two conflicting lines of development, namely standardisation 
and assimilation, and diversity and localism (Skogerbø, 2020). Local media 
structures have remained remarkably stable in spite of the technological and 
economic shifts that have seriously altered media production, distribution, and 
consumption. More than 25 years have passed since the Internet was commer-
cialised, during which local journalism practices and local media have met with 
disruptive innovations that they have had to adapt to and incorporate (Olsen 
& Solvoll, 2018a, 2018b). What needs explanation then is not the changes, 
but the apparent stability of the structure. Decentralisation has not only re-
mained, it has increased, both in newspaper titles, in the increasing support to 
regionalisation of NRK’s programme, and in the stability of independent local 
broadcasting. These trends have appeared parallel to the disruptions of market 
models, consumption habits, and format changes in the media business, and 
indicate that localism, one of the deep structures of Norwegian society, may 
indeed be a characteristic of the Norwegian media structure in the foreseeable 
future (Skogerbø, 2020).
Social media, such as YouTube, Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, Snapchat, 
and TikTok, are partly substituting for, partly adding to, the legacy media as 
channels for production, distribution, and consumption of both legacy media 
and user-generated content. Further, a range of new service providers, such as 
the most well-known streaming services Spotify, Tidal, Netflix, HBO, and many 
more, have entered the media market over the past decades. Concurrently – as 
in the other Nordic countries except Iceland – immigration has, over the past 
decades, become a recurring political issue that has mobilised populist politics 
and fed into a new type of media: the alt right “alternative media” (see Herkman 
& Jungar, Chapter 12; Ihlebæk & Nygaard, Chapter 13).
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Media users
As in the other Nordic countries, media habits and consumption patterns have 
to a large degree shifted to digital platforms (See Figure 5.1).







 2003/ 2004/ 2005/ 2006/ 2007/ 2008/ 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
  Newspaper  TV  Radio  Internet  Mobile phone
Comments: The figure shows the results of a survey asking the participants what their most important news 
source is. Mobile phones were only included in the survey between 2008/2009–2013. With regard to newspapers, 
the figures refer to print copies.
Source: Medienorge, 2019a
Figure 5.1 shows that the Internet has become the overall most important source 
for news consumption, a pattern that is common to all Nordic countries. The 
figure shows those who agree as to what news source is their most important 
one as well as changes over time. The decline in importance is sharpest for 
newspapers and least dramatic for radio. The Internet has undoubtedly taken 
over as the most important source. From the figures in Figure 5.1, we cannot 
differentiate between the websites of news media, social media, and other 
Internet sources; nevertheless, Figure 5.1 clearly illustrates the major shifts in 
consumption patterns that have taken place after 2000. When looking at age 
differences, statistics show that Internet sources are the most important for those 
under 40. These groups are also less likely to read local newspapers, watch 
television, or listen to radio news (Medienorge, 2019a, 2019b). 
Research strands in Norwegian political communication 
Political communication researchers in Norway have been and still are located 
at different institutions and tied to many different disciplines, such as media 
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studies, media sociology, political science, rhetoric, law, and more (Ihlen et al., 
2015). In the following, we outline some strands of research that have been 
prominent in the past decades.
Election studies
One strand stems from election studies, with the very early study of voters’ 
preferences for newspapers in the 1957 parliamentarian election as its first 
example (Rokkan & Torsvik, 1960). This early publication revealed that vot-
ers of different party affiliations with access to newspapers did not necessarily 
read their own party outlet, but they selected their newspapers for more reasons 
than party preference. Neither did this first study – inspired by and yielding 
results in line with Paul Lazarsfeld’s two-step hypothesis (Lazarsfeld et al., 
1948) – provide much support for strong media effects on voting behaviour. It 
was suggested that the news media had few direct effects on political behaviour, 
a finding corroborated by many international studies, and a period of theoris-
ing later termed “the phase of powerless media” by Swedish media researcher 
Kent Asp (1986). This line of continued studies of individual media effects has 
also permanently been included in the election studies surveys in the form of 
questions about information sources for voters (e.g., Karlsen & Aalberg, 2015). 
More recently, the election study project also fields a separate campaign panel 
study emphasising media use and changes during the campaign (Haugsgjerd et 
al., 2019). More sporadically, studies of election reporting have been added to 
the election studies (Aardal et al., 2004; S. Allern, 2011) thereby adding insights 
and theories from agenda-setting studies, framing, and political journalism to 
election studies (Thorbjørnsrud, 2009). Since 2009, election studies have also 
included surveys of the candidates running for parliamentary elections, and 
the research focus has been on candidate campaigning, particularly their com-
municative efforts (Karlsen & Enjolras, 2016; Karlsen & Skogerbø, 2015). In 
recent years, the professionalisation of political communication and political 
parties has also begun to receive scholarly attention (Karlsen, 2010, 2019). The 
involvement of communication professionals in party politics and campaigning 
is clearly a relevant topic for future research, not only in Norway, but in the 
other Nordic democracies, too (see Chapters 2, 3, 4, & 6).
Social media and politics
Over the past decade, election studies have included a range of studies on how 
social media have been implemented in political communication in general, 
and in election campaign communication in particular (Kalsnes et al., 2017), 
which is the second strand of research in Norwegian political communication. 
In particular, Twitter, and to some extent Facebook – new channels for politi-
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cal actors to mobilise members, followers, and voters – have attracted much 
scholarly attention. Quite early, methods were developed to collect and analyse 
Twitter data that gave room for comparative studies across elections and coun-
tries (Larsson & Moe, 2012, 2014; Moe & Larsson, 2013). Enli and Skogerbø 
(2013) noted that social media such as Facebook and Twitter rapidly became 
campaigning tools for parties and individual candidates, seemingly reinforcing 
the image of “celebrity politicians” and extending the room for personal cam-
paigning in a party-centred system. Other studies show a variety of interactive 
social media practices among politicians and parties (Larsson, 2014; Larsson 
& Skogerbø, 2016); between and within political systems (Enli & Moe, 2015); 
and between politicians representing small and large parties, to mention some 
of the aspects that have been addressed. One line of research is the series of 
studies on how political actors use social media to interact with voters (Enli, 
2015; Karlsen & Enjolras, 2016). Karlsen and colleagues have, in a number of 
publications, discussed how social media influence and shape political debates. 
Among other issues, they have studied the echo chamber hypothesis, that is, 
whether the fragmentation of the media leads to formation of closed rooms, 
echo chambers (Sunstein, 2007), or filter bubbles (Pariser, 2011). In line with 
international findings (Bruns, 2019), there is little evidence in the Norwegian 
studies that social media lead to fragmentation to the degree that these theories 
suggest (Karlsen, 2015; Karlsen et al., 2017). In sum, these studies show that 
social media have extended the political space for interaction between politi-
cians and other societal groups. This is true not only in a quantitative sense – by 
adding to the sheer number of places where communication takes place – but 
is also valid in qualitative terms, as this plethora of services all feature different 
affordances allowing for various types of staging, interaction, and performances.
Media distortion, mediatisation, and political journalism
A third strand that has been important for decades started with an article by 
Norwegian sociologist and co-leader of the first Power Project, Gudmund 
Hernes (1977). Hernes argued – in line with the thesis on limited media effects 
on political attitudes – that the media may have little influence on attitudes 
and direct decision-making, but considerable power in “distorting” the way 
politics is meditated and communicated. This distortion took place by way 
of the media adapting political messages to media formats as well as pressure 
groups adapting their messages to fit with journalistic criteria. The concept 
was developed in later publications (Eide & Hernes, 1987) and has remained a 
major theory in Norwegian studies of media power (Sæbø & Slaatta, 1997). The 
early publications foreran the later concepts of “media logic’” (Altheide, 2013; 
Altheide & Snow, 1979) and “mediatisation”, first formulated by Asp (1986) and 
later developed by Knut Lundby (2009), Jesper Strömbäck (Esser & Strömbäck, 
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2014; Strömbäck, 2008), Stig Hjarvard (2013), and many others inside and 
outside the Nordic countries. The influence of the early conceptualisation of 
media influence as having a distorting influence on politics remained a theme 
in Norwegian political communication (Aalberg & Curran, 2012; Aalberg & 
Jenssen, 2007), and the international debate on mediatisation contributed to 
its development without removing the importance of the early contributions. In 
other words, the observation that political actors, politicians, as well as grassroot 
movements use the media logic to draw attention to their causes was incor-
porated early in Norwegian political communication research and developed 
further in studies of power, politics, and journalism (S. Allern, 1997; Knudsen, 
2016). Norwegian researchers have also extended the study of mediatisation 
to other parts of the political system, namely public bureaucracies (Figenschou 
et al., 2017; Thorbjørnsrud et al., 2014).
Today, Norwegian studies of political journalism cover many themes and 
partly overlap with other fields (S. Allern, 2011, 2015; Thorbjørnsrud, 2009; 
see also Allern et al., Chapter 7). Local political journalism has been studied for 
decades and has recently regained much attention (Mathisen & Morlandstø, 
2019). Political journalism on different platforms (Rogstad, 2015), the rela-
tionship between sources and journalists (S. Allern, 1992, 1997; Skogerbø & 
Moe, 2015), scandals (S. Allern & Pollack, 2012), and political journalism in 
minority media (Ijäs, 2012; Skogerbø et al., 2019) are among the themes that 
may be subsumed under political communication. 
The public sphere and rhetoric
A fourth group of perspectives that has attracted much attention in political 
communication is studies of public speeches, rhetoric, and the public sphere. 
Jürgen Habermas’s The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere (1989) 
was translated into Norwegian (Habermas, 1971) nearly 20 years before its 
English version and had major impact on studies of political and democratic 
communication. Partly overlapping with the other strands that we have singled 
out, the public sphere perspective has been discussed and applied as a framework 
for assessing media performance and political journalism (Eide, 1984), as a theo-
retical and normative framework for analysing political communication (Aalberg 
et al., 2015), and for assessing the growth and transformation of the Norwegian 
public sphere (Gripsrud, 2017). Another, partly linked, tradition – the study of 
political rhetoric – is becoming increasingly vocal in political communication 
studies (Kjeldsen, 2015; Kjeldsen et al., Chapter 18). Norwegian scholars have 
looked at, for instance, the credibility of political orators (Johansen, 2002) and 
visual political rhetoric (Krogstad, 2015). To date, Johansen’s book (2019) 
on the emergence, growth, and distribution of rhetorical power in political 
communication in pre-democratic Norway is the most comprehensive study 
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in the field. This strand of research and the integration of rhetoric and visual 
political rhetoric also represent the interdisciplinarity of Norwegian political 
communication in the sense that we find research grounded in the humanities, 
the social sciences, and to some extent other disciplines.
These four main lines of research amount to substantial, but not exhaustive, 
categories of Norwegian political communication research. The field is fast de-
veloping, quantitatively and qualitatively. Researchers from diverse disciplines 
extend the numbers of themes, methods, and data sources that can be subsumed 
under the umbrella of political communication practically as we speak, and 
thereby also questions and challenges for the future.
Future challenges
There are at least two major challenges for future political communication 
research as we see it. First, the changing media: Much attention has, over the 
past decade, been given to the growth, application, and impact of social media 
for political communication, which in many different ways have changed the 
conditions for communication between parties, politicians, and voters, in Nor-
way and elsewhere (see, e.g., Kalsnes et al., 2017; Larsson & Skogerbø, 2016). 
Mediatisation – in the version of a theory describing the distorting effects that 
journalism seemingly has on political practices (Aalberg & Jenssen, 2007) – may 
have lost some of its descriptive and explanatory power (Nygren & Niemikari, 
2019; see also Strandberg & Carlson, Chapter 4) as digital media provide so 
many ways for “dodging the gatekeepers” (Skovsgaard & van Dalen, 2013). 
Parties and politicians have increased their power as sources by having access 
to many alternative platforms for publishing news, such as producing their 
own messages and content, publishing on their own channels, and being able 
to negotiate the conditions on which they appear in the news media (Brands 
et al., 2018; Maurer & Beiler, 2018). Simultaneously, the legacy news media 
no longer have the same hold on audiences that they once had, in Norway 
probably the strongest in the 1980s and 1990s as media consumption rose to 
unprecedented figures both in time and spending (Skogerbø & Syvertsen, 2004). 
Still, mediatisation is a useful term for describing macro-processes of social and 
political change (Esser & Strömbäck, 2014; Hjarvard, 2013). So far, much less 
attention has been given to the fact that the environments in which journalism 
is produced are undergoing fundamental changes. Key to future research is 
thus to theorise and reconceptualise the political communication process in a 
constantly changing media system. 
Second, the changing politics: Over the past decade, political communica-
tion research in Norway has, as mentioned above, studied new themes, such 
as social media’s impact on election campaigns, populism, political journalism, 
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lobbyism, and alternative media. All these include important topics, approaches, 
and perspectives, yet it remains to be seen whether any of them are adequate for 
analysing the challenges created by the climate crisis, on the one hand, and the 
major challenges to privacy created by increasingly sophisticated technologies 
for surveillance and monitoring of social and political phenomena, on the other. 
What new constellations of political actors – if any – do the increasingly pressing 
effects of climate and environment issues give rise to? The 2017 election sent 
shockwaves through established parties that were hit by the strength of the toll-
road protests, and similar protests may emerge on other issues. In this perspective, 
there may be unpredicted and unexpected challenges to political communication 
practices and research that we do not overview at this point in time. 
Conclusion
In this chapter, we have outlined the main aspects of Norwegian political com-
munication and the political and media systems in which political communica-
tion takes place. Norway can be described as a constitutional monarchy and 
an affluent, small, stable welfare democracy. The revenues and management 
of the petroleum industry act as a financial backbone, but they are also vulner-
able in light of the climate crisis. Norway is a multiparty political system where 
governments are created on the basis of negative parliamentarism: a cabinet 
does not need to be supported by a majority in parliament (the Storting), but it 
must resign if a majority votes against it. The electoral system is proportional 
representation and consists of four-year electoral terms (national and local).
The Norwegian media system, along with the other Nordic systems, is what 
Hallin and Mancini (2004) categorised as democratic corporatist, a categorisa-
tion still open to debate (Enli & Syvertsen, 2020; Syvertsen et al., 2014). Over 
the past decade, the media industry has transformed into a digital and hybrid 
sector in which journalism is produced, distributed, and consumed on a variety 
of digital and social media platforms, most notably smartphones and other port-
able devices. These changes have caused major challenges to business models 
and consumption patterns, but there are also clear signs of continuity. The 
public broadcaster NRK and its commercial counterpart, TV2, have adapted 
to the digital environment. Media policy-making, funding, and the media sub-
sidy system have been changed but upheld, and the local media structures, in 
particular local newspapers, were until 2020 surprisingly stable. Accordingly, 
political communication in the 2020s takes place on a large number of arenas: 
the traditional news media, many kinds of digital and social media, and offline. 
As always, it takes many different forms, expressions, and messages, and there 
is a marked shift to Internet and social media platforms as main sources for 
the youngest generations.
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Following this description, we outlined four strands of political communica-
tion research in Norway. First, we outlined election studies, which have a long 
history and theoretically span the phase of powerless media to agenda-setting 
and framing and contemporary discussions of professionalisation, populism, 
and election communication on social and digital media. Second, we outlined 
social media and politics, partly overlapping with the former, which have over 
the past decade generated a host of studies on the use, implementation, and 
impact that social media and new media forms have on political campaigns, 
political influence, and political debate and discussion. Third, we emphasised 
mediatisation and political journalism, which are also long-term interests of 
Norwegian researchers. How media logics and journalistic practices influence 
political communication have been explored for decades and from many angles 
and perspectives and have recently been employed to analyse new problems and 
actors, such as bureaucracies and Twitter communication. Fourth, we outlined 
studies on the public sphere and rhetoric. Over the years, a host of studies on 
the development of political speeches and on the conditions for public sphere 
developments have been published (e.g., Gripsrud, 2017; Johansen 2019). 
Lastly, we identified two future challenges for Norwegian political commu-
nication research. The first is simply that the media are changing and digital 
media open up for a host of new practices of both producing and consuming 
political communication. We pointed to the increased possibilities of sources 
for “dodging the gatekeepers”, legacy media losing its hold on its audience, but 
there are many other examples. The second challenge is that politics are chang-
ing and will create new forms of communication; the recurrent and permanent 
crises, such as pandemics and the climate crisis, are some of the issues that will 
demand much attention in the years to come. Other factors are security issues 
raised by the increased opportunities for surveillance and the pressures on pri-
vacy. These and many other issues will demand research into the conditions for 
sustaining democratically viable political communication practices.
In conclusion, we will nevertheless point to two main characteristics fol-
lowing our discussion. First, Norwegian democracy stands out as being stable 
despite the several global crises over the past decade and some turbulence in the 
Norwegian government. The large picture shows a resilient and stable welfare 
state. Simultaneously, the media industries and the political communication 
structures have been disrupted and changed by digitisation and hybridisation, 
yet, there are also clear signs that the large media houses adapt and transform 
their editorial and journalistic performance to the new conditions, but other 
political actors do as well.
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Chapter 6
Media and politics in Sweden
Lars Nord & Marie Grusell
Abstract
This chapter introduces political communication in Sweden with a particular focus 
on the most important developments during the last decade, and we discuss current 
main actors and structures and the dynamic interplay between voters, politics, 
and media. Important changes are taking place with regard to the party system, 
the media system, and voter behaviour, and the current transformations have 
various causes. On the supply side, no part of the Swedish society is untouched 
by the new opportunities offered by digitalisation and new media technology. 
The hybrid media system parallels news media and social media and blurs the 
lines between information and entertainment. Mass media companies converge to 
platform neutral digital media companies, and political parties navigate between 
traditional and digital communication channels in their efforts to reach voters. 
On the demand side, new media habits and media diets develop, more individual 
and fragmented than ever before. 
Keywords: political communication, Sweden, mediatisation, professionalisation, 
media system
Introduction
Sweden has changed. It can be argued that the globally known “middle way” 
country (Childs, 1936), successfully balancing liberalism and social welfare, has 
now been transformed to a less notable country “somewhere in the middle” in 
most socioeconomic international rankings. From a political communication 
perspective, Sweden has traditionally been described as a blended country, suc-
cessfully mixing liberal ideas of freedom of the press with state interventions 
to guarantee media pluralism in cases where the market is not able to achieve 
it. Whether these distinctive features prevail is, however, an open question.
Using the well-known typology from media scholars Daniel Hallin and Paolo 
Mancini, Sweden has often been referred to as a typical democratic-corporatist 
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country, where politics and media-relations have been characterised by a 
strong mass press, political parallelism, journalistic professionalism, and a vital 
role of the state (Hallin & Mancini, 2004). In a specific overview of Swedish 
political communication published more than a decade ago, gradual changes 
within political and media systems were noted, but at the same time country-
specific relations between politics, media, and the public were still considered 
relatively important for political communication developments (Strömbäck & 
Nord, 2008).
Today, the middle way metaphor has probably become an even more obso-
lete way to describe contemporary societal developments in Sweden. In some 
political communication aspects, the country could rather be described as an 
“extreme case”, for example with regard to digitalisation processes: people’s 
access to broadband and the use of mobile devices are extremely high in inter-
national comparison, and the profile of young audiences’ media use deviates 
more from other users than in other countries. Furthermore, the hitherto politi-
cal stability and steady bloc-politics have now been replaced by new alliances 
across previous ideological borders, increased party fragmentation, and more 
complex parliamentary scenarios (Nord et al., 2018). Finally, legacy media such 
as daily newspapers and public service media face several serious challenges 
in the digital media landscape both with regard to economic and audience 
developments (Weibull et al., 2018).
The objective of this chapter is threefold. Firstly, we introduce political 
communication in Sweden with a particular focus on the most important de-
velopments during the last decade. Thus, we discuss the current main actors 
and structures and relevant aspects of the dynamic interplay between voters, 
politics, and media. Political parties are described with regard to election results, 
roles in the parliament or government, and structural and strategic communi-
cation profiles during election campaigns. Distinctive features of the Swedish 
political communication system that differ from the other Nordic countries are 
particularly observed.
Secondly, we address central political communication theories with relevance 
for these developments with a particular focus on the contemporary trends 
of mediatisation, professionalisation, and market orientation of political and 
media actors in Sweden. The merits and shortcomings of these three central 
theories are analysed, and possible future challenges and changes in media and 
politics-relations are discussed. Additionally, recent signs of fragmentation of 
the public sphere, the political system, and the media system are addressed. 
Thirdly, we highlight some possible challenges for future political com-
munication research in Sweden. Generally speaking, political communication 
research in Sweden as well as in other countries is struggling with the relevance 
of long-established theories of the field in the digital age (e.g., agenda-setting, 
gatekeeping) (Bennett & Pfetsch, 2018). Furthermore, the most used methodo-
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logical approaches in the field (e.g., surveys and content analysis) are not always 
perfect instruments to catch real-time developments and scattered audience 
behaviour. From an empirical point of view, political communication research 
in Sweden probably needs to widen the analytical perspective from the “usual 
suspects” – voters, parties, and media – to include other important actors (e.g., 
lobbyists, influencers, and alternative media). Last, but not least, it is relevant 
to address the risks with the ongoing internationalisation of political commu-
nication research encouraging more studies of Sweden as an interesting case 
in international comparison, but at the same time offering less substantial and 
comprehensive analyses of specific conditions of Swedish political communica-
tions with great societal relevance.
Old democracy faces new political challenges
Sweden celebrated 100 years of democracy in December 2018. In 1918, a 
majority in the parliament decided to suggest universal suffrage in the country. 
However, the celebration activities were partly overshadowed by the current 
political crisis and the very long process to form a new government due to the 
complicated parliamentary situation after the outcome of the national elections 
in September 2018. There were, of course, very good reasons to remember 
100 years of societal progress and democratic stability. But at the same time, 
the contemporary political situation illustrated new challenges facing the old 
democracy. More than 100 days of forming a new government was definitely 
more widely discussed than 100 years of democratic conditions.
The electoral system in Sweden is strictly proportional with a 4 per cent 
threshold for receiving seats in parliament. Voters use party list ballots with 
a possibility to mark one single candidate they prefer, but most votes are still 
based on sole party preferences. In contrast to all other Nordic countries, since 
1970, Swedes vote every fourth year on national, regional, and local level on 
the same day. Additionally, there are elections to the European Parliament 
every fifth year (Bäck et al., 2015). This makes election campaigns rare, and 
Sweden has been referred to as the country in Europe where voters go to poll-
ing stations least frequently. 
This electoral system has some obvious consequences. First of all, the national 
electoral campaign overshadows campaigns on lower administrative levels, 
which means that regional and local issues are somewhat neglected in media 
coverage and public debate during the election campaign. National party leaders 
are often more well known than local leaders by the public. Second, the system 
seems to promote voter turnout. Most people vote in all the three elections when 
they go to the polling stations, and thus voter turnout is remarkably high in 
Sweden, also on regional and local levels. On the national level, voter turnout 
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has increased in every election since 2002, and 87.2 per cent of the electorate 
voted in the national elections in 2018. However, voter turnout in the European 
Parliament elections is still much lower but reached an all-time high in 2019, 
with a voter turnout of 53.3 per cent of eligible voters (Bolin et al., 2019).
The party system in Sweden has historically been described as one of the 
most stable in the world, with the same five political parties represented in the 
parliament between 1918 and 1988, and with the Social Democrats in an almost 
hegemonic position, ruling the country for 42 years from 1934 to 1976. Political 
conflicts have regularly been based on left–right-wing ideological positions, but 
it is important to note that party politics in general and over time have been 
characterised more by policy compromises and agreements on single issues 
than by conflicting ideological struggles (Hadenius, 1996). However, relatively 
new political parties such as the Green Party, the Christian Democrats, New 
Democracy, and the Sweden Democrats have emerged on the national political 
scene since 1988, and the success of new parties on the regional and local level 
is even more evident. The party system has become more fragmented than ever, 
and power relations between the parties have changed (Bäck et al., 2015; Bäck 
& Hellström, 2018).
The long-time dominance of the Social Democrats in party politics – perhaps 
more notable than in any other Nordic country – is now definitely broken. The 
party is still the biggest in Sweden with 28 per cent of the votes in the 2018 
national elections. More interesting is the fact that this is the lowest figure for 
the biggest party in parliament ever. Another historical record since 2018 is 
that the two major parties in recent decades, the Social Democrats and the 
Moderates, together do not reach a majority of the seats in parliament. The 
nationalist-conservative party, the Sweden Democrats, entered the parliament 
in 2010 with 5.6 per cent of the votes. In 2018, they received 17.6 per cent of 
the votes and are currently the third largest party in the Swedish Parliament 
(Nord et al., 2018). Table 6.1 shows the election results and voter turnout in 
the five latest national elections.
Party system changes reflect changing conflict patterns in the Swedish society. 
Traditional social conflicts between left and right positions – distributions of 
welfare, taxation, and jobs – still exist and play an important role. But they 
exist together with other conflict dimensions that sometimes tend to be more 
controversial and dominate public debate. One such dimension is the conflict 
between economic growth and sustainable environment, where increasing 
worries for climate change influence party politics. The most important new 
conflict dimension is, however, the increasing tension between nationalism and 
globalism, most intensively expressed in the debate about immigration. In the 
aftermath of the big migration flows to Europe in the autumn of 2015, Sweden 
received more refugees per capita than any other country on the continent. Im-
migration became a major topic in Swedish politics, and the only party at that 
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time with a restrictive immigration policy, the Sweden Democrats, managed 
to set the political agenda for the forthcoming years.
The continuous electoral successes of the Sweden Democrats have reshaped 
the political landscape and made government coalitions less foreseeable (Bäck & 
Hellström, 2018). In contrast to other Nordic countries, the right-wing national-
ist populist party has been isolated by all other political parties, mainly because 
of its historical roots in neo-Nazism and racist movements. This parliamentar-
ian situation made it more difficult than ever to form effective governments, as 
the only way to prevent the Sweden Democrats from influence was to find new 
alliances across previous ideological borders. As the result, a minority govern-
ment of Social Democrats and Greens was formed in January 2019, after four 
months of negotiations and with support from two former political opponents, 
the Liberals and the Centre Party. 
The main reason behind party fragmentation is changing political preferences 
within the Swedish electorate. The most significant development with regard to 
voter behaviour is not a single drift towards left or right, but the overall increas-
ing volatility that makes politics more unpredictable. Predispositions and party 
alignments seem to be of less importance, and voting decisions are taken later 
during the campaign. In 2018, a record number of 41 per cent of the elector-
ate voted for another party than they did four years before. About one-third 
of the electorate made their decision during the campaign and one-fifth during 
the very last week of the campaign. In many cases, voters’ new preferences are 
within the same group of parties as before, but an increasing number of voters 
also jump from one political camp to the other side of the political spectrum. 
It is also quite common to split the votes in national, regional, and local elec-
tions. About one-fourth of the electorate normally split their votes on election 
day (Oscarsson & Holmberg, 2016).
The volatility certainly reflects different public perceptions of politics. First 
of all, it is a result of decreased party membership and party identification. A 
Table 6.1 National election results and voter turnout in Sweden, 2002–2018 (per cent)
 2002 2006 2010 2014 2018
Centre Party  6.2 7.9 6.6 6.1 8.6
Christian Democrats 9.1 6.6 5.6 4.6 6.3
Liberals 13.4 7.5 7.0 5.4 5.5
Green Party  4.6 5.2 7.3 6.9 4.4
Moderates 15.3 26.2 30.1 23.3 19.8
Social Democrats 39.9 35 30.7 31 28.3
Sweden Democrats 1.4 2.9 5.7 12.9 17.5
Left Party  8.4 5.8 5.6 5.7 8
Voter turnout 80.1 82 84.6 85.8 87.2
Source: Valmyndigheten, n.d.
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very small group of citizens – around 2 per cent – are still members of a political 
party, and the majority of Swedish voters do not single out any specific party 
that they generally identify themselves with in contrast to other parties. These 
figures have been going down for a very long time and contribute to a political 
reality where a majority of voters are relatively openminded in their final vot-
ing decisions. Traditional class-based and generational voting still exists, but 
individual preferences are becoming more important (Karlsson & Lundberg, 
2015; Oscarsson & Holmberg, 2016).
Second, mistrust of politicians and political institutions in Sweden weakens 
steady party preferences; about 50 per cent of citizens express “some” or “a lot 
of” mistrust in political actors (Oscarsson & Holmberg, 2016). Furthermore, 
government parties in Sweden have regularly faced defeats in upcoming elec-
tions, while parties with no political responsibility have generally been more 
successful (Strömbäck, 2013). Still, it is important to note that citizens, despite 
political mistrust, seem to have considerable faith in the democratic system as a 
whole. A solid majority thinks democracy works well, and voter turnout figures 
are impressively high in international comparisons. Consequently, it may be 
relevant to describe Sweden as a “cool” democracy where citizens have little 
passion for political parties and regular personal involvement in political work, 
but do get mobilised during election campaigns and find it more or less a civic 
duty to cast their votes on election day.
Reaching the voter in many more ways
These very significant political conditions – electoral volatility and high voter 
turnout – make party campaign communications extremely important, as there 
is much at stake in every election for every party. It is not possible for a single 
party to get all of the undecisive voters, but a successful campaign can definitely 
be of great importance for the electoral outcome. There are also many indica-
tors of changes of political party communications in recent election campaigns, 
both with regard to structures and strategies.
Contemporary election campaigns in Sweden are not arenas for amateurs, 
generalists, or idealists. On the contrary, campaigns are to a large extent 
managed by professional experts in distinctive areas of communication such 
as advertising, media management, polling, databases, or social media. In 
a comparative perspective, party campaign budgets have increased year by 
year. In 2018, the eight parties in the parliament together spent more than 
SEK 300 million on their campaign activities, and about 50 per cent of their 
budgets were advertising costs. This was even more than during the “super 
election year” of 2014, when both general elections and European Parliament 
elections were held. 
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However, party communications are not only developing because of financial 
and personal resources. Another significant trend is the increase of strategic 
considerations in the selection of communication channels and platforms and 
the more frequent use of feedback from voters, using tracking polls, focus 
groups, and other methods. (Nord & Strömbäck, 2018).
For a long time, the Swedish electoral campaign context was mainly journal-
ist controlled. News programmes, television debates, and party leader hearings 
were perceived as the highlights of the campaign (Esaiasson & Håkansson, 
2002). In recent years, the combination of downsized newsrooms and more 
efficient government communication and news management may have changed 
the balance in favour of political sources (K. M. Johansson et al., 2019).
Furthermore, the increased importance of the Internet and social media 
changes the relationship between political parties and journalists. In all recent 
election campaigns, there has been speculations around when social media will 
take over as the single most important communication tool (Findahl, 2014; 
Nord et al., 2018). However, this has not happened, and social media are still 
supplementing rather than replacing traditional news media in election cam-
paigns. On the other hand, digital and social media are undoubtedly becoming 
increasingly important for political communications as more and more people 
regularly use the new platforms for every election (Grusell & Nord, 2016; cf. 
Barrling & Holmberg, 2018).
From a party perspective, social media make it easier to communicate di-
rectly with the voter without relying on traditional media. The party use of 
social media as a new form of communication channel has expanded fast and 
has been increasingly integrated in the campaign toolbox during recent election 
campaigns. Today, social media are used by Swedish parties both as a refined 
tool for communication in the election movement and as a tool for reaching 
specific groups such as journalists and certain voter groups. All parties, regard-
less of party size and ideological perspectives, have been working intensively 
with social media during the last decade. The basic function of social media has 
been to facilitate communication between party members and arouse interest 
in different political activities but also to be a channel for mobilising nuclear 
voters and reaching out to new groups of voters (Bjereld et al., 2018; Grusell 
& Nord, 2016).
Until the national elections in 2014, all political parties claimed that news 
media were the most important campaign communication channel. During the 
election campaign in 2018, however, Facebook was perceived as the single most 
important communication channel, slightly more important than television 
news. Table 6.2 shows the party ranking of different communication channels 
in recent election campaigns.
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Table 6.2 Party perceptions of communication channels’ importance in national elections, 
2010–2018 (mean values)
 2010  2014  2018 
Facebook 4.1 4.5 4.7
TV news 4.6 4.8 4.4
Direct mail 3.5 4.4 3.9
Newspapers 4.6 4.4 3.7
Radio news 4.5 4.2 3.7
Party website 4.6 4.5 3.4
Blogs 4.4 2.8 3.3
Posters 3.6 4.0 3.1
Party desks 4.1 4.1 3.1
Canvassing 3.0 2.5 3.0
TV ads 3.5 3.5 2.6
Internet banners 2.9 3.8 2.3
Comments: Communication channels were ranked by campaign managers on a five-point scale (1 = not important 
at all; 5 = very important); N = 8. 
Source: Bolin et at., forthcoming
However, using social media effectively in order to reach the voters during election 
campaigns is not easy. For politicians who want to use social media to reach their 
voters, there are many pitfalls – Twitter is a good illustration of this. The national 
elections of 2010 were predicted, more than any previous election campaign, to be 
played out online and in social media, but for several different reasons this did not 
occur, primarily as politicians and political parties were not yet willing to “let go of 
the microphone”. Tweeting was largely a monologue instead of a dialogue (Grusell 
& Nord, 2012; cf. Small, 2011); for instance, a study by Larsson and Moe (2012) 
indicates that only a small proportion of political opinion-makers accounted for a 
very large number of tweets. Twitter seemed to act as a new channel for voices that 
already belonged to an elite or had high positions in the media and political life. 
Another observation was that Twitter was primarily used for giving out information 
rather than a way of conducting dialogue. Larsson and Moe (2012) say that their 
study indicates that if the use of Twitter had some effect, it was minimal. Twitter 
remained a marginal phenomenon even in the 2014 and 2018 elections. 
This connection between party campaigns and media features brings us to tak-
ing a closer look at the Swedish media system that has undergone dramatic and 
significant changes in recent decades.
A competitive and crowded media landscape
The Swedish media system has been described as somewhat of an archetype 
of a democrat corporatist model with a highly developed newspaper market, 
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a tradition of political parallelism, a high degree of journalistic professional-
ism, and with considerable state interventions in the media system (Hallin & 
Mancini, 2004). At the same time, a transformation process is evident, where 
newspaper markets face increased competition from global actors and the tra-
ditional links between political parties and media have weakened significantly. 
From a media theory perspective, the Swedish media system is still a mixture 
between classical liberal ideas of the press as an independent fourth estate, and 
social responsibility ideas concerning the necessity for state interventions in 
order to maintain diversity and provide journalism produced for public good 
(Allern & Pollack, 2016). Direct press subsidies to the increasing number of 
newspapers with low market shares and strong public service media remain as 
cornerstones of Swedish media policy, even if critique from the private media 
sector and right-wing politicians against this policy tends to increase (Nord & 
Ots, 2019). Since 2019, press subsidies are part of a new platform-independent 
media subsidy system, where support to news media in regions with low media 
presence is included.
During the last decades, the Swedish media landscape has become highly 
digitalised and undergone considerable changes as commercial radio and 
television channels, free tabloid newspapers, and the Internet and social me-
dia have been introduced (Weibull et al., 2018). The digital media landscape 
can be described as more competitive and crowded; the supply of diverse 
media channels has increased significantly; media choices are more individual 
and usage patterns become more fragmented. Former mass media such as 
printed newspapers and broadcast radio and television still attract a huge 
audience, but are gradually losing terrain, especially in younger generations 
of the population (Ohlsson, 2019).
The Swedish newspaper market is changing dramatically and facing serious 
economic challenges (Weibull et al., 2018). Advertising revenues are moving 
from national newspapers to global giants like Facebook and Google, and the 
willingness to pay for news is declining, as news is free on many digital plat-
forms. Media ownership is becoming more concentrated, and the number of 
journalists and newsrooms is decreasing, not least on the local level (Truedson, 
2018). Paywalls and premium or plus content are countermeasures from the 
newspaper industry, and a few leading national media companies are still mak-
ing good business, but the overall future looks gloomy. Readership figures may 
look impressive in international comparison but are declining.
Sweden, as well as the other Nordic countries, was once referred to as 
“the heartland” of public service media (Lowe & Steemers, 2012). But the 
latest decades have seen a deregulation of broadcast media and increased 
competition between public service media – financed by licence fees, taxes, 
or both – and commercial media, financed by advertisements and subscrip-
tions. Furthermore, competition has grown in the digital era, when public 
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service and private media appear on the same digital platforms and when 
barriers between, text, audio, and visuals have vanished. The new situation 
has fuelled the debate about public service remit and their possible “market 
distortions” (Nord, 2016; Syvertsen et al., 2014). Since 2010, Sweden has 
agreed to implement a public value test regarding all new public service 
activities that need to be checked with regard to public service value and 
market impact (Wormbs, 2011). 
However, public service radio and television stations continue to be major 
players in the Swedish media system. In both linear television and linear radio, 
public service maintains the market-leading position in terms of aggregate audi-
ence shares. In 2018, Sweden’s public service television accounted for 35 per 
cent of the traditional television daily viewing in the country. The equivalent 
proportion for Sweden’s public service radio was 75 per cent (Facht & Ohlsson, 
2019). Some key figures of media use trends in Sweden are displayed in Table 6.3.
Table 6.3 Some key figures on media use trends in Sweden, 2010–2018 (per cent)
 2010 2014 2018
Daily newspaper readership 75 67 55
Public radio audience market share 69 79 75
Public TV audience market share 35 35 35
Daily Internet use 76 83 88
Daily social media use 35 48 71
Comments: The table shows the share of the whole population that every day reads a newspaper, uses the Internet, 
or uses social media. Public media audience share is the share of total daily listener or viewer time. 
Source: Ohlsson, 2019
A truly digital society
Since the introduction of the Internet, the boundaries of both radio and televi-
sion have become increasingly unclear. The movement from traditional to digital 
media is moving at a rapid pace. In 2017, more than 80 per cent of the Swedes 
had a smartphone and over 60 per cent had a reading tablet. In addition to 
this, 56 per cent had a subscription to a streaming video on demand (SVoD) 
service for film, series, or sports. The media consumption through the Internet is 
increasing, where, for example, Netflix is the market leader in SVoD in Sweden 
today. In the ad-financed part of the market, YouTube enjoys a corresponding 
special position (Ohlsson, 2018).
The usage of social media has in a short timespan gone from being part of 
the private sphere to becoming a natural part in the public conversation. In 
Sweden, access to and use of the Internet and social media is very high. Overall, 
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Swedes can be described as an increasingly digitised people. Virtually everyone 
uses the Internet, from a young age to retirement. The use of broadband via 
fibre at home is increasing, and more than half of Swedish households are con-
nected to the Internet via fibre. The most common way of using the Internet 
daily, however, is via mobile phone. For young Swedes, aged between 16–25, 
there is a 100 per cent use of smartphones (Davidsson et al., 2018).
 When the Swedes rank the most important sources of information on a 
five-point scale, the Internet now receives the highest average value for the first 
time: 3.7 compared with 3.5 for television and 3.2 for newspapers (Davidsson 
& Findahl, 2016). Public interest in seeking information about elections on 
the Internet has also increased. During the 2018 Swedish election campaign, 
more voters than ever turned to the Internet for political information. This 
trend was particularly strong among first-time voters. However, television was 
still perceived as the single most important source of information prior to the 
election by most voters: 73 per cent of the voters considered television as an 
important or a very important communication channel, while 41 per cent said 
the same about websites. Among social media, Facebook was considered the 
most important source of information (19%), Twitter came in second (12%), 
and YouTube ranked third (9%) (The Swedish Internet Foundation, 2018). 
The most widespread social media platforms are spread across several age 
and education groups, but generally, the networks are dominated by young 
people (Davidsson & Thoresson, 2017). But there are also gender differences 
in usage patterns and differences between people in varying life stages (Find-
ahl, 2013). Currently, the most popular social media platform in Sweden is 
Facebook, followed by Instagram (Davidsson et al., 2018). Although Facebook 
currently dominates in terms of social media, it is not certain that the company 
will hold this position in the future – this will be determined by the users. There 
is every reason to believe that users will move to other social networks if they 
are perceived as more attractive. 
Furthermore, it is interesting to note that young children’s use of the Internet 
continues to grow: 79 per cent of Swedish toddlers use the Internet, primarily 
for watching television and videos. By six years of age, 98 per cent use the 
Internet. In school, it is common to use the Internet both to seek information 
and as a part of schoolwork. YouTube is the most common service – virtually 
all young people under 25 years old use YouTube, a large majority of them 
daily (Davidsson et al., 2018).
Of the Internet users, 77 per cent use play services, half have a subscription 
to Netflix, and two-thirds listen to music on Spotify. Almost everyone uses 
Internet banking – the use of mobile Bank ID (a citizen identification and 
authentication solution) is increasing each year – and 71 per cent of Internet 
users have the app Swish (a mobile payment system). Additionally, e-commerce 
is a well-established way to buy goods: Almost all Internet users between the 
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ages 26 and 55 have bought objects via the Internet that have been delivered 
by mail (Davidsson et al., 2018).
To sum up, digitalisation processes are rapidly changing media habits and 
the use of media for political communications. This makes it relevant to ask 
whether traditional theoretical approaches to studying political communication 
in Sweden still matter.
Three central theories become less central
Three theoretical perspectives – mediatisation, professionalisation, and market-
orientation processes – stand out as the most central when analysing contem-
porary Swedish election campaigns (Nord & Strömbäck, 2018). Mediatisation 
processes are confirmed on different levels: media are the most important source 
of political information for most people, media organisations are increasingly 
independent from political institutions, media coverage is more driven by media 
logic than political logic, and political actors tend to adopt to this media logic 
in their efforts to catch public attention (Esser & Strömbäck, 2014). Media 
content analyses of Swedish election campaigns and referendum campaigns have 
been conducted since 1979, and generally confirm that mediatisation is a useful 
theory for understanding shifting power relations in political communication 
over time (Asp & Bjerling, 2014; B. Johansson & Truedson, 2017). 
Professionalisation processes appear both in political parties and media 
institutions. External experts and consultants are hired for specific tasks, more 
money is spent in the campaign (especially on advertising), more sophisticated 
tools are developed for analysing public opinion, and campaign strategies are 
more coherent and parts of permanent campaigning perspectives (Gibson & 
Römmele, 2009; Kiousis et al., 2015). At the same time, political journalism 
develops in similar ways. Election campaign coverage is generally well planned 
and following news department strategies. News coverage is characterised by 
professional news values and intentions to set the political agenda, not just 
mirroring political standpoints and controversies. Professional political jour-
nalism is both an arena for political debate and an independent actor trying to 
influence and direct this debate (Asp, 1986; Nygren, 2015). Content of politi-
cal journalism in national news media is more often guided by structural bias 
than ideological bias. Winners and losers are picked in game-framed contexts, 
but political actors’ positions vary over time. Professional considerations play 
a more important role in newsroom work than do political orientations (Asp 
& Bjerling, 2014; Nord & Strömbäck, 2018).
Finally, market orientation is a feature of political communication processes 
in Sweden, but perhaps not as evident as the other trends. Market orientation 
is, put simply, about attracting the largest shares of the audience or electorate 
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as possible. The media system has certainly become more market oriented; 
competition for audiences and advertisers between private, public, and global 
actors are tougher than ever. Mass media perspectives are increasingly obsolete 
in a digital media world where media diets are becoming more individual and 
fragmented and media choices are almost unlimited (Chadwick, 2013; Syvertsen 
et al., 2014). 
The Swedish party system is not market oriented to the same extent yet. 
Policy positions are not mainly explained by a willingness to adopt to public 
opinion trends or attitudes of specific target groups. On the contrary, political 
ideology and well-established views on political issues are central in public de-
bate, even if political parties do their best to package and frame their ideas and 
policy positions in order to make them as favourable as possible for potential 
voters. Signs of market orientation in politics sometimes appear, and results of 
internal opinion polls can make parties reframe their standpoints to some extent. 
Still, overall party politics are more about selling (convincing) than marketing 
(adjusting) (Lees-Marshment, 2001; Nord & Strömbäck, 2018).
The emphasis on these three processes of central importance for political com-
munication is motivated by empirical observations of recent election campaigns, 
but does not exclude other perspectives or changes of their importance in the 
future. It may be argued that the processes of mediatisation, professionalisation, 
and market orientation are all consequences of a more general transformation 
of political communication conditions in terms of individualisation and frag-
mentation. The increased voter dealignment and volatility among the electorate 
make election outcomes less predictable (Oscarsson & Holmberg, 2016). There 
is much to gain from a successful campaign, and political parties therefore use 
professional methods and tools and try to get media exposure. It is plausible 
to assume that changing voter behaviours and attitudes are the main driving 
forces behind party professionalisation, mediatisation, and market orientation. 
In similar patterns, more independent voters and decreased party identification 
have facilitated media system trends towards more professional and active news 
journalism, media logic perspectives, and commercial audience orientation.
There is no doubt that the trends of mediatisation, professionalisation, 
and market orientation will be important in more election campaigns to come 
in Sweden. There are, however, signs of possible disruptions or changes that 
may affect all of these processes. For example, news media dominance of the 
public sphere cannot be taken for granted as social media platforms are in-
creasingly used, also during election campaigns (Gottfried & Shearer, 2016). 
Accordingly, mediatisation patterns may be more complex and based on more 
unpredictable interactions between news media and social media agendas and 
discourses. Some arguments support the idea that social media are becoming 
more central in this development, as they may be used effectively by political 
parties for direct and unedited communication with voters, and as they are 
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most widely used and appreciated by younger generations. Empirical obser-
vations of recent elections campaign suggest that political parties do not yet 
fully use the interactive potential of social media, and mainly perceive these as 
just another channel for uni-directional messages (Bjereld et al., 2018). While 
it is not realistic to assume that social media will replace news media as the 
main source for political information in forthcoming years, it can be expected 
that social media logics and structures – that differ in many ways from news 
media – are gradually becoming more important for the understanding of why 
political discourse is as it is (Allcott & Gentzkow, 2017; Klinger & Svensson, 
2015; Olsson & Eriksson, 2016).
Professionalisation trends are challenged in the media sector by decreas-
ing resources for news departments and commercial pressure on regional 
and local newspapers (Nielsen, 2015). At the same time, the increased use 
of user-generated content blurs the line between media producers and media 
consumers. Hyperlocal media with less professional orientations expands, 
social media platforms become more important, and so-called alternative 
media, with more extreme political positions, emerge (Holt, 2016; Nygren 
et al., 2018). And perhaps most importantly, the increased possibilities to 
measure digital journalism impact in terms of audience sharing and clicking 
may decrease the importance of traditional news values and professional 
considerations in newsroom work and encourage audience-centred perspec-
tives (Hanusch, 2017; Petre, 2018). 
For political parties, professionalisation has always been a two-sided coin. 
Historically, all parties in Sweden are becoming more professionalised, regard-
less of size and ideological positions (Nord & Strömbäck, 2018). There is no sign 
of a return to more ad hoc–designed campaigns, and even more sophisticated 
tools and devices can be expected for the future. Still, professionalisation has 
never been a single key to electoral success (Moring et al., 2011). There is no 
clear correlation between professional campaigns and election results. On the 
contrary, successful parties sometimes conduct unprofessional campaigns. It is 
worth noting that some recent campaigns, such as Donald Trump’s in the US 
in 2016, generally have been perceived as less professional but more emotional 
and appealing to voters’ values (Allen & Parnes, 2017).
Similarly, market-orientation of political parties does not always guarantee 
success. It may work best for bigger, catch-all parties, who want to expand their 
base of possible voters. But smaller parties can have more success in profiling 
themselves as niche parties and sticking to specific values and thus be perceived 
as ideologically strong and convincing by certain segments of the electorate. 
It has also been claimed that too much market orientation of politics may be 
less appreciated in the Swedish political culture. When it comes to the media 
system, it is more difficult to see any countertrends, as there are no major signs 
of less-competitive media markets in general. On the margin, some media out-
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lets may focus on more idealistic values of investigative journalism, targeting 
sub-audiences with such preferences.
Thus, established political communication theories generally still have ex-
planatory value when analysing relations between parties, media, and voters 
in Sweden. At the same time, recent developments in terms of digitalisation of 
media markets and fragmentation of the public sphere impose huge challenges 
for future research. The following section of this chapter addresses this topic 
further and adds some other aspects to this discussion.
Future challenges and directions of research
Political communication studies in Sweden have always been overshadowed 
by election studies focused on voter behaviour and party preferences among 
the electorate. The behavioural approach in political science was introduced 
at a very early stage, first by legendary political scientist Herbert Tingsten and 
later by a group of scholars in Gothenburg, initially led by Professor Jörgen 
Westerståhl. The very first systematic analysis of elections and voter behaviour 
started in 1958; thus, Sweden has among the most impressive longitudinal 
studies of voters and elections in the world. To a large extent, these studies 
also cover central political communication themes, even if they are traditionally 
more associated with political science.
Other aspects of political communication, such as election campaign com-
munications and media coverage of election campaigns, have always existed but 
are growing in number in recent decades. Election campaigns are now systemati-
cally covered from different perspectives and with an increasing interest in the 
different roles of social media in political communication. However, studies of 
other actors outside the classical campaign context – such as lobbyists, influenc-
ers, and alternative media, just to mention a few – have to some extent been 
neglected compared to analyses of the interplay between voters, news media, and 
party politics. As contemporary political communication takes place in many 
arenas in society and beyond the election-campaign context (e.g., permanent 
campaigning), there is a need for more research with a broader approach to 
opinion formation processes and effects. Such approaches should include inter-
est in new areas of political communication, for example, interactions based 
on emotional rather than rational aspects, and the non-politicisation of politics 
in terms of personalisation and privatisation trends, not least in social media.
Another challenge is imposed by the fact that political communication in 
Sweden, as most other social sciences, has become much more integrated in 
the international academic community and its traditions. There are obvious 
advantages with this process; publishing in peer reviewed international academic 
journals secures high quality of research and working in international research 
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networks facilitates understanding of country-specific contexts when these are 
put in international systematic comparisons. However, there is also a risk that 
the dominating paradigm of internationalisation in political communication 
leads to less interest for academic works that are highly interesting on the na-
tional level, but less attractive for international publishing and the individual 
academic career. For example, the total dominance of doctoral dissertations 
based on previously published international articles results in less monographs 
of typical Swedish phenomena. Ten years ago, it was perceived as a great prob-
lem that most Nordic political communication scholars produced their work 
in native languages and did not reach the international research community 
(Strömbäck et al., 2008). This problem hardly exists anymore; the problem is 
rather the lack of works that are nationally relevant.
Finally, it is worth adding that some of the challenges in Sweden are similar 
to those in many other countries. All over the world, academics in this field 
must deal with both theoretical and methodological challenges. Well-established 
central theories in the field, such as gatekeeping and agenda-setting, may still 
be of relevance, but are also regularly disputed in the light of the ongoing 
digitalisation and media development and increased media use fragmentation 
processes (cf. Bennett & Pfetsch, 2018; Davis, 2019). Additionally, traditional 
social science methods such as surveys and content analysis may be less ac-
curate to catch these digital media developments. There is definitely a need for 
more innovative scientific methods based on new technology, such as real-time 
measurements and systematic analyses of metric data.
Conclusion
When trying to summarise recent political communication developments in Swe-
den, it is obvious that important changes are taking place with regard to party 
system, media system, and voter behaviour. The current transformations have 
various causes. On the supply side, no part of the Swedish society is untouched 
by the new opportunities offered by digitalisation and new media technology. 
The hybrid media system parallels news media and social media and blurs the 
lines between information and entertainment and between private chats and 
public discussion. Mass media companies converge to platform-neutral digital 
media companies, and political parties navigate between traditional and digital 
communication channels in their efforts to reach voters. On the demand side, 
new media habits and media diets develop, more individual and fragmented 
than ever before. Electoral volatility is certainly a driving force in the develop-
ment of campaign communications.
So, is there still a Swedish model of political communication? Do distinctive 
national or Nordic features prevail, or are they more or less replaced by global 
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and transnational trends? The answer to these questions is to a large extent in 
the eye of the beholder and depends on the perspective. In a national perspective, 
the abovementioned changes look very significant and indicate that political 
communication conditions have been drifting in a direction that makes Sweden 
look more like other countries. Parties become more professionalised, media 
more commercialised, and voters more volatile. However, in an international 
comparison, Sweden still stands out on a wide range of important factors, such 
as high voter turnout, high newspaper reach, strong public service media, and 
high level of digitalisation in almost all segments of the population. The most 
correct answer is perhaps that the current “middle way” goes in a slightly more 
international direction than ten years ago.
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Abstract
The objective of this chapter is to describe and discuss some important political 
journalism development trends in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. The 
term political journalism traditionally refers to news, commentaries, and other 
genres related to the coverage of political processes, institutions, and policy ques-
tions. It is, however, difficult to draw a clear dividing line between political news 
and other types of current affairs coverage. While political logic once dominated 
the discourses of political journalism, the emergence of the news media as an 
independent institution gave journalists a substantial definitional power and an 
ability to define the communicative rules of the game, but professional political 
sources quickly learned to exploit news media logics for their own aims and 
objectives. During the last decade, the growth of social media networks and the 
relative weakening of the legacy media has created a less stable situation for the 
negotiation of control between journalists and their sources. 
Keywords: political journalism, news regimes, policy professionals, sacerdotal 
traditions, communicative rules
Introduction
Since the turn of the millennium, the digital revolution and the commercialisa-
tion of communication have challenged the terms of political journalism in at 
least two important ways. First, they have led to structural changes in the media 
system, resulting in severe effects; for example, legacy media organisations, 
especially print newspapers, have lost large parts of their advertising income 
to tech giants, such as Facebook and Google, and been forced to develop new 
business models to survive. One answer has been payment for online news 
content, a strategy which has been more important and successful in countries 
like Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland than in most other parts of the 
world (Newman et al., 2019). However, in most Nordic media organisations, 
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financial problems have also led to staff reductions and other editorial cuts, 
limiting the resources available for quality journalism based on investigations 
and reportage. 
Second, the establishment of online media and social media networks have 
given political actors, such as governments, parties, and individual politicians, 
increased opportunities for communication with opinion leaders and voters, 
often independent of legacy media’s editorial judgements and filters. Internet 
penetration in the Nordic countries is among the highest in the world, and the 
adoption of social media is generally high, giving political actors a means to 
reach the public without the assistance of legacy media. These parallel develop-
ment trends represent a wide range of changes and challenges, not least affect-
ing legacy media organisations, which have traditionally considered political 
journalism an important part of their democratic role.
The term “political journalism” traditionally refers to news, commentaries, 
and other journalistic genres related to the mediated coverage of political pro-
cesses, institutions, actors, party programmes, and policy questions. Classical 
examples of political journalism are reports about government decisions, party 
initiatives, public policy proposals, parliament resolutions, and politicians’ 
election campaigns. 
However, this definition limits political journalism to an institutional context, 
which in many cases is problematic. It is difficult to draw a clear dividing line 
between political news and other types of current affairs coverage in the news 
media. Both “hard news” and feature stories concerning crime, the environment, 
unemployment, immigration, health, social services, and other societal questions 
may have political implications, leading to policy debates about priorities and 
the allocation of values in society. A news story without any direct link to par-
ties or politicians can trigger discussions about politics or, as Lasswell (1936) 
defined the concept in a famous book title, Politics: Who gets what, when, how. 
News journalism and other types of current affairs journalism are intertwined 
in practice. Likewise, normative theories about media and democracy recognise 
that news and current affairs journalism – not only institutional political news 
– is “claimed to be the life blood of democracy” (Fenton, 2010: 3). 
The intertwinement of political and current affairs journalism is also reflected 
in the editorial departments of news organisations. Most local journalists are 
all-round reporters and desk editors, covering several news areas, including 
local politics and current affairs. Today’s newsrooms are organised to empha-
sise convergence, speed, and technological skills in order to compete in the 
changing and increasingly convergent media markets. Lack of specialisation 
has been strengthened by a general tendency in today’s media industry in which 
journalists are expected to meet higher demands for the production of content 
for different platforms and have less time for journalistic research and time-
consuming reportage work (Nikunen, 2014). 
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However, national news organisations and some regional media houses in 
the Nordic countries still have some specialised political reporters who regularly 
cover traditional, institutional political news. These news outlets also offer daily 
political commentaries and analyses. The press lobbies of the parliaments in the 
Nordic countries are long-lasting examples of the organised relations between 
political journalists and politicians (Allern, 2001, 2010; Dalen & Skovsgaard, 
2010). One contributing economic factor behind such continuing priorities may 
be that parliamentarian and party-centred political news is relatively cheap to 
produce, especially compared with more investigative forms of journalism. News 
interviews and background interviews are easily organised and cost effective 
(Niemikari et al., 2019). In fact, according to Dalen and Skovsgaard (2010), 
Danish political journalists, covering the parliament as a regular “beat”, have 
experienced less internal, commercial pressure than other journalists in their 
media organisations. One reason may be that they are able, with small expen-
ditures, to deliver a steady stream of news stories.
 The objective of this chapter – based on a review of research literature in 
the field – is to describe and discuss some important political journalism devel-
opment trends in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. The next section 
discusses the media’s roles as channels, arenas, and actors on the scene of politics. 
Then, in “New political actors on the media scene”, we discuss the relations 
between journalists, politicians, and policy professionals. The next section, “The 
communicative rules of the game”, addresses how media formats and “logics” 
influence politics and power struggles. The following section, “Changing ap-
proaches to political journalism”, discusses conflicting news media strategies 
concerning the prioritisation and presentation of political news in today’s media 
environment. The last section comprises some concluding remarks about the 
future development of political journalism in a hybrid media system. 
Changing historical relations between media and politics
The relations between Nordic news media organisations and political institutions 
have gone through dramatic changes during the last half century. The traditional 
political role of the mass media – associated with the omnibus press and the party 
papers in the first two decades after World War II – was, first and foremost, to be 
a channel for other political institutions, such as political parties, governments, 
parliaments, and municipal authorities. In the contacts and negotiations between 
journalists and their political sources, the politicians generally had the upper hand 
and many of them played a double role as both politician and publisher. The state-
owned public service channels, representing a monopoly in radio and television, 
primarily functioned as information disseminators and educational institutions, 
not as independent news producers (Bjerke, 2011; Djerf-Pierre, 2000; Esaiasson 
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& Håkansson, 2013; Hjarvard, 1999). The political parties strictly controlled 
the limited political debate programmes broadcast before national elections. In 
this period, the role of journalists was reduced to that of technical moderator, 
ensuring that the politicians received their agreed transmission time (Allern, 2010, 
2011a; Esaiasson & Håkansson, 2002; Hjarvard, 1999). 
In the late 1960s and 1970s, this party-controlled channel role was weakened 
and eventually abolished. An important part of the journalistic professional-
isation process in this period focused on gaining independence from political 
parties. The media channels were gradually developed into arenas where the 
parties and politicians had to compete for visibility and influence. During the 
1980s, the deregulation of telecommunication and broadcasting ended the 
public service channels’ monopoly in radio and television, leading to changes 
that furthered this development. The party press also became history. News 
media organisations and journalists became, in an increasingly competitive 
media market, independent actors and political interpreters (Allern & Blach-
Ørsten, 2011; Lund et al., 2009; Pedersen et al., 2000; Østbye, 1997; Østbye 
& Aalberg, 2008). 
In Finland, these historical changes were described through the study of three 
generational groups of political journalists (Kantola, 2012, 2016a; see also Kol-
jonen, 2013). The oldest group, characterised as “the solid moderns” in the news 
organisations, were, in many cases, directly engaged in politics and aligned with 
a political party in their youth (Kantola, 2012). They were carriers of national 
responsibility, had tight relations with their sources, and were critical of poli-
tics as “infotainment”. Today, most of them have retired from the newsrooms. 
Journalists that came into the profession in the 1980s (a middle generation 
characterised as “the liquefying moderns”) have independent professionalism as 
their central ethos (Kantola, 2012). Many of them have university educations and 
see themselves as professionals detached from politics. They have also endorsed 
storytelling techniques and market-oriented news criteria to a greater degree than 
the solid moderns. The youngest generation, described as “the liquid moderns”, 
has an anti-institutional, flexible identity and accepts opinionated journalism 
with an agenda (Kantola, 2012). They do not cover politics as a regular beat but 
participate in projects and teams using ad hoc sources. 
Using a term taken from institutional theory, this development of journalism 
can be characterised as a succession of distinct news regimes with a set of norms 
and routines that cut across individual news media organisations (Blach-Ørsten, 
2014; Ryfe, 2006). The “partisan news regime” associated with the party press 
was gradually influenced by the rise of public broadcasting and developed into 
an “independent news regime”, characterised by professional media organisa-
tions with an informal but central role in political processes (Blach-Ørsten, 
2014: 93). Practically speaking, this is still the case today. There are, however, 
signs of changes to a new type of regime defined by competition more than 
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anything else. The “competitive news regime” is increasingly dependent upon 
professional sources that can deliver exclusives and scoops (Blach-Ørsten, 2014: 
94). This may strengthen the interactions and cooperation between journalists 
and professional political actors.
It is notable that differences in political history and culture may lead to 
country-specific media coverage of political movements and parties. For ex-
ample, this has been observed in the press coverage of the right-wing Nordic 
populist parties, organisations that have common traits, such as their opposition 
to immigration, but may also represent important differences concerning politi-
cal history and life cycles (Herkman, 2016, 2017a, 2017b; Jungar & Jupskås, 
2014; Herkman & Jungar, Chapter 12). 
Interesting differences were also revealed in a recent study of mediated po-
litical scandals related to the #metoo movement in the four Nordic countries. 
While there were several national scandals in the political field related to #metoo 
in Sweden and Norway, there was only one sexual harassment case related 
to the Finnish Parliament and none in Denmark. A likely hypothesis “is that 
the culture of silence related to questions regarded as personal and sexual is 
somewhat stronger in the Finnish and Danish political environments than in 
those of Sweden and Norway” (Pollack et al., 2018: 3103).
New political actors on the media scene
Direct contact and negotiations between journalists and politicians comprise 
a basic relationship in political journalism. However, other professional po-
litical actors have grown in importance on the media scene. While politicians 
traditionally get their mandate through democratic elections, the new type of 
political actor is an employee or a consultant for hire who has political and 
communicative expert knowledge. In an analysis of this development in Sweden, 
Garsten and colleagues (2015) called this new category of political actors “policy 
professionals”; they are not elected but employed to pursue politics – they have 
power but no democratic mandate.
A large group of policy professionals are employed as political or communi-
cation advisors in government ministries and parliamentarian party groups or 
as party organisation leaders. Others are employed as lobbyists or advisors in 
corporations and trade and interest organisations – or they have jobs as con-
sultants in public relations firms offering lobbying advice (Blach-Ørsten et al., 
2017a; Ihlen & Gullberg, 2015; Kantola, 2016b; Karlsen, 2010; Lounasmeri, 
2018; Svallfors & Tyllström, 2017). This labour market has opened revolving 
doors between politics and public relations, lobbying, and media organisations 
(Allern, 2011b, 2015; Allern & Pollack, 2018; Svallfors, 2016). Furthermore, 
former politicians and former journalists offer their professional competence 
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as a commodity on a new labour market. Historically, this phenomenon can 
be analysed as an expansion of market logic into public areas where market 
exchange had previously been restricted (Tyllström, 2013). 
Policy professionals are also employed in think tanks – representing a type of 
expertise that is more engaged in strategic attempts of political and ideological 
opinion building than that of advisors who are more engaged in day-to-day poli-
tics. The expansion of think tanks today is a common phenomenon in the Nordic 
countries, and they are frequently referred to in the national media and among 
decision-makers. Politically, think tanks represent both business and labour union 
interests, but the largest and most influential organisations in the Nordic think tank 
landscape are financed by business interest organisations and represent a market 
liberal ideology (Allern & Pollack, 2016, 2020; Bjerke, 2016; Blach-Ørsten & 
Kristensen, 2016; Christensen & Holst, 2020; Kelstrup, 2016a, 2016b, 2018, 
2020; Kelstrup & Blach-Ørsten, 2020; Lounasmeri, 2016, 2020; Óscarsdóttir, 
2020; Sörbom, 2018).
The expansion of the public relations industry and the introduction of new 
types of policy professionals also represent a countermeasure to the profes-
sionalisation of journalism, namely, the growth of more professional news 
media sources. For many decades, political parties, government departments, 
corporations, trade organisations, and interest groups have prioritised build-
ing up their own communication expertise, handling both media relations and 
direct communication to stakeholders and voters. This is important because 
the relations between journalists and their sources largely explain the content 
of the news media, especially news and reportage material. 
The journalist-source relationship also applies to political journalism. Re-
porters, commentators, politicians, advisors, and consultants with backgrounds 
in media or politics know each other well; they usually develop long-term, 
strategic relationships and regularly talk “on record” as well as “off record” 
(Dindler, 2015). Both parties initiate possible news stories and “follow-ups”. 
Gans (1980: 116), in his analysis of American news organisations, characterised 
such relations using a dance metaphor: “sources seek access to journalists, and 
journalists seek access to sources. Although it takes two to tango, either sources 
or journalists can lead, but more often than not, sources do the leading”. 
While the ability of resourceful actors to engage journalists and lead the 
“tango” is also documented in Nordic media research (Allern, 1997, 2015; 
Kristensen, 2004; Mathisen, 2013; Sahlstrand, 2000), this should not be inter-
preted as though professionalised sources have permanent positions as primary 
definers; influence through agenda setting and the framing of news stories are 
always conquered through negotiations of control (Allern, 1997, 2018; Ericson 
et al., 1989; Schlesinger, 1990). The final decision concerning publicity is, after 
all, an editorial responsibility. 
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The communicative rules of the game
According to theories of mediatisation, politics in the Nordic countries today 
is largely driven by a “news media logic” – in contrast to a “political logic” 
based on the conceptualisation “that politics ultimately is about collective and 
authoritative decision making as well as the implementation of political deci-
sions” (Strömbäck & Esser, 2014: 14). While political logic is constituted by 
polity (the institutional framework of politics), policy (the content of politics), 
and politics (the power struggles over policy making), news media logic is 
constituted by professionalism (journalistic norms and criteria), commercialism 
(economically motivated rationales), and media technology (news production 
according to different technologies’ affordances) (Strömbäck & Esser, 2014).
In line with this, the news media define the communicative rules of the game, 
and politicians are, to a large degree, dependent on media coverage for gauging 
public opinion and generating attention (Esser, 2013). Politicians, therefore, 
adapt their initiatives to conventional media formats and general news values, 
such as conflicts, proximity, sensations, and personalisation (Blach-Ørsten, 
2014; Skovsgaard & Dalen, 2013; Strömbäck, 2008; Strömbäck & Esser, 2014). 
The expansion of policy professionals as a new layer of non-elected advisors and 
communication specialists inside government institutions and parliamentarian 
party groups confirms and reinforces this development. However, contradictory 
tendencies in relation to the news media also exist, such as when governments 
and parties consciously try (and succeed) to avoid the public floodlight by clos-
ing media access to important back regions (Albæk et al., 2014; Allern, 1997; 
Ericson et al., 1989).
How news media logic influences the power relations between journalists 
and political parties is, however, complicated to analyse. To interpret examples 
of the mediatisation of politics as a general expression of media power would 
be naïve, although such general conclusions are too often drawn on a weak 
empirical basis. The role of journalism in relation to business and marketing 
enterprises may illustrate the pitfalls of this reasoning. For nearly a century, com-
mercial corporations and their public relations advisors have professionalised 
and refined their ability to adopt, use, and exploit media formats and general 
“news values”. A well-known strategy is to produce “information subsidies” 
– pre-packaged and framed news proposals – which may lower the editorial 
news threshold, influencing how information is prioritised and presented to the 
public (Allern, 1997, 2018; Gandy, 1982). Today’s media-trained politicians 
and professional communication advisors also know how to “spin” a story. 
They offer interviews and news “exclusives” to competing media organisa-
tions, as well as backstage “leaks” with information directed against political 
opponents. In the strategic dance between journalists and political sources, 
both parties can take the lead, and, as mentioned above, professional sources 
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often succeed (Allern, 1997; Gans, 1980; Green-Pedersen & Stubager, 2010; 
Kristensen, 2004; Schlesinger, 1990).
However, such promotional successes depend on several factors. Theories 
of news values generally predict that politicians in top positions get the most 
media coverage (Harcup & O’Neill, 2001, 2016). A Swiss study of politicians 
covered by the print media observed that “formal power in the policy-making 
process […] easily translates into discursive power in the media, which can 
further strengthen the political power of an actor and ultimately lead to a self-
perpetuating cycle of political influence and media coverage” (Tresch, 2009: 71). 
A party’s standing in the polls generally influences its media appearances, 
concluded a Swedish election study (Asp, 2006); the same conclusion was 
drawn in a Norwegian study of the representation of political parties in televised 
election programmes (Allern, 2011a). The consequence of such practices was 
characterised in a Danish study of election news as an incumbency bonus in 
political news coverage: “the more powerful you are, the more attention you 
receive”, and governments with more support (who are the expected winners 
of an election) had a larger incumbency bonus than weaker governments (Hop-
mann et al., 2011: 278). The news media’s orientation towards party leaders 
and well-known politicians with good communication skills makes it harder 
for lesser-known politicians to gain media access (Skovsgaard & Dalen, 2013). 
Therefore, a mediatised campaign – adapting to or adopting media for-
mats and market-oriented news media logic – does not tell us much about 
who influences whom. In Norway – with its long history of televised election 
programmes – politicians have, since the 1970s, been professionally trained to 
master different programme formats, including question programmes, duels, 
or television-arranged “public meetings”; in other words, they have adapted 
to the “media logic” of the television channels. In 1997, TV 2 – one of the two 
leading Norwegian television channels – decided that their journalists that year 
should be political agenda-setters during the pre-election period. Polls about the 
voters’ interest in different topics were made and followed up with news and 
reportages. The hope was that these party-independent initiatives would strongly 
influence and frame the discussions in the televised debate programmes. The 
strategy was afterwards summed up as a fiasco; the news initiatives had little or 
no influence on the political parties’ prioritised agendas (Allern, 2011a). Thus, 
power over media formats does not guarantee political agenda-setting power. 
A Danish study of the 2011 national election drew the same general conclu-
sion: political parties had substantial influence on which issues the news media 
covered during the election campaign, while the media had limited influence on 
the parties’ agendas. According to Hopmann and colleagues (2012: 186), the 
news media “are not independent actors acting autonomously but are engaged 
in an interaction with political actors who are their central sources in election 
campaign coverage”.
143
7. DEVELOPMENT TRENDS AND CHALLENGES IN NORDIC POLITICAL JOURNALISM
 As Van Aelst and colleagues (2014) summed up, concepts such as media 
logic and political logic may be seen as overlapping, but they are not mutually 
exclusive. Politics is about power, and media logic can be used as a tool to reach 
political goals, or – alternatively – it can be an obstacle; this was the conclu-
sion of a recent study by Nygren and Niemikari (2019: 218), which found that 
“media logics set the rules of the game, and political sources can play the game 
to reach their goal according to political logics”. 
These changes in political communication need to be seen in a historical 
perspective. While political logic once dominated the discourses of political 
journalism, the emergence of the news media as an independent institution gave 
journalists a role as actors with a substantial definitional power and the ability 
to define the communicative rules of the game. However, professional political 
sources quickly learned to use and exploit news media logics for their own aims 
and objectives. During the last decade, the growth of social media networks and 
the relative weakening of the legacy media have created a less stable situation 
for the negotiation of control between journalists and their sources. 
Changing approaches to political journalism
Following Blumler and colleagues (1989), we may distinguish between four 
different approaches to political journalism that characterise the priorities of 
modern news media organisations: the “sacerdotal”, “pragmatic”, “conven-
tionally journalistic”, and “analytic” approaches. 
First, the sacerdotal approach – which is understood as a type of priestly 
ritual – views political processes and institutions as sacerdotal to democracy 
and, therefore, as important per se. In line with this, news organisations must 
inform voters about political proposals, conflicts, and decisions; scrutinise the 
work of political power holders; and contribute to the democratic process by 
stimulating political debates. This interpretation of what journalism is and 
should be echoes the traditional, institutionally oriented definition of political 
journalism mentioned above. In the Nordic countries, as in some other Northern 
European countries and the UK, a sacerdotal approach has its historical roots 
in the party press and public service channels.
In this tradition, politics is an important beat to be covered by specialised 
and knowledgeable reporters who develop professional source relationships in 
the field. An organisational expression of this is the existence of a press lobby 
in the parliament, securing regular contact between journalists from the leading 
media organisations and national politicians. Another well-known feature in the 
Nordic countries is broad coverage of election campaigns, including interview 
programmes with party leaders and televised election debates (Allern, 2011a; 
Esaiasson & Håkansson, 2002; Johansson & Strömbäck, 2019). News deci-
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sions and programme priorities are, in this tradition, strongly influenced by the 
agenda of the political institutions and parties. 
Another characteristic feature of the sacerdotal approach is that political 
news is seen through a national, institutional prism. Domestic policy questions 
are prioritised and, in some cases, supplemented by foreign policy questions of 
national interest, which are on the parliamentarian agenda. This scenario is still 
typical for the Nordic countries, regardless of whether they are members of the 
European Union, as is the case in other countries where the news media primarily 
operates in a national or local market (Aalbæk et al., 2014; Ihlen et al., 2010; 
Slaatta, 1999). Geographical proximity and possibilities for national framing 
are important criteria of newsworthiness; this also applies to political news 
journalism about European affairs (Heikkilä & Kunelius, 2014; Ørsten, 2004)
A contrast to prioritising politics, especially domestic politics, as important 
per se is represented by the pragmatic approach; political events are not insti-
tutionally predefined as newsworthy and must, therefore, compete with other 
types of news – including crime, disasters, sports, and celebrities – for the allo-
cation of space on news pages or time in broadcasted news programmes. Media 
organisations working in this tradition will often have only a few specialised 
political reporters or commentators (or none). 
The pragmatic approach means that politics (in contrast to content such as 
sports and entertainment) does not represent any reserved editorial news area. 
This is especially typical of the priorities of the popular tabloid papers and their 
online sites. With the exception of the final weeks before national elections, 
such pragmatism is, today, a typical editorial line. Political news competes with 
everything. The priorities are based on market-oriented and commercial news 
criteria related to the interests (and advertising value) of specific audience groups 
and segments of readers (Allern, 2002, 2010; Schultz, 2007). In all types of 
media, including television, an organisational expression of this development is 
an editorial system where journalists must try to “sell” their stories and reports 
to the central desk and its editors. 
The pragmatic approach is close to the conventionally journalistic approach, 
which entails selecting and prioritising events laced with drama and conflict to 
fulfil market-oriented news values. A norms violation by a well-known politi-
cian, which can be framed as a political scandal, will always create headlines. 
The pragmatic and conventionally journalistic approaches are both associated 
with the dramatised storytelling tradition of newspapers and broadcasting 
channels, representing market-oriented, popular, and tabloid journalism.
The fourth type, the analytic approach, gives journalists the roles of inter-
preter and commentator. The rise of the punditocracy – or commentariat – in 
the Nordic press and the public service broadcasting channels over the last two 
decades represents an institutionalised expression of this approach (Nord & 
Stúr, 2009; Nord et al., 2012). The pundits are ascribed the role of the all-round 
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experts of the news media, commenting on polls and explaining what the politi-
cians “really mean” and intend to do. A new, hybrid genre, also representing the 
analytic approach, is political news analysis, blurring the traditional distinction 
between news and views on the news pages. 
Commentary, which is historically linked to the essay genre, is one of the 
classical genres of modern journalism, but, in the Nordic party press, political 
commentaries were mostly editorials, representing the collective voice of the 
paper and symbolising the difference between news and views. The development 
of political journalism representing an analytic approach has given commentaries 
and news analysis more prominence in all types of news media (Nord & Stúr, 
2009; Nord et al., 2012). In an area of greater competition, news organisations 
have upgraded the market value of interpretations and political opinion making 
(Allern & Blach-Ørsten, 2011). 
The structure of the news media industry has always been important for the 
relevance and strength of these different approaches to political journalism. A 
traditional, sacerdotal approach was a dominating feature of Nordic political 
journalism in the decades after World War II – lasting until the late 1980s. 
Politics mattered and political journalism was at the core of the journalistic 
profession in an era when national politics was regarded as the most vital 
public issue (Kantola, 2016a). The coverage was issue- and party-oriented, 
and stories concerning politicians’ personal or private lives were not part of 
the political reporting. 
The changes in the media system throughout the last three decades have 
led to market changes that have generally weakened the sacerdotal approach 
and strengthened the other three approaches. Newspapers and other media 
organisations have been reorganised into media houses, publishing on several 
platforms, both online and offline. The state-owned Nordic radio and televi-
sion public service channels – now also publishing online news – face tough 
competition but continue to be important parts of the media structure in all 
four countries (Syvertsen et al., 2014). 
 Combined with a “conventional” journalistic approach demanding drama, 
conflict, and lively pictures, one effect of this marketisation seems to be that 
institutionalised political news about processes and decisions is generally 
marginalised. Another important development trend is the strong increase in 
mediated national political scandals in the Nordic countries during the last 
two decades. Commenting on well-known political corruption cases in West 
Germany in the 1980s, Logue (1988: 261) wrote that the Scandinavian labour 
movements and governments “are virtually free of such embarrassments”. No-
body would award such a political certificate today. Today, frequent scandal 
reporting is the “new normal” in political journalism with a substantial increase 
in the mediation of personal behaviour scandals (Allern et al., 2012; Herkman, 
2017a; Pollack et al., 2018). 
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However, during the final weeks before national elections, the heritage of the 
sacerdotal tradition is still strong in Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden, 
and the public service channels continue to serve as the most important arenas 
for political election debates. Such debates are traditionally organised by the 
large public service channels, but some of the commercial media houses also 
offer this format on their online sites nowadays. As a general rule, the norms 
of “balance” and “impartiality” in public service broadcasting indicate that all 
political parties represented in parliament should have the right to participate 
on par with other parties. 
This sacerdotal tradition has – after the deregulation of broadcasting in 
the 1980s – been supplemented and combined with a more market-oriented, 
pragmatic editorial line. One example is staged, televised duels between prime 
minister candidates, a popular format that favours the leaders of the largest 
ruling government party and the largest opposition party, leading to a “presi-
dentialisation” of the media coverage (Webb, 2007). However, just before a 
national election day, a debate between all party leaders is still an institution-
alised “grand finale” in all four countries.
In these election periods, the national, regional, and local newspapers and 
their online sites try to mobilise citizens to vote and initiate polls, debates, and 
interviews as regular and important content elements (Allern, 2011a; Asp & 
Bjerling, 2014; Esaiasson & Håkansson, 2002, 2013). In Denmark, political 
journalism almost exclusively focuses on national-level politics, national ac-
tors, and the parliament. In Sweden, Norway, and Finland – which still have 
relatively strong local press and regional public service channels – the coverage 
of regional and local politics traditionally plays a somewhat greater role. How-
ever, a recent media study of the 2018 Swedish election campaign documented 
a dramatic change in media habits and communication patterns; the position 
of the local media was weakened, many local editorial offices closed, and social 
media played a more central role (Nord et al., 2019). 
From an institutional perspective, these approaches represent changing priori-
ties and changing news regimes, but old forms do not vanish when new forms 
develop. Political journalism still subscribes to the institutional myth of the 
news media as the fourth estate, independent of other power holders; this myth 
is strengthened by the established discourse and research on the news media’s 
importance for democracy (Aalberg & Curran, 2012). While journalists are no 
longer partisans – as political journalists were in the period of the party press 
– they are definitely actors and participants in politics, representing new types 
of political interpretation and interventionism (Allern & Blach-Ørsten, 2011; 
Reunanen & Koljonen, 2018). Thus, norms and ideals generally change slowly. 
Nordic journalists were recently studied as part of a Worlds of Journalism 
Study, based on a large survey dataset; a telling result, and especially relevant 
for political journalism, was that Nordic journalists still share an ideal vision of 
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being watchdogs, critically monitoring and scrutinising those in power (Ahva 
et al., 2017). Finnish political journalists stand out as a coherent group with 
particularly uniform values. They also endorse the role of analytical independent 
watchdogs that keep their distance from audiences and commercialisation and 
are cautious in using controversial reporting practices (Väliverronen, 2018). 
The professional orientation of Nordic journalists matches well with the struc-
tural characteristics of the Nordic media system and the media welfare state 
(Syvertsen et al., 2014) and, according to Ahva and colleagues (2017: 609), 
“appears to clearly be linked to the characteristics of the political context and 
media system in which they work”.
The regular coverage of political institutions represents an influential histori-
cal tradition in both public service broadcasting and the printed press, and it 
also serves as an argument for a democratic media policy. 
Conclusion: Challenges in a hybrid media landscape
The conventional wisdom (or hypothesis) in today’s media landscape is that 
political journalism in its traditional formats and genres, disseminated by the 
legacy media organisations, will gradually wither away. Thus far, these proph-
ecies have failed. One reason may be that such structural and institutional 
changes take time. Media habits have an institutionalised inertia that undermines 
both utopias and dystopias (Enroljas et al., 2013). Another basic factor is the 
historical lesson that the old media institutions are, in most cases, long-lived 
because of their ability to adapt to the challenges of a changing technological 
and economic environment (Blach-Ørsten et al., 2017b). 
However, an important change the last decade is the conversion of traditional 
newspaper organisations into multiplatform media houses, offering their audiences 
a wide range of journalistic products, including printed newspapers, online news 
and feature stories, videos, and podcasts. A crucial question is linked to this busi-
ness model: How can journalism be funded in a media world where the global tech 
companies yearly increase their share of the advertising market? One of the media 
industry’s most important answers to this question has been to establish online 
paywalls, especially combined subscriptions for printed and online products. 
According to the Reuters Institute Digital News Report 2019 (Newman et al., 
2019), 34 per cent of the Norwegian population and 27 per cent of the Swedish 
population pay for online news, while this was the case for only 16 per cent of the 
population in Finland and 15 per cent in Denmark. However, even in Norway, 
which tops the Reuter Institute’s international list for payment for online news, 
the income (from audiences and advertisements) of the printed press was still as 
high as 74 per cent in 2018, while digital incomes of all kinds accounted for 26 
per cent (Medietilsynet, 2019). The newspaper may be an endangered species, but 
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it is still – as a medium – the funding base for most of the journalism produced 
outside of the large, publicly funded public service institutions. 
Concerning news, current affairs, and political journalism, the Nordic public 
service radio and television channels play an important role. When it comes 
to brand trust, they top the national media organisation lists (Newman et al., 
2019). However, due to the growth of right-wing populism and a polarisation 
of the political climate, public service channels are currently experiencing chal-
lenges concerning political support for their funding and independence. An 
early warning signal was the 20 per cent funding cut for the main Danish public 
service provider, Danmarks Radio, by the right-wing government in 2018. The 
settlement reduces the staff by 375 jobs and reduces the number of television 
channels from six to three – the new contract also forbids the production of 
long, text-based news articles online (Schrøder & Ørsten, 2019). In Sweden, 
the new conservative bloc (comprised of the Sweden Democrats, the Moderates, 
and the Christian Democrats), launched attacks on the Swedish public service 
media during the autumn of 2019, arguing for a reduced financial base and a 
more limited programme mandate (Allern, 2019). These attacks continued in 
2020, and have resulted in a more polarised public debate concerning media 
policy and the future of public service media.
In a complex, hybrid media system, traditional news media, online sites, 
and social media coexist and interact (Chadwick, 2013). Political actors use 
Facebook and Twitter messages as direct communication (and propaganda) 
tools to reach voters, but such messages are also sources for news and provide 
a basis for follow-up stories and comments in online news, printed newspapers, 
and broadcasting programmes. Legacy news organisations operate on several 
independent platforms and have developed their own web applications, but 
they also use social media as news disseminators. A study of Facebook news use 
during the 2017 national elections in Norway – comparing news disseminated 
by four leading legacy media organisations and three hyperpartisan, right-wing 
media outlets – found that, with a few exceptions, established legacy media 
dominated the most engaging news stories (Kalsnes & Larsson, 2019). Despite 
the public focus on social media platforms, the traditional media organisations 
(with public service broadcasters in the lead) still seem to remain the most 
important media for most voters (Asp & Bjerling, 2014; Blach-Ørsten et al., 
2017b; Jensen et al., 2016; Larsson & Skogerbø, 2018; Skogerbø & Krums-
vik, 2014). In addition, there is also the old, direct, and verbal type of voter 
contacts (seldom studied by media-centred communication scholars) through 
door-knocking, house parties, street agitation, and traditional physical meet-
ings. Summing up the experiences from the 2017 national election in Norway, 
the Conservative Party’s chief communication officer even characterised door-
knocking and talking to ordinary people about the party’s policies as “the most 
important election campaign tool” (Solhaug, 2019: 33). 
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Therefore, as several of the chapters in this anthology describe, modern 
political campaigning and communication analyse, discuss, and are character-
ised by the use of a wide range of media and communication tools, including 
legacy media and the many social media networks. One of the challenges in 
the study of political journalism is to continue to analyse this dialectic between 
“old” and “new” types of political communication and political journalism 
with an open mind. 
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Chapter 8
Local political communication 
in a hybrid media system
Carl-Gustav Lindén, Lisbeth Morlandstø, 
& Gunnar Nygren
Abstract
      This chapter analyses the local media  and local political  conditions in  the  Nordic 
countries from the perspective of power. The rapid changes in the local media 
system described in this chapter have led to a redistribution of this power in the 
local community in different directions. The starting point for our analysis is the 
four variables defined by Hallin and Mancini (2004) to describe different media 
systems and to identify change in power and power relations. We find that local 
media structures are changing, with downsized newspapers and decreasing use of 
local newspapers while social media is becoming more prominent. Norway and 
Sweden try to balance decreasing commercial conditions with state support, while 
there is a strong regional public service in all Nordic countries. Political parallelism 
in the old sense of political power and control of newspapers has gone. Profes-
sional journalists have become only one group among many different producers 
of local media content, duly losing power over local agendas.
Keywords: local media, local journalism, Nordic countries, media system, hybrid media
Introduction
In this chapter, we analyse the local media ecosystems and conditions for local 
political communication in the Nordic countries. We approach this topic from 
the perspective of power and the way in which changing local media also reflect 
or influence power relations in the local community. Local news often provides 
critical information on issues that people in the locality find important – schools, 
public health, housing, building, and planning. To this end, local media play 
an important role in empowering citizens as actors in the local community, 
serving a dual role as watchdogs in the locality as well as providing an arena 
for actors in local conflicts (Peterson & Carlberg, 1990; Weibull et al., 2018). 
The quality of the media ecosystem is related to the power that is exerted 
to control the information flow in local communities. This power has at least 
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two dimensions: the power of different media platforms to influence local 
communities and the question of which actors have the power to influence 
the content of these local media platforms (Asp, 1986). Both of these power 
dimensions are important in analysing the role of different media platforms in 
local political communication. 
The frame of reference for our study is the model used by Hallin and Man-
cini (2004) to analyse media systems, adapted to the local framework. In this 
context, identifying the changes in the power to influence local communities 
and media content is essential. However, we also acknowledge the change in 
the media ecosystem, such as the rising importance of social media, which 
Chadwick (2017) calls the “hybrid media system” – hence the use of the term 
“hybrid” in the title of this chapter. Chadwick (2017: 3) notes that “the rapid 
diffusion of new communication technologies creates a pressing need to rethink 
the complex and multifaceted forces that are reshaping the political communica-
tion environments”. Moreover, hybridity means that we do not need to make 
the either-or distinction, for instance, between “new” or “old” media, but treat 
them instead as parts of the media system (Nygren, 2018). Nonlinearity is thus 
an important characteristic of hybridity.
First, we identify the actors and institutions in the local media ecosystems. 
Second, we briefly explain the role of the state in relation to local media, and 
third, the degree of political parallelism in the local setting and local political 
journalism in the Nordic countries. Fourth, we go into the degree of profes-
sionalisation of local journalism. In all four perspectives, we also analyse how 
changes in local media impact power and power relations in local communi-
ties. After this broad presentation of the local media system in the Nordic 
countries, we discuss the central theories applied to analyse local media and 
political journalism and present some challenges and suggestions for research 
in the field. Lastly, we discuss what happens with regard to local political com-
munication, using notions such as the fragmentation and hybridisation of the 
local media system. 
The local media ecosystems in the Nordic countries 
A local media ecosystem is a concept encompassing all media actors and media 
institutions in a geographically defined area, including advertisers, news sources, 
and news consumers (Anderson, 2016). Local media are an important part of 
the media landscape (Napoli et al., 2015; Nielsen, 2015) and form a vital basis 
for political communication and dialogue. The same goes for the Nordic media 
systems, which are characterised by a decentralised press structure consisting of 
a great number of local and regional newspapers spread throughout the coun-
tries. Weibull (2005) notes that, for a long time, Finland, Norway, and Sweden 
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constituted the region with the highest level of newspaper circulation and the 
region where newspapers had the largest share of the advertising market. In 
the World Press Trends 2017 Report (WAN-IFRA, 2018), Finland, Norway, 
and Sweden are still ranked high in terms of printed newspaper circulation per 
1,000 inhabitants. Moreover, when it comes to online news, the Nordic countries 
rank highest in the world, with Norway at number one with 42 per cent paying 
for online news during 2019, and Sweden second with 27 per cent. By way of 
comparison, the proportion paying for online news in the US was 20 per cent 
(Newman et al., 2020). According to the report, Norway and Finland also have 
the largest supply of local newspapers. In addition, all of the Nordic countries 
have strong public service broadcasting at the regional level and share a long 
democratic tradition characterised by stability of and confidence in political 
institutions. Taken together, this forms a Nordic “welfare state media model” 
based on strong commercial, local, national, and regional media in combination 
with public services (Syvertsen et al., 2014).
During the last decade, this stable situation has become more fragile while 
local media systems have simultaneously become more fragmented and more 
consolidated. Subscription-based newspapers have transformed into multiplat-
form publishing houses, but have at the same time become more centralised 
and downsized to adapt to the shrinking economy. Public service broadcasters 
have also developed multi-platform publishing, albeit affected by shrinking 
resources to a lesser extent, which has increased the conflicts between public 
service broadcasting and the commercial media (Grusell & Nord, 2012). In 
addition, most local forms of media – freesheets, hyperlocal online news, 
and small subscription-based papers – are growing. Besides traditional local 
media, social media platforms, mainly Facebook, have become the most fre-
quently used sources for people when they want to stay updated on local news 
(Nygren, 2018; Olsen et al., 2018). Social media, especially Facebook groups, 
have developed into major platforms for local news and debate, building on 
participation and interactivity. However, platforms also absorb economic re-
sources from traditional media, since the vast majority of digital ad revenues 
end up in the hands of Facebook and Google, also in the Nordic countries 
(Ohlsson & Facht, 2017).
Local media have tended to attract little attention from media research 
compared with national media. Media researchers have been criticised for 
focusing mostly on the largest media companies, the biggest media events, the 
most prominent media personalities, and the most visible journalists. Aldridge 
(2007) and Nielsen (2015) add that, despite being central and vital arenas 
for public debate, local media are ignored, not only in research, but also in 
professional debates. This lack of attention means that there is less awareness 
and knowledge about the formation of local and regional opinion and the role 
of local and regional media in democratic and political participation. Accord-
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ing to Waschková Císařová (2017), this attitude is changing. In recent years, 
scholars have shown an expanding interest in local journalism both in Europe 
and in other parts of the world. Hess and Waller (2017) argue, for instance, 
that local media are resilient in a digital world and that their value has become 
clearer and more interesting. Nielsen (2015) argues that local newspapers are 
the keystone media in local societies and help people understand themselves 
as part of a community. A vital part of this reorientation is research on small 
hyperlocals, that is, new forms of local media such as community websites 
or online news startups not connected to legacy media (Lindén et al., 2019a; 
Nygren et al., 2018; Williams et al., 2015).
There are some recent examples of research on the local media structure 
in the Nordic countries, especially in Norway and Sweden (Mathisen & Mor-
landstø, 2016, 2018, 2019a; Nygren et al., 2018). In Finland, local media and 
journalism are largely overlooked by researchers, with a few exceptions (Lin-
dén, 2017; Ojajärvi, 2014; Ojajärvi & Valtonen, 2012). In 2017, the Danish 
School of Media and Journalism conducted a large study on the content, role, 
and importance of local and regional media in Denmark (Svith et al., 2017), 
supplementing historical narratives on the subject (Jørgensen, 2016; Søllinge, 
2005), but aside from these studies, current research with a local focus in Den-
mark is minimal (Lund, 2018).
Even though the Nordic countries all have a decentralised media structure, 
some differences can be found. Finland, Norway, and Sweden have a much 
higher distribution of newspapers compared to Denmark. Norway and Finland 
have more than 200 newspapers and Sweden just over 150, while Denmark has 
only around 30 subscription-based newspapers. Most newspapers in Denmark, 
in turn, are daily newspapers, while many newspapers in the other Nordic 
countries are published only weekly or a few days per week. Norway is also 
distinguished by having most of the smallest newspapers, with low circulation 
and limited distribution. 
Most of these daily and weekly newspapers in Finland, Norway, and Swe-
den are local, but differences emerge even here. Norway and Finland have 
had very stable structures in this respect (Finnish Newspapers Association, 
2019; Høst, 2019). In Sweden, however, every other local newsroom has 
closed down since 2004. The number of local journalists decreased by 30–40 
per cent (Nygren, 2018), while 35 municipalities were without any editorial 
presence in 2018 (Truedson, 2018). The backbone of the Finnish press system 
consists of regional papers (Björkroth & Grönlund, 2014), and “more than 
half of Finland’s paid-for newspapers are local weeklies” (Harrie, 2018: 24). 
However, in a media policy report for the Finnish government, Ala-Fossi and 
colleagues (2018) pointed to serious diversity risks at the local media level 
since many municipalities have no newspapers, and where there is a media 
presence, only one title exists. 
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The major difference compared to Denmark lies in the number of free 
newspapers. Almost all of the households in Denmark (82%) receive one (or 
more) free local weeklies once or twice a week. Some are pure advertising pub-
lications, whereas others constitute the only journalistic news channel in local 
areas, because all of the subscription-based media (newspapers, television, and 
radio) are regional, not local. Thus, with far fewer newspaper subscriptions 
in Denmark, free weeklies, television, and local radio have a more dominant 
role than in the other Nordic countries. Harrie (2018: 13–14) characterises 
this as a “continental feature, with television news dominating in another way 
than in Finland, Norway and Sweden”. This also applies locally, which may 
be exemplified by Nordjylland, the region of northern Denmark. In addition 
to the regional media company Nordjyske medier, which has local television 
and radio channels (they also publish daily and weekly newspapers and maga-
zines), both the public service company – the Danish Broadcasting Corporation 
(DR) – and the commercial television channel TV2 have regional radio and 
television stations in Nordjylland. Regional television and radio stations are 
also important local media actors in Norway, Sweden, and Finland, but since 
the number of local newspaper subscriptions are relatively low in Denmark, 
radio and television play a far more dominant role.
What distinguishes Denmark, Finland, and Sweden from Norway is that a 
number of free newspapers have been established in recent years, in print as 
well as on the Internet – the so-called hyperlocals. Some of these have been 
established in areas that no longer have their own newspaper, but most have 
appeared in larger cities or suburbs where there are also several other traditional 
media present but where the population density is greater and the advertising 
revenue correspondingly better (Nygren et al., 2018). In Sweden, a doubling of 
free newspapers has been reported since 2000, with approximately 300 local 
free newspapers in 2016. Two-thirds of these are published weekly (Nygren, 
2018). Denmark has approximately 260 free weeklies as well, most of which 
are published by the same companies that run the local subscription-based 
newspapers. This trend is not found to the same extent in Norway, where free 
newspapers have had less favourable conditions. At the end of 2017, only 13 
free newspapers came out weekly in Norway, with most of them appearing in 
cities. In Finland, there is no clear trend, but in 2018, Sanoma decided to start 
publishing three new freesheets in the metropolitan region.
Newspaper markets in the Nordic countries have long been dominated by 
local and regional ownership and control (Gustafsson, 1996). This has changed 
during the last 10–15 years with the growth of large newspaper groups. In Nor-
way, about 60 per cent of the newspaper market is owned by the three largest 
groups, while the rest are owned by other, often local players (Medietilsynet, 
2020). In Sweden and Finland, the same development has occurred, with a 
few regional and national ownership groups in each country controlling most 
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of the local newspapers. Denmark has five major newspaper conglomerates 
publishing the majority of the local dailies and the local weeklies (The Agency 
for Culture and Palaces, 2018). The concentration of ownership gives media 
companies options to centralise production and standardise formats, adminis-
tration, and IT development. Content is used across many titles (syndication) 
and newspapers have gradually become less local (Nygren & Nord, 2017). 
In other words, the power and control over media content has moved to the 
national level. 
Media use has changed a great deal in recent years as well. The Nordic 
countries have high Internet usage compared to other countries. Local news-
papers were generally late in developing their own online services. Many 
local newspapers were in a monopoly situation where it felt inappropriate 
to develop competing online editions for their own paper editions, and they 
have traditionally had a weaker position on the Internet compared to na-
tional newspapers (Harrie, 2018; Ottosen & Krumsvik, 2012). Local media 
companies are suffering from digital isolation; using relations between web 
pages, and the structure of hyperlinks, Sjøvaag and colleagues (2019) have 
shown that local newspapers in Scandinavia are largely disconnected from 
the digital ecology.
As online news consumption has passed print readership, local newspapers 
have been forced to rethink their business models. One important result has 
been the introduction of digital subscriptions and different forms of premium 
services behind so-called digital paywalls. Though online news in general has 
become a commodity with little value, local journalism is less resourced and 
has greater value for the community it serves (Goyanes, 2015).
In Norway, both Amedia, with 63 local titles, and Schibsted have recently 
been able to attract a substantial number of digital subscribers and are now at 
the forefront in the world (Lehtisaari et al., 2016). Norway has become some-
thing of a shining light, as 42 per cent of the population pays for online news 
(Newman et al., 2020), but research by Olsen and colleagues (2018) shows that 
media managers are still struggling to understand what content the audience 
really is prepared to pay for. The misalignment between the supply of content 
and perceived value is particularly prominent among customers that are young, 
have low income, and low interest in news.
State impact on local media
In the 1960s and 1970s, all Nordic countries developed systems of state subsi-
dies for newspapers. This was a result of the “democratic corporatist” model 
where news media were regarded as part of the “democratic infrastructure” in 
society. With this perspective, systems were introduced to support newspapers 
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in preserving diversity of opinion and to support daily newspapers without 
interfering with the independence of the news media (Picard, 2013). 
In Norway, the maintenance of press subsidies is seen as absolutely crucial 
for supporting the large number of local media companies in the country, and 
in 2019, the government sought to increase press subsidies for local media 
(Ministry of Culture, 2019). In Finland, press subsidies were abolished as early 
as 2008, and media companies, including local ones, are expected to tackle the 
financial and existential crisis in the newspaper sector mainly by developing in-
novative content and business strategies, which has been a common response in 
other countries as well (Brüggemann et al., 2016). Instead of financial support 
for distribution and other functions, Finland has focused innovation support 
for the media sector through the state innovation agency Tekes Finland (now 
Business Finland). A general problem for media groups focusing on the local 
level is the lack of financial resources and the innovation culture needed to 
reinvent their business models (Krumsvik et al., 2013). A report addressing 
changes in media policy in Finland suggests that the most critical environment 
for the national media system is at the local level, where the lack of diversity, 
namely only one newspaper title or no media at all, is a threat to democracy 
and public debate (Ala-Fossi et al., 2018).
In Sweden, the government has gone in the same direction as in Norway, 
proposing increased support for local journalism and news media. The pro-
posal, “Journalism in the whole country”, in early 2018 included a 20 per cent 
increase in press support and the introduction of a new kind of support for 
media to increase the local coverage in “blind spots”, as well as state support 
for media innovations (Ministry of Culture, 2018). It could be argued that 
this increasing support in Norway and Sweden helps local media to maintain 
power over media content.
The other facet of Nordic media policy has been strong public service 
broadcasting, also at the regional level. A major part of public service regional 
journalism in all Nordic countries is produced in a net of regional newsrooms, 
from ten regional offices in Denmark to 18 in Norway and 25 in Sweden. Still, 
public service is more regional than local, and most of the original news stories 
are produced by local newspapers. In Sweden, the ratio is one to ten when 
comparing the news production output in regional public service with that in 
local newspapers (Nygren & Schaerff Engelbrecht, 2018).
In recent years, public service media have been criticised by both commercial 
media and the political right (Olsen et al., 2018). In Denmark, media policy 
has undergone the most radical change from a Nordic and even a European 
perspective. In 2018, the government cut financial resources to balance the 
budget (Jensen, 2018), but according to DR, this will not influence key areas 
like news, nationally or locally.
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Political parallelism in the local media system 
One of the features that previously characterised the northern European media 
systems was the close relationship between the media and political parties (Hal-
lin & Mancini, 2004). This party press system no longer exists, at least not in 
terms of ownership and direct control. The ties to political parties have long 
since been broken, even though we can still find media that are clearly sym-
pathetic to and supportive of certain political directions. Moreover, and more 
generally, there is a broad consensus that the media still have a social mission 
to be watchdogs on behalf of the citizens in a society (Hanitzsch, 2011). The 
media are supposed to contribute to a functioning democracy – that is to say, 
there should be a focus on political processes, and citizens should be able to 
follow and participate in political activities and engage in political advocacy 
(Ihlen et al., 2015). This mission requires journalists and politicians to have 
close relations. The end of the party press, however, has weakened politicians’ 
power over media content in favour of journalists. 
The relationship between media and politics is obviously somewhat different 
in terms of expression in the various Nordic countries. Much of the research 
in Norway shows that local media are still an important arena for political 
communication. Engan (2016), who studied the role of local media in the Nor-
wegian municipal and county elections in 2015, found that local and regional 
media still formed an important arena in the election campaign. He showed 
that local politicians, on the one hand, are critical of local media, considering 
them unable to adequately reflect the real political issues in communities. On 
the other hand, they regard them as important to be visible to the local public 
by getting their message across and being depicted in the local media. Engan 
(2015) has also interviewed local politicians in three different communities about 
their relations with their local newspaper. He found that, despite considerable 
dissatisfaction with local journalism, they consider the local newspaper to be 
one of the most important arenas of communication with their voters: “Politi-
cians depend on the newspaper in order to reach out with the message and to 
profile both the party and themselves, either by giving interviews or by using 
the ‘opinion’ columns” (Engan, 2015: 152).
Other findings show that political issues are dominant in editorials and 
columns in regional newspapers in Norway (Mathisen & Morlandstø, 2016, 
2018). As much as 62 per cent of editorials and commentaries concern politics 
(Mathisen & Morlandstø, 2016). In addition to focusing mainly on political 
issues, politicians themselves – local, regional, and national – make up 30 
per cent of those who are active as commentators in the traditional media 
(Mathisen & Morlandstø, forthcoming), showing that the regional and local 
media arenas are considered important and relevant to politicians and political 
communication locally.
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As shown by Svith and colleagues (2017), Danish local and regional media 
also cover politics. However, their study shows a mismatch between the political 
journalism that readers demand and the one that is actually practised. The study 
reveals that journalists believe it is important to convey political decisions in 
regional and local media but not the views of the political debate. However, 
citizens want journalism about what politicians think and how they act prior 
to decisions being made (Svith et al., 2017). This criticism resembles Engan’s 
(2016) findings about his local political informants, namely dissatisfaction with 
local journalists’ ability to understand what is relevant to cover.
Likewise in Sweden, local politics are important facets of traditional local 
media news coverage. But there is also a strong trend of the political system 
creating its own platforms for political communication when traditional media 
close the local newsrooms or decrease the coverage of local politics. Local and 
regional authorities hire former journalists to build their own media platforms 
online, and the number of local officials working with information often out-
number local journalists (Rehnberg & Grafström, 2019). Between 2004 and 
2014, the number of local communicators more than doubled, and during the 
same period, the size of newsrooms in local media shrank by 30–40 per cent. 
In Gothenburg, for example, 145 communicators are employed by the city, 
far more than the number of reporters in the only local newspaper (Tenor & 
Nygren, 2017). Local communicators produce public service information but 
also politically related information. They also produce information subsidies 
for local media, and representatives of every other local municipality say that 
the downsized local newspaper often or very often publishes their press releases 
without any major changes (Tenor, 2017). In Denmark as well, we find more 
and more well-staffed information websites controlled by local authorities, 
presenting local news edited as journalism. 
In Finland, the Association of Local and Regional Authorities has established 
its own newsrooms that produce online articles about what is going on at the 
local level. For instance, Kommuntorget was founded to compensate for the 
withdrawal of journalists from less inhabited areas. The journalists produce 
original content for the site, which also aggregates articles from local newspa-
pers. The newsroom is still an experiment and only operates in the minority 
language Swedish, but there are plans for expansion. In Norway, Kommunal 
Rapport, established in 1987, is owned by the Norwegian Association of Local 
and Regional Authorities (KS) but is an independent daily news website and 
weekly newspaper that covers municipal affairs. In this case, the audience in-
cludes politicians and executive officers of the local municipalities and counties 
of Norway, and its reporters have won several awards for journalism. 
During elections, websites and Facebook pages of local political parties 
become more important as local political arenas, since they are used for cam-
paigning and creating content for social media that is easily disseminated. In the 
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local elections in Sweden in 2018, these channels were equally or more important 
for voters under 30 compared with traditional media (Nord et al., 2019). This 
means that the power of traditional media as a political arena is diminishing; 
their role as gatekeepers becomes weaker when media content travels through 
the social media networks. The power of local authorities and local parties is 
strengthened and becomes more important in direct communication with citizens 
and voters at the expense of the traditional media. At the same time, research 
shows that for local politicians, Facebook and party websites are mostly a new 
platform for one-way communication during party campaigns, with dialogue 
being regarded as less important (Skogerbø & Krumsvik, 2015). However, 
local media still form an important platform where local political voices can 
be heard, at least in Norway (Sjøvaag, 2018). 
The degree of professionalisation in journalism
Journalism in the Nordic countries has been characterised by a high degree 
of professionalism, in national as well as in local media. The profession has a 
strong autonomy, upheld by professional organisations, professional educa-
tion, and a professional norm of acting as independent watchdogs in relation 
to power (Ottosen, 2005; Wiik & Nygren, 2016). The strong public service 
media in all Nordic countries have made journalists adopt public service ideals 
in commercial media as well, and the common ethical standards are regulated 
in developed systems of self-regulation (Krogh, 2016). Local journalists must be 
just as professional as those working for larger media outlets, namely by main-
taining the same distance and integrity in relation to sources and advertisers. 
Journalism performs a dual role in society, serving as a critical watchdog 
on the one hand, and as a supporter of the area in which the media operate on 
the other – often denounced in Norway as “glue and loupe”. For local jour-
nalists, it may be easier to act as a patriot on behalf of the local community 
than to direct a critical gaze (Mathisen, 2013). Local journalists often face the 
dilemma of closeness. The advantages of being close to the community in which 
you operate may be difficult to reconcile with the need to maintain a critical 
distance when necessary. In addition, local media are often dependent on local 
support and local alliances in order to secure and legitimise their activities, and 
sometimes innovative changes, in order to fulfil their role as a critical voice 
(Morlandstø, 2018).
That said, there have been clear tendencies towards a deprofessionalisation 
of journalism in the last 15–20 years (Nygren, 2008). This does not point to 
a steadily declining level of professional quality, but rather, the borders of the 
profession have become less clear, and it is becoming more difficult to define 
journalism at the local level as well. Legacy newspapers are dominated by a 
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commercial-technical paradigm, and the focus has been moving from publishing 
towards economy (Andersson, 2014; Kunelius & Ruusunoksa, 2008). Profes-
sional organisations for journalists are also in decline with fewer members, and 
in Denmark, the union now represents all kinds of media workers, including 
public relations and advertising employees. In commercial media, local news 
has been downsized, for example in Sweden, where commercial TV4 discon-
tinued all regional broadcasts in 2014 and local newsrooms were closed down 
(Nygren & Nord, 2017). Commercial local media also developed a new kind 
of paid content (native advertising, content marketing) far removed from any 
public service ideal. The same trend is visible in Norway: both national and 
regional news media are closing down district offices, which raises concerns over 
media shadows and blind spots in the news coverage (Mathisen & Morlandstø, 
2019b). The power of national and regional media as watchdogs in local and 
regional communities has been weakened.
In those parts of the local media ecosystem that are growing, deprofession-
alisation is obvious. Content in the new hyperlocals is produced by many non-
journalists, and the borders between journalism and business become blurred 
when the same people produce editorial content as well as ads. The ideal for 
many hyperlocals is more about promoting the local area than being a critical 
watchdog, and more about confirming a positive image of the local community 
than being a critical journalist (Leckner et al., 2017; Mathisen, 2014). Other 
actors in the local ecosystem are also producing content close to journalism, 
not only in the political sphere (see above). Actors such as the police, local 
organisations, and local commercial interests are building their own platforms 
for local communication. On the most important platform outside of legacy 
media, namely social media like Facebook, the content production is completely 
deprofessionalised. User-generated content in the local Facebook feed can be 
regarded as a democratic achievement, but nonetheless, there is no professional 
level regarding ethics and verification. Still, in Sweden, Facebook is used more 
than the local newspaper for staying updated on the local community (Nygren, 
2018). Taken together, these trends point to the fact that an increasing share of 
the local mediated communication is produced by actors other than journalists. 
This indicates a change in the power over media content and the opportunity 
to influence local communities.
However, a Norwegian study on the working conditions of local journalists 
shows that although features of deprofessionalisation can be identified, journal-
ists nevertheless express a strong sense of autonomy in their work. True, Lamark 
and Morlandstø (2019) found that the number of employees in the editorial 
staff have been reduced in recent years and that web-based platforms and tools 
have led to more deskwork. Yet, they found that they have the opportunity 
to make their own choices and to prioritise the journalism they believe is the 
most important for the local community. They also talk about managers who 
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encourage them to set their own priorities, even when they decide to pursue 
cases that require considerable time and resources. Hence, deprofessionalisation 
is definitely an issue, but there is also greater awareness of the responsibility 
that local journalists have in relation to their own work.
Media content and the development  
of hybrid media systems
Local journalism has often been criticised for being “poor”, characterised by 
single-source journalism, lack of critical and investigative journalism, and many 
soft and sentimental news stories (Mathisen, 2010; Nielsen, 2015). With regard 
to the degree of critical and investigative journalism in local media, this criticism 
is probably justified. Both the Danish (Svith et al., 2017) and the Norwegian 
studies (Mathisen & Morlandstø, 2019a) find little agenda-setting, critical, and 
investigative journalism in the regional and local media. In Norway, on aver-
age, only 5 per cent of the coverage can be called critically investigative, while 
in Denmark, less than 1 per cent is referred to as “labor intensive and focused 
journalism” (Svith et al., 2017: 44).
In Sweden as well, the share of independent or critical journalism in local 
newspapers is rather modest, according to a study from 2003. Only 9 per cent 
of all coverage by local municipalities fulfils the basic criteria for watchdog 
journalism, namely to be about power and politics and to have at least two 
independent sources and critical questions. But the study also shows that the 
watchdog function of local newspapers is larger than this, as it is also about 
providing publicity for local issues and scope for local debate. In addition, 
the existence of independent local media and the potential publicity regarding 
misuse of power and corruption is an important part of the critical function of 
local media (Nygren, 2003).
A recent Swedish study shows that the absence of local journalists leads to 
fewer community news stories and more crime stories. Institutional actors are 
also quoted more often when journalists are not present (Karlsson & Hellekant 
Rowe, 2019). A Danish study shows that as much as 82 per cent of the content 
deals with topics that meet a “vital information need” locally (crime and ac-
cidents, emergency situations, health, education, transport, environment and 
planning, finances, civil society, and politics) (Svith et al., 2017: 33). In Norway, 
this figure was found to be 67 per cent (Mathisen & Morlandstø, 2019a). 
The Norwegian study also found that politics is the second largest content 
category in local media after sports, and that most political content is found in 
the smallest newspapers. This means that the media themselves regard political 
issues as an important subject area to cover. Another study of political journalism 
in the Norwegian media, conducted by Sjøvaag (2018), found that local and 
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regional politicians are often heard in local and regional media. However, they 
do not seem to be seen as relevant sources in national media, which are more 
inclined to use national and international politicians as their sources (Sjøvaag, 
2018). Sjøvaag’s (2018: 17) conclusion is that “maintaining a local newspaper 
structure will be relevant in order to maintain platforms where local political 
voices can be expressed” and that this is what “ensures a critical control of 
political power in a decentralised political system, such as the one in Norway”.
Nevertheless, we see a tendency for political debates that used to take place 
in local media arenas to gradually be moving to social media such as Facebook 
and Twitter. Nygren (2018) refers to an example from Sollefteå, Sweden. Plans to 
close parts of the hospital in the autumn of 2015 were leaked to the public. The 
opponents quickly established a Facebook group that soon had 15,000 members 
and where about 60 posts were published daily. The traditional media linked 
to this Facebook group in their reviews of the case and also used the group to 
find sources and tips for their own coverage. In a study of people’s media use 
in two local communities in Norway, we can identify some of the same. Lie 
(2018) finds that local and social media are used for different purposes. Social 
media are clearly considered to be the most useful arena for quick information 
about local events or for creating community engagement, while local legal 
newspapers are considered the most appropriate arena for the mediation of 
local achievements and “victories” and for creating and nurturing a common 
local identity (Lie, 2018: 67).
Both Lie (2018) and Nygren (2018) show that a new local media system 
is emerging. Nygren (2018: 208) calls it a “hybrid media system”, where new 
and old media do not replace each other but instead live side by side, which 
changes the conditions for all types of local media. In this local hybrid media 
system, Facebook and other social media platforms fulfil some of the functions 
that local media used to fill, like local gossip, news about family and friends, 
and information about events. Traditional media have to relate to this, and 
they use Facebook as a source for ideas, for interaction with audiences, and as 
a channel for “spreadable” news. Traditional media still produce most of the 
local news, but instead of the old form of distribution, news is now circulating 
in the local community in digital form and (as always) by word of mouth. A 
Danish study on news reporting during the past 20 years concluded that tra-
ditional media (newspapers, radio, and television) still account for most of the 
original journalism in Denmark and thus affect what decision-makers perceive 
as the common political agenda (Lund, 2018). At the same time, the Internet, 
with actors like Google, Facebook, and Twitter, is increasingly communicating 
a plethora of mostly unedited news and related debates, which naturally affects 
what is put on the political agenda.
Content analysis of the Danish regional and local media (Svith et al., 2017), 
however, shows that content on Facebook is, as in Sweden, more symbolic, 
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emotional, and entertainingly focused on items such as quizzes, competitions, 
and celebrities than the traditional media, which focus on more “solid” politi-
cal issues such as the environment, transport, and the economy. We can argue 
that these political themes cover the “vital information needs” of their local 
inhabitants to a greater extent (Svith et al., 2017: 39). The study also shows 
that Facebook shares less local material and has fewer comments from citizens 
about local issues compared to the legal local media. Moreover, the study reveals 
that half of the articles in regional and local media in Denmark have a local 
perspective, and the smaller the medium, the more dominant the local perspec-
tive is (80%) (Svith et al., 2017). In Norway, 66 per cent of the articles in the 
regional and local media have a local perspective (Mathisen & Morlandstø, 
2019a). This implies that when the local media landscape changes and new 
media actors enter the stage, there is no guarantee that the new actors, such 
as Facebook, will be able to create an arena for the political communication 
that in fact takes place at the local level. On the contrary, social media like 
Facebook have no geographical connection at all – the networks are local and 
global at the same time.
Adding to the hybrid media system, we are also witnessing a fundamental 
change in journalism where advanced algorithms are entering the newsrooms, 
also in local media. These software systems are mainly used to analyse user 
behaviour and predict who will pay for news, but also for generating news texts 
from structured data. Companies such as United Robots and Newsworthy in 
Sweden are providing their customers with thousands of automatically gener-
ated texts on anything from sports and the weather to the property market 
and local crime. These texts are based on templates crafted by journalists 
but subsequently published without any editorial intervention. One of the 
customers is the newspaper corporation Bonnier Local News, which tries to 
compensate for the lack of local journalists with automated texts (Lindén et 
al., 2019b).
Existing research and the need for new questions
As mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, the amount of research on local 
media and political communication in the Nordic countries is not extensive. 
Theoretically, most of the research has a democratic and institutional perspec-
tive. The research in Norway is largely focused on local media in relation 
to local democracy (Mathisen & Morlandstø, 2018), both with respect to 
how media platforms are available for local politicians to express their views 
(Sjøvaag, 2018) and with respect to citizens’ access to and participation in 
public debates (Mathisen & Morlandstø, 2016). We find much of the same 
in Danish research (Svith et al., 2017), but in Denmark, studies also reflect a 
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media-ecological perspective (Nielsen, 2015). Nielsen describes local media as 
the keystone media in a local political information environment. Local media 
is “the primary provider of a specific and important kind of information (news 
about local politics) and is a medium that enables other media to cover this 
aspect of the community” (Nielsen, 2015: 67). In other words, local keystone 
media are a vital part of the media ecosystem. Swedish research also reflects 
this media ecosystem perspective when studying local media (Nygren, 2018), 
particularly in relation to the increasing number of hyperlocals (Nygren et 
al., 2018) and the emergence of local media blind spots (Nygren & Schaerff 
Engelbrecht, 2018). There are very few studies on local audiences in the Nordic 
countries (Engan, 2015; Lie, 2018; Lindén, 2017).
Several researchers argue that it is now necessary to ask completely new 
questions in journalism and media research – research that most often assumes 
a democracy and a normative perspective in the studies (Broersma & Peters, 
2017; Nielsen, 2017; Wahl-Jorgensen, 2017). This view has probably also been 
the most common for researchers in the Nordic countries, even when researching 
local media. Broersma and Peters (2017) argue for new methodological measures 
to understand how the societal mission is changing and how journalism works 
in this new converged media landscape. They write that researchers should stop 
taking the ideal norms of journalistic work in society for granted, such as the 
media having a social mission to safeguard certain democratic values. A nar-
row focus on these standards can lead us to risk affirming adopted truths about 
the role of the media, without understanding how the media actually work. 
Instead, one should turn the focus of the research onto the actual practice and 
onto the audience. Researchers should be more concerned with how journal-
ism is exercised in the newsroom and how the media are used by the public, 
rather than being fixated on idealised ideas about how the media should work 
(Broersma & Peters, 2017).
We agree that more perspectives are needed in media research, also in relation 
to local media. In order to broaden knowledge about local political commu-
nication, we need to gain a better understanding of how audiences experience 
the role of the media, and not only how the media themselves believe they 
perform this role (Meijer, 2013). In addition, we believe that it is important 
to study the relationship between legacy media and all the new media that 
compete in the local market. We know little about this relationship, especially 
locally. This applies to both social media and the new hyperlocals, which have 
both geographical and thematic impact areas. It will also be important to gain 
more knowledge about what it means for democracy that local authorities and 
politicians communicate more directly with citizens through social media, for 
instance. Finally, we need more comparative research, particularly research 
that juxtaposes different trends across various national, political, cultural, and 
institutional contexts.
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Conclusion: Fragmentation and redistribution of power
The starting point for our analysis of local political communication and the 
role of local media in the Nordic countries was the four variables defined by 
Hallin and Mancini (2004) to describe different media systems and to identify 
change in power and power relations. We also added the concept of hybridity 
(Chadwick, 2017), which reflects the changing nature of media systems, as 
social media plays an increasingly important part in sharing information at the 
local level. The results show rapid and extensive changes:
 • Local media structures are changing, with downsized newspapers and 
decreasing use of local newspapers. At the same time, local professional 
journalists have lost their monopoly over the local public spheres, and 
new platforms are growing on social media as well as in different kinds 
of hyperlocal media outlets.
 • States try to balance decreasing commercial conditions with state support 
in Norway and Sweden, and with a strong regional public service in all 
Nordic countries. This can only partly compensate for advertisements 
moving to Google and Facebook.
 • Political parallelism in the old sense of political power and control of 
newspapers has gone. However, local municipalities and politics build 
increasing resources to influence media content. They still use local media 
in political communication but also offer new platforms outside traditional 
media for local news and local politics online and in social media.
 • Content production in local media systems is deprofessionalised and taken 
care of by other actors producing local content for online and social media 
platforms. Professional journalists have become only one group among 
many different producers of local media content, duly losing power over 
local agendas. 
The notion of fragmentation summarises the development. Before the Internet, 
the local newspaper represented the local public sphere (besides the local square 
and meeting places). Now this common local public sphere is divided along 
different lines – by age and generation, by social class and ethnicity, and by 
political lines and values. These different spheres are now found in local groups 
on Facebook, in local news producers outside traditional media, and in the 
feeds of every social media user. Traditional media still connect people across 
different local spheres to build a common public sphere in the local community, 
but this is an increasingly difficult task.
So what are the implications for the distribution of power in the local com-
munity? As noted in the introduction, the issue of who controls information 
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flows in the local community is a question of power. The rapid changes in the 
local media system described in this chapter have led to a redistribution of this 
power in the local community in different directions.
The power of traditional media is decreasing, their virtually monopolistic 
position in the local public arena is now history, and their resources for produc-
ing content are decreasing. Instead, some of this power has been transferred to 
citizens using social media platforms to connect, distribute, and discuss public 
issues. But power has also been shifted to global actors like Facebook, which 
determine the conditions for these platforms, for instance, by scripting the 
templates and determining the rules of engagement. Strong local actors such as 
local authorities and local politicians increase their influence over media con-
tent when newsrooms are downsized and the public relations departments of 
the actors grow. They also develop new platforms for communication directly 
with local citizens, bypassing traditional media. In addition, new hyperlocal 
and semi-professional media are growing where old traditional media are too 
weak or vanishing – freesheets and online news sites are becoming the main 
local news organisations in many areas.
Even if national authorities prioritise economic support for legacy local media 
and regional public services in some of the Nordic countries, we are witnessing 
a new media ecosystem that is very different from the old media system that 
we used to know. This development will have consequences for democracy, 
although it is perhaps too early to judge whether these consequences will be 
for better or for worse. 
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Chapter 9
Cultural communication  
as political communication
Nete Nørgaard Kristensen & Anna Roosvall
Abstract
This chapter makes the argument that issues related to the cultural public sphere 
should be considered part of the political communication circuit. Cultural journal-
ism in the Nordic context is a central case in point. On the side of arts, popular 
culture, and lifestyle, Nordic cultural journalism at times includes reporting and 
debate about sociocultural and politically saturated issues such as climate change, 
migration, terrorism, freedom of speech, identity politics, and gender inequalities. 
The chapter highlights three theoretical approaches, intersecting with the field of 
political communication, which have been of particular importance in Nordic 
scholarship about cultural journalism: public sphere theory, the politics of recogni-
tion, and the sociology of (cultural) journalism. The media coverage and debates 
about #metoo in Danish and Swedish cultural journalism in late 2017 serve to 
illustrate the arguments about the political in cultural journalism and reveals its 
quantitative salience as well as its qualitative specificities.
Keywords: cultural debate, cultural journalism, public sphere, politics of recogni-
tion, #metoo 
Introduction 
Issues related to the cultural public sphere, including media and news con-
tent about arts and culture, are often infused with political dimensions. The 
perspectives and agents involved may differ from those typically associated 
with political communication, but to neglect them as part of the field would 
be to miss out on important aspects of the current political communication 
landscape. In this chapter, we pay particular attention to the political dimen-
sions of what is often referred to as “cultural journalism” (i.e., institutional-
ised news media’s reporting of and debates about cultural issues, trends, and 
artefacts), as one example of culturally saturated media content with political 
communication perspectives and potentialities. On the side of arts, popular 
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culture, and lifestyle, cultural journalism may include reporting and debate on 
climate change, migration, terrorism, freedom of speech, identity politics, and 
gender inequalities. The latter has been especially salient in the recent coverage 
of the #metoo movement. 
The Nordic region is particularly relevant when studying the political in 
cultural journalism. This is partly because the cultural journalism tradition 
trumps the more limited arts journalism tradition in this context, and partly 
because culture is an important pillar of the Nordic media model (e.g., Syvert-
sen et al., 2014). More specifically, media subsidy structures and the public 
service media ethos emphasise arts and culture as topics of priority (Kristensen 
& Riegert, 2017).1
We highlight three theoretical approaches of particular importance in the 
Nordic context to the study of cultural journalism, which intersect with the field 
of political communication: public sphere theory, the politics of recognition, 
and the sociology of (cultural) journalism. In addition to outlining the overall 
contours of these macro- and meso-level theories, we point to some of the em-
pirical research produced within these frameworks in the Nordic region. We 
argue that this research points to the importance of paying more attention to 
the cultural dimensions of the political, but that it also confirms the challenges 
in much existing research of recognising the cultural as political. We aim to 
make the case that if political communication scholars acknowledge the po-
litical potentials of cultural journalism, it will make the field better equipped 
to discuss political communication in all its guises and thereby achieve a fuller 
understanding of the political as well as communication, and specifically of how 
they intersect. When assessing political communication in one of its guises, it 
is important to know what it can be in other guises.2
In addition to emphasising the particular Nordic aspects of the field and 
the Nordic contribution to international research, we aim to elaborate in this 
chapter on some of the differences between the Nordic countries, both in terms 
of theoretical approaches and empirical realities. In addition to constituting 
a review of an often-neglected part of the field and a theoretically anchored 
argumentation for why it is crucial to start taking it seriously, the chapter also 
contains empirical elements to illustrate our points, including previous studies 
on cultural coverage in the wake of terrorist attacks (Hellman et al., 2017; 
Kristensen & Roosvall, 2017; Riegert & Widholm, 2019) as well as a new 
study on #metoo reporting in cultural journalism in the Nordic context. These 
empirical studies illustrate both the quantitative salience of cultural journalism as 
political communication and the qualitative differences it constitutes compared 
to other types of journalism, not least political journalism.
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Three key theoretical perspectives
We draw on three approaches in the literature about the cultural dimensions of 
political communication that are of international significance in cultural jour-
nalism scholarship, and which have a prominent position in Nordic research. 
Somewhat crudely segmented, public sphere perspectives appear as particularly 
prominent in a Norwegian context, while Swedish research focuses more on 
democracy aspects, globalisation, and attitudes towards sameness and differ-
ence. In Denmark and Finland, sociological approaches are key, emphasising 
the role of cultural journalism and the news media in society, the organisation 
of the cultural newsroom, and a changing professional ethos.
Public sphere perspectives 
Both sociologists and media scholars, also beyond the Nordic context, have 
proposed terms such as “the aesthetic public sphere” (e.g., Roberge, 2011), “the 
cultural public sphere” (e.g., McGuigan, 2005), and “cultural citizenship” (e.g., 
van Zoonen, 2005), and urged a “cultural turn in citizenship studies” (Dahlgren, 
2006) to highlight the importance of moving beyond the political public sphere 
when studying media, citizenship, politics, and society. In the Nordic context, 
the works of Gripsrud (e.g., 2008, 2017) and Dahlgren (e.g., 2006) have been 
central. These concepts surfaced in the early 2000s, as various media and gen-
res increasingly blurred the boundaries of the public and the private, and the 
political and the personal (e.g., Dahlgren, 2006). They have come even more to 
the forefront in the past decade as digital media technologies have offered new 
fora for public discussion and engaged new types of voices in mediated public 
debates. This has contested established notions of authority and expertise, dis-
tinctions between rational and emotional discourse, and distinctions between 
reasoning and argumentation, not only about politics, but also about lifeworld 
matters and cultural issues (e.g., Kristensen & From, 2015; Wahl-Jorgensen, 
2019). Much political communication research has been increasingly critical 
of these changes as the public sphere has disrupted (for an overview, see, e.g., 
Bennett & Pfetsch, 2018). Cultural and affective turns in parts of political com-
munication research have also directed attention to the aesthetic or cultural 
public sphere, emphasizing, however, the political importance of the cultural, 
critical, emotional, and subjective (Kristensen, 2019; Wahl-Jorgensen, 2019).
As in much political communication research, scholarly debates about the 
cultural or aesthetic public sphere take their point of departure in and criticise 
the Habermasian perspective on deliberative democracy – that is, the idea, 
crudely put, that decisions are made collectively, based on rational, equal, and 
impartial argumentation among citizens in the public sphere. This democratic 
ideal stipulates that the best argument ultimately wins, which, subsequently, 
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creates peace and consensus (Gutman & Thompson, 2009). The emphasis on 
argumentation points to the importance of media and communication. A key 
critique of Habermas’s (1989: 30) outline of the public sphere is, however, that 
it distinguishes relatively sharply between “the public sphere in the political 
realm” and “the public sphere in the world of letters”. Both are placed between 
the state and civil society as sites of public discussion, though discussions of a 
quite different nature and with a clear hierarchy between the two. 
A first main argument in the literature criticising this division is that the 
boundaries of the political public sphere and the literary public sphere are in 
fact quite blurred. Roberge (2011) argues that culture should not be perceived 
as demarcated from the political but as an integrated and equal part. The 
public sphere is cultural per se – the cultural is part of the political and vice 
versa. For the same reasons, the literature distances itself from the hierarchising 
made between the sphere of public affairs and the sphere of letters (e.g., Jacobs, 
2012). Habermas labelled the literary public sphere a pre-form “precursor” or 
“training ground” (1989: 29) of the political public sphere, as “it constituted 
certain principles, procedures for debate that were later taken over by the politi-
cal public sphere” (Gripsrud, 2017: 183). While this points to the importance 
of the literary public sphere, it still suggests a hierarchy. This hierarchy has 
long been upheld by sociologists, political scientists, and media and journalism 
scholars, as most attention has been devoted to the political public sphere, the 
media as a political public sphere, and political journalism. This hierarchy has 
also been upheld in the newsrooms, with political journalists and hard news 
ranking higher than cultural journalists and soft news, as we shall return to 
(e.g., Kristensen & From, 2015; Schultz, 2007). 
A second key argument is that all types of culture have the potential to 
critically engage people, make them reflect upon their lives, and influence their 
actions and interactions: “Cultural production are windows, so to speak, 
through which critical views can penetrate the routine of everyday life”, Roberge 
(2011: 439) argues. Similarly, Gripsrud (2017: 183) points to the importance 
of the cultural public sphere as “a space for reflection and discussion” about 
human relations, emotions, and human existence, or in other words, issues of 
importance to the “development of subjectivity and self-understanding”. While 
these arguments mainly refer to how individuals navigate the world, they also 
allude to the political potentialities of this lifeworld navigation. Accordingly, 
the literature argues for applying a broad conceptualisation of culture. Gripsrud 
(2008: 203) points to Habermas’s own naming of the literary public sphere as 
somewhat narrow and perhaps also misrepresentative, as he referred to not only 
literature but to various cultural fields, including music and theatre. For that 
reason, Gripsrud suggests expanding the notion of the literary public sphere to 
the cultural public sphere. Similarly, McGuigan (2005: 429) argues that topics 
such as celebrity, sports, and scandal today “may be viewed as trivial distractions 
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from the great questions of the day or, perhaps on the other hand, as represent-
ing deeper cultural concerns”, pointing to a much broader conceptualisation 
of culture, encompassing also more intimate or private aspects, not mainly 
aesthetic ones. While early Nordic cultural journalism research often echoed 
Habermas’s argument about the decline of the public sphere, seeing cultural 
journalism becoming increasingly interested in popular culture and consump-
tion rather than engaging cultural citizens (Bech-Karlsen, 1991; Lund, 2005), 
recent contributions have applied more inclusive approaches (e.g., Knapskog 
& Larsen, 2008; Kristensen & From, 2015).
A third commonality is the use of mediated cultural critique or criticism as a 
central case in point of the blurred boundaries of the cultural and the political 
public sphere. Roberge (2011: 448) argues that “criticism is always normative 
and interrogative, always tries to define culture through a political lens and con-
versely, politics through a cultural lens”. Similarly, Jacobs (2012: 232) argues, 
aesthetic publics provide a space for commentary about important matters of 
common concern. In other words, spaces of cultural criticism link a discussion 
of entertainment media to a broader discussion about society, politics, and 
public life, and they do so within the same organizational spaces – the media 
– that organize the more privileged and “serious” public debates. 
In the digital media landscape, cultural criticism exemplifies the inclusiveness of 
the cultural public sphere. At one end of the spectrum, it encompasses expertise-
based cultural debates and reasoning by intellectuals, academics, and cultural 
journalists. At the other end, it includes micro-celebrities, influencers, and 
ordinary consumers expressing cultural opinions and subjective, experienced-
based tastes on social media (Kristensen & From, 2015). As shown by Danish 
research into cultural journalism and criticism, these voices and discourses are 
all part of the cultural public sphere today (e.g., Kristensen & From, 2015; 
Kristensen et al., 2018). 
When engaging with the political dimensions of cultural journalism, models 
of democracy beyond the deliberative have also been highlighted, among them 
“agonistic democracy” (e.g., Kristensen & Roosvall, 2017; Riegert et al., 2015). 
Agonistic democracy resembles deliberative democracy in that it conceives of 
argument as key, but it stresses the importance of confrontation rather than 
consensus (Mouffe, 2013). The goal is not to end up in peace and consensus, 
but to keep arguing in what Mouffe (2013) terms a “conflictual consensus” 
mode, where what you agree on is that democracy should prevail, not what 
methods are best suited to achieve the most preferable form. Agonism is not the 
same as antagonism; agonism includes respect for the opponent and does not 
create enemy-images (Chambers, 2001). Cultural journalism studies, especially 
from Sweden, have concluded that agonistic democracy seems to correspond 
well with the approach of cultural journalism in covering societal issues (e.g., 
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Riegert & Roosvall, 2017). In an investigation of Danish and Swedish opinion 
pieces in relation to two terror attacks in 2015, cultural journalism appeared less 
deliberative and less antagonistic than traditional political journalism, instead 
being agonistic (i.e., embracing conflict but not employing enemy-like polarisa-
tion) (Kristensen & Roosvall, 2017). Likewise, an interview study with Swedish 
cultural journalism editors found that the raison d’être for cultural journalism, 
especially in the press, was permeated by a conflictual approach, situated within 
a democratic rationale (Riegert et al., 2018). These studies show that cultural 
journalism is inherently political. Following Mouffe (2005), we make in this 
regard a distinction between “politics” (i.e., an institutionalised and traditional 
political practice), and “the political” (i.e., the more ideological side, played out 
in numerous societal venues, providing ideological alternatives where pluralism 
and agonism play substantial roles). Mouffe (2005) argues that artistic practices 
have the potential to unsettle ideological hegemony in a “post-political” con-
dition, where conformism, moralism, and universalism may otherwise repress 
the political agonism necessary for meaningful democracy. This is relevant for 
cultural journalism in two ways: cultural journalism includes reviews, debates, 
and reflection of artistic practices, and cultural journalism’s debates and literary 
essays constitute such practices themselves (Riegert et al., 2015). 
The politics of recognition
A second theoretical strand relating to cultural dimensions of political com-
munication draws on approaches to recognition (e.g., Fraser, 2008). This is 
specifically relevant to cultural journalism scholarship studying globalisation 
concerning identity and status in relation to both immigration and ethnicity 
in the domestic realm and approaches to the world outside of the domestic 
realm. Such research has to a large degree been done in Sweden, where cultural 
journalism has been a crucial arena for public discussion about identity politics. 
According to the Swedish digital media archive Retriever, the term “identity 
politics” first appeared in the cultural pages (Dagens Nyheter in 1993). Fur-
thermore, the most circulated and read articles in Sweden have, in recent years, 
often been cultural debate articles, addressing issues of Swedishness, ethnicity, 
and racism with a justice perspective (Riegert et al., 2018). 
Identity politics saw its heyday in the late twentieth century and can broadly 
be understood as struggles for justice and the right to maintain or cultivate 
group uniqueness by minority groups in majoritarian contexts – a politics 
of recognition of groups (Fraser, 2000, 2008). In addition to recognition, 
redistribution (of economic means) and representation (in political bodies) 
are interconnected major strategies towards justice and rights (Fraser, 2008). 
Fraser (2000) also distinguishes between two models under the recognition 
approach: the identity model and the status model. The identity model stresses 
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identities to the extent that they may become reified (Fraser, 2000). The risk 
is that focus moves from promoting equality to valorising difference (Fraser, 
2008). Reification of identities is a staple of news media representations, 
particularly in output, making sharp distinctions between “us” and “them” 
(Roosvall, 2014). The status model, in turn, stipulates that what acquires rec-
ognition is not just group identity but “the status of individual group members 
as full partners in social interaction” (Fraser, 2000: 113). Thus, Fraser sug-
gests that the status model avoids the pitfalls of the identity model, which are 
displacement of redistribution struggles, maldistribution of means, reification 
of people, and misrecognition (negative recognition) of people (Fraser, 2000, 
2008). While the identity model contains crucial insights regarding racism and 
sexism (Fraser, 2000), recognition should no longer be reduced to a question of 
identity but must become a question of social status. The status model tackles 
subordination by “establishing the misrecognized party as a full member of 
society, capable of participating on a par with the rest” (Fraser, 2000: 113). 
The status model is more rarely evoked in news media output (Roosvall, 2014). 
However, as we shall return to, this is exactly what the #metoo movement 
seems to have been aiming to do: establishing the misrecognised party as a full 
member of society, capable of participating on a par with the rest. The status 
model furthermore aims to “de-institutionalize patterns of cultural value that 
impede parity of participation and to replace them with patterns that foster 
it” (Fraser, 2000: 114–115). Such de-institutionalisation of patterns could 
take place in and through the news media, where identity construction to a 
large degree takes place (Roosvall, 2014). Here, news media can constitute 
an arena for direct identity politics performed by activists and groups via, for 
instance, manifestos and statements on op-ed pages, or in cultural opinion 
sections, such as those published in relation to the hashtag #metoo. 
In Sweden, 49 groups, occupational and others, had published testimonial 
manifestos in the beginning of February 2018 (Schwartz, 2018), only three 
months after a story broke about abuse in the Hollywood industry, triggering 
the movement. At the same time, news media can function as a forum for 
more indirect identity politics, a representational identity politics (Roosvall, 
2014), as constituted through the totality of the #metoo coverage. As we shall 
return to, the very existence of the #metoo reporting broke previous patterns 
of silence, which had existed despite at least partial knowledge. Exercising 
rights does not just include the actions of activists in society – what is done 
via communication devices and channels in reporting on these actions is also 
a way of exercising rights (Butler, 2011). In studies of political communica-
tion, it is important to be attentive to if or when such extra- and intra-media 
versions of exercising rights might clash or converge. Cultural journalism 
and mediated cultural debates constitute important sites for analysing this, 
as they potentially include different types of voices than those typically heard 
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in political journalism and communication (Kristensen & Roosvall, 2017; 
Roosvall & Widholm, 2018). 
Appiah (2018) highlights that we live with the legacies of ways of think-
ing about identity concerning, for instance, nationality and ethnicity, formed 
during the nineteenth century, which now have to be rethought. Fraser (2008) 
similarly suggests a rethinking of the American feminist movement, detailing 
geographical shifts in feminist energies to transformations in views on gender 
justice since the 1970s, and broader shifts in political discourse in post-war 
capitalism. Her aim is to reinvigorate theory as well as practice of the feminist 
imagination and, in the end, reinvent the feminist project for a globalising world. 
In the analysis of the #metoo news media coverage below, we will mainly relate 
to the last two of three phases of feminism that Fraser discusses: its intersec-
tion with identity politics during the 1990s and its more recent transformation 
into a movement increasingly characterised by transnationalism, which is a 
geographical scale that significant parts of cultural journalism embrace much 
more than general news and op-ed material do (Kristensen & Roosvall, 2017; 
Roosvall & Widholm, 2018). 
The sociology of (cultural) journalism
A third Nordic approach to the study of the cultural dimensions of politi-
cal communication takes its point of departure in the sociology of news and 
journalism. The sociology of news has been central in Western media studies 
since the 1970s, when research attention shifted from individual news mak-
ers’ choices and predispositions to extra-media influences, such as political 
economy and technological change and intra-media or organisational structures 
(e.g., Gans, 1980; Schudson, 2005). With the emergence of journalism studies 
as a more distinct research field in the early 2000s, this sociological turn was 
further cemented (e.g., Steensen & Ahva, 2015). A key trait of this often em-
pirically grounded research is that it typically focuses on news and journalism 
more broadly, not on cultural journalism more specifically. One reason is that 
sociological debates about news and journalism are closely connected to some 
of the abovementioned normative ideals about democracy, as news media and 
journalism are seen as key to an informed citizenry and as an important arena 
for the public reasoning about issues of political and sociocultural significance. 
The sociology of cultural journalism concerns the role that cultural journalism 
plays in society and what influences the practising of this role. Since the early 
2010s, Nordic scholars have taken an interest in the study of the particular 
normative standards and practices of cultural journalists and the organisation of 
the cultural newsroom. Several of these studies point to cultural journalists often 
being split between obeying traditional journalistic values, such as objectivity 
and autonomy, and following their own professional paths, borrowing from 
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more aesthetic and narrative modes of communication. In the following, we 
highlight some of the studies and their empirical contributions to substantiate 
this argument. 
In terms of normative role conceptions, survey data across the Nordic 
region show that, compared to other beat journalists, the watchdog role is of 
less importance to cultural journalists – for example, in Denmark and Sweden 
(Kristensen & Riegert, 2017) – but this does not imply that political roles of a 
broader nature are absent. A Swedish interview study, for example, shows that 
cultural editors see it “as their job to question the status quo, to challenge all 
power, expose injustices and authoritarian regimes in any form” (Riegert et al., 
2015: 782). Furthermore, comparative research on a more global scale shows 
that telling stories and promoting tolerance, such as more humanistic types of 
political engagement, is more important to cultural journalists around the globe 
than to other types of journalists (Hovden & Kristensen, 2018). 
These role conceptions link to the norms and values as well as organisa-
tional frameworks that influence the daily practices of cultural journalists. 
Drawing on the Finnish context, Hellman and Jaakkola (2012) argue that 
cultural journalists follow an aesthetic paradigm, adhering more to the norms 
and values of arts and culture than to those of Western journalism. Focusing 
on the Norwegian context, Hovden and Knapskog (2015: 807) show that 
this puts them in a position of being “doubly dominated”, by both the field 
of journalism and the field of cultural production, as they are considered to 
lack cultural and symbolic capital in both domains. This is one explanation 
as to why their work is, as mentioned, often considered of less importance in 
informing citizens, in stimulating debate of political and societal significance, 
and thus in serving democracy. This again links to the type of issues covered 
in journalism, including by cultural journalists. 
Internationally, scholars have criticised journalism, more broadly, for turning 
its attention from hard to soft news (e.g., Plasser, 2005) and thus for neglecting 
the societal role of journalism. This is often viewed as a sign of tabloidisation 
or commercialisation (e.g., Jóhannsdóttir, 2018). Others have questioned this 
theoretical distinction, as the boundaries between what constitutes hard and 
soft news are vague (Reinemann et al., 2012). Cultural journalism exemplifies 
this. Parts of cultural journalism engages in traditional cultural reporting of 
cultural politics and day-to-day events in the cultural field by means of sources 
and news genres, that is, applying approaches known from news journalism and 
hard news. Some scholars argue that such approaches have in fact become more 
prevalent in cultural journalism, speaking of a “newsificiation” or “journalis-
tification” of cultural journalism, also in the Nordic context (e.g., Hellman & 
Jaakkola, 2012; Sarrimo, 2017). But other parts of cultural journalism engage 
in arts, culture, and lifeworld issues by means of more interpretive and narrative 
genres and of distinct journalistic voices, that is, apply professional approaches 
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of a quite different epistemic nature than the ones typically associated with hard 
news or political reporting (e.g., Kristensen, 2019). Of key importance in the 
context of political communication research is that by applying such approaches 
cultural journalism may provide alternative perspectives, or “a cultural filter” 
(e.g., Riegert et al., 2015), including alternative as well as less polarised per-
spectives, not only on cultural issues but also on politicised, culturally saturated 
topics such as nationality, ethnicity, and gender (e.g., Roosvall & Widholm, 
2018) or politically motivated violence, such as terror attacks (Kristensen & 
Roosvall, 2017; Riegert & Widholm, 2019). In the Nordic – and especially 
Swedish – context, cultural journalism appears to stand out as particularly 
engaged in such political dimensions of the cultural (Hellman et al., 2017; 
Purhonen et al., 2019). 
For these reasons – in other words, reasons pertaining to the roles that cultural 
journalism plays in society and to the ways in which cultural journalists practise 
these roles – they have been labelled “journalists with a difference” (e.g., Forde, 
2003; Hovden & Kristensen, 2018). However, such distinctions do not void 
cultural journalism of political dimensions, which becomes even more apparent 
when looking at the actors involved and given voice in cultural journalism. 
Actors and sources in cultural journalism
Proximity to sources and objects of reporting is a characteristic that makes 
cultural journalism stand out in relation to other types of journalism (e.g., 
Jaakkola, 2015). Moreover, part of cultural journalism is viewed as “churnal-
ism”, because it relies on the cultural industries’ information subsidies with 
only limited editorial effort (Kristensen, 2018). For these reasons, cultural 
journalists are often criticised for not conforming to normative ideals such as 
autonomy and distance. 
It is important to note, however, that closeness to sources in cultural jour-
nalism does not concern sources from the political elite, but mainly involves 
cultural producers – that is, it does not necessarily imply a failure to take a 
critical distance to political elites. Such elites play a relatively marginal role 
in the reporting, however. A Danish study of printed and web-based cultural 
journalism shows that approximately one in two sources are from the cultural 
industries – artists, cultural personas, industry people, and so on. Journal-
ists or pundits from the media industry, as well as experts, are also given a 
voice; however, this is rarely the case for politicians and officials (Kristensen, 
2016). Similarly, a Swedish study of cultural journalism in newspapers and 
on public service radio reveals that only 3 per cent of actors were politicians, 
whereas journalists, authors, artists, musicians, and academics were featured 
much more frequently (Roosvall & Widholm, 2018). This is in contrast to the 
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otherwise prominent inclusion of state actors (often politicians) in journalism, 
which generally interplays with the application of national and international 
geographical scales. Swedish cultural journalism is, however, concluded to be 
inherently transnational, drawing on the transnational geographical scale in 
at least two of three articles or segments during the examined years from the 
mid-1980s to the mid-2010s (Roosvall & Widholm, 2018). 
In addition, a comparative Danish-Swedish study of the editorial and cul-
tural debates in connection with terror attacks in France and Denmark in 2015 
showed that voice was often given to people from the cultural public sphere. It 
also showed that the Swedish cultural pages were more political, in Mouffe’s 
(2005) terms, than the Danish ones: opinion pieces regarding the attacks were 
more commonly discussed in the Swedish cultural pages compared with the 
Danish newspapers, where the discussion took place more on the general op-ed 
pages (Kristensen & Roosvall, 2017). This is connected to the fact that in the 
Swedish material, “cultural personas” (authors, critics) were more common 
than in the Danish material (Kristensen & Roosvall, 2017). The same study 
concluded that reference points used in the cultural articles were more cultural, 
drawing on novels, history, authors, and the like. Though this is not surprising, 
it is significant, since it makes political issues come out differently in the way 
they are discussed by those contributing to (or, in some cases, even dictating) 
the discussion. 
In continuation, cultural journalists are sometimes seen as competitors to 
artists and cultural producers, as they constitute cultural actors, producers, 
opinion makers, and sources themselves (Knapskog & Larsen, 2008). By exten-
sion, parts of cultural journalism do not include sources in the reporting at all. 
A Danish study shows that two in three cultural stories do not quote sources, 
though platform differences are significant with less sources in printed stories 
compared to online stories (Kristensen, 2016). One explanation is genre use, 
as key genres are reviews, essays, analyses, and so on, which do not comprise 
sources in the traditional sense. This suggests that, when covering explicitly 
political and broader societal issues that do not concern cultural products 
as such (e.g., the staging of plays, exhibitions of paintings, musical concerts, 
publications of books, etc.), cultural journalists may not be close to sources at 
all. In fact, the opposite is more likely to be the case. In cultural coverage and 
debates of, for instance, immigration policy, freedom of speech, or terror at-
tacks, cultural journalists seem to be independent of sources, also in the sense 
that general journalism is ideally independent in terms of “distance to external 
constraints, in particular sources” (Jaakkola, 2015: 99). And perhaps even 
more so, given the fact that they do not attend political press conferences or 
intermingle with politicians and the like on a regular basis, as is the case for 
many political journalists in the Nordic context, often working from within 
the parliament as part of the press gallery. In fact, in the Nordic countries, 
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cultural journalism has been known for autonomy, as the cultural news desk 
in some major newspapers has traditionally been autonomous from the owners 
and the editor-in-chief, serving under its own editor only. While this autonomy 
has gradually been abandoned on a formal level, it still impacts the spirit of 
cultural journalism, which may take a different stand than the editorial pages 
in societal debates (Hellmann & Jaakkola, 2012; Riegert & Roosvall, 2017).
Intersections of cultural and political communication  
– the case of #metoo
We now turn to the media coverage in Sweden and Denmark of the #metoo 
case, as it exemplifies political dimensions of cultural reporting, constitutes an 
example of politics of recognition, and is illustrative of some of the differences 
between Nordic countries in their engagement with political-cultural issues (see 
also Askanius & Møller Hartley, 2019; Pollack, 2019; Pollack et al., 2018).
The study is based on the print edition of the Danish national newspapers 
Politiken and Jyllands-Posten and the Swedish national newspapers Aftonbladet 
and Dagens Nyheter, which are of a relatively comparable nature, covering 
more left-leaning and liberal-right–leaning parts of the media spectrum. Using 
the search term “metoo”, we studied the initial framing and debates from 17 
October 2017 to 31 December 2017. This covered the period immediately 
after Alyssa Milano (re-)introduced the hashtag #metoo on 15 October 2017, 
which was a follow-up of the The New York Times’ investigative reporting 
from early October 2017 that exposed the Harvey Weinstein scandal. The two 
Swedish newspapers published 710 articles (522 in Dagens Nyheter and 188 
in Aftonbladet), whereas the Danish newspapers published only 194 articles 
(123 in Politiken and 71 in Jyllands-Posten). Studies by Askanius and Møller 
Hartley (2019) and Pollack and colleagues (2018) confirm the relatively limited 
reporting in Denmark, compared with Sweden.3 In both countries, the cultural 
pages dominate the #metoo coverage, though least so in the Danish newspaper 
Jyllands-Posten (see Table 9.1). 
Moreover, the cultural pages seem to drive and instigate a lot of other cov-
erage, as exemplified by the investigative reporting on the Swedish Academy 
and “The Cultural Profile” [“Kulturprofilen”], published in Dagens Nyheter’s 
cultural section. This set off much interest in the Swedish news sections and 
also appeared in the Danish coverage (cultural and other sections). Testimonial 
manifestos published in the cultural sections in Sweden set off publication of 
manifestos in the sports and news sections (65 manifestos in all; see Pollack, 
2019), again followed by news stories, including local reporting on local politi-
cians being dethroned due to sexual misconduct (“Stockholm news” section in 
Dagens Nyheter; see also Pollack et al., 2018). 
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Sweden 38 15 4 25 2 15
Dagens Nyheter 38 15 5 21 3 19
Aftonbladet 39 18 1 38 1 3
Denmark 41 28 10 9 9 3
Politiken 47 28 11 8 5 1
Jyllands-Posten 30 28 10 10 17 6
 
Comments: In the case of Aftonbladet, the separate section “entertainment”, which brings more pop-culture and 
tabloid-type stories about the cultural industries, is included in the cultural section category, as entertainment 
stories are included in the cultural sections of the other newspapers investigated, which do not have separate 
entertainment sections. The number of coded items were 522 (Dagens Nyheter), 188 (Aftonbladet), 123 (Poli-
tiken), and 71 (Jyllands-Posten).
In their study of the #metoo coverage in four Danish and four Swedish newspa-
pers during the last two weeks of October 2017, Askanius and Møller Hartley 
(2019) show that in Denmark, the case was most prominent in the debate sec-
tions, while being covered more as traditional news and editorials in Sweden. 
Another difference was that there was more focus on the individual in Denmark, 
in contrast to the focus on structure in Sweden, although individual focus 
dominated overall. Their findings do not specify the role of culture sections, 
however. While the significance of news in the Swedish material is clear in our 
study too (see Table 9.1), the cultural section still trumps the news section as 
well as the debate section. The dominance of the cultural and debate pages, as 
well as the migration of the #metoo issue back and forth between the diverse 
newspaper sections, suggests the agenda-setting power of cultural issues as well 
as cultural sections. Moreover, the specificities of the coverage in these sections 
shine additional, much needed light on the issue of individual versus structure, 
noted as a significant distinction in the cited Nordic #metoo studies, or, as we 
discuss it, identity versus status (see also below).
Agonistic democracy approaches could be detected in the manifestos and 
investigative reporting that drove much of the coverage. They brought conflict 
and injustice to the fore, challenging traditional practices in the workplace and 
society. “Meeting someone halfway” and seeking consensus was not prioritised; 
instead, claims were rather unconditional. Furthermore, in both deliberative 
and agonistic approaches to democracy, debate and discussion are key, whether 
of a rational or conflictual consensus-oriented nature. Similar to Askanius and 
Møller Hartley (2019), our study finds that debate and opinion pieces were 
given much space, which we, in view of public sphere theory and the mentioned 
approaches to democracy, interpret as signalling the importance of the subject 
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(see Table 9.2). “Views” genres included not only editorials and debate pieces, 
but also columns or commentary published in diverse sections, and reviews and 
essays published in the cultural sections. 
Table 9.2 Overall distributions between news, “views”, and front page references (per cent)
News stories Views
Front page  
references
Sweden 51 38 11
Dagens Nyheter 51 34 14
Aftonbladet 51 48 1
Denmark 46 52 3
Politiken 41 57 2
Jyllands-Posten 53 42 4
Comments: The number of coded items were 522 (Dagens Nyheter), 188 (Aftonbladet), 123 (Politiken), and 
71 (Jyllands-Posten).
As mentioned, the #metoo testimonial manifestos given space in the cultural 
sections focused on women’s status rather than identity; they concerned women’s 
rights to equal roles, positions, and possibilities across sectors and industries. 
This could consist of simply being able to take the bus at night, not being seen 
as an object, being acknowledged for professional skills, or in other words, be-
ing able – as women – to take part in society on a par with men, as stipulated 
in the status model (Fraser, 2000). Without this focus on demands and claims 
to equal rights, and to equal status, the testimonies as such, with their accounts 
of sexual abuse, may have become objectifying and reifying, as often happens 
when women and their bodies are in focus (Roosvall, 2005). 
A few salient articles exemplify a focus on status, also in the newspapers’ 
own production of media content. A particularly significant Swedish piece is 
the long investigative reportage by Matilda Gustavsson in Dagens Nyheter on 
17 November, containing interviews with 18 women who had been sexually 
abused by “The Cultural Profile”, a person married to a member of the Swed-
ish Academy and with much influence over the cultural scene in Stockholm 
(Gustavsson, 2017). The women are often quoted directly, thus embodying 
a power position in the discourse. Quotes focus on shame as being collective 
rather than individual (and not pertaining to the women), thus underlining 
status rather than identity. The roles and experiences of women are discussed, 
not their feminine identities. Body and sex(ual abuse) are continuously referred 
to, but in a power-critical manner, and they are not used as illustration or 
sole characteristics; the women’s positions as artists and the like are simul-
taneously highlighted. The women are actors in the article, not objects, and 
aspects of legal processes are included, which ultimately expresses an agonistic, 
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conflictual perspective without becoming enemy-focused or antagonistic. In 
Aftonbladet, where culture and entertainment are separated into different 
sections, an overview reading reveals, however, that in the entertainment 
pages, which are of a tabloid-like nature, focus is on individuals and men, 
specifically men who have been accused. A prevalent focus on the individual 
is also noted in previous studies of the #metoo movement across the Nordic 
countries (Askanius & Møller Hartley, 2019; Pollack et al., 2018). Such a 
focus on individuals and men does not seem to emphasise recognition of status 
as much as the traditional cultural reporting, but more in-depth studies are 
needed to examine this further.
A look to one of the most salient pieces in the Danish reporting, an exten-
sive cultural article in Politiken (Wind-Friis et al., 2017), reveals a focus on 
agonism and status rather than identity, like Matilda Gustavsson’s article in 
Dagens Nyheter. This long investigative piece focuses on misconduct by a key 
film producer at the Danish production company Zentropa. It is a reflexive 
article, critical towards previous journalistic reporting about the given film 
producer and company. It calls into question earlier objectifying practices 
and media images, thus criticising reification of identity – a risk with the ap-
plication of the identity model – not only in the film industry but in the media 
industry as well. The article includes many direct quotes by both women and 
men, giving voice to some victims. At the same time, it calls out members of 
the press, letting them answer critical questions about their previous lack of 
action, despite their long knowledge, at least partly, about the misconduct. A 
forefronted conclusion is that a series of singular examples of abuse were not 
enough for the journalists to act; examples from other countries – the initial 
reportage from the US, and also testimonies from Sweden – seem to have been 
needed. This indicates the benefits, and necessity, of a transnationalisation of 
the women’s movement, as suggested by Fraser (2008) in her critique of the 
too nationally confined women’s movement in the US. 
Despite the necessary transnationalisation alluded to in the Zentropa article, 
events in other parts of the world, except for the US, is not a key focus overall, 
especially not in the Swedish material. Issues regarding the Danish context ap-
pear only seven times (1%) in the Swedish data, and issues regarding the Swedish 
context appear 11 times in the Danish material (6%). When other parts of the 
world do appear, national specificity tends to be highlighted, not only in the news 
and the political opinion sections (such articles are found in Dagens Nyheter on 
3 December and 25 November 2017 and in Politiken on 3 November 2017), but 
also on the cultural pages (one example is from Dagens Nyheter on 27 October 
2017). This indicates a state-territorial framing and that the transnationalisation 
of the women’s movement, argued for by Fraser (2008), is not yet realised, neither 
as it is accounted for in the media, nor in the scopes of the testimonial manifestos. 
The transnational characteristics of cultural journalism in Sweden that have been 
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identified previously (Roosvall & Widholm, 2018) do thus not materialise here.
This specific knowledge of the cultural journalism field, as part of the political 
communication field, indicates that there is something specific to the #metoo 
reporting, which – together with the general spread over diverse sections, es-
pecially in the Swedish material – suggests that it has taken on a merged form 
of cultural-political coverage. In other words, culture affects news and political 
coverage and opinion, and news and political opinion affects cultural coverage 
and opinion. Understanding the specificities of sections of journalism, and the 
specificities of the cultural public sphere, facilitates a valid analysis and a clearer 
picture of what is going on in our societies. 
The critical aftermath of the #metoo movement, specifically the criticism 
towards how the media (mis-)handled specific cases and thus severely harmed 
persons who were named, contains further – and deeply tragic – evidence of 
the societal impact of cultural journalism. Based on their reporting on Benny 
Fredriksson, CEO of Kulturhuset Stadsteatern (the Stockholm City Theatre, 
one of the two main theatre institutions in Stockholm), who committed suicide 
after a series of critical articles about him connected to #metoo, Aftonbladet was 
convicted by The Press Council [Pressens Opininionsnämnd], resulting in the 
newspaper having to publish a statement of the decision and to pay a fee. The 
conviction underlined that the severity of the harm done towards Fredriksson 
was exacerbated by the fact that it was published not only in the news section 
“but also in the editorial and cultural pages [translated]” (Aftonbladet, 2019). 
Conclusion
This chapter has pointed to the cultural dimensions of the political and the 
political dimensions of the cultural as an emerging research strand within the 
study of political communication. We have especially focused on the political 
dimensions of cultural journalism as an area with political communication per-
spectives and potentialities. We have highlighted three theoretical approaches 
particularly important in existing Nordic research and have demonstrated that 
even within these strands, especially those dealing with public sphere theory and 
the sociology of journalism, it remains a challenge to recognise the cultural as 
political, including the political potentialities of cultural coverage and debate. 
Or put differently, it remains a challenge for cultural journalism studies to be 
accepted as an important aspect of the political communication circuit and 
thus as a research field with (also) political dimensions. We have made the case 
that acknowledging these dimensions potentially makes us better equipped to 
discuss political communication in all its guises and variations and thereby to 
achieve a fuller, more well-informed understanding of the political as well as 
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communication and, specifically, how they connect. 
To exemplify this, we have, in addition to drawing on previous studies of 
cultural journalism, provided a mapping of, and brief qualitative look into, 
the coverage of #metoo in Danish and Swedish newspapers in the autumn of 
2017. This analysis demonstrates that cultural journalism may be a key arena 
for and driver of political coverage and opinion. Moreover, it indicates that 
knowledge of the field of cultural journalism as a form of political communi-
cation is necessary to be able to make valid conclusions about – in this case 
– the presence of (inter-)national framing, which in general news and political 
opinion are staple, but in cultural journalism is more of a rarity. The case of 
#metoo has also exemplified the inclusiveness of cultural journalism today. This 
coverage involved a continuum from politically saturated stories, investigative 
reporting, and cultural editors calling for action, at one end of the spectrum, 
setting agendas also for other parts of journalism. But it also included more 
traditional news stories about the evolvement of #metoo in various countries 
(applying national rather than transnational perspectives) and debate articles 
engaging critically and supportively with the topic, thus serving as a forum for 
conflictual consensus. At the other end of the spectrum, the coverage also in-
volved entertainment and gossipy stories. All of these stories add to the picture 
of this complex matter and point to cultural journalism as an area of research 
that deserves more attention in a world of increasing media hybridisation, 
both in terms of content and genres, and in a media landscape characterised by 
increasing attempts to stand out in the multitude of accessible media material, 
not least in the field of political communication.
Notes
 1. One example is that, across public service broadcasters in the Nordic countries, culture is 
highlighted as key areas of commitment. This is evident in the annual public service reports 
from key public service providers, such as Sveriges Television (SVT, Sweden), Norsk Rik-
skringkasting (NRK, Norway) and Danmarks Radio (DR, Denmark).
 2. The study of the political dimensions of cultural journalism presented here are not to be confused 
with scholarly debates about political communication cultures (e.g., Pfetsch, 2004; Esser & Pfetsch, 
2017) or journalism cultures (Hanitzsch et al., 2011). These approaches study and compare the 
actions, norms, and attitudes of actors associated with the political public sphere within different 
political and media systems but pay little attention to the study of the political dimensions of 
cultural journalism and the actions and attitudes of agents contributing to this type of journalism.
 3. Pollack and colleagues (2018) find extensive coverage in Norway and coverage in Finland some-
where in between.
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Chapter 10
Indigenous political communication  
in the Nordic countries
Eva Josefsen & Eli Skogerbø 
Abstract 
A study of political communication will not be complete without taking into 
account the differences in experiences regarding the lack of recognition and ex-
periences of oppression between indigenous citizens and citizens belonging to the 
ethnic majority. This chapter reviews the status of Nordic indigenous political 
communication and compares political institutions, actors, and conditions. Most 
attention is paid to Sámi political and media institutions in Norway and Sweden, 
as we have most data available from these settings, although some examples from 
Finland and Greenland are included, too. The overview shows similarities result-
ing from colonisation and assimilation, but also major differences between the 
main institutions, Sámi parliaments, party systems, and media institutions owing 
to different state policies. In conclusion, we point to the challenges for research 
on indigenous political communication in the Nordic countries.
Keywords: Sámi, indigenous, political communication, media, journalism
Introduction 
Across the world, indigenous peoples are reclaiming cultural and political influ-
ence after having suffered decades and centuries of colonisation, assimilation, 
and repression. The Nordic countries form no exception to this (Berg-Nordlie 
et al., 2015). Sweden and Denmark are among the oldest states in Europe, with 
a past as colonial powers that includes rule of territories historically populated 
by indigenous peoples and many linguistic, cultural, and ethnic minorities, 
both on other continents and in the home region. Within the Danish state, 
the Kalaallit peoples of Greenland are recognised as indigenous, and the Sámi 
have a similar status in Finland, Norway, and Sweden. The traditional Sámi 
living area includes Russia, but the premises for political communication in 
Russia differ extensively from the Nordic countries; thus, the situation in Russia 
is not included here. As in other parts of the world, indigenous peoples in the 
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Nordic countries were, at the height of the colonial period and far into the 
twentieth century, systematically repressed with the aim of erasing indigenous 
languages, cultures, and ways of life (Bryld, 2010; Eidheim, 1999). A study of 
political communication will not be complete without taking into account the 
differences in experiences regarding the lack of recognition and experiences of 
oppression between indigenous citizens and citizens belonging to the ethnic 
majority. We must acknowledge that collective experiences have had permanent 
consequences for contemporary political communication practices. One such 
consequence is marginalisation and lack of knowledge about the indigenous 
peoples in the majority population. Another consequence is silence among 
members of the minority groups (Kovach, 2009). For decades, individuals and 
families have stayed silent about traumatic experiences, family histories, and 
experienced injustice in both the local and national environment (Labba, 2020). 
A third consequence very important for political communication is the loss of 
indigenous languages and oppression of the use of mother tongues. There are 
many examples and much documentation. Suffice it here to refer to Hyltenstam 
(1999), who maintains that assimilation and rejection, rather than recognition 
of linguistic diversity, were traits of Swedish nationalism and nation-building. 
Such experiences continue to shape the climate and conditions for indigenous 
political communication even today (Mörkenstam, 2019).
Taking these basic facts as starting points, conditions for political com-
munication for the Nordic indigenous peoples cannot be regarded as similar 
to those of the majority populations. This is to some extent recognised by 
the states. In Norway, following similar initiatives as Canada, a Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission was set up in 2018 with the mandate to uncover 
past injustices towards the Sámi and other minority groups and suggest tools 
for reconciliation.1 The government of Greenland unilaterally established a 
reconciliation commission in 2013; however, the Danish state did not see a 
need for participation (Thisted, 2017). 
Even in a region once famous for its “passion for equality” (Graubard, 
1986) and recently discussed as the next “supermodel” for successful govern-
ment (The Economist, 2013), the examples above illustrate that colonial and 
postcolonial structures still matter for political communication. In the Nordic 
countries, parallel to experiences of indigenous peoples all over the world, 
minorities were silenced and excluded and expected to “die out” or disappear 
as the majority populations of the new and old Nordic states consolidated 
their state-formation processes (Elenius, 2002; Junka-Aikio, 2016). Further, 
indigenous political claims on the Nordic states have been met with what 
Mörkenstam (2019) has termed “organised hypocrisy”: Indigenous rights and 
claims for self-determination are, on the one hand, supported internationally 
and to some degree included in national constitutions and legislation, and on 
the other, often disregarded or rejected as industries (e.g., mining or energy 
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production) are allowed to extract resources on indigenous lands. The most 
well-known of these claims, the unsuccessful protests against damming the 
Alta-Kautokeino river in Norway in 1979–1981, led to recognition of Sámi 
demands for increased influence and establishment of the Sámi Parliament in 
1989, followed a few years later by the Sámi Parliament in Sweden (1993) and 
in Finland (1997)2 (Josefsen et al., 2016).
Unfortunately, in this chapter we do not provide a comparison with the 
Kalaallit-Greenlandic situation, not because the case is irrelevant but because 
we do not have the knowledge and competence needed to do so. On the con-
trary, the relevance is striking as there are many similarities between Sámi 
and Greenlandic colonial and contemporary political history, journalism, 
and media structures, as Hussain (2017, 2018), Ravn-Højgaard (2019), and 
Ravn-Højgaard and colleagues (2018) have shown in their recent studies. For 
this study, with the exception of mentioning some of the overarching institu-
tional differences between the Greenlandic-Danish and other Nordic countries’ 
solutions to self-government, we restrict the overview and comparison to the 
situation of the Sámi, and mainly to the conditions and structures for political 
communication in Norway and Sweden, with only some examples pertaining 
to Finland. We examine, first, who and which the central Sámi actors and 
institutions for Sámi political communication are; that is, the political actors 
and institutions and the media institutions and actors. In this part, we draw 
attention to the rather striking empirical differences between these two, other-
wise quite similar, Nordic countries. Second, we discuss central approaches 
and theories that are applied to analyse Sámi political communication. In 
conclusion, we draw attention to some of the main challenges for research on 
indigenous political communication. 
Political institutions and actors
With a few local exceptions, the Sámi live as minorities in rural and urban 
localities alongside non-Sámi people within and outside of their traditional 
homeland, Sápmi (see Figure 10.1). 
Public registration of ethnicity is prohibited in Sweden and Norway, while 
in Finland the definition of who is Sámi is highly controversial. This has 
resulted in absent and deficient demographic data on the Sámi population. Most 
sources estimate that 40,000–60,000 Sámi reside in Norway; 20,000–40,000 
in Sweden; 7,000–8,000 in Finland; and 2,000 in Russia. However, the figures 
vary and are highly inexact (Lehtola, 2004; Pettersen, 2014).
At the state level, the political systems in which Sámi political communication 
take place are quite similar (with the exception of Russia): Finland, Norway, 
and Sweden are small Nordic welfare democracies displaying characteristics 
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of social equality, comprehensive public services, and inclusion (see Chapters 
2–7). The Sámi have a constitutional position as an indigenous people in all 
three Nordic countries, but the measures for political influence towards the 
national governments and the scope of self-determination differ, as does their 
status in terms of international law. Whereas all the Nordic countries have 
adopted the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples 
(2007), only Norway and Denmark have ratified the ILO C169 Indigenous 
and Tribal Peoples Convention (1989). The differences in the states’ adoption 
of international law are regarded as essential for understanding and explain-
ing the differences in power for the Sámi (Josefsen et al., 2016; Mörkenstam, 
2019). State borders also differentiate when it comes to institutionalisation of 
indigenous politics and, accordingly, the political structures enabling politi-
cal inclusion, participation, and self-determination vary. There are significant 
power asymmetries between the Sámi and the national institutions and actors 
in both countries, most importantly the prerequisite for self-determination, 
namely autonomy. None of the states have granted the Sámi people territorial 
Figure 10.1 Sápmi, the traditional homelands of the indigenous Sámi people
Comments: Shown in blue, Sápmi spans the northern regions of Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Russia.
Source: Wikimedia Commons (CC BY-SA 3.0)
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autonomy. The institutional differences in indigenous representation and self-
determination between Norway and Sweden can be explained by references to 
past colonial practices and present state policies. Not neglecting the fact that 
in both countries long-term assimilation processes had similar effects on both 
sides of the border, we also find striking dissimilarities. One of those is the dif-
ferences between the two Sámi parliaments.
The Sámi parliaments
The Sámi parliaments are elected by and amongst Sámi voters in each country 
and are institutions for indigenous representation voicing demands for increased 
political self-determination; however, they do not have identical powers. In 
Norway and Sweden, the Sámi parliaments share similarities in their dual func-
tions of being both administrative and representative assemblies, but they are 
different in terms of autonomy and hierarchical ties to the state, as we outline 
below.  
In Norway, the Sámi Parliament met for the first time in 1989, established 
by an amendment of the Norwegian constitution and empowered by the Sámi 
Act (Sameloven, 1987). The Act states that the Sámi Parliament decides inde-
pendently what matters it considers relevant to discuss and consult with the 
Norwegian state or parliament. In 2020, the Sámi Parliament had 39 members 
elected from seven constituencies. Election periods were four years, and elec-
tion day and periods coincide with those of the Norwegian parliament (see 
also Chapter 5, Skogerbø & Karlsen). The constituencies are not limited to 
the historical Sámi homelands but cover the entire country. They vary in geo-
graphical size and population with most voters concentrated in the northernmost 
constituencies. The election system is proportional and dynamic to the degree 
that the number of mandates for each constituency is revised every four years 
according to changes in registered voters within each constituency. 
The representatives are elected from a variety of lists and parties, most of 
them small and returning few mandates. Some of the parties that seek representa-
tion at the local and national levels of Norwegian government (see Chapter 11, 
Hopman & Karlsen) also run for representation in the Sámi Parliament. The 
largest of these is the Labour Party, which has a couple of times managed to 
form a governing coalition led by a Sámi Labour president. Others – explicitly 
Sámi organisations and parties – run only for election to the Sámi Parliament. 
The dominant one, the Norwegian Saami Association (NSR), has led majority 
coalitions in most periods since 1989, also after the 2017 election. Even the 
Progress Party, which has as its main Sámi political issue to abolish the Sámi 
Parliament, has returned representatives in several elections (Josefsen et al., 
2017a). The Sámi party system in Norway is thus different from the Swedish 
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one in that so-called Norwegian parties run in the Sámi Parliament election. 
Further, there have been continuous cooperation and consultation between the 
Sámi Parliament and the Norwegian government and parliament to include Sámi 
rights in Norwegian law. Important examples are the Education Act (1998), the 
Planning and Building Act (Plan- og bygningsloven, 2008), and the Finnmark 
Act (2005). Still, despite protective measures being set up by international and 
national law on indigenous rights and resistance from the Sámi Parliament, there 
seems to be an increase in industrial exploitation projects of natural recourses 
in Sámi traditional living areas. 
In Sweden, the Sámi were historically categorised in two groups: those who 
were reindeer herders and those who were not – a policy termed “the category 
split” (Saglie et al., 2020). The first group were allocated specific rights to 
reindeer husbandry and defined as Sámi, the second group were considered 
non-Sámi and subjected to assimilation (Lantto & Mörkenstam, 2008). For 
centuries, this policy split the Sámi population, and it remains a dividing line 
in Sámi politics (Nilsson et al., 2016). This has a bearing on the Sámi Parlia-
ment in two ways: first, it is the main dividing line between parties returning 
representatives; and second, the Sámi Parliament is one of two Sámi political 
power centres, the other one being the Sámi reindeer herding communities 
(discussed more below).
The Sámi Parliament in Sweden is organised partly as a democratically 
representative body and partly as a state government agency for Sámi issues 
(Lawrence & Mörkenstam, 2016). This double purpose creates less autonomy 
for the parliament as it limits the formal and informal opportunities to be re-
garded as an equal and autonomous party or to explore and voice Sámi interests 
towards the Swedish parliament and government. Concerning the election sys-
tem, the four-year intervals of the Sámi parliamentary elections are not parallel 
to those of the Swedish parliament as elections are held at different dates and 
years. In 2020, one constituency covered the entire country, but parties may 
present several lists of candidates. Representatives in the Sámi Parliament so 
far have been elected from parties unique to Sámi politics. The parties have 
been mostly small and reflected the historical divisions in Sámi politics with 
few similarities with the parties represented in other decision-making bodies 
in Sweden (see Chapter 6, Nord & Grusell). In the 2017 election, the Party for 
Hunting and Fishing Sámi returned the largest number of mandates, however, 
after the election, the Swedish Sámi Association formed a majority coalition 
consisting of several parties. 
The Sámi parliaments in Norway and Sweden are founded on similar legal 
provisions, yet there are substantial differences between the two. The role of 
the Sámi Parliament in Sweden as a government agency makes it subordinate 
to the state, a role that is impossible to combine with being an independent 
voice for Sámi interests. In Norway, the Sámi Parliament has formal political 
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autonomy but limited economic resources and at best variable influence over 
decisions concerning Sámi interests and exploitation of traditional lands. Other 
differences relate to the party and election systems. 
Mörkenstam (2019) argues that the restricted power and voice of the Sámi 
Parliament in Sweden is the main reason why the courts have become important 
political actors for resolving Sámi rights issues. Several Sámi groups, specifically 
reindeer herding communities (“sameby” in Swedish), have taken the Swedish 
state to court to contest both land and cultural rights. A reindeer herding com-
munity is an economic and administrative entity and a reindeer pasture district, 
and they make up a political structure parallel to the Sámi Parliament. In 2019, 
there were 51 Sámi reindeer herding communities in Sweden.
Within each community there may be several enterprises consisting of 
several reindeer owners. Every reindeer herding community has a board that is 
responsible for managing reindeer husbandry within its own geographical area. 
According to the Reindeer Husbandry Act (Rennäringslag, 1971), only those 
who are members of a reindeer herding community have the right to live by 
reindeer herding, and the members make up approximately 10 per cent of the 
Sámis in Sweden. Temporarily culminating with the Girjas Case, in which the 
High Court in 2020 ruled in favour of the reindeer herding community Girjas 
for holding the right to manage hunting and fishing resources within its lands, 
there are several court cases pending in which reindeer herding communities 
contest rights to land and water. In this context, it should be stated that the Sámi 
living areas in Sweden have for decades, if not centuries, been major sources of 
hydroelectric power, minerals, and other natural resources. 
Politics is not only policy formation but a question of networking and 
extracting windows of opportunity. In addition to the differences between 
the Sámi parliaments, the Sámi party systems in Norway and Sweden are not 
similar. As already mentioned, in Sweden, the category split defined reindeer 
herders as Sámi and all others as Swedes, and it is still the most significant 
political cleavage among voters and parties. The parties represented in the 
Sámi Parliament in Sweden are all to some extent related to this conflict and 
not to the left-right axis that is central to Swedish politics in general (Saglie et 
al., 2020; see also Nord & Grusell, Chapter 6). Unlike the Sámi Parliament in 
Norway, until 2020, only Sámi parties have run for Sami Parliament elections 
in Sweden. Sámi parties claim to be political workshops of their own without 
any strings or obligations towards Swedish party policies formed by non-Sámi 
party members and leaderships. 
In contrast, in Norway, where the category split does not apply – as 
historically, all Sámis were subjected to racist and assimilationist state policies 
– a mix of parties have been represented in the Sámi Parliament. Some of the 
Norwegian parties that run for election in local, regional, and national decision-
making bodies also seek representation in the Sámi Parliament, whereas other 
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organisations are unique to Sámi politics. The degree of support or resistance to 
Sámi self-determination is the main political cleavage in Sámi politics in Norway 
(Saglie et al., 2020). The Progress Party’s voters are the strongest against, and 
the voters for the Norwegian Saami Association are the strongest in favour, of 
Sámi self-determination (Saglie et al., 2020). This mixed-party system, with 
both Sámi and Norwegian parties, provides Sámi politicians with gateways 
into the Norwegian decision-making system on all levels. It does not guarantee 
acceptance for Sámi views and interests, but it secures that Sámi politics will 
in one way or another be part of the party’s policy. For example, the Progress 
Party would abolish the Sámi Parliament, and have for years promoted this view 
both in the Norwegian and Sámi parliaments. Other parties with more positive 
approaches to Sámi rights and politics have included it in the party structure. 
The Labour Party has established a separate Sámi party group within the na-
tional party structure and integrated Sámi politics into election programmes 
for national and many regional and local elections. As pointed out above, these 
differences between Norway and Sweden can only be explained by reference 
to the two states’ former segrationist and assimilationist policies. The historic 
experiences of Sámis in the two countries were different and had lasting effects 
on the political institutions. Research has also shown that there are huge differ-
ences in trust in state authorities between Sámi citzens in Norway and Sweden 
(Nilsson & Möller, 2017).
In short, the differences between the Sámi political institutions and Sámi 
political actors in Norway and Sweden are much larger than the differences 
between the national and local governments in the two neighbouring countries. 
To illustrate, the Norwegian and Swedish parliaments are similar representative 
and decision-making bodies; the national, regional, and local election systems 
show mainly similarities; the party systems are similar, if not identical; and 
the left-right conflict is the main dividing line in both Norwegian and Swedish 
politics (see Chapters 1–6). In contrast, the Sámi political systems in the two 
countries are similar only in name: the two Sámi parliaments have different 
powers; the election systems are different; the party systems share few simi-
larities; and as mentioned above, the main conflicts are substantially different. 
Conclusions drawn by researchers on Sámi politics in Norway and Sweden 
point to the same: while studies in Norway have, for example, emphasised that 
the Sámi Parliament has to some extent influenced Norwegian state policies; 
that Sámi voters express relatively high trust in Sámi and Norwegian political 
and media institutions (Josefsen & Skogerbø, forthcoming); and even point to 
a hint of routinisation in Sámi politics (Josefsen, 2015), research in Sweden 
points to marginalisation (Mörkenstam et al., 2016) and a low degree of trust 
(Nilsson & Möller, 2017). 
Mörkenstam (2019) highlights the decoupling of values laid down in 
international law and concrete political actions regarding the exploitation of 
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traditional Sámi land and the displacement of Sámi industries in Sweden. In 
Norway, there are numerous examples of the same (Sámi Parliament, 2018), 
including resource exploitation projects such as mining and wind turbines, which 
the Sámi Parliament in Norway argues are in violation of both Norwegian and 
international law (Sámi Parliament, 2020a, 2020b). Such issues are usually on 
top of the Sámi political agenda, yet only rarely reach the headlines of Norwe-
gian and Swedish news media. 
Media institutions and Sámi political journalism
Sámi political parties, politicians, organisations, and other actors communicate 
with Sámi voters through many different channels, personally and mediated 
(Josefsen et al., 2017b). Sámi issues and politics are reported by journalists 
(Skogerbø et al., 2019), talked about among friends and family, and discussed 
and distributed by social media such as Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Instagram, 
and the like (Lindgren & Cocq, 2016). Popular culture plays a major – and it 
seems, increasingly important – role also for indigenous political communication: 
music has always been a channel for voicing interest (e.g., Mari Boine, Sofia 
Jannok); and increasingly so is television drama (Midnight Sun, Thin Ice); 
gameshows and competitions (e.g., Muihte Mu, Eurovision Song Contest) 
(Sand, 2019); documentaries; talk shows (e.g., Mu Jiena); film (e.g., prize-
winning Sámi Blood, 2017); and many other forms of popular culture (DuBois 
& Cocq, 2019). Sámi journalism is performed both within and across state and 
institutional borders. The status as indigenous peoples entails certain rights 
when it comes to media access and representation, such as subsidies to media 
institutions that practise indigenous journalism allowing for storytelling and 
news reporting from a Sámi perspective as opposed to being reported about 
from the outside. In the Nordic countries, public service broadcasters have for 
decades had indigenous (for our purposes, Sámi) newsrooms, thus providing 
a test case for the practice of indigenous journalism (Plaut, 2014). Generally, 
the news media’s reporting and production of political news are important for 
Sámi political parties, organisations, and citizens. 
The institutional frameworks for indigenous journalism follow from the 
diverging policies of each state. First, across the Nordic countries, public broad-
casters have indigenous journalism either as part of their remits or, in the case of 
Kalaallit Nunaata Radioa Greenlandic Broadcasting (KNR), as a main objective 
to make programmes for the Greenlandic population. The Finnish, Norwegian, 
and Swedish public broadcasters all have Sámi divisions – YLE Sápmi, NRK 
Sápmi, and Sameradion & SVT Sápmi, respectively. The Sámi public broad-
casters thus have unique positions, with nationwide coverage and the potential 
to reach most Sámi citizens. They broadcast daily in multiple languages (several 
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Sámi languages, Norwegian, Swedish, and Finnish) through radio, television, 
the Internet, mobile apps, and social media. They produce programmes and 
content in a variety of genres, among them news and political journalism, such 
as the 15-minute television news programme Ođđasat that have been (and in 
2020 still was) co-produced by NRK Sápmi, SVT Sápmi, and YLE Sápmi five 
days a week since 2003. Ođđasat broadcasts to Finland, Sweden, and Norway 
in Sámi languages and is subtitled in the majority languages. 
Another factor rarely touched upon in studies on indigenous journalism is 
the relationship between journalism as a practice carried out by professional 
news media, such as the Sámi editorial teams within the public broadcasters, 
and civic journalism. Social and digital media offer cheap, accessible, and easily 
available platforms for communication and are of increasing importance for the 
development of journalism, as information sources and as arenas for political 
communication. Indeed, the most recent studies of Sámi parliamentary elections 
show that Facebook is a relatively much used – but not trusted – source by 
the voters in the Sámi Parliament elections (Josefsen et al., 2017b). The more 
specific characteristics of Sámi media structures and institutions in Norway and 
Sweden are outlined below.
In Norway, two daily Sámi newspapers are supported through the press sub-
sidy system. One, Ságat, is published mainly in Norwegian, and the other, Ávvir, 
in North Sámi. Both have consistent and extensive political journalism (Josefsen 
& Skogerbø, 2013). From 2017, a weekly news magazine, Sámi Magasiidna, 
has also been published in North Sámi in print and online. Further, two local 
newspapers are subsidised for producing news in South Sámi and Lule Sámi.
The public service broadcasting remit is articulated slightly differently in 
Norway and Sweden. In Norway, NRK is a state-owned corporation with 
a license to broadcast that is legally enshrined. The remit is comprehensive 
and specified in five main points: strengthen democracy; provide universally 
accessible programmes; strengthen the Norwegian and Sámi languages, identity, 
and culture; strive for quality and innovation; and be non-commercial.
NRK Sápmi defines itself as an indigenous broadcaster, realised through ac-
tive international cooperation to increase and develop programme exchange, 
creation, and development with other indigenous stations around the world. 
There are a number of district offices in various parts of Sápmi and one in the 
capital Oslo. North Sámi is the primary language of radio broadcasts, with 
permanent and recurring inserts in South Sámi, Lule Sámi, and Norwegian. 
Unlike many other indigenous broadcasters that must serve a linguistically 
diverse indigenous audience (e.g., Hafsteinsson & Bredin, 2010), NRK Sápmi 
uses Sámi both as the primary broadcasting language and a working language.
Studies have shown that Sámi political issues were marginalised in nation-
wide political news during the same period in which the Sámi newsroom grew 
(Ijäs, 2012), indicating that more extensive Sámi political journalism does 
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not necessarily provide access to the national public sphere (Eide & Nikunen, 
2011; Eide & Simonsen, 2007). Coverage of the Sámi Parliament elections have 
posed dilemmas for NRK Sápmi – namely, to what extent the Sámi language 
should be used in the reporting on the election and whether using Sámi should 
be prioritised over the objective of reaching all Sámi voters (Skogerbø et al., 
2017). Over the years, the combination of languages and multi-platform and 
multi-media programme productions seemingly have eased or resolved much 
of the tension between universality and use of Sámi languages, observable in 
online and programme formats where languages are mixed (e.g., the NRK Sápmi 
news website, the slow-TV production Giđđajohtin, 2017). 
In Sweden, concerning print media, no Sámi daily or weekly news media 
exists; however, the magazine Samefolket3 in 2020 had seven issues per year 
and reports extensively on Sámi culture and politics, mainly in Swedish. In 
northern Sweden, studies have found some coverage of Sámi politics in local 
newspapers (Gottardis, 2016; Mörkenstam et al., 2012), and over the past few 
years there seems to be an increasing number of reports on Sámi land rights 
issues also in national media, such as Svenska Dagbladet’s series of articles in 
2018 and 2019 (Svenska Dagbladet, 2019). 
Public service broadcasting is organised in three independent companies 
owned by a managing foundation (Förvaltningsstiftelsen, 2018): SVT, SR, 
and Sveriges Utbildningsradio. They are obliged to produce and broadcast 
universally accessible programmes for the public. SR’s and SVT’s remits in-
clude the provision of a multifaceted and broad programme offering with a 
particular responsibility for the Swedish language and must provide content 
in the national minority languages of Sámi, Finnish, Meänkieli, Romani chib, 
and Yiddish. Sameradion & SVT Sápmi belongs to SR and SVT, respectively, 
and is the largest and most important Sámi news producer in Sweden. The two 
editorial teams were merged into one in 2014, producing Sámi journalism and 
other programmes on radio, television, and the Internet. Sameradion had its 
main editorial team in Kiruna and employees in several localities including the 
capital, Stockholm, and was broadcasting in several Sámi dialects and Swed-
ish. A comparative study of election coverage in NRK Sápmi and Sameradion 
& SVT Sápmi revealed that the objective of universal reach made Swedish the 
main language for election coverage, as more Sámi voters would understand 
the majority language (Skogerbø et al., 2019). 
A striking difference between the two public service institutions is the posi-
tions they occupied in the organisational structure of their respective parent 
companies (Skogerbø et al., 2017). While NRK Sápmi in 2020 was a department 
under the immediate responsibility of the CEO of NRK, Sameradion & SVT 
Sápmi was a subdivision placed much lower in the organisation. NRK Sápmi 
and Sameradion & SVT Sápmi both heavily emphasised their responsibility to 
practise political journalism from the inside, but there were considerable differ-
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ences in the resources set up for journalistic production and in the production 
outcome, measured in hours of television and radio broadcasts. The editorial 
teams in Sweden were not only much smaller but also divided between two 
companies, and accordingly initially had fewer opportunities to draw attention 
to the Sámi community. The marked difference in resources adds to explain-
ing the differences between them. By far, NRK Sápmi had more journalists 
and resources to provide multilingual content, whereas their Swedish sister 
organisation had to choose. 
As reported by Skogerbø and colleagues (2019), the fact that Sámi stories 
were rarely told by mainstream, nationwide media was the very motivation for 
doing Sámi political journalism. The public broadcasters had the most extensive 
coverage of Sámi politics and, in Sweden, were the only media that reported 
Sámi news on a daily basis. The situation was somewhat different in Norway, 
as Sámi and, to some extent, local newspapers in northern Norway, reported 
regularly on Sámi politics and elections. Both Sámi editorial teams described 
their practices as indigenous journalism, while they highlighted and emphasised 
different dimensions. On both sides of the border, they were acutely aware of 
their position as the main producers of Sámi political journalism and the main 
mediated public spaces for Sámi politics. 
Owing to the differences between the two countries’ electoral systems, the 
frameworks within which the two teams produced Sámi political journalism also 
differed. NRK Sápmi must report two election campaigns simultaneously, as the 
elections for the Norwegian parliament and the Sámi Parliament are held on the 
same day. Therefore, journalists had an opportunity to connect the two cam-
paigns and, for example, confront parliamentarian candidates for the Norwegian 
parliament with questions about Sámi issues, thereby giving voters information 
about the power relations between the Norwegian and the Sámi parliaments. In 
Sweden, the election period for the Sámi Parliament did not run concurrently 
with that of any other governing body, and the journalists did not have the same 
opportunities to establish connections between different levels of decision-making. 
Sámi journalism is constrained not only by limited resources, immense dis-
tances, and scattered audiences, but also by the institutional frameworks of the 
two countries: differences in politics towards the Sámi; different status of the 
Sámi as an indigenous people; different powers of the Sámi Parliament; different 
election and party systems; and different media institutions. As such, indigenous 
journalism challenges the Nordic public service broadcasting remits: it tells the 
story of a divided people across borders, where indigenous journalists must 
operate within the constraints of both national public service institutions and 
separate political systems (Marklin & Husband, 2013; Skogerbø et al., 2019). 
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Other political actors
We have so far mainly discussed the “usual suspects” in political communication: 
governments, parties, media institutions and journalism, and voters, in addition 
to Sámi reindeer herder communities in Sweden. There are, however, many other 
cultural and social organisations that make up Sámi civil society and contribute 
to Sámi political communication. Significantly, three transnational actors need 
mentioning: the publicly funded Sámi University College; the Sámi Council, 
which is a non-governmental organisation (NGO); and the Sámi Parliaments’ 
cooperative body, the Sámi Parliamentary Council. These are important actors 
safeguarding and articulating a transboundary Sámi community and identity. 
Moreover, the Sámi have for decades had prominent positions internationally, 
in particular in the UN. In 2020, the UN Forum for Indigenous Peoples and 
EMRIP, the expert panel, were headed by two Sámi women from Finland and 
Norway, respectively. Further, on the national, regional, and local level, Sámi 
language and culture centres, museums, companies, organisations, and organ-
ised Sámi interest groups debate a variety of Sámi issues, forward support and 
demands, formulate strategies, and implement policies. The total number of 
Sámi civic organisations and institutions is nevertheless quite low, and there is 
limited independent civic mobilisation outside the Sámi parliament system and 
the election canal (Selle & Strømsnes, 2015), both in concrete numbers and 
compared to the civic society at large in the two countries. 
Approaches to analysing Sámi political communication
Many studies show that indigenous peoples are poorly and often stereotypically 
represented in the majority media, and the coverage of Sámi cultural and political 
issues has been no exception to this. In the Nordic countries, as elsewhere, there 
is a long history of marginalisation of ethnic minorities in the nation-wide media 
(Eide & Simonsen, 2007; Horsti & Hultén, 2011; Skogerbø, 2000). In Nordic 
research on Sámi political communication, methods, theories, and perspectives 
from political science, sociology, and other social sciences have been applied, 
as have approaches from critical and postcolonial studies. 
A main approach can be categorised as election studies, as they have been and 
continue to be carried out in Norway and Sweden. The first Sámi Parliament 
election study was carried out in Norway in 2009 (Josefsen & Saglie, 2011). 
In the aftermath of the Sámi Parliament elections in Norway and Sweden 
in 2013, the research was extended to a comparative study (Josefsen et al., 
2017a; Nilsson et al., 2016). The most recent study includes only the Sámi 
parliamentary election in Norway in 2017 (Berg-Nordlie et al., Forthcoming). 
With a starting point in a survey study of Sámi voters, extended analyses of 
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election coverage and practices of journalism, the Sámi election studies have 
provided insights into Sámi voters’ preferences and behaviour, issue salience, 
political trust, Sámi political news and voters’ information sources, and the 
significance of election systems. Prior to the election projects, a few studies 
had looked at the development of Sámi politics, power, and influence (Bjerkli 
& Selle, 2003; Broderstad, 1999, 2001, 2008), and the number of studies 
also addressing issues of political communication grew over the years (Bjerkli 
& Selle, 2015). Further, as Sámi political institutions have increasingly been 
researched, more aspects of political participation and exercise of citizenship 
have been addressed (Broderstad, 2008; Selle et al., 2015; Semb, 2012), as 
have the conditions for political communication and political journalism 
(Skogerbø et al., 2015). The role and influence of the Sámi Parliaments as 
established political institutions within the Norwegian and Swedish governance 
systems have been studied by several authors (Falch & Selle, 2018; Falch et al., 
2016; Josefsen, 2014; Josefsen et al., 2016; Lawrence & Mörkenstam, 2016; 
Mörkenstam et al., 2012). 
As indigenous and postcolonial perspectives gain ground internationally, they 
increasingly influence the discussion of Sámi political influence and self-determi-
nation (Broderstad, 2014; Kuokkanen, 2009; Lawrence & Mörkenstam, 2016; 
Minde et al., 2008) as well as studies of Sámi media and journalism (DuBois 
& Cocq, 2019; Skogerbø et al., 2019), of Sámi journalism (Pietikäinen, 2003; 
Pietikäinen & Dlaske, 2013; Pietikäinen & Luostarinen, 1997), and of public 
discourse in Finland (Junka-Aikio, 2016). Plaut (2017) recently found that Sámi 
journalism should indeed be considered transnational journalism, as it seeks to 
identify and foster a common sense of identity and nation-building across state 
borders. To this, we would add cultivating cultural and political images and 
forging ties across territories, in addition to state-building, which are functions 
that, for instance, Ravn-Højgaard (2019) foresees for the media in Greenland. 
This line of thought emphasises indigenous media as instruments for advocacy 
and cultural revitalisation. Empirically, this trend is rooted in the practices and 
ideological conviction often expressed by indigenous media producers, which has 
been quoted in the studies above and also contested. Tara Ross (2017) argues, 
for instance, that media consumers have many more reasons for using media 
than ethnicity. The essentialism implicit in the focus on ethnic media may lead 
to overlooking audiences, and equally important is the fact that ethnic media 
are often under-resourced and cannot provide their audiences with a full-scale 
media menu, as Moring (2007) has highlighted. Hokowithu and Devadas 
(2013), on the other hand, reject the notion that indigenous journalism should 
be conceptualised as a practice and institution distinct from other forms of 
journalism or as having inherently emancipatory characteristics.
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Conclusion and challenges for future indigenous political 
communication research
Researching Sámi politics and political communication faces many challenges, 
of which four are particularly important: recruitment of indigenous research-
ers; lack of a strong transborder research community; linguistically, culturally, 
and empirically demanding projects; and integration of postcolonial theories 
and indigenous studies with political communication frameworks. The points 
below are made on the basis of our experience with research into Sámi political 
communication, but we assume that they are equally relevant for research on 
Kalaallit and Greenlandic political communication.
Recruitment of indigenous researchers
The preface to Veli-Pekka Lehtola’s (2004: 5) book on the Sámi people states 
that “the Sámi are the most studied people in Europe”, pointing to the fact 
that indigenous peoples have been studied as objects of interest for non-indig-
enous researchers with limited inside knowledge of culture and communica-
tion forms. Indigenous peoples’ historical experiences of research have been 
marked by abuse, prejudice, ridicule, arrogance, domination, and even racism 
(Kovach, 2009). It has not been uncommon for indigenous peoples not to have 
recognised themselves in the research results and findings (Smith, 1999). In 
our view, research will always improve by bringing in both outside and inside 
perspectives and experiences when it concerns indigenous peoples, but we still 
find examples of where this is not the case. This is also a challenge for political 
communication research in the Nordic countries. 
Lack of a strong transborder research community
Further, one of the most important constraints for Sámi political communication 
research is the lack of a strong transborder research community on indigenous 
politics and communication. This chapter, for instance, draws heavily on re-
search done within the framework of the Sámi Parliament Election Projects, 
yet even these have only once managed to attract funding for a comparative 
study between Norway and Sweden, and none have included Finland and 
Russia. Further, whereas there is recruitment to and funding of Sámi research 
projects in Norway, there are far fewer opportunities for long-term funding, 
recruitment, and cooperation. 
Linguistically, culturally, and empirically demanding projects
Studying Sámi political communication cannot be done without having teams 
of researchers who, in addition to being well-versed in media and political 
212
EVA JOSEFSEN & ELI SKOGERBØ
communication studies, jointly know Sámi culture and society, have mastered 
several methods, and know a number of different languages – of which at least 
one (preferably more) must be a Sámi language, one (preferably more) a Nordic 
language, and obviously one must be English in order to internationalise, un-
derstand, and interpret data across local and transborder contexts. Such teams 
exist, but are rare and also rarely funded for long periods of time. 
Integration of postcolonial theories and indigenous studies  
with political communication frameworks
As the analyses above show, researching indigenous political communication 
and indigenous political journalism highlights the need to include indigenous 
perspectives into mainstream theories on national political systems. Sámi politics 
and political communication cannot only – neither within or across the borders 
that divide Sápmi – be analysed with reference to the election and party systems 
of the nation-states, of which there is an abundant existing literature within the 
Nordic countries. The Sámi political and media systems simply do not comply; 
neither do our theories on political journalism and election coverage catch the 
postcolonial legacy. For example, Sámi elections do not draw massive media 
attention (Allern, 2011), they are not mediatised (Esser & Strömbäck, 2014), 
and Sámi top politicians hardly control high media capital (Davis, 2010). Rather, 
we cannot understand the patterns of political communication without having 
a theoretical framework that integrates indigenous, postcolonial perspectives 
with theories on political communication, participation, and representation.
Notes
 1. Sannhets- og forsoningskommisjonen [Truth and reconciliation commission]: https://uit.no/
kommisjonen 
 2. The Sámi Parliament in Finland was established by the Sámi Act in 1997. It substituted the 
former Sámi Delegation [Saamelaisvaltuuskunta] that was established in Finland as early as 
1973, a popularly elected advisory body. The Sámi delegation was important for the later 
demands for Sámi representative bodies in both Norway and Sweden.
 3. http://samefolket.se
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Chapter 11
Elections and political communication 
in the Nordic countries
David Nicolas Hopmann & Rune Karlsen
Abstract
This chapter is a review of the main features of elections and the related political 
communication and campaigning in the Nordic countries. The focus is on na-
tional election campaigns in Norway, Sweden, mainland Finland, and mainland 
Denmark, with occasional references to Iceland and to other types of election 
campaigns. The first part of the chapter begins with a discussion of the rules and 
regulations governing elections across the Nordics. This discussion is followed by 
a review of the rules and regulations governing election campaign communica-
tion. The second part of this chapter presents the research programmes of voters 
and voting behaviour in the Nordic countries, as well as research programmes 
on election campaign communication. The goal of this second part is not to 
provide a detailed overview of past findings, but to reveal crucial similarities 
and differences with respect to elections and political communication across the 
Nordic countries. 
Keywords: political communication, election campaigns, electoral rules, turnout, 
voting behaviour
Introduction
The Nordic countries, and even more so the three Scandinavian countries, 
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, are often seen as belonging to one family with 
roughly similar political and media systems (Knutsen, 2017; Syvertsen et al., 
2014). They are often grouped together or provide the basis for comparative 
research employing a most-similar systems design. Indeed, in many respects 
these countries are alike. For instance, all Nordic countries have multi-party 
systems, strong public service broadcasting, and high electoral turnout – at 
least compared to other countries. In this vein, the Nordic “five party model” 
has, for example, been given much attention in political science (e.g., Knutsen, 
2017), and the concept of the “media welfare state” suggests that the Nordic 
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countries constitute a distinctive group of countries with respect to their media 
landscapes (Syvertsen et al., 2014; see also Skogerbø et al., Chapter 1).
When taking a closer look at the Nordic countries, in particular in the 
context of election campaigns, several major differences emerge, however. For 
instance, rules for calling national elections vary as much as theoretically pos-
sible, from very strict to very liberal. Also, the electoral systems differ in the 
extent to which voting is personalised. In Finland and Sweden, paid political 
advertising is allowed on television, unlike in Norway and Denmark. Moreover, 
some of these differences across countries have been linked to the differences in 
political communication and campaigning found across the Nordic countries.
In this chapter, we review the main features of elections and the related po-
litical communication and campaigning in the Nordic countries. While doing 
this, we focus on Norway, Sweden, mainland Finland, and mainland Denmark, 
and we focus on national election campaigns in these countries, with occasional 
references to Iceland and to other types of election campaigns (e.g., presidential, 
European, regional, and local). The chapter is divided into two parts. First, we 
begin by discussing the rules and regulations governing elections across the 
Nordics. We then move to a review of the rules and regulations governing elec-
tion campaign communication. In the second part, we turn our attention to the 
research programmes of voters and voting behaviour in the Nordic countries, 
after which we present research programmes on election campaign communica-
tion and discuss the general findings in recent trends in electoral campaigning. 
The goal of this second part is to take stock of the research programmes them-
selves, not to provide a detailed overview of their past findings. However, the 
presentation reveals crucial similarities and differences with respect to elections 
and political communication across the Nordic countries. 
Electoral rules and regulations in the Nordics
The rules and regulations on elections form the basis for how election campaigns 
are run. Different rules and regulations create different incentives for politicians, 
political parties, and other actors, and they define what is allowed and what is 
prohibited. We begin with the questions of who is allowed to run in elections 
at various political levels: passive voting regulations.
Denmark, Finland, and Sweden are – unlike Norway and Iceland – members 
of the European Union (EU). Denmark was the first of the Nordic countries to 
join (1973), while Finland and Sweden joined much later, in 1995. EU membership 
entails participation in the elections for the European Parliament, which, since 
1979, have been held every fifth year. As shown in Table 11.1, the basic rules for 
who is allowed to run in these elections are similar across countries. Different 
from other types of elections, however, is the requirement that candidates must 
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be nominated by political parties (in Finland, also by constituency associations 
of at least 2,000 members). Denmark is in the somewhat exceptional situation 
in which its Atlantic territories – Greenland and the Faroe Islands – are not 
members of the EU, unlike mainland Denmark. Greenland was in fact a member 
of the European Community initially, but left in 1985 following a referendum 
held in 1982 (for an overview of election campaigns, voting rules, and results in 
Greenland, see, e.g., Ackrén & Lindström, 2012). As a consequence, residents 
of Greenland and the Faroe Islands do not participate in EU elections. 
Table 11.1 Running in elections in the Nordic countries
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden
EU Danish citizens 
residing in the EU, 
EU citizens residing 
in Denmark, at 
least 18 years old, 
resident, and nomi-
nated by a political 
party (excluding 
residents of Green-
land and the Faroe 
Islands)
Finnish citizens, EU 
citizens residing 
in Finland, at least 
18 years old, and 
nominated by a 
political party or 
constituency asso-
ciation
n.a. Swedish citizens, 
EU citizens residing 
in Sweden, at least 
18 years old, and 
nominated by a 
political party





Danish citizens, at 
least 18 years old, 
resident 
Finnish citizens, at 
least 18 years old, 
and nominated by 




and at least 18 
years old in the 
election year 
Swedish citizens, at 
least 18 years old, 
nominated by a 
political party 
Regional EU and Nordic 
citizens + foreig-
ners with > 3 years 
residency, at least 
18 years old, and 
regional resident
n.a. Nordic citizens + 
foreigners with > 3 
years residency, and 
at least 18 years 
old in the election 
year, and regional 
resident
EU and Nordic 
citizens + foreig-
ners with > 3 years 
residency, at least 
18 years old, nomi-
nated by a political 
party, and regional 
resident
Local EU and Nordic 
citizens + foreig-
ners with > 3 years 
residency, at least 
18 years old, and 
local resident
EU and Nordic 
citizens + foreig-
ners with > 2 years 
residency, at least 
18 years old, local 
resident, and nomi-
nated by a party 
or constituency 
association
Nordic citizens + 
foreigners with > 3 
years residency, and 
at least 18 years old 
in the election year, 
and local resident
EU and Nordic 
citizens + foreig-
ners with > 3 years 
residency, at least 
18 years old, nomi-
nated by a political 
party, and local 
resident
Source: Compiled by the authors based on various sources
Another exception in a Nordic context is that Finland is not a constitutional 
monarchy. The head of state is an elected president, as is the case in Iceland. 
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Moreover, the Finnish constitutional rules for running in presidential elections 
are outstanding in the sense that they require candidates to be born Finnish 
citizens (Ministry of Justice, Finland, 2019: §54). This rule is equivalent to a 
similar requirement in the US where candidates running for president have to be 
born American citizens. There are no similar citizenship-at-birth requirements 
for running in any other election in the Nordics, including the presidential 
elections in Iceland (whose consitution requires a candidate to be at least 35 
years old, however, see Government of Iceland, 2018: Article 4).
When it comes to who is allowed to run for the national parliament, rules 
are similar across Denmark, Finland, Norway, and Sweden. Most impor-
tantly, candidates must be citizens and at least 18 years old. Finland and 
Sweden effectively require candidates to be nominated by political parties (or, 
in Finland, an association of at least 100 members), while in Denmark, an 
individual candidate would not need more than 150 signatures from eligible 
voters (a party needs a certain fraction of prior votes, effectively around 20,000 
signatures). Notice also that in Finland, Sweden, and Norway, voters holding 
certain positions in public duty are not allowed to run in some elections or to 
combine certain electoral offices. For instance, the Swedish national election 
law does not allow members of a national parliament to become members 
of the European Parliament. To mention another example, persons “holding 
military office” are not allowed to become members of the Finnish parliament 
(Article 27 of the Constitution).
The rules on running in regional and local elections are an example of an 
area where the Nordic countries treat citizens of other Nordic countries almost 
equivalent to their own citizens (most important in this respect is the right to free 
settlement and an extended entitlement to welfare across the Nordics, compared 
to third-country citizens). Both local and other Nordic citizens of at least 18 
years are allowed to run in regional and local elections, with minor exceptions 
across the countries. For instance, in Denmark, at least 25 signatures (in the 
larger cities 50 or 150 signatures) are needed for individual candidates. In the 
three EU member states, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, EU citizens are also 
allowed to run. On top of that, other foreign citizens with at least three years 
(or in Finland, two years) of residency are allowed to run.
Who is eligible to run for office, or passive voting regulations, is only one 
side of the coin. The other side is who is eligible to vote for a candidate or 
party running: active voting regulations. As one would expect, passive and 
active voting rights largely go hand in hand, which is evident from the over-
view presented in Table 11.2. That is, if you are allowed to run for office, you 
are also allowed to vote. There are some exceptions or extensions, however. 
For instance, in European elections, as is the case all over the EU, residents 
holding a passport from an EU country other than the one they reside in can 
choose in which country they want to cast their vote (i.e., in their country of 
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Table 11.2 Voting across Nordic countries
Denmark Finland Norway Sweden
EU Danish citizens 
residing in the EU, 
EU citizens residing 
in Denmark, and 
at least 18 years 
old (excluding 
residents of Green-
land and the Faroe 
Islands)
Finnish citizens, EU 
citizens residing 
in Finland, and at 
least 18 years old
n.a. Swedish citizens, 
EU citizens residing 
in Sweden, and at 
least 18 years old
Presidential n.a. Finnish citizens at 





at least 18 years 
old, and resident 
(with short-term 
exceptions)
Finnish citizens, at 
least 18 years old
Norwegian citizens, 
and at least 18 
years old in the 
election year
Swedish citizens, 





at least 18 years 
old, and resident 
(with short-term 
exceptions)
Finnish citizens, at 
least 18 years old
Norwegian citizens, 
and at least 18 
years old in the 
election year
Swedish citizens, 
and at least 18 
years old (it is pos-
sible for the par-
liament to expand 
the right to vote, 
so the referendum 
includes EU and 
Nordic [Norway 
and Iceland] citi-
zens + foreigners 
with > 3 years 
residency, at least 
18 years old)
Regional EU and Nordic 
citizens + foreig-
ners with > 3 years 
residency, at least 
18 years old, and 
regional resident
n.a. Nordic citizens + 
foreigners with > 
3 years residency, 
and at least 18 
years old in the 
election year, and 
regional resident 
(Norwegians 
abroad: also prior 
residents)
EU and Nordic 
citizens + foreig-
ners with > 3 years 
residency, at least 
18 years old, and 
regional resident
Local EU and Nordic 
citizens + foreig-
ners with > 3 years 
residency, at least 
18 years old, and 
local resident
EU and Nordic 
citizens + foreig-
ners with > 2 years 
residency, at least 
18 years old, and 
local resident
Nordic citizens + 
foreigners with > 
3 years residency, 
and at least 18 
years old in the 




EU and Nordic 
citizens + foreig-
ners with > 3 years 
residency, at least 
18 years old, and 
local resident
Source: Compiled by the authors based on various sources 
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residence or in the country of citizenship). In Finnish presidential elections, there 
is no requirement for Finnish citizenship at birth, unlike the requirement for 
running for office. In national parliament elections and national referendums, 
Danish citizens are generally only allowed to vote if they reside in the country, 
unlike Finland, Norway, and Sweden, which allow citizens living abroad to 
participate. In regional and local elections, eligibility is also tied to residing 
regionally or locally.
Another important difference across countries is who voters can vote for. 
In Denmark, Norway, and Sweden voters vote for a party, but can also give 
a preference vote to their preferred candidate on the party list – in Finland, a 
vote is cast for a candidate. However, the right to vote for a specific candidate 
(rather than a party) may in practice have no consequences. For instance, in 
Norwegian national elections, more than half of a party’s voters have to express 
a will to change the candidate list defined by a political party in order for the 
preference votes to alter the candidate list. There is never a case that such as 
high proportion of voters want to change the party list and, hence, in practice, 
preferential votes in Norway have no consequence.
Parties in Denmark can run in various ways. Whether, and how, preference 
votes alter who of a party’s candidates are elected depends on the way parties 
decide to run (Ministry of Social Affairs and the Interior, Denmark, 2020). 
Casting a preference vote (rather than a party vote) can therefore be without 
any consequences in Denmark, too. The ballot paper design reveals how parties 
run. Though most voters arguably have no idea under what rules their preferred 
party runs, some parties run with candidate lists that can be changed by voters. 
As a consequence, party candidates face an additional competition in the elec-
tion campaign – they not only have to convince voters to vote for their party, 
they also have to compete against their fellow party members running on the 
same candidate list. Hence, electoral rules, and the rules on preference votes in 
particular, seem to affect styles of campaigning in the Nordic countries. Candi-
dates running for parliamentary elections in Norway, where preference votes do 
not influence the candidates’ order on the list, have a party-centred campaign 
style (e.g., Karlsen & Skogerbø, 2015). Candidates in Finland, where voters 
vote for candidates, have a more individualised style (e.g., Karvonen, 2014; 
Moring, 2008). Candidates in Finland need to attract attention on their own 
candidacy in the campaign to compete with candidates from their own party. 
Indeed, the consequences of the competition for preference votes are not to be 
underestimated. For instance, in Denmark, the more preference votes parties 
attract (proportionally), the larger their overall support seems to be (Thomsen 
& Elklit, 2007; Thomsen & Sloth, 2013). 
That aside, previous research has refuted the commonly held belief that the 
media – which tend to focus on individual politicians – in general, and television 
in particular, drives preferential versus party voting, at least in the 2009 Danish 
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local elections. Rather, (some) media seem to provide information conducive 
to voting for specific candidates, instead of parties (Elmelund-Præstekær & 
Hopmann, 2012).
Nordic election campaigns: Rules and regulations
Another area where differences between the Nordic countries are larger than 
likely expected are national election campaigns. An overview is provided in 
Table 11.3. In Norway, national elections are held on the second Monday of 
September every fourth year. This date is a fixed date that cannot be changed. 
Dissolving the parliament, which in other countries would result in early elec-
tions, is not possible – this option does not exist in the Norwegian constitution. 
The opposite to this strict Norwegian corset is found in Denmark. While the 
Danish constitution requires national elections to be held every fourth year, 
there is rarely ever four years between two national elections. The minister has 
the right to call an election whenever they wish to do so. Normally, elections 
are called three weeks in advance, resulting in a short and intense election 
campaign. Between these two extremes, we find Finland and Sweden, with 
the latter most likely having the most notable election framework. In Sweden, 
early elections can be called, which most recently occurred in 2014. However, 
these early elections do not alter the election calendar, which has elections 
every fourth year – the following national elections are not postponed. Logi-
cally, early elections are called “extra” elections [extra val] in Sweden, as they 
are held in addition to the fixed national elections. To what extent these very 
different approaches lead to different dynamics in the election campaigns is 
difficult to assess (see below). 
There is another striking difference across the Nordic countries: whether 
different types of elections are held simultaneously. However, this difference in 
formal setup apparently cannot be linked to major differences in how election 
campaigns are run across the Nordic countries. Since 1970, Swedish local and 
regional elections are always held on the same day as national parliamentary 
elections. This approach has triggered substantial debate on the pros and cons of 
holding elections simultaneously. While a spontaneous assumption may be that 
local politics has less good conditions and may be overshadowed by national 
politics when holding joint election days, Swedish reality paints a much more 
complex picture (Håkansson et al., 2001). Both media coverage and voting 
behaviour are to a substantial extent “local”. At the end of the day, the attrac-
tiveness of holding elections jointly is a question of what kind of democratic 
ideal one favours (Oscarsson, 2001). 
In other countries, it is possible but not common to hold different elections 
simultaneously. In 1996, this happened in Finland when the first-ever European 
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years, called at the 
discretion of the 
prime minister.
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Source: Compiled by the authors based on various sources
Parliament elections in Finland were held simultaneously with municipal elec-
tions (Anckar, 1997). In all subsequent Finnish European Parliament elections, 
turnout has been lower. In 2001, Danish local, regional, and national elections 
were held simultaneously. To mention an example of an “overshadowed” 
election, in 2009, a referendum on the Danish Act of Succession referendum 
227
11. ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES
[tronfølgeloven] was held simultaneously with the European Parliament elec-
tions. With the substance of the referendum barely contested, the referendum 
received limited attention resulting in a low turnout of 58 per cent only. Because 
of this low turnout, the referendum nearly failed – at least 40 per cent of all 
eligible voters have to approve of a change to the constitutional laws in order 
for it to pass. Beyond these examples, however, it is not common to hold dif-
ferent elections simultaneously outside of Sweden.
Finally, communication during election campaigns is regulated in various 
ways. Most visibly, politicians and parties are not free to set up election post-
ers as they please. For instance, in Sweden, election posters are allowed during 
the five weeks up to election day. In Denmark, the time period is roughly the 
same (depending on the weekday the election is held), but in most cases the 
day from which posters are technically allowed will be before the day election 
day is actually announced. Hence, from the moment the prime minister calls 
an election, posters are allowed. 
In Denmark and Norway, political advertising on television is, at the time of 
writing, prohibited. Danish rules go as far as prohibiting any sort of explicitly 
sponsored political message during election campaigns, precluding, for instance, 
interest organisations such as trade unions or business associations from buying 
airtime. In Sweden, political advertising on commercial television (with TV 4 
virtually having a monopoly) came with the transition to a digital broadcast 
system and had its breakthrough with the European 2009 and Swedish 2010 
election campaigns, but is seen rather sceptically by Swedish voters (Johansson, 
2017). Finland has no specific regulation at the time of writing; political advertis-
ing on television emerged in the early 1990s for which substantial proportions 
of campaign budgets are allocated today – though it is highly debated whether 
it has the desired effects, if any (Moring, 2017). Remaining bans on political 
advertising on television are not uncontested, however. In the 2009 Norwe-
gian parliament elections, several local television stations aired paid political 
advertisements, while other stations offered to air political advertisements free 
of charge (OSCE, 2009). 
Can these differences be linked to differences in how campaigns are run 
across the Nordic countries? On the one hand, the answer may be affirmative. 
As Moring (2017: 250) noted in his review, Finland appears to be the country 
with the most liberal media regulations and, as a consequence, the “biggest dif-
ferences are seen in the party and candidate campaign budgets and organization 
of campaigns”. Yet, on the other hand, Moring (2017: 250) also noted that the 
“most important campaign media are still the candidate debates and current 
affairs broadcasts on television”. One reason for this balanced conclusion may 
be that Finnish parties, unlike parties in other countries outside of the Nordics, 
act cautiously and tend to refrain from negative campaigning.
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Campaign focus in electoral research: Background
For a long time, research questions regarding the campaign and communica-
tion processes were not part of the research agenda in electoral research, in 
general as well as in the Nordic countries. When the first election study was 
carried out in the US in 1940, the campaign was expected to be decisive for the 
outcome of the election (Lazarsfeld et al., 1969). Based on the successful use of 
propaganda by the totalitarian states in the 1930s, the mass media was thought 
to be all-powerful (e.g., Asp, 1986; McQuail, 1994). Much to the researchers’ 
surprise, the study unveiled great stability in the campaign – very little seemed 
to happen. Indeed, Lazarsfeld’s (1944) first article from the Erie County study 
was called “The Election is over”, and the first sentence in the article read: “In 
an important sense, modern presidential campaigns are over before they be-
gin”. Rather than reporting on the campaign effects, the Columbia group laid 
the basis for the sociological approach in voter research. The minimal effects 
model of campaigns became the generally accepted view, and consequently, 
campaigns did not receive much attention for decades (Holtz-Bacha, 2004; 
Schmitt-Beck, 2007).
The sociological approach introduced by Lazarsfeld and colleagues (1969) 
was supplemented by the socio-psychological approach of the Michigan group 
(Campbell et al., 1969).1 The so-called Michigan model soon came to dominate 
electoral research in the US. In Europe, this model was rivalled by the Lipset 
and Rokkan (1967) model, which was developed through macro-sociological 
studies of political cleavages (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967; Rokkan & Valen, 1964).2 
In addition, Downs’ (1957) proximity model, developed within the rational 
choice tradition, has been influential in electoral research. It assumes that vot-
ers and parties are rational and motivated by self-interest and that voters will 
vote for the candidate closest to their own position (for reviews of models in 
electoral research, see Evans, 2003; Listhaug, 1989).
An important backdrop for the renewed interest in election campaigns 
was the weakening of ties between parties and voters. Moreover, theoretical 
advances in communication research – most importantly, the agenda-setting 
approach (McCombs & Shaw, 1972), the refinement of agenda-setting through 
the concepts of priming and framing (Iyengar, 1991; Iyengar & Kinder, 1987),3 
as well as Noelle-Neumann’s (1973, 1980) work on the “Spiral of Silence” – 
contributed to the return of the concept of powerful media. Combined with 
the emergence of television, particularly the observation that the new medium 
most likely contributed to Kennedy’s win in the 1960 presidential campaign, 
this resulted in communication studies increasingly focusing on the influence 
of the media for vote choice (Holtz-Bacha, 2004). 
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Nordic research programmes on voters
The Nordic countries, and Norway and Sweden in particular, have a long tra-
dition of research on voters. Sweden has the second longest running election 
study programme in the world, second only to the US. The Swedish National 
Election Studies Program was established in 1954 by Jörgen Westerståhl and 
Bo Särlvik. Indeed, Westerståhl was influenced by the above-mentioned lead-
ing American electoral researchers (Lazarsfeld at Columbia and Campbell at 
Michigan) when he established the election study programme at the University 
of Gothenburg (Holmberg, 2010). Ever since, Sweden has carried out voter 
surveys in relation to national elections. 
Norway also has a long tradition for electoral research. Like in Sweden, 
electoral research in Norway was influenced by electoral research in the US. 
In 1957, the first election study was carried out under the leadership of Stein 
Rokkan and Henry Valen at the Institute for Social Research in Oslo, and the 
Norwegian National Election Studies project has been located there ever since. 
There has been a voter survey at every national election since 1957 (except 
for the 1961 election). The first election study in Denmark was in 1971, led 
by Ole Borre and colleagues (Andersen et al., 1999). The organisation of elec-
toral research in Denmark has nevertheless been somewhat more ad hoc than 
in Sweden and Norway, and the research group behind it has consisted of a 
consortium of researchers from Aarhus, Aalborg, and Copenhagen. Finland 
and Iceland have a shorter history of election studies; the first one, for both 
countries, is from 1983 (Bengtsson et al., 2014). After 2003, there has been a 
study in relation to each parliamentary election.4
All the Nordic election programmes publish comprehensive volumes on 
voting and voters related to national elections (e.g., Aardal & Bergh, 2019; 
Hansen & Stubager, 2017; Oscarsson & Holmberg, 2013, 2016). The Nordic 
voter – the Danish, Finnish, Icelandic, Norwegian, and Swedish voter combined 
– is most thoroughly investigated by Bengtsson and colleagues (2014). While 
most comparative research emphasises the similarities between the Nordic 
countries, the Nordic voter book highlights the differences between them when 
it comes to electoral behaviour. For example, though they share comparably 
high turnout rates at national elections (Figure 11.1), there are increasing 
differences between the Nordic countries. Turnout has been consistently very 
high in Denmark, Iceland, and Sweden, with turnout rates between 85 and 90 
per cent. Norway has followed closely with turnout somewhat beneath 80 per 
cent. Finland has seen the steepest decrease in turnout and has had below 70 
per cent participation at national elections since the 1990s.
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As in most established democracies, there has been a weakening of the ties 
between parties and voters in the Nordic countries. An essential result of this 
development is the increasing numbers of voters deciding what party to vote 
for during campaigns. Figure 11.2 reports the proportion of the electorate 
postponing their vote choice until the campaign. As mentioned, Norway and 
Sweden have data on voter behaviour back to the 1960s, and during that dec-
ade, only 15 per cent in Norway and 21 per cent in Sweden decided during 
the campaign. From the 1970s through the 2000s, the proportion deciding 
during the campaign increased considerably. Today, about half the electorate 
decide (or, more precisely, report that they decide) during the campaign in all 
the Nordic countries. But there are differences between them. The share is the 
highest in Sweden: In the first decade after the turn of the century, almost 60 per 
cent decided during the campaign. Finland, Iceland, and Norway also reached 
high levels in the 1990s and have seen rather stable proportions since then. In 
Denmark, the increase has been significantly slower and did not approach the 
Swedish, Finnish, Icelandic, and Norwegian situation until recently. 
The development described in Figure 11.2 gives the impression of quite 
unstable Nordic electorates. Recent studies using panels – repeated surveys 
throughout the campaign – moderate this impression somewhat: about half 
of the late deciders hold on to the same party throughout the campaign (e.g., 
Haugsgjerd et al., 2019).
The weakening ties between voters and parties and the increasing number 
of voters deciding during the campaign have contributed to more focus on the 
effect of the election campaign for vote choice. However, electoral research 
shows that stable factors, like socioeconomic factors and political values and 
attitudes, primarily drive vote choice. In 2005, Sweden even had rather strong 
class voting (Bengtsson et al., 2014). How can stable factors explain changing 
231
11. ELECTIONS AND POLITICAL COMMUNICATION IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES
party preferences? One reason for this is most likely that such stable factors are 
decisive in the voter’s calculation of which parties they may consider voting for, 
constituting their party or consideration set. Campaign factors can influence the 
choice between the parties in the consideration set (Karlsen & Aardal, 2016; 
Oscarsson & Rosema, 2019).
Nordic research programmes on campaign communication
Research on campaign communication has become increasingly important in 
the Nordic countries.5 Again, Sweden has the most comprehensive research 
programme. Already in relation to the 1979 national election, Kent Asp es-
tablished a research programme on media content during election campaigns 
at the University of Gothenburg (see Asp, 1986). Ever since, at every national 
election, the Swedish media campaigns have been documented and studied, con-
tributing with essential knowledge about political journalism and the nature of 
campaign coverage (Johansson & Strömbäck, 2019). A couple of decades later, 
Strömbäck and colleagues established a second research programme on media 
campaign coverage at Mid Sweden University, focusing more on mediatisation 
issues. For the 2018 election, the two research programmes merged (Johansson 
& Strömbäck, 2019). Another research effort in Sweden worth mentioning is 
the studies on election posters, with a database now covering several thousand 
posters from the past 100 years (Håkansson et al., 2017).
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Comment: The proportion deciding during the campaign is added per decade and divided by number of elections. 
Source: Bengtsson et al., 2014; figures kindly provided by Kasper Møller Hansen
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Although the other Nordic countries do not have similar longitudinal re-
search programmes on media coverage of election campaigns, campaign media 
coverage is given ample scholarly attention. To mention some examples, in 
Denmark, Albæk and colleagues (2010) studied Danish television campaign 
coverage from 1994 to 2007. They focused on political bias in election cover-
age. Elmelund-Præstekær and Mølgaard-Svensson (2014) studied negativity in 
Danish election campaigns during 1994–2011, including how negative media 
coverage of parties is. Green-Pedersen and colleagues (2017) studied media cov-
erage of issues and actors in the period of 1984–2003 (see also Green-Pedersen 
& Stubager, 2010). In Norway, the first comprehensive study of media content 
during campaigns was carried out in 2001, as part of a project that studied 
party messages, media coverage, and voter reactions (Aardal et al., 2004). In 
addition, Sigurd Allern (2011) studied campaign television debate shows from 
1961 to 2009. In Finland, Carlson (2017) reviewed prior studies of election 
posters and presented a longitudinal study with a particular focus on the depic-
tion of children. In addition, a series of studies focusing on campaign media, 
particularly political advertising on television as well as the Internet later on, 
have been carried out in all elections since 1992.
One central question is to what extent campaign coverage is mediatised 
(see also Skogerbø et al., Chapter 1). Norwegian and Swedish findings tend to 
answer this question affirmatively (e.g., Jenssen & Aalberg, 2007; Johansson 
& Strömbäck, 2019). This finding entails that political coverage is based on 
news media logic and not political logic; media coverage is shaped by the for-
mat, resources, norms, and values of the news media, and their need to obtain 
the audiences’ attention (e.g., Asp, 1986). Central to this concept is the focus 
on so-called game frames, or horse-race journalism. Rather than focusing on 
the political issues and political differences between parties, much attention is 
given to the political game as a contest to be won. For example, according to a 
study of the Norwegian 2001 campaign, 60 per cent of the campaign coverage 
included a game frame (Waldahl & Narud, 2004). This finding is similar to 
results reported from Denmark (Pedersen, 2014). Moreover, Danish media 
appear to increasingly emphasise negative messages from political parties 
(Elmelund-Præstekær & Mølgaard-Svensson, 2014). At the same time, other 
Danish results have highlighted the prevailing importance of a political logic 
for news media coverage (Hopmann et al., 2011). 
Overall, the studies find less support for election campaign coverage being 
politically biased. The longitudinal Swedish studies show that in a campaign, 
media coverage indeed favours some parties and disfavours others. However, 
the favoured and disfavoured parties differ from one campaign to the next (Asp 
& Bjerling, 2014). These findings resonate well with studies from other Nordic 
countries (e.g., Albæk et al., 2010). 
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Another important finding across established democracies is that political 
parties have professionalised their electoral campaigning (e.g., Farrell & Webb, 
2000; Plasser & Plasser, 2002), so too in the Nordic countries (Guðmundsson, 
2014; Karlsen & Narud, 2004; Kosiara-Pedersen, 2011; Tenscher et al., 2012). 
Political parties obviously strive for the best possible media coverage during 
electoral campaigns, which becomes all the more important the more volatile 
voting behaviour becomes (see above). In part, the professionalisation of cam-
paigns entails that parties integrate sophisticated practices and new technology 
in their campaign strategy (e.g., Tenscher et al., 2012), and in part, it describes 
how an increasing number of professionals are involved in the campaigning 
effort (Farrell & Webb, 2000; Karlsen, 2010).
An important condition for this professionalisation of campaigns in the 
Nordic countries is the steep increase in state funding of political parties (e.g., 
Koß, 2011). For example, the total state subventions to Norwegian parties in-
creased from NOK 62 million in 1970 to NOK 515 million in 2012 (adjusted 
for inflation, based on 2012) (E. Allern et al., 2016). It was not until 1987 that 
Danish political parties received state funding, and with the so-called Olsen 
plan in 1995 – named after Erling Olsen, who served as the speaker of the par-
liament in 1994–1998 – the funding of Danish political parties was increased 
substantially (Elmelund-Præstekær & Hopmann, 2008). The idea behind the 
plan was to increase the resources of the parliament vis-à-vis the government 
and the EU. With increased funding, the parties also had the resources to pro-
fessionalise their campaigning (Kosiara-Pedersen, 2011). One central source of 
inspiration in the 1990s and early 2000s was Tony Blair’s campaign strategies in 
the UK, but also presidential campaigns in the US. In the years to follow, “spin” 
and “spin doctors” became central in the vocabulary of every political pundit. 
Anders Fogh Rasmussen became prime minister in 2001 following, by Danish 
standards, a highly choreographed electoral campaign (Elmelund-Præstekær 
& Hopmann, 2008). Yet, despite campaigns being planned and prepared more 
professionally today – such as systematically testing campaign messages before 
fielding them – and despite many new technological remedies now being used in 
Danish campaigns, we also saw a re-emergence of the most ordinary approaches 
to campaigning in the past years, such as ringing doorbells (Kosiara-Pedersen, 
2011).
The literature on the professionalisation of campaigning has highlighted 
that campaigns increasingly become “permanent” (Blumenthal, 1982), in other 
words, that the difference between routine and campaign periods increasingly 
become blurred. It is plausible to assume that this is particularly the case in 
Denmark, given that the date for the next election is not scheduled, unlike the 
other Nordic countries (see above). To what extent this actually is the case is 
obviously difficult to establish. In Norway and Sweden, it has traditionally been 
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distinguished between the short campaign – the four to five weeks leading up to 
the election, and the long campaign – up to a year (or more) before the election 
(Esaiasson, 1990; Karlsen & Narud, 2004). However, in Sweden, with fixed 
election dates, a transition to permanent campaigning is being discussed (Nord, 
2013). More generally, Sweden, where state subsidies for political parties were 
introduced in the 1960s, is another example of a country where over time more 
resources are being used on campaigning and where campaigning has become 
more professional. Yet, there seem to be rather stable differences between parties 
– larger parties run more professional campaigns (Strömbäck, 2015). Moreover, 
compared to parties in the UK or the US, Swedish parties must be considered less 
professional, still. Reasons for this include still (comparatively) fewer resources 
seen, declining membership, and policy focus (Strömbäck, 2015).
In Finland as well, permanent campaigning is discussed in relation to the 
professionalisation of campaigning (Tenscher & Mykkänen, 2014). Overall, 
Finland has witnessed increasing professionalisation of electoral campaigning 
in recent national and European campaigns, yet substantial differences between 
parties remain, as Tenscher and Mykkänen (2014) noted in their work. Their 
analyses also reveal that Finnish parties are still less professional than their 
German counterparts with respect to campaign strategies. A similar tendency is 
found in Norway, where parties are increasingly utilising new practices offered 
by new technologies, and in-house campaign professionals, party employees, 
have strong influence on campaign strategies (Karlsen, 2010; Karlsen & Narud, 
2004; Karlsen & Saglie, 2017). Research results from Iceland also document 
an increasing professionalisation of political communication, where training 
politicians on how to use the media as well as shielding politicians from the 
media have also emerged as important trends (Guðmundsson, 2014 ; see also 
Ólafsson & Jóhannsdóttir, Chapter 3).
In short, it is safe to conclude that electoral campaigning has profession-
alised across the Nordic countries. However, to the best of our knowledge, no 
comparative and diachronic investigation of electoral campaigning across the 
Nordic countries is available. Some of the studies cited above discuss more than 
one country, such as Finland and Sweden (Tenscher et al., 2012) or Iceland 
and Norway (Guðmundsson, 2014), but we lack a systematic understanding 
of the changes in campaign communication within the Nordic countries with 
data gathered in the same fashion across the Nordic countries enabling us to 
understand the differences and similarities over time and space.
Conclusion
How similar are the Nordic countries with respect to elections and political 
communication, after all? On the one hand, the preceding discussions may 
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leave the impression that the Nordic countries are rather dissimilar. Election 
dates are set in the most different ways one may think of. Electoral systems vary 
substantially across the Nordic countries, with some countries, for instance, 
having European elections, while other countries or territories do not. Finland 
and Iceland have presidential elections, unlike the constitutional monarchies of 
Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. While voting in all Nordic countries can be 
personalised, whether this has an effect on who is elected varies greatly. And 
we find huge variation in the extent and continuity in research programmes on 
electoral behaviour and campaign communication. 
Yet, on the other hand, we find many similarities across the Nordic countries, 
as one may expect. Even where paid television advertising is allowed, it is used 
cautiously, unlike what we see in many other countries. Turnout in national 
elections is high, and the trend towards deciding late whom to vote for shows a 
high correlation across most of the Nordic countries. Providing Nordic citizens 
with special voting rights within the Nordic countries stresses the similarities 
across the Nordic countries. Some of these similarities speak to the distinctive-
ness of the Nordic countries (such as the stable and high turnout) and some 
are found elsewhere as well (such as the trend toward deciding late whom to 
vote for). Hence, scholars interested in making the argument that the structures 
defined by electoral setups and campaign regulations are less important for 
how election campaigns are conducted can certainly find supportive arguments 
when studying the Nordic countries more closely. This raises the question of 
what other factors explain the similarities across the Nordic countries, such as 
cultural background and media systems, which are addressed in the introduc-
tory chapter of this anthology.
In their analysis of the “media welfare state”, Syvertsen and colleagues 
(2014: 128) conclude that the Nordic countries have a lot in common with 
other (developed) Western countries, but they have the most in common with 
their Nordic neighbours: “To the degree that one can speak at all of regional 
media and communications structures, Nordic media constitute a distinct en-
tity”. Based on the above review, we are hesitant to support such a bold notion 
when discussing elections and political communication in the Nordic countries. 
A “Nordic” model of political communication has been discussed, but – to 
the best of our knowledge – not yet fully developed (Guðmundsson, 2014). 
There are substantial differences with respect to the rules governing elections 
and their campaigns. When it comes to styles of campaigning, the Norwegian 
party-centred campaign, on the one hand, and the Finnish individualised cam-
paign, on the other, might constitute the two extremes in a Western European 
context. The electoral campaigning of candidates and political parties changes 
over time and has become more professional, as it has in many countries. In fact, 
sources for inspiration regarding new campaign techniques are often countries 
outside of the Nordics, and not primarily immediate Nordic neighbours. This is 
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not to say that we are witnessing an Americanisation of elections and political 
communication in the Nordic countries (e.g., de Vreese et al., 2017). Rather, 
in line with an analysis of campaigning during the 2009 European elections 
in the two German-speaking countries Austria and Germany and the Nordic 
countries Finland and Sweden (Tenscher et al., 2012), the central take-away 
appears to be that differences in the political communication between political 
parties are much larger than between countries.
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Notes
 1. Socio-demographic factors introduced by Lazarsfeld and his group are central to the key 
concept in the Michigan model: party identification. Hence, one approach did not replace 
the other. See Converse (2006) for an interesting historical account of the development of the 
Michigan model and the fusion of the social structure and the socio-psychological perspective. 
 2. This model is also referred to as the “Rokkan and Valen model” as it was first developed 
through explorative studies of Norwegian electoral politics. It was later developed into a more 
general model by Rokkan.
 3. For an overview, see, for example, Semetko (2007).
 4. See https://www.vaalitutkimus.fi/en/vaalitutkimus_suomessa.html 
 5. In addition, in recent years, studies of election campaign content have increasingly focused 
on social media (see Nord & Grusell, Chapter 6).
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Chapter 12
Populism and media and communication 
studies in the Nordic countries
Juha Herkman & Ann-Cathrine Jungar
Abstract
This chapter introduces the developments of and research on political actors called 
populist in the Nordic countries. The focus is on contemporary populist right-wing 
parties – the Sweden Democrats, the Danish People’s Party, the Finns Party, and 
the Norwegian Progress Party – though we discuss the history of Nordic populist 
parties on a more general level as well. Nordic research on populism has for the 
most part adopted political scientific, ideational, and empirical perspectives lack-
ing genuine theoretical considerations. However, contextual differences can be 
found, and sociological and cultural approaches to studying populism have been 
promoted of late. The perspective on populism in media and communication stud-
ies has concentrated especially on the political communication of populist actors 
and the relationship between the media and populism. The future challenges for 
Nordic populism studies are linked to changing media and political environments, 
requiring a new look at their relationship.
Keywords: populism, radical right-wing parties, Nordic countries, party system, 
media
Introduction
Populism is difficult to define, being described as a slippery or chameleonic 
concept (Canovan, 2005; Taggart, 2000). Therefore, how populism and re-
search on it are addressed in the Nordic countries depends on how populism is 
defined. If populism is understood, for example, in a Laclaudian (2005) sense 
as “a political logic” where a segment of the population identifies itself with 
“the people” as a total political agent antagonistically confronted by a hegem-
onic power bloc, then populism has been a common process in Nordic politics 
since the late nineteenth century. However, populism in the Nordic region is 
commonly approached from a political scientific and empirical perspective 
and associated with political parties challenging domestic party systems and 
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more traditional mass parties. Therefore, populism in the Nordic countries is 
currently manifesting itself as so-called new populism, that is, in the form of 
populist radical-right political parties – which have been emerging in the late 
twentieth century in many European countries.
New populism has been characterised as anti-establishment protest move-
ments criticising bureaucratised states and the alleged corruption of established 
elites and parties (Taggart, 2000). Several scholars have connected it to na-
tionalism and to a “nativist ideology” consisting of anti-immigration policies, 
xenophobia, and the racism of extreme or radical right-wing movements (see 
Mudde, 2007; Rydgren, 2004). Such sentiments are often combined with a 
general criticism of the European Union as a political project restricting na-
tional sovereignty.
In this chapter, we provide a comparative review of the developments of 
political populism and its relationship to media and communication studies in 
the Nordic countries. Starting with a short historical introduction of political 
actors called “populists” in the Nordic countries, we then focus on Nordic 
research on populism that has applied especially to political sciences, media 
and communication studies, sociology, and cultural studies. After the research 
review, we then discuss the similarities and differences between populism in the 
different Nordic countries, while also explaining in part the variation in research 
approaches used in the Nordic region. We conclude by briefly reflecting on 
the challenges that populism research currently faces in the Nordic countries.
Populist actors in the Nordic countries
Historically, populism in the Nordic countries has been connected to particu-
lar political parties, mainly to the Finnish Rural Party (1959–1995), the Finns 
Party (1995–), the Danish Progress Party (1972–), the Danish People’s Party 
(1995–), the Norwegian Progress Party (1973–), New Democracy (1991–2000) 
in Sweden, the Sweden Democrats (1988–), and the Best Party (2009–2014) in 
Iceland. In addition, a populist style has been linked to individual politicians 
mainly representing the parties listed above. Populism has also been connected 
to other minor movements, and some mainstream political players have oc-
casionally been called populists.
Jungar (2017) has identified three waves of Nordic populist movements. 
First, the “agrarian populist” wave was seen in the late 1950s in Finland, with 
the establishment of the Finnish Rural Party. The second wave appeared in the 
early 1970s in Denmark and Norway, during which anti-taxation protest parties 
were electorally successful. The third wave emerged in the late 1980s, when the 
nationalist and nativist Sweden Democrats was launched and populist parties 
in Finland, Denmark, and Norway began to adopt anti-immigration policies 
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as an important part of their agenda. Jungar (2017) calls this last wave “new 
populism”, even if some other scholars do not associate the term self-evidently 
with extreme nationalism or anti-immigration policies.
The first wave:  
Agrarian populism of the Finnish Rural Party
The Finnish Rural Party [Suomen Maaseudun Puolue] (SMP) was established 
in 1959 when its founder Veikko Vennamo separated with his followers from 
the Agrarian Party [Maalaisliitto], the predecessor to today’s Centre Party 
[Suomen Keskusta]. The party was popular, especially among small farmers 
suffering from the effects of rapid urbanisation and industrialisation policies. 
It combined anti-establishment appeals with leftist socioeconomic policies and 
conservative values. The party was somewhat popular in local elections in the 
1960s, but enjoyed heavy success in the 1970 parliamentary elections, in which 
it gained 18 members of parliament (MPs) by promoting a strong anti-elite 
approach while appealing to “the pure people”.
SMP experienced internal conflicts during the 1970s, but it made an elec-
toral comeback in the 1983 parliamentary elections, receiving 10 per cent of 
the vote (17 MPs), and was invited to take part in the government. SMP had 
previously not been considered a party with governmental credibility due to 
its criticism of Finland’s specific foreign policy relations with the Soviet Union. 
After the death of the long-serving President Urho Kekkonen in 1983, who had 
personified a friendly relationship between Finland and the Soviet Union dur-
ing the Cold War, SMP was rehabilitated. Moreover, Pekka Vennamo, the far 
less antagonistic and provocative son of Veikko, had been elected party leader, 
which paved the way to governmental incumbency. Assuming governmental 
responsibility resulted, though, both in petty internal disagreements and electoral 
decline. SMP went bankrupt after the 1995 parliamentary elections, in which 
the party won only one seat.
The second wave:  
Anti-taxation protests in Denmark and in Norway
The second Nordic wave of populism was economically liberal in nature. The 
Danish and Norwegian progress parties were critical of the growth of the 
tax-based welfare states. The Danish Progress Party [Fremskridspartiet] was 
established in 1972 and received 15 per cent of the vote in the 1973 parliamen-
tary elections (Jungar, 2017). The party was strongly personified by its popular 
leader, the lawyer Mogens Glistrup, whose provocative and folkish style dif-
ferentiated him from other politicians. The party gained its best result in the 
first parliamentary elections in 1973, with 28 seats in parliament, by adopting 
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a strong anti-taxation protest agenda seemingly reflecting the “voice of ordi-
nary people”. However, the party’s organisation remained loose and centred 
on its leader, contributing to a continuous decline in support. Glistrup also 
used nationalist and anti-Islamic rhetoric, especially during the 1980s, though 
the issue of anti-immigration only became more salient in the 1990s with the 
Danish People’s Party [Dansk Folkeparti] (DF) (Bächler & Hopmann, 2017). 
In the 1998 parliamentary elections, the Progress Party won only four seats, 
and in 2001 it lost all of them. After that, the party for the most part lost its 
significance in the Danish political field.
In Norway, Anders Lange’s anti-taxation movement was established in 1973. 
The party received 5 per cent of the vote that same year in the parliamentary 
election, but after Lange’s sudden death in 1974, the leader-centric protest move-
ment encountered difficulties (E. H. Allern, 2013). The party changed its name 
to the Progress Party [Fremskrittspartiet] (FrP) and its longstanding leader, Carl 
I. Hagen (1978–2006), began invoking a strong neoliberal ideology. Basically, 
FrP is the only political party called populist in Norway, even though intellec-
tually driven, anti-establishment, and anti-EU movements were titled Populist 
Work Groups in the early 1970s (Jupskås et al., 2017). During the 1980s, FrP 
started to promote anti-immigration approaches and its popularity began to 
increase (Andersen & Bjørklund, 2000). In the 1989 parliamentary elections, 
FrP experienced a parliamentary breakthrough and gained 13 per cent of the 
vote and 22 seats in parliament.
The third wave:  
Nativism and the anti-immigration approach take over
Sweden was described for years as a European exception with no right-wing 
populist parties having successfully gained a seat in parliament (Rydgren, 2002). 
The anti-establishment and economically liberal New Democracy Party [Ny 
Demokrati] was elected to parliament for one term between 1991 and 1994, but 
it was not before 2010, with the rise of Sweden Democrats [Sverigedemokra-
terna] (SD), that a nationalist party gained seats in the Swedish parliament 
(Strömbäck et al., 2017).
SD was formed already in 1988, but with its background in neo-Nazi 
movements, the party remained marginal and was excluded from collaboration 
with other political parties and mainstream media (Baas, 2014). The first party 
leader, Anders Klarström (1992–1995), had a background in neo-Nazism, but 
soon thereafter the new party leader, Mikael Jansson (1995–2005), started to 
distance the party from its extremist legacy. The current party leader, Jimmie 
Åkesson (2005–), has continued to transform SD by building up a nationwide 
party organisation and taking distance from its past. Over 100 members have 
been expelled, and the Sweden Democratic Youth organisation was dissolved 
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in 2015 with the aim of developing a more electorally attractive party with 
governing potential.
Even though social conservatism was added as a second ideological pillar 
to nationalism in the party programme of 2011, anti-immigration is the most 
salient issue for SD voters. SD gained almost 13 per cent of the vote in the 2014 
parliamentary elections, and in the 2018 elections the party received 17.5 per 
cent of the vote, making it the third largest party in the country. However, SD 
still remains isolated because no other party is prepared to collaborate with it 
in government. Nevertheless, the political parties have taken different stances 
towards SD after the 2018 elections. The process of forming a government was 
complicated and put a (temporary) end to the two-bloc dynamics in Swedish 
politics. In 2019, the party leaders of the Christian Democratic Party and the 
Conservative Party met with SD and announced that they would cooperate in 
policies where they have shared interests, such as immigration, criminal policies, 
and nuclear power. 
DF was established in 1995 by former members of the Progress Party who 
were dissatisfied with the weak organisation of their party. Pia Kjærsgaard 
was elected as the first party leader of DF. Her aim was to establish an an-
ti-immigration and EU-sceptic political party that would be able to influence 
policy-making by building up an efficient and centralised party organisation. 
In the parliamentary elections of 1995, the party received 7.4 per cent of the 
vote, and DF acted as a support party to centre-right coalition governments 
from 2001 to 2011. From this position, DF was able to influence immigration 
policies. The party succeeded in growing its electoral support, which varied 
between 12 and 14 per cent in Denmark’s parliamentary elections during the 
2000s. In the 2015 parliamentary election, the party received 21.1 per cent 
of the vote and was the second largest party after the Social Democrats. Pia 
Kjærsgaard stepped aside after the 2011 election and was replaced by the new 
leader, Kristian Thulesen Dahl, who also was a founding member of DF.
With Thulesen Dahl, DF continued to primarily focus on nationalist and 
nativist approaches confronting “the Danish people” with respect to immigrants 
– especially Muslims – and the European Union (see Bächler & Hopmann, 
2017). The party also adopted a more centrist socioeconomic position. In the 
2019 parliamentary elections, the electoral growth of DF came to a halt: DF 
received only 8.7 per cent of the vote and lost 21 seats. The mainstream parties 
both to the right and the left had adopted the immigration and migration pol-
icies of DF, and the Social Democrats, in particular, were successful in taking 
votes away from DF. Moreover, in the 2019 election, DF faced competition 
from two even more extreme parties – the New Right [Nye Borgerlige] and 
Hard Line [Stram Kurs].
The Finns Party, previously the True Finns [Perussuomalaiset] (PS) was 
likewise established in 1995 as a successor party to SMP. The long-standing 
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leader of the party, Timo Soini (1997–2017), was the last party secretary of 
SMP, carrying forward the original populist spirit of an agrarian “heartland” 
(Taggart, 2000). However, PS became electorally more popular only after Soini 
started to flirt with nationalist and nativist agitators, such as the late MP Tony 
Halme and party’s current leader, Jussi Halla-aho, who came to be known as 
a leading anti-immigration figure through his blog writings during the 2000s. 
PS enjoyed success in the 2008 local elections, but in “big bang” parliamentary 
elections of 2011, the party surprised everyone by receiving 19.1 per cent of 
the vote (Arter, 2012).
PS refused offers to join the government and remained in opposition, securing 
17.7 per cent of popular support in the 2015 elections. However, after the 2015 
elections, PS opted to participate in the conservative right-wing government. 
At the 2017 party conference, PS split when Jussi Halla-aho and his followers 
were elected as party leaders. Since then, PS has continued in opposition as a 
clearly radical right-wing party, whereas Soini and his followers remained in 
government, forming the new Blue Reform Party [Sininen tulevaisuus]. In the 
2019 Finnish parliamentary elections, the Blue Reform Party did not receive any 
parliamentary seats. In turn, PS became the second largest parliamentary party, 
with 17.5 per cent of the vote, only 0.2 per cent less than the Social Democratic 
Party. In party polls taken in autumn 2019, PS showed a support rate of more 
than 24 per cent, making it the largest party in Finland.
In Norway, FrP was the most successful in the 2009 parliamentary elections, 
in which the party received almost 23 per cent of the vote with its new leader, 
Siv Jensen (2006–). According to opinion polls, support for the party topped 
30 per cent in 2008, but the terrorist attacks perpetrated by Anders Behring 
Breivik in Oslo and on Utøya Island in the summer of 2011 had dampening 
effects on anti-immigrant rhetoric in the country (Figenschou & Beyer, 2014). 
However, even if it then lost some of its popularity, FrP remained the third 
largest party in 2013 and joined a minority government together with the 
Conservative Party [Høyre], supported by the Liberal Party [Venstre] and the 
Christian People’s Party [Kristelig Folkeparti]. The government reformed after 
the parliamentary elections of 2017, and the support parties were included as 
partners in the new government.
However, the internal level of conflict increased within government after the 
broadening of the governmental base, and FrP left the cabinet in January 2020. 
FrP could not accept the decision of the other three coalition parties to bring 
back to Norway a 29-year-old Norwegian woman with Pakistani background 
and her sick child – who had lived in the ISIS-controlled area of Syria – from the 
al-Hol detention camp. FrP perceived that it had been unsuccessful in obtaining 
support for tougher immigration and integration policies, such as the restriction 
of immigrants and family reunification. Support for FrP had dropped in the 
opinion polls and, now once again removed from governmental responsibility, 
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FrP could fight the 2021 election campaign as an opposition party. As such, 
with its 45-year lifespan and seven years in government, FrP has been the most 
long-lived successful populist party in the Nordic countries.
Contemporary Nordic populism:  
Part of the radical right-wing–party family
Discussion about populism in the contemporary Nordic context is generally 
in reference to four nationally successful right-wing populist parties (see Table 
12.1). Historically, the Nordic populist parties have ideologically converged 
and are today part of the Nordic, as well as the European, radical-right-party 
family (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014). They increasingly cooperate bilaterally and 
transnationally: SD, PS, and DF are members of the same party groups in the 
Nordic Council (Nordic Freedom), whereas they are currently divided in the 
European Parliament. Until the European elections of 2019, the parties were 
members of the Europe of Conservatives and Reformists (ECR). After the 2019 
elections, SD remained in the ECR, whereas PS and DF joined the more radical 
Identity and Democracy group, which also includes the Lega (Italy), the National 
Rassemblement (France), and the Austrian Freedom Party. FrP refrains from 
collaborating with the other Nordic populist parties, as they are perceived as 
being too extreme. Instead, the party has had bilateral contacts with the Liberal 
Party in Denmark and the Republican Party in the US.
Iceland has not experienced right-wing populist movements similar to the oth-
er Nordic countries. Even if Iceland can be linked to similar media and political 
systems as Norway, Denmark, Sweden, and Finland, the remarkably smaller size 
of the media market, its geographic location, and particular political tradition 
make Iceland somehow a different case than the other Nordic “democratic 
corporatist” countries (Hardarson, 2008; see also Ólafsson & Jóhannsdóttir, 
Chapter 3). However, just as populism in different forms surges in popularity 
in response to political and other types of crises, Icelandic populism has been 
connected especially to the collapse of the banking sector in 2008, which shocked 
the whole country. During the crisis, comedian Jón Gnarr strongly attacked 
Icelandic politicians and banks and won the local Reykjavik elections in 2010 
as head of the satirically named Best Party [Besti flokkurin]. Gnarr served as 
mayor of Reykjavik from 2010 to 2014, but his populism cannot be associated 
with that of radical right-wing parties in the other Nordic countries – it has 
rather been compared to the Italian comedian Giuseppe “Beppe” Grillo and 
the early Five Star Movement [Movimento 5 Stelle] with its strong demands 
for direct democracy (Boyer, 2013). The Progressive Party has also been called 
a representative of “softer version” of populism for its explicitly nationalist 
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Table 12.1 Contemporary right-wing populist parties in Nordic parliaments
Source: Compiled by the authors
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Research on populism in the Nordic countries
A literature review on populism research in the four Nordic countries was car-
ried out as part of a large-scale, COST-funded project (European Cooperation 
in Science and Technology), in which a communication perspective on populism 
was emphasised (Aalberg et al., 2017). The studies covered the period until 2015, 
and much has happened since then. However, the main arguments crystallised 
in the literature review are still valid for this chapter.
First, even though some theoretical efforts to conceptualise and define pop-
ulism have appeared in the Nordic context (e.g., Jupskås, 2013), the majority 
of populism research has been empirical. As the authors of previous studies 
remind us, the Nordic definitions of populism vary from popular discourse’s 
irresponsible vote-seeking strategies to more nuanced discussions of populism 
as ideology or style. However, in all countries, the definitions of populism rely 
most often on those proposed by key scholars of the topic, namely Cas Mudde, 
Paul Taggart, and Margaret Canovan (Jupskås et al., 2017). The definition of 
populism with perhaps the most widespread support among current Nordic 
populism researchers is presented by Mudde (2007: 23): 
A thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into 
two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ and ‘the corrupt 
elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté 
générale (general will) of the people. 
However, the definition is often supplemented by the ideas of “heartland” 
(Taggart, 2000) – the nostalgic yearning for an idealised (national) past – and 
populism as a non-liberal “shadow of democracy” (Canovan, 1999). Likewise, 
Moffitt’s (2017) ideas of populism as a political style have recently been applied 
by Nordic scholars.
Second, most of the research has been connected to the Nordic populist 
political parties discussed in the previous section. Thus, contemporary Nordic 
right-wing populist parties and their predecessors have been studied, for ex-
ample, as part of election studies to find out how these parties can be defined 
ideologically in contrast to other parties, why these parties have been supported, 
and who votes for them (e.g., E. H. Allern, 2013; Jupskås, 2013; Klages, 2003; 
Rydgren, 2004; Widfeldt, 2008). In regard to these themes, comparative analyses 
between two or more countries have also been conducted (e.g., Jungar, 2017; 
Jungar & Jupskås, 2014; Rydgren, 2010; Widfeldt, 2014). During the early 
2000s, Swedish researchers focused particularly on the “exceptionality of Swe-
den” in European party politics because no radical right-wing populist party 
had received many votes before the electoral success of SD in 2010 (Rydgren, 
2002; see also Strömbäck et al., 2017).
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Most of the above empirical studies can be categorised as an “ideational 
approach to populism” (Mudde, 2017). The main point behind the ideational 
approach is that populism is linked to ideologies or a “set of ideas”. With the 
ideational approach, populism is seen as a Manichean angle in relation to the 
political world, equating Good with “the will of the pure people” and Evil with 
a conspiring elite. According to the ideational approach, populism also stands in 
opposition to pluralism by emphasising the unity of the majority (Mudde, 2017).
The question of normativity is perhaps the most crucial issue separating 
different populism studies in the Nordic countries from each other. As already 
mentioned, much of the research treats populism rather neutrally as an empirical 
research subject, but some scholars take a more critical stance towards populism, 
seeing it as a negative phenomenon and even as a threat to democracy (see 
Mudde & Kaltwasser, 2012). Some of the studies do not provide a definition for 
populism, but instead treat it as a commonplace idea referring to irresponsible 
vote-seeking strategies or even openly xenophobic rhetoric, while others identify 
populism with extreme right-wing movements and with historical connections 
to the totalitarian Nazi and Fascist regimes (see Müller, 2016). These kinds of 
approaches are common in popular scientific and politically-laden analyses 
(e.g., Baas, 2014) as well as in some academic studies (e.g., Pyrhönen, 2015). 
Such a normative perspective can be explained by the fact that contemporary 
populist parties in Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Norway represent radical 
right-wing populism with exclusive anti-immigration attitudes, and populism 
in general is often associated with these attitudes. 
Another specialty in the Nordic research on populism is an emphasis on 
Laclau’s (2005) populism theory among a group of Finnish scholars (e.g., Ko-
vala et al., 2018; Palonen, 2009). As discussed in the beginning of the chapter, 
Laclau (2005) defines populism ontologically as a discursive process of political 
reasoning by which a group of people identifies as “the people” – as a total 
political agent – and antagonistically confronts other groups of the population, 
such as “the elite”. In this sense, Laclau’s definition is rather reminiscent of, 
for example, Mudde’s (2007) definition of populism and has also been linked 
to the ideational approach. However, what makes the Laclaudian tradition 
different from ideational approaches is its background in neo-Marxian radical 
democracy theory with strong normative emphases. Laclau developed together 
with Mouffe a theory of radical democracy in the late 1970s and early 1980s in 
which they associated progressive societal movements with populist discursive 
identification and signification processes (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985). Therefore, 
for Laclau and Mouffe, populism represents a positive possibility for societal 
change, political mobilisation, and challenging hegemonic power – even if 
Mouffe (2005) has also concerned herself with the negative effects of exclusive 
right-wing populism in the European political field.
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Media and communication studies’ perspectives  
on populism
When it comes to the communication dimension of populism, the COST-project 
mentioned above emphasised such an approach and included almost all Eu-
ropean countries in addition to the Nordic region (see Aalberg et al., 2017). 
Essential in the communication approach to populism is the fact that populism 
is understood as a specific type of communication rather than as particular move-
ments, ideologies, or political actors. As such, almost all political agents can 
employ populist political communication, in which the main characteristics are 
people-centrism and an anti-elite appeal or discrimination against out-groups, 
such as immigrants or sexual and ethnic minorities (Jagers & Walgrave, 2007). 
The empirical analyses of the COST-project have in particular included the 
Nordic countries Denmark, Norway, and Sweden (Reinemann et al., 2019).
Even though the communication perspective on populism as a specific and 
systematic approach is rather recent, several scholars have been studying the 
populist style of political communication in the Nordic countries for some time 
(e.g., Hatakka et al., 2017; Hellström & Hervik, 2014; Ylä-Anttila, 2017). Most 
of these studies have concentrated on the populist political communication of 
the new right-wing parties defined in the previous section. Some of the studies 
focus especially on the populist style and rhetoric of the populist right-wing party 
leaders (e.g., Klages, 2003; Niemi, 2013). However, current communication 
studies are increasingly focusing on the social media and online communication 
strategies of populist actors (e.g., Karlsen & Skogerbø, 2015).
Another important group of communication studies has specialised in the 
relationship between journalism – or “the media” – and populism. Extensive 
content analyses of the media attention given to the Nordic populist parties have 
been carried out especially in Sweden (Ljunggren & Nordstrand, 2010) and in 
Finland (Pernaa & Railo, 2012) after the groundbreaking election success of SD 
and PS in the early 2010s. Also, more theoretical and general approaches have 
been taken to the relationship between the media and populism (e.g., Andersson, 
2010; Niemi & Houni, 2018). Herkman (2017) compared the media attention 
given to all four Nordic right-wing populist parties from the perspective of the 
so-called life-cycle model, in which the developments of the populist parties 
and resulting media attention are categorised via different life phases.
A common claim has been that populist politicians and leaders are charis-
matic, or at least expressive, in their communication style compared to other 
politicians. Indeed, some scholars have demonstrated the expressive power of, 
for example, the late leader of the Danish Progress Party, Mogens Glistrup 
(Klages, 2003), and the former leader of the Finns Party, Timo Soini (Niemi, 
2013) – although, as Bächler and Hopmann (2017) argue, much of these discus-
sions illustrate the populist communication style linked to the Nordic populist 
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parties in general rather than rely on systematic analysis. Instead, much of the 
communication analysis of the Nordic populist actors focuses more on their 
content or agenda than on their style. Especially in Denmark and Sweden, re-
search has demonstrated how right-wing populist actors have concentrated on 
issues related to immigration and have had remarkable agenda-setting power in 
these debates (e.g., Hellström & Hervik, 2014; Rydgren, 2010). Some studies 
have also been carried out on gender (e.g., Norocel, 2013), demonstrating a 
general trend towards identity and morality-based framings in populist com-
munication (e.g., Vigsø, 2012).
Expressive, morality-based communication is highly effective because it 
emphasises emotional public debates connected to populist actors. Wodak 
(2015: 19–20) uses the phrase “right-wing populist perpetuum mobile” to 
describe the tendency of these actors to use continuous provocations, such as 
insults and exaggerations, to gain public attention in the mainstream media. 
Analyses of the late leader of the Austrian Freedom Party, Jörg Haider, and 
Donald Trump prove the success of this kind of communication strategy in 
practice (e.g., Groshek & Koc-Michalska, 2017; Wodak, 2015). The number 
of public scandals linked to right-wing populist parties, especially in Finland 
and Sweden, also increased remarkably during the early 2010s, indicating the 
provocativeness of the Nordic populist communication style (Herkman, 2018). 
It seems that public scandals even contribute to the success of the movements 
because their supporters interpret scandals as “witch hunts” carried out by 
political and media elites.
Paradoxically, it seems that public scandals linked to FrP and PS have not 
decreased when these parties have become serious players in the governing 
cabinets, which can be explained by a “double-speech strategy” in which the 
leading figures of the parties appear to take a constructive approach and behave 
decently, whereas other party members appeal to the radical supporters with 
provocative and even insulting statements (e.g., Hatakka et al., 2017).
A common strategy of populist actors has also been to play the role of under-
dog in relation to the mainstream media by claiming that they receive, at least 
compared to other political parties, less and overly distorted media attention 
(Mazzoleni, 2008). However, the quantitative mappings of media coverage 
during the election campaigns demonstrate that the amount of media attention 
given to the Nordic right-wing populist parties has been relatively high (e.g., 
Ljunggren & Nordstrand, 2010; Pernaa & Railo, 2012), with the media quite 
often critically discussing the nationalist and nativist approaches promoted by 
these parties (Herkman, 2016).
There is some evidence that the popular press has been more positive towards 
domestic populist parties than the so-called prestige media (Herkman, 2017; 
Klages, 2003). In Norway, the commercial broadcaster has been seen as more 
populist and sympathetic to FrP than the public service broadcaster (Jupskås et 
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al., 2017). However, there are clear differences between the Nordic countries; 
Sweden has differed especially with almost exclusive critical media attention 
being focused on the domestic populist party SD, whereas in Denmark, Norway, 
and Finland, positive attention has also been promoted (Hellström & Hervik, 
2014; Herkman, 2017).
As the liberal journalistic media tends to be critical of nationalism and the 
nativism promoted by the radical right-wing populist parties, social media has 
become a fruitful platform for their community formation and independent 
communication (Krämer, 2017). Several studies on the online communication 
of right-wing populist actors in the Nordic countries have found examples of 
more radical rhetoric (Hatakka, 2019; Sakki & Pettersson, 2016), direct ap-
peals to the people (Niemi, 2013), and different platform strategies compared 
to mainstream parties (Larson & Kalsnes, 2014). However, the Nordic right-
wing populist parties’ online communication usually becomes more mainstream 
when they turn popular (cf. Karlsen & Skogerbø, 2015). In contrast, Hatakka’s 
(2019) study demonstrates the tendency to polarisation and the strengthening 
of extreme voices in populist online communication. There is clearly still a need 
for further analyses of online communication linked to Nordic populist parties.
Similarities between Nordic populist parties
The Nordic countries are typical representatives of consensual multiparty 
democracies based on the welfare state model. This may partly explain why 
populist parties have been successful for a long time in these political systems; 
the consensual establishment can easily be labelled a “corrupt elite” by populists. 
Even if some country-specific differences can be found, the Nordic countries have 
been characterised as examples of the so-called democratic corporatist model 
of political and media systems, in which a reliance on corporative consensual 
decision-making is scrutinised by a highly professional and autonomous com-
mercial media accompanied by strong public service broadcasting (Strömbäck 
et al., 2008). Populism in the Nordic countries is generally not seen as offensive 
in style as in Southern and Eastern European countries, where politics is tradi-
tionally more confrontational. For example, according to the European Social 
Survey, the supporters of the Nordic populist parties are quite different than 
the supporters of extremist populist movements elsewhere, because the former 
support a democratic society and want to be integrated within it (Mesežnikov 
et al., 2008).
However, as the Nordic populist parties did not garner greater success until 
they began to intensively criticise immigration in the 1990s and especially the 
twenty-first century, they are not that different from other successful European 
right-wing populist parties belonging to the same radical right-wing–party fam-
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ily. They combine authoritarian policies – anti-immigration, traditional family 
values, and demands for stricter policies on crime – with socioeconomic centrist 
positions, such as tax-based redistribution of wealth, welfare chauvinism, a 
state-regulated market, and protectionism (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014). Immigra-
tion and law and order are the most important issues for all four parties. For 
SD and PS, social and moral issues outrank economic policies, and in the case 
of DF they are roughly equal. FrP is the only party for which economic issues 
are significantly more important than social and moral policies, although still 
not as salient as immigration and law and order (Bakker et al., 2012).
In all four countries, some of the most radical members of the right-wing 
populist parties have also faced public scandals and even court cases for making 
racist or discriminatory statements (see Herkman, 2018). In general, the rhetoric 
promoted by these parties on, for example, immigration, does not differ from 
the rhetoric of other European populist right-wing players to the extent that it 
would be possible to agree that the parties are quite different. The whole Nordic 
system has obviously turned towards the liberal model with more market-driven 
media and polarised political communication than before, making provocative 
political communication increasingly more normal (Herkman, 2009; Ohlson, 
2015). Let us also not forget the changes that digitalisation and the spread of 
social media have had on the Nordic media systems as well, making populist 
political communication more accessible and salient than before. In practice, 
the populist parties have also become more similar over the years, whereas the 
populist parties in Norway, Denmark, and Finland have turned from traditional 
anti-elite protest movements into nativist right-wing parties, and SD, for its 
part, has changed from a neo-Nazi extreme right-wing movement into a radical 
right-wing populist party (Jungar, 2017).
Contextual differences in Nordic populism
In spite of the systemic, policy, and organisational similarities, there are dif-
ferences between the populist political parties in the Nordic countries deriving 
from their different histories and particular political and cultural contexts. Since 
DF and FrP gained established positions in their domestic party systems earlier 
than PS and SD, they have somehow been normalised and become mainstream, 
whereas PS and especially SD are still particularities or anomalies in their politi-
cal fields (Herkman, 2017). This applies especially to their parliamentary status 
and the media attention they receive. 
The parliamentary experiences have also differed for the four Nordic parties. 
FrP joined a centre-right government 40 years after its formation, and in 2013, 
its experience with governing has been positive both in terms of policy and 
votes. FrP has been able to influence policy-making and has not experienced 
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any major incumbency effect in terms of its electoral support in government 
until recently. The governmental experience of PS has been quite different. PS 
joined a centre-right government after the parliamentary elections of 2015. As 
the party had to compromise on immigration, bailouts to euro-zone countries, 
and cutbacks in welfare provisions, its electoral support decreased rapidly, 
and the party split when Jussi Halla-aho was elected as party leader in 2017. 
The cordon sanitaire that was put on PS in 2017 has remained. However, such 
isolation was no obstacle to PS’s success in the 2019 parliamentary elections. 
The fact that PS’s party organisation remained intact after the split, that the 
party maintained its economic resources, and that it could benefit from being 
in the opposition are obvious explanations for its electoral fortunes.
When DF was formed in 1995 as a splinter of the Danish Progress Party, 
the main ambition of the party leader, Pia Kjærsgaard, was to form a well-or-
ganised party that could influence policy-making. Between 2001–2011 and 
2015–2019, DF acted as a support party to centre-right minority governments. 
This parliamentary position allowed the party to influence Danish immigration 
and migration policies, which transformed radically during this period – with-
out experiencing the electoral costs of governmental incumbency. This was 
the case until the latest parliamentary elections of 2019, in which DF suffered 
an electoral setback due to both increased competition from the mainstream 
parties that have adapted to the immigration policies of the DF and from the 
new, more extreme parties.
SD has been met with an isolationist strategy, a so-called cordon sanitaire, 
since it made its parliamentary breakthrough in 2010. Its historic origins in 
extremism and radical immigration policies have been the motivations for the 
refusal to negotiate with SD. However, with the continued electoral growth of 
the party and the resulting blackmailing position of SD, the process of forming 
a government has become quite complicated in Sweden: neither the left-green 
coalition nor the centre-right alliance control a proper majority anymore. 
However, the isolationist strategy has not prevented the electoral growth of 
SD nor the indirect influence of SD on agenda-setting or other political players 
increasingly adapting to SD’s immigration policies. These kinds of contextual 
differences also explain the different levels of media attention that the four 
Nordic populist parties receive, because political publicity is inherently linked to 
such party parameters as government opposition positions and minister offices.
Contextual differences also partly explain the different stances of the domestic 
populist players in public political communication. Even if several public com-
motions have been linked to DF, SD, and PS, Herkman’s (2018) study shows 
that between 2005–2015 only one of those affairs turned into a national scandal 
with longstanding and wide-ranging media attention in Denmark, whereas in 
Sweden and Finland they resulted in several large national scandals. Herkman 
(2018) explains the result by the differences in political cultures, in which the 
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Danish context is seen as more tolerant of nativist provocations than, for ex-
ample, the Swedish or Finnish contexts. Several studies have demonstrated that 
so-called media populism (e.g., Mazzoleni, 2014), in which the Danish media 
bolsters the confrontation between ordinary citizens and the political elite and 
uses us-against-them appeals, has been common in Denmark (see Bächler & 
Hopmann, 2017). Another reason for the greater tolerance and normalisation of 
anti-immigration rhetoric in Denmark compared to the other Nordic countries 
may reside in the legacy of the Muhammad cartoon crisis, which was a decisive 
and repoliticising event for Danish political communication in 2005–2006 
(Esmark & Ørsten, 2008).
The overall analysis of political scandals in the Nordic region also re-
veals that Sweden has been more fertile soil for scandals compared to other 
Nordic countries during the 2000s, indicating less tolerance for misconduct 
in political culture and a more aggressive media (S. Allern et al., 2012). 
However, at the same time, Swedish political communication has been called 
“politics friendly”, meaning that it focuses rather seriously on daily politics 
(Strömbäck & Nord, 2008: 118). This has anchored the Swedish media to 
the political cordon sanitaire against the SD and can be seen in comparative 
studies, illustrating that DF, FrP, and PS are more similar to other political 
parties than SD in terms of the media attention they receive (Hellström & 
Hervik, 2014; Herkman, 2017).
Norway differs from other Nordic countries in the sense that even if most 
Norwegian scholars tend to agree that FrP can be categorised as a populist party 
(Jupskås et al., 2017), the term populism has not been connected as eagerly to 
the party, and populism has often been located somewhere other than Norway 
(Herkman, 2016). The long history of FrP and its participation in government 
have gradually normalised the party, making it more reminiscent of traditional 
conservative right-wing movements than its Nordic counterparts – even if FrP’s 
strong emphasis on a nativist anti-immigration approach clearly connects it to 
the populist radical right-wing–party family and to other contemporary populist 
parties in the Nordic countries (see Jungar & Jupskås, 2014). Some analyses 
have indicated that the nationalist-patriotic appeals to the people might be 
more common in the Norwegian party system than in other Nordic countries 
(Jupskås, 2013), thus making a populist communication style perhaps more 
legitimate in Norway than in other Nordic countries.
Conclusion: Challenges in populism research
The success of right-wing populist movements indicates in part the radical chal-
lenges to and changes in the formerly rather enduring party systems of the Nordic 
countries (Arter, 2012). It is important to be sensitive to these transformations 
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by approaching them through multiple theoretical perspectives involving both 
institutional and cultural dimensions. Acknowledging at least three challenges 
is essential for the future understanding of and research on Nordic populism: 1) 
the ambiguities in definitions of populism, 2) the normative challenges caused 
by populism, and 3) the changing media environment.
One of the biggest challenges in populism research in general is the ambi-
guity in the very definition of populism, which contributes to difficulties in 
operationalisations of empirical research design. Therefore, scholars debate 
which political actors should be called populist and by what means. The debate 
on whether FrP is a populist party or not indicates this problem in the Nordic 
context, where right-wing populist parties have gained a rather established 
position and started to become normal players in their political field. Further-
more, there are scholars who claim that many of the right-wing radical parties 
currently called populist should rather be called nationalist – at least from a 
Laclaudian perspective (Stavrakakis et al., 2017). This also applies to the Nor-
dic region, where traditional anti-elitist populism has been transformed into 
ethno-nationalist efforts to exclude outgroups such as immigrants. Therefore, 
there is also still a clear need for context-sensitive theorisations on populism 
in Nordic academia.
Secondly, the question of normativity in populism research derives from 
the challenge, and even threat, that the right-wing populist parties obviously 
pose to liberal-democratic values such as equality, basic human rights, and 
especially minority rights, making many scholars critical of (radical-right) pop-
ulism in general and the associated political parties in particular (see Mudde & 
Kaltwasser, 2012). However, this may lead to one-dimensional interpretations 
and self-evident results in the research. Thus, more reflection is also needed 
regarding normative assumptions linked to populism in the Nordic context. 
The communication approach to populism may serve as one way out of these 
challenges (Aalberg et al., 2017), but combining it with ideational and cultural 
approaches may also create a new understanding of normative approaches to 
Nordic populism in the future (e.g., Hatakka, 2019).
Finally, the simultaneous rapid transformation of the media and communi-
cation environment renders the relationship between populism and the media 
even more complicated, demanding of scholars new skills to empirically study 
and theoretically understand populist communication in the contemporary 
“hybrid media system” (Chadwick, 2013). The changes in the media environ-
ment have helped populist movements enjoy more success and become more 
mainstream or normalised in their political field. Furthermore, all these changes 
together may transform the overall political climate and culture in ways that 
will have more devastating consequences for Nordic political life than we can 
perhaps imagine today.
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Chapter 13
Right-wing alternative media in the
Scandinavian political communication landscape
Karoline Andrea Ihlebæk & Silje Nygaard
Abstract
The competition to set the public agenda has become increasingly tough. In this 
chapter, we explore the role of right-wing alternative media. This kind of news 
provider constitutes a relatively modest, but distinct, actor in the Scandinavian 
political communication landscape. Several sites have managed to gain attention 
through successful social media strategies and controversial reporting, often 
focusing on topics like immigration, crime, and Islam. In this chapter, we outline 
how alternative media are conceptualised and theorised in the literature, and 
how the boundaries between professional and alternative media are drawn and 
negotiated. Pointing to studies conducted in a Nordic context, we outline key 
characteristics of the right-wing alternative media scene in Scandinavia. From a 
research perspective, we argue that there are notable challenges associated with 
research on right-wing alternative media which are particularly related to fluidity, 
moving targets, and methodological limitations. 
Keywords: alternative media, right-wing, boundaries, immigration, ethics
Introduction
Criticised and contested by some, celebrated and consumed by others, the rise of 
what has been termed “right-wing media” (Benkler et al., 2018) or “right-wing 
alternative media” (Holt, 2020) has caused public debates in both Nordic and 
Western contexts. Critics emphasise the populist, low-quality, sensationalist, 
and sometimes hateful content found on some of these sites, fearing that they 
contribute to increased polarisation, distrust, and racism in society. Supporters, 
on the other hand, argue that such media provide original perspectives and new 
voices on key issues – like crime, immigration, and Islam – that are not covered 
by the mainstream press (Nygaard, 2020).
While right-wing alternative media may be a relatively small phenomenon 
in comparison to the scope and impact of established media, such actors have 
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managed to exert increasing influence on the public agenda in hybrid digital 
media systems through active social media strategies and controversial reporting 
(Chadwick, 2013; Larsson, 2019; Sandberg & Ihlebæk, 2019). We argue that 
exploring this phenomenon is important, because it informs the discussion on 
how the boundaries between professionals and amateurs, and legitimate and 
deviant actors have become increasingly difficult to discern in the current politi-
cal communication environment, and how fierce the competition for attention 
and authority has become.
In this chapter, we particularly focus on right-wing alternative media that 
engages in the production of news, including current affairs, commentaries, and 
analyses (Harcup, 2005; Harcup & O’Neill, 2001). We first outline how alter-
native media have been conceptualised and theorised in the literature. Further, 
we address how the boundaries between the professional and the alternative 
have been drawn and point out the key actors central to the process of creat-
ing such boundaries. We use theoretical dimensions to look more closely at 
the right-wing alternative media scene in the Scandinavian region and describe 
key features of selected sites. Finally, we discuss the notable challenges in the 
field, particularly those relating to conceptual fluidity, moving targets, and 
methodological limitations.
Right-wing alternative media – theoretical approaches
There has been a remarkable proliferation of content producers in today’s 
high-choice online media environment, blurring the lines between what we 
understand as professional and amateur production, and between producers and 
consumers (Bruns, 2005). The drastic transformation of who can produce and 
distribute content represents, on the one hand, a form of democratisation, as 
the agenda-setting power of the mainstream media is challenged. On the other 
hand, concerns have deepened about the impact of partisan and alternative 
news providers, as well as disinformation and “fake news” (Bakir & McStay, 
2018; Benkler et al., 2018; Kalsnes, 2019; Leung & Lee, 2014; Marwick & 
Lewis, 2017; Tandoc et al., 2018). As Holt (2020) points out, the latter should 
in general not be used to describe right-wing alternative media. Even though 
misleading content might occur on some sites, it is more often a case of partisan 
news rather than content that is made up to intentionally mislead the audiences. 
Essentially, the fundamental questions at stake are: Who sets the agenda in an 
increasingly hybrid and complex media sphere? And, which actors are conceived 
as reliable or trustworthy by particular user groups?
The term “alternative media” signifies producers of content that represent 
something different from the established media. A core question is what consti-
tutes the quality of being “alternative” (Atton, 2002a). It must be stressed from 
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the start that such distinctions are not easily drawn; it requires approaching the 
question as continuous boundary-work in the field of news production (Carlson, 
2015, 2017; Singer, 2015; Witschge et al., 2018). Several authors stress that it is 
not a matter of either-or; rather, it is possible to approach mainstream–alternative 
as a continuum (Harcup, 2005; Holt et al., 2019).
Traditionally, academic interest in alternative media was concerned pri-
marily with initiatives that arose from left-wing activism taking the form of 
amateur production of magazines, newspapers, films, documentaries, and 
radio programmes (Atkinson, 2008; Atton, 2002a; Atton, 2002b; Downing, 
2001; Fuchs, 2010). Spurred by anti-globalist or anti-capitalist positions, al-
ternative media criticised the traditional media for being elitist, hierarchically 
organised, and removed from the people – participatory grassroots initiatives 
were encouraged and applauded. Inspired by social movement theories, studies 
of alternative media focused on key concepts, such as citizen empowerment, 
participation and inclusion, and social change (Atton, 2002a; Fuchs, 2010; 
Haas, 2004). Atkinson and Berg (2012: 520) described alternative media as a 
form of “resistance performance” and pointed out that “activist organisations 
utilize alternative media to build worldviews concerning power, to construct 
strategies for resistance against such power, and to coordinate with other orga-
nizations”. Alternative media, from this perspective, should ideally function as 
a counter-sphere and challenge the mainstream media with their intimate ties to 
political and economic elites. Haas’s (2004: 115) definition of alternative media 
also builds on this approach: “Media devoted to providing representations of 
issues and events which oppose those offered in the mainstream media and to 
advocating social and political reform”.
In the last decade, online alternative media initiatives have been increasingly 
identified as coming from right-wing to far-right and extreme positions (Atton, 
2006; Benkler et al., 2018; Figenschou & Ihlebæk, 2019; Haanshuus & Ihlebæk, 
2019; Heft et al., 2020; Holt, 2020; Padovani, 2016). Describing alternative 
media as “right-wing” or “far-right” alludes to certain shared ideological ideas 
reflecting the political field, even though alternative media sites may not have 
direct political ties (Heft et al., 2020). Scholars have pointed out nationalism 
and authoritarianism as central denominators that are commonly shared by 
actors placed on the right-wing of the political scale, as well as a conservative 
stance on sociocultural matters (Jungar & Jupskås, 2014; Rydgren, 2018). More 
extreme far-right positions also include outright racism, xenophobia, fascism, 
anti-Semitism, and anti-democratic sentiments (Carter, 2018; Mudde, 1995). 
Studies on what has been characterised as right-wing alternative media sites 
emphasise similar traits. In particular, a shared and distinct anti-systemness, as 
well as profound scepticism, or even hostility, towards immigrants, Muslims, 
left-wing elites, and the mainstream media, is common (Figenschou & Ihlebæk, 
2019; Heft et al., 2020; Holt, 2020). As some of the outlets tend to foster 
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cultural divisions, racism, and hate, scholars have disagreed on whether the 
radical and extreme far-right initiatives should be termed “alternative” at all, 
taking into account the traditional focus on inclusion and democratisation 
(Atton, 2006).
To overcome the obstacles related to different ideological stances in alter-
native media, Holt and colleagues (2019: 863) propose a non-normative rela-
tional understanding of alternative media and suggest that “alternative news 
media represent a proclaimed and/or (self) perceived corrective, opposing the 
overall tendency of public discourse emanating from what is perceived as the 
dominant mainstream media in a given system”. Essential in this definition is 
that “alternativeness” is a strategic label used predominantly by the actors in 
question to signalise a position. However, the authors also argue that the label 
can be applied by others, including audiences, researchers, politicians, or com-
petitors. For the definition to have any analytical value, then, it is necessary to 
clearly outline from which position the label “alternative” is used and why. As 
a form of self-positioning, a prerequisite is that alternative media are critical 
of the mainstream media and of professional journalism’s methods and set out 
to present an alternative. From an empirical point of view, the self-ascribed 
role can be identified in the way the sites write about themselves, or through 
interviews and public statements. In addition, Holt and colleagues (2019) argue 
that different forms of “alternativeness” can be studied on a micro, meso, or 
macro level. On a macro level, they state that the boundaries between alterna-
tive or professional can be analysed by investigating elements such as inclusion 
versus exclusion in press support systems, adherence to institutionalised press 
ethics, and membership in professional organisations. On a meso level, they 
suggest looking at organisations, for instance, by studying the size, structure, 
and business model of the sites and their particular production practices. On a 
micro level, the authors recommend studying the people involved by scrutinis-
ing their professional background and motivations for taking part, as well as 
looking at the content produced. Holt and colleagues (2019) further argue that 
these dimensions are not mutually constitutive and that multiple combinations 
of alternativeness across these dimensions are possible. Thus, a weakness of 
the approach is that it does not consider how to compare the different dimen-
sions against each other, a point we will discuss in the conclusion. To assign 
alternatives to their proper places on the ideological left- to right-wing scale 
requires specific markers characteristic for right-wing or left-wing positions 
(Heft et al., 2020).
In the following, we explore key characteristics of right-wing alternative 
sites in a Scandinavian context and outline findings from the relatively few 
studies that have been conducted. We begin by referring to the Reuters Insti-
tute Digital News Report (Newman et al., 2019), which provides compara-
tive data on readership of what they term “other online news brands”. The 
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 Nyheter idag.se  Samnytt.se  Resett.no  Rights.no 
  Friatider.se  Nyatider.se  Document.no  Denkorteavis.dk
survey is helpful because it demonstrates how widespread the phenomenon 
is in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, and also identifies key actors that have 
managed to attract an audience. It is worth mentioning that due to the low 
barrier of entry into the online environment, new alternative news initiatives 
emerge and disappear quickly. To achieve a full overview of all actors in the 
field is thus difficult.
Readership and trust
There are more Swedish right-wing alternative news sites included in the survey 
than Norwegian or Danish (see Figure 13.1) (Newman et al., 2019). This may 
indicate that the phenomenon is more widespread in Sweden than in the other 
two countries, in line with findings of other studies (Holt, 2020). The survey 
also shows that more people reported having heard of the Swedish sites and 
they have a higher number of site visitors compared to Norwegian and Danish 
sites (see the report for details). The reason for this disparity is difficult to know, 
but it may be related to the wider political and cultural context of immigration 
(a point to be covered in more detail in the conclusion).
Figure 13.1 Readership of key alternative news sites in Scandinavia (per cent)
Comment: The figures show reading on a weekly basis. 
Source: Newman et al., 2019
Figure 13.1 shows that 11 per cent of Swedes reported that they had used Ny-
heter Idag, 10 per cent reported using Fria Tider, 9 per cent Samhällsnytt, and 
6 per cent Nya Tider. In Norway, the study showed that 7 per cent reported 
weekly use of Resett, while the use of Document (6%) and Human Rights Service 
(4%) is somewhat lower. In Denmark, which has the lowest presence of right-
wing–leaning alternative media, 4 per cent reported weekly use of Den Korte Avis.
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The survey further gauged brand trust. Respondents were asked how trust-
worthy they considered the news received from a specific brand. A 0-point score 
was counted for the option “not at all trustworthy”, ranging up to 10 points 
for “completely trustworthy”. In all three countries, the alternative media sites 
included in the survey scored significantly lower than legacy news media sites 
among respondents who reported that they had heard of the brand. Those who 
had heard of the Swedish alternative media outlets scored their trustworthiness 
from 4.10 (Fria Tider) to 5.06 (Nyheter Idag) in contrast to the public service 
broadcaster SVT, which scored 6.59 points. The Norwegian outlet Document 
scored 4.70 and Resett 4.35, while the Norwegian public service broadcaster 
NRK, scored 7.50 points. The Danish outlet Den Korte Avis scored 4.64 in 
comparison to Danmarks Radio’s 7.68 (Newman et al., 2019). Observing trust 
scores given by those who routinely use the brand, the scores are clearly much 
higher and the differentiation between alternative and legacy news sites is much 
lower (for more details, see Newman et al., 2019). This reflects that stronger 
processes of polarisation are at play when using alternative media than when 
using established media.
Currently, reasons for using and engaging with alternative media in a Nordic 
context is to a large degree unexplored, however, international studies have in-
dicated that political affiliation and attitudes towards immigration play a part 
(Ihlebæk & Holter, 2020;  Schulze, 2020). Some studies point out that audiences 
of alternative media tend to be active on social media, and consequently, alterna-
tive media sites gain relatively high scores on social media engagement (Larsson, 
2019; Sandberg & Ihlebæk, 2019). In a notable study conducted by Noppari 
and colleagues (2019), the authors suggest three profiles of right-wing alternative 
media users in Finland: system sceptics, agenda critics, and the casually discon-
tent. System sceptics are characterised by a “broad systemic-level suspicion” and 
mistrust of elites, including journalists, who are viewed as a tool the powerful use 
to maintain power and repress opponents (Noppari, 2019: 29). Agenda critics 
share a hostile view of media elites whom they believe have a political agenda 
that leads to biased reporting, and that alternative media are needed to ensure 
diversity. They seek more dialogue and a more legitimate position in public 
discussions. The casually discontent think some individual journalists cause bias; 
this group consumes alternative news mostly to gain additional information, as 
well as for fun and entertainment (Noppari et al., 2019). In sum, the authors 
found that users of alternative media “made active, affective, and conscious 
choices to consume and engage with material that contradicts the agenda and 
views of the dominant public sphere and promoted strong ideological stances 
expressed via populist address” (Noppari et al., 2019: 33). They conclude that 
more attention should be given to the manner in which media trust and mistrust 
are negotiated among different user groups, and how distrust is used by some 
alternative media sites to mobilise particular groups of citizens.
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Self-ascribed role
As outlined above, a key element in identifying right-wing alternative media is 
to first explore how they position themselves as an alternative, and in addition 
analyse ideological markers on specific sites to illuminate left-wing to right-
wing positions (Heft et al., 2020; Holt et al., 2019). Empirically, this can be 
done through conducting interviews with those involved or through content 
analysis of their websites, more specifically how they describe themselves in the 
“about us” section or the content they produce. Also, it is possible to investigate 
ideological features by investigating the use of topical tags or by investigating 
what they write about and how it is framed. In the context of this chapter, 
which focuses on right-wing media, common topical tags could for instance be 
“immigration”, “crime”, or “media criticism” (Figenschou & Ihlebæk, 2018; 
Holt, 2016a; Sandberg & Ihlebæk, 2019).
Examining more closely the motivations stated on a selection of sites in each 
country in Scandinavia (see Table 13.1) reveals that the general tendency in all 
three Scandinavian countries is for such media actors to place themselves in 
opposition to – or as an alternative to – mainstream sources. In other words, 
most sites self-declare that they want to be an alternative in one way or the 
other – emphasising that they represent something different. However, this can 
be expressed in different ways and to different degrees.
Fria Tider stands out, as it does not disclose any information about its mo-
tivation. However, they have a revealing slogan connected to their subscription 
service, and their founder, Widar Nord, has previously argued that a principal 
motivation is to represent a “counterpart to the established Swedish media”, 
and that their strategy is to “watch what the established media do, and then do 
the opposite” [translated] (Nord, 2012: para. 5). Looking more into ideological 
features, and in particular key characteristics important to the political right, 
such as anti-elitism, immigration, Islam, and crime, only two outlets refer to 
immigration in their motivations – Norwegian Human Rights Service and Dan-
ish Den Korte Avis. The same pattern is also visible in the use of topical tags 
featured on the site. Looking more closely at the news published on their front 
pages makes it clear that many sites write extensively about immigration and 
crime. However, to be able to identify the actors more specifically on a right-
wing to far-right scale, a more comprehensive analysis of content, frames, angles, 
language, and pictures is needed. This points to the importance of combining 
different approaches when identifying ideological positions of alternative media.
Currently, few studies have explored the motives of Scandinavian right-wing 
alternative media sites through interviews. An exception is the nation-specific 
interview study conducted by Holt (2016a). The study shows that a common 
motivation for editors and writers is to enlighten the Swedish public on matters 
they perceive as problematic and even dangerous consequences of immigration. 
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Table 13.1 Self-ascribed roles of selected right-wing alternative media outlets
Motivation Topical tags 
Norway
Document To challenge the consensus-driven  
“established media” and to provide  
independent information as “the voice of 
freedom and reason that breaks free from 




“To collect documentation, information, and 
analysis to shed light on different sides in the 
field of immigration and integration”.
immigration, Islam, 
crime, women and 
equality, politics,  
statistics, free speech
Resett “To work for democracy and freedom of 
speech [, …] to be critical towards the power 
and fight for those who are not easily heard. 
This implies to criticize and be an alternative 
to the established media”.
foreign affairs, culture 
and satire, lifestyle, 
sports, economy
Sweden
Fria Tider Slogan: “Give the Swedish media the finger”. economy, science, 
culture, law and order, 
domestic and foreign 
affairs, politics, media, 
EU, investigative
Nyheter Idag To “report news on politics, gossip, social 
media and foreign news […] based on  
libertarian principles”.
Sweden, politics,  
economy, world,  
culture, sports
Samhällsnytt To “specialize in the areas where the  
established media exhibit omissions”.
domestic affairs, foreign 
affairs, culture, science
Denmark
Den Korte Avis “To provide a wide range of topics to 
their readers, including politics, economy, 
immigration and integration, health, social 
conditions, culture and foreign policy”. These 
topics will be covered in a “short, clear and 
sharp form”.




To be “an independent media outlet without 
any hidden agendas”.
Does not use tags
24NYT To “contribute to open up public debate 
that is hermetically closed in a cultural radical 
echo chamber”.
crime, Denmark,  
international
Source: Quotes taken from the “about us” section or equivalent on each website
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Holt’s informants claimed that mainstream media outlets are “politically cor-
rect”, and that they conceal and distort negative cultural and societal aspects 
related to the immigration issue and to Islam. A recurring point raised in the 
interviews was that many alternative media actors had experienced having their 
op-eds and letters to editors refused by mainstream media editors, and that 
their postings in the comment sections of mainstream online newspapers were 
often removed. Thus, they created an alternative platform for the voices and 
viewpoints that were not represented in the mainstream media. Further, some 
alternative media actors admitted that they are mainly commercially motivated 
and that they see market potential in publishing alternative perspectives on the 
immigration issue. Interestingly, while the term “alternative media” has been, to 
some degree, adopted as a trademark by alternative media outlets, Holt (2016a) 
also describes a tendency to dissociate from the alternative media label to avoid 
being lumped with far-right outlets, such as neo-Nazi Nordfront.
Content
Another approach to explore the “alternativeness” of right-wing alternative 
media is to look at the content they produce and how it is presented (Holt, 
2020). Professional journalism is characterised by a shared understanding of 
values and ethics, for instance by striving for impartial reporting (Deuze, 2005). 
Previous content analysis has found that while alternative sites often mimic the 
aesthetics of established online newspapers, they frequently blur objective news 
reporting with commentaries and opinions (Kenix, 2013; Wickenden & Atton, 
2005). Also, even though alternative media in general share a deep mistrust 
of the mainstream media, research suggests that they often depend heavily on 
content from the established media, which they reframe and decontextualise 
by making small amendments (Ekman, 2018; Haanshuus & Ihlebæk, 2019; 
Haller & Holt, 2018; Krzyzanowski & Ledin, 2017). 
There are few comparative content analyses of right-wing alternative media 
conducted in a Scandinavian context. A study by Nygaard (2019) compares the 
Norwegian alternative media outlet Document, Swedish Fria Tider, and Danish 
Den Korte Avis, and illuminates differences among the three outlets concerning 
how subjective they allow themselves to be in their news reporting. Although 
all three alternative media attempts to convince their audiences that Scandi-
navian societies have become unsafe, linking immigration to increased crime 
rates, they use quite different strategies to convey this message. The Swedish 
and Danish outlets represent opposite extremes: The former address the public 
mainly through a descriptive news-genre style, while the latter promote their 
perspectives on immigration dogmatically through opinions. The Norwegian 
case falls somewhere in between. Nygaard (2019) concludes that it seemed 
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important for the Swedish and Norwegian outlets to borrow credibility from 
the mainstream media by giving the appearance of objectivity through using a 
descriptive news-genre style.
Some national studies have also analysed the content of right-wing alternative 
media sites. A study by Holt (2016b) compares the content and style of Swedish 
alternative media with professional mainstream media. He found variations in 
the following key points: first, results suggested a much narrower topical scope in 
alternative media outlets, focusing on issues such as politics, social issues, crime, 
war, and conflicts; second, the alternative media articles were characterised 
by a considerably more negative tone and more critical perspectives. Another 
nation-specific study conducted by Figenschou and Ihlebæk (2019) showed that 
media criticism is a common feature in Norwegian alternative news sites. They 
qualitatively analysed how journalistic authority was questioned and challenged 
in a variety of far-right alternative media outlets, ranging from right-wing to 
far-right extremist sites. In the study, the authors found that common forms of 
media criticism across extremist and moderate sites are claims that journalists 
are lazy, stupid, and biased, and that they mislead audiences about the threats 
of immigration, a finding that mirrors Holt’s studies. While the sites in question 
engage frequently in media criticism, self-criticism was non-existent. In their 
study, Figenschou and Ihlebæk (2019) identify five positions used to ascribe 
authority to themselves as media critics: the insider position points to experi-
ence in the professional journalism field that some alternative journalists have; 
the expert position builds factual legitimacy by referring to extensive statistics 
and facts about immigration; the victim position attributes the source of their 
knowledge to personal and negative experiences with professional journalism; 
the citizen position is used to legitimise the claim that professional journalists 
have become too removed from ordinary people; and the activist position points 
to experiences of direct physical confrontation with professional journalists – 
a view promoted by extreme actors. The study indicates that the strategy of 
alternative media actors is to frame their media criticism from multitude angles. 
Organisational features
Another dimension of illuminating differences between professional and alterna-
tive media is to consider organisational features. A media organisation “creates, 
modifies, produces, and distributes content to many receivers” (Shoemaker & 
Reese, 2014). Legacy media organisations are owned predominantly by large 
national or transnational media houses, and their aim is twofold: to generate 
profits for their owners through particular business models, and to fulfil demo-
cratic goals by promoting an informed citizenry, functioning as the fourth estate. 
Established media organisations are traditionally structured hierarchically, 
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independent from political interference, and characterised by specific editorial 
practices and journalistic routines founded on a set of ethics and values. In this 
regard, media organisations function as an important arena in which journalists 
become socialised into a “shared journalistic ideology” (Deuze, 2005; Hovden et 
al., 2016). Alternative media organisations are often run by activists, organised 
according to non-hierarchical participatory principles, and dependent on vol-
untary work and alternative funding models (Atton, 2002a; Hamilton, 2000). 
Their aim can be commercially oriented, but the rise of left-wing alternative 
media in the 1980s was largely motivated by the need to break with the com-
mercial logic of the news media that, they argued, favoured elitist and capitalist 
interests. It is again necessary to stress that, due to the digital transformation, 
established media organisations have restructured their organisational models, 
and new online natives have successfully entered the market. Thus, it is useful 
to take into account a more hybrid understanding of what a media organisation 
is, identifying both similarities and differences across a mainstream–alternative 
continuum (Atton, 2002b; Harcup, 2005; Kenix, 2013).
Among the leading outlets in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark, there are huge 
differences with regard to organisational features in the amount of informa-
tion available on their online sites (see Table 13.2). Generally, Danish outlets 
disclose fewer staff members, and apparently there are more fluid dynamics in 
the Danish sphere because the outlets have a shorter lifespan than Norwegian 
and Swedish outlets. Den Korte Avis, considered the only well-established 
outlet, discloses only two staff members, while the leading actors in Norway 
and Sweden disclose up to ten staff members.
Regarding funding of alternative media outlets, the overview suggests that 
advertising, user donations, and subscriptions, or a combination of these, are 
the most common. This illustrates how alternative media seem to adopt the 
commercial logics of the legacy media, pointing to the blurry boundaries between 
the two. In Norway and Denmark, however, left-wing activists have repeatedly 
warned corporations not to advertise on such outlets via Twitter, which has led a 
substantial number of corporations to boycott the outlets. Thus, alternative busi-
ness models, such as user donations, are necessary. Furthermore, the Norwegian 
outlet Human Rights Service, established in 2001 as a think tank to improve 
integration and to promote universal democratic rights, stands out by receiving 
direct government subsidies annually since 2005 to promote integration. As the 
outlet is regarded as a key actor within the right-wing alternative media sphere 
in recent years, retaining these government subsidies is highly controversial 
and regularly debated in the public sphere. Despite this controversy, one of its 
editors was a regular columnist for the Oslo-based broad-sheet Aftenposten 
for several years, underscoring the blurry boundaries between mainstream and 
alternative media (Figenschou & Ihlebæk, 2019).
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Document 2003 10+ Advertising and     
user donations
Human Rights Service 2001 2 State support and 
user donations




Fria Tider 2009 – Advertising and     
subscriptions
Nyheter Idag 2014 7 Advertising and     
subscriptions
Samhällsnytt 2017 9+ Advertising and     
user donations
Denmark
Den Korte Avis 2012 2 Advertising and     
user donations
NewSpeek Networks 2015 – Advertising and     
user donations
24NYT 2017 1 Advertising and     
user donations
As mentioned above, scholarly literature highlights “deprofessionalisation”, that 
is, that people involved in alternative media practices are more often than not 
amateurs with little or no professional journalism training (Hamilton, 2000). 
Among the Swedish alternative media outlets, this holds true, as it seems that 
most people involved do not have experience in professional journalism. In 
Norway and Denmark, however, some key actors behind or employed by Docu-
ment, Human Rights Service, Resett, Den Korte Avis, NewSpeek Networks, and 
24NYT have wide experience in professional journalism, including in leading 
national news organisations, such as Norwegian VG and TV 2, and Danish 
Jyllands-Posten and Ekstrabladet. The married couple behind Danish Den Korte 
Avis, Karen Jespersen and Ralf Pittelkow, both have professional backgrounds 
in mainstream media and as high-profile social democratic politicians. Jespersen 
has even served as a minister for both the Social Democratic Party and the Lib-
eral Party. This illustrates the aforementioned blurring of boundaries – some 
professional journalists do indeed choose to work for alternative sites, but there 
is currently no research that has elucidated this phenomenon properly, nor its 
consequences for journalistic practices in the Scandinavian context.
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Another point for discussion is that Swedish alternative media represen-
tatives often have dubious reputations concerning independence, as many of 
them have various connections to the right-wing populist party, the Sweden 
Democrats (Herkman & Jungar, Chapter 12). For instance, the domain names 
for both Nyheter Idag and Avpixlat, the predecessor to Samhällsnytt, were 
originally registered by then member of parliament for the Sweden Democrats, 
Kent Ekeroth. Ekeroth is widely known for his involvement in the “iron pipe 
scandal” in 2010, in which three top politicians representing the party armed 
themselves with iron pipes from a construction site while committing a verbal 
racial attack on a comedian (Expressen, 2012). Ekeroth’s involvement in these 
outlets has been the subject of controversy and repeated mainstream media 
attention. However, Nyheter Idag’s website states that the outlet does not have 
direct ties to any political organisations. Because any connection to the Swe-
den Democrats is perceived as highly controversial in Sweden, at least among 
its opponents, due to its roots in fascism, it is likely that these connections 
contribute to the constantly recurring portrayals of Swedish alternative media 
outlets as ideological deviants in the Swedish mainstream media. In Denmark, 
Den Korte Avis does not appear to have affiliations to any political party, while 
the founder of NewSpeek Networks and 24NYT, Jeppe Juhl, has links to the 
Danish radical right party, the New Right, although in May 2019, Juhl claimed 
that he is no longer involved with these outlets (Andersen, 2019).
Relations with professional media organisations  
and press ethics
Yet another approach to exploring alternative media is to look at the media 
system and how the boundaries are set through institutional mechanisms 
(Skogerbø et al., Chapter 1). As pointed out by several scholars, the Nordic 
media model is characterised by strong press organisations, institutionalised 
self-regulation, editorial freedom, a high level of journalistic professionalism 
and autonomy, generous press support systems, and cultural policies (Hallin 
& Mancini, 2004; Jensen, 2016; Nord, 2008; Ohlsson, 2015; Syvertsen et al., 
2014). Following a media system approach, it is possible to pinpoint certain key 
actors that play important parts in defining and maintaining the boundaries of 
journalism at the institutional level: media politicians or bureaucrats who play 
a role in defining who should be eligible for press support; press organisations, 
such as unions for journalists or associations for editors or media businesses; 
and the regulatory boards administering complaints brought against breaches 
of institutionalised ethical codes. Focusing on the latter, a key feature of Nordic 
media is the self-regulation system, whereby the press polices the press. This 
implies that professional journalism as an institution has agreed on a set of 
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rules that the entire profession accepts (Syvertsen et al., 2014). In Norway, 
Sweden, and Denmark, the role of the media councils is to determine whether 
a complaint is justified and, if so, to sanction the publication in question by 
having it publish the media council’s statement (Syvertsen et al., 2014) and 
make a public apology in order to restore public trust. In Norway, The Code 
of Ethics of the Norwegian Press is enforced by The Press Complaints Council, 
funded by the main press organisations, and complaints can be made against 
members of the umbrella organisation, The Norwegian Press Association. In 
Sweden, The Code of Ethics for Press, Radio and Television is enforced by The 
Press Ombudsman. Newspapers, magazines, and online publications that are 
part of The Swedish Media Publishers’ Association, The Magazine Publishers’ 
Association, or alternately, online media that have applied for membership in 
The Ethical Press System, are included in the voluntary system. In Denmark, 
The Danish Press Council enforces The Press Ethical Rules that are part of The 
Media Liability Act. In a Scandinavian context, we posit that membership in 
professional organisations and inclusion in the self-regulatory system represent 
an important boundary-marker in the media field.
Looking at some right-wing alternative media sites in each country, we find 
that some abide by the ethics rules but most do not. It is, of course, important 
to note that professing loyalty to a Code of Ethics and abiding by it in everyday 
practice is not necessarily the same thing. More studies are needed to address 
how ethics are perceived and internalised by alternative news organisations. In 
Sweden, Nyheter Idag is registered with the self-regulatory system of the Swed-
ish press and thus have agreed to abide by the ethical codes of conduct, while 
Samhällsnytt, Fria Tider, and Nya Tider have not. In Denmark, none of the key 
alternative media actors are registered with Pressenævnet, the institution that 
deals with complaints concerning mainstream media’s adherence to the ethical 
codes of conduct. In Norway, a public debate arose concerning who should 
be included in the self-regulatory system. Before March 2018, a Norwegian 
news outlet that stated its adherence to the ethical guidelines was included in 
the system; however, The Norwegian Press Association changed their statutes 
so only members of professional media organisations associated with the Nor-
wegian Press Association – and who, in effect, contributed financially to the 
self-regulatory system – could be included. This alteration was done to protect 
the credibility of the media institutions, editors, and journalists who commit to 
the ethical guidelines (The Norwegian Press Association, 2019). By changing 
the self-regulatory system, the Norwegian Press Association effectively managed 
to strengthen the boundaries on an institutional level. Following this change, 
however, two editors of right-wing alternative media outlets applied to become 
members of the Association of Norwegian Editors, which would automatically 
lead to their inclusion in the self-regulatory system. In June 2018, the editor 
of Document, Hans Rustad, was accepted as a member. In contrast, the editor 
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of Resett, Helge Lurås, was denied membership twice. The decision was based 
on three aspects: the fact that Resett had offered a source substantial money to 
share a story about a young man’s sexual encounter with a female politician; a 
lack of moderation in the comment section; and their ongoing campaign and 
calls for boycotts against mainstream media outlets. The case is interesting 
because it points to how boundaries are drawn and negotiated, but also the 
fluidity in the field where alternative actors can move towards – or potentially 
also further away from – the mainstream. 
Finally, exploring mainstream media reactions to right-wing alternative 
media can help enhance our understanding of the boundaries between the 
two. Although research on this matter is still scarce, Nygaard (2020) has dem-
onstrated through a content analysis how Norwegian, Swedish, and Danish 
mainstream news organizations tend to portray right-wing alternative media 
as journalistically and ideologically deviant in order to protect the boundaries 
of professional journalism as well as the limits of acceptable public debate 
from actors they deem illegitimate. As the distance between mainstream and 
alternative media is also dependent on mainstream media reactions to their 
emergence, more research on the mainstream/alternative continuum should 
take the mainstream media as a starting point.
Conclusion: Challenges for research on alternative media
In this chapter, we have explored the role of right-wing alternative media, ar-
guing that such news providers constitute a relatively modest, but nevertheless 
distinct, actor in the Scandinavian political communication landscape. Statistics 
indicate that the phenomenon is more widespread in Sweden than in Norway 
and Denmark. The exact reasons for this remain unclear, but the political and 
cultural context point to some possible explanations. Because immigration is 
recognised as a driving force for right-wing alternative media, it is relevant 
that policies towards immigration and integration differ historically in the 
three countries. Sweden was first in Scandinavia to become a destination for 
immigrants and has generally been the most liberal, in terms of access and in-
tegration (Brochmann et al., 2012). The populist right-wing party, the Sweden 
Democrats, is highly critical of immigration and has long been excluded from 
coalitions through a political cordon sanitaire, while in the other two countries, 
similar parties take a more prominent role (Wettstein et al., 2018). In this re-
gard, Brochmann and colleagues (2012) argue that a critical public debate on 
the challenges and problems relating to immigration and multiculturalism has 
been less present in Sweden. This may have opened a market for right-wing 
alternative media that focuses more vocally and provocatively on the nega-
tive aspects of immigration (Holt, 2016a). Heft and colleagues (2020) further 
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suggest that the lower supply of alternative media in Denmark may be related 
to the Danish mainstream media context, which is favourable to right-wing 
actors, in the sense that it allows politically incorrect issues and positions to a 
greater extent. One must of course be cautious when speculating about cause 
and effect, especially when comparative studies are scarce. There is a danger 
of reducing complex matters to simplified conclusions, and more research is 
needed to explore how political, social, and cultural dimensions influence the 
role and impact of right-wing alternative media in the Nordic sphere.
We have pointed to certain difficulties in terms of how to conceptualise 
alternative media actors. Holt and colleagues (2019) suggest a relational and 
non-normative definition, which is helpful in separating alternative media from 
the left-wing social movements’ perspective. They emphasise the need to look 
into how alternative media describe and position themselves in opposition to the 
mainstream, but also how “alternative” can be used as a label by others – even 
though this is less developed in their framework. In addition, they suggest that 
“the alternativeness” can be studied analytically on micro, meso, and macro 
levels by looking at content, practices, organisational features, and relations to 
professional media organisations and press ethics. Heft and colleagues (2020) 
furthermore argue that in order to categorise alternative sites as coming from a 
right-wing to a far-right ideological position, it is necessary to identify ideological 
markers in their motivations, use of topical tags, and how they frame their stories. 
Inspired by these perspectives, we explored a selection of right-wing alterna-
tive media in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. We looked at their self-ascribed 
roles and ideological positions, as well as referring to studies that characterise 
the content, organisational features, and their relation to institutionalised press 
ethics. We argue that although many right-wing media sites clearly position 
themselves as being in opposition – or an alternative – to mainstream media, this 
is expressed and framed in different ways and to different degrees. Further, we 
argue that it can be difficult to place such actors on the right-wing to far-right 
scale without conducting in-depth interview studies or systematic content analy-
sis. Empirical evidence from the Swedish context shows that people involved 
in alternative media tend to dissociate from the “immigration-critical alterna-
tive media” label to avoid being confused with far-right outlets (Holt, 2016a). 
Thus, there are indications of an ongoing adaptation process, as the distinction 
between mainstream and alternative media is increasingly difficult to discern. 
Another dimension of alternativeness is in its organisational features. In 
this chapter, we show that the selected sites are dependent predominantly on 
volunteer work and alternative business models. This varies if the people in-
volved come from professional or activist backgrounds; most alternative media 
organisations consist of a mix of the two. Some actors in Norwegian and Danish 
alternative media have extensive experience in professional journalism, includ-
ing in leading national news institutions. A Norwegian study shows that this 
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insider knowledge is used to criticise the way professional journalists conduct 
their jobs (Figenschou & Ihlebæk, 2018). Our findings point out the complex 
and fluid relationship between right-wing alternative media sites and profes-
sional organisations, press ethics, and the self-regulatory system. We posit that 
this dimension affords a very strong boundary marker of professionalism in the 
Nordic media system and consequently should be emphasised when categorising 
alternative media. Our overview shows that most right-wing alternative media 
do not adhere to professional ethical codes, which is not surprising based on 
their self-ascribed role as standing in opposition and serving as media critics. 
However, some sites do claim adherence to professional norms. 
Using a multi-level approach to study alternative media, it is necessary to clarify 
how different dimensions should be weighed against each other. To illustrate, the 
Norwegian site Document, established in 2003, which clearly positions itself as 
an alternative to the mainstream press, is nevertheless a member of the Associa-
tion of Norwegian Editors and part of the press ethics system. They have what 
seems to be a stable number of writers, some with a background in professional 
journalism. There has not been a systematic, long-term analysis of the content 
they produce; however, a study by Nygaard (2019) suggests that Document 
sometimes mixes news and views. This somewhat paradoxical situation points 
to the need for future research to shed light on how the different dimensions of 
alternativeness is given value in order to function as a reliable analytical tool, 
and also on what level comparative research should be conducted (see Heft et 
al., 2020). It also points to the necessity of being aware of methodological and 
analytical challenges when studying a moving target with imprecise boundaries. 
Finally, a point for discussion is that the distance between mainstream and 
alternative media depends not only on how alternative outlets describe themselves 
but also on how they are perceived and received by the mainstream media and 
broader public sphere. To better understand how boundaries are constructed 
and challenged in the media field, future research should investigate how and by 
whom such distinctions are drawn and when they change. Certain social actors, 
especially news media professionals and academics, have been the ones who define 
what is news and journalism and what is not. As the journalistic field increas-
ingly must play by the rules of the technological field, it is pertinent to ask who 
decides where the centre and the periphery of the profession are (Tandoc, 2019). 
Our findings show that audiences of alternative media tend to actively engage 
on social media and, consequently, news and views from alternative media gain 
relatively high scores on social media engagement when compared to mainstream 
online newspapers. If legacy media organizations are losing ground to social media 
platforms, it is equally important to understand how the audience understand the 
boundaries between professional journalism and new digital entrants to the pro-
fession, such as alternative media, because it is not at all certain that legacy media 
sources occupies a central position in audiences everyday news consumption.
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Chapter 14
Abstract 
Focusing on fake news, disinformation, and misinformation, this chapter addresses 
how the main actors in the political communication process (politicians, news 
media, and citizens) deal with the increasingly complex information environment 
in Scandinavia. In this chapter, we examine how politicians apply the term “fake 
news” in relation to both news media and political opponents. Additionally, we 
address how the news media deal with the challenge of fake news and disinforma-
tion, typically through verification and fact-checking. Lastly, we examine how 
citizens relate to fake news, employing data from the Reuters Digital News Report 
(Newman et al., 2018) from the three Scandinavian countries: Norway, Sweden, 
and Denmark. This study demonstrates that we need new methods for digital 
source criticism, verification, and media literacy in an information environment 
suited to the information manipulation of text, icons, images, and video.
Keywords: fake news, disinformation, social media, polical journalism, political 
communication
Introduction
In April 2018, a seemingly mundane and perhaps even trivial event took 
place when the employment of Sólrun Rasmussen as a high-school teacher 
in Copenhagen ended. However, her marriage to Danish prime minister Lars 
Løkke Rasmussen – and in particular his participation as an assessor in a 
meeting with the principal of the school – made the event interesting to the 
news media. The Danish tabloid Ekstra Bladet covered the meeting, indicat-
ing that she had been fired and questioning whether the prime minister had 
mixed his private and professional roles (Østergaard & Mathiessen, 2018). 
In an exchange on Twitter, the prime minister took the issue with the news 
coverage in a noteworthy fashion:
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My good friends at Ekstrabladet continue to surprise me with stories about 
my family and me. Had no idea my wife had been fired… #FakeNews #dkpol 
[translated]. (Rasmussen, 2018)
The tweet is interesting for two reasons. First, it created more confusion about 
what actually happened; no one was any wiser from reading the tweet, and 
the subsequent conversation on the social medium only made the fog around 
the course of events denser. Second, and most importantly in the context of 
this chapter, the prime minister used the hashtag #FakeNews, and in doing so, 
questioned the trustworthiness of the newspaper’s coverage. This is particularly 
interesting since, in the Danish system, the prime minister also acts as the min-
ister of the press. By using this hashtag, he joined ranks of those who dismiss 
unfavourable news coverage with a passing reference to how the content of the 
news media cannot be accepted at face value. “Fake news” is a central discursive 
marker in today’s complicated relationship between politicians, news media, 
and citizens in Western democracies, and it is one that comes with a challenge 
to the foundation of democratic societies.
“Fake news” was the Collins Dictionary’s 2017 Word of the Year. With a 
conceptual framework from discourse theory, the term has been called “a floating 
signifier” through which different discursive elements are “being mobilised as part 
of political struggles to hegemonise social reality” (Farkas & Schou, 2018: 299), 
and politicians around the world use it to describe news organisations whose cov-
erage they find disagreeable. Politicians have appropriated the term as a weapon 
against the fourth estate and as an excuse to limit or censor free speech. Most 
famously, American president Donald Trump frequently labels media outlets such 
as CNN or The New York Times as offering fake news, criticising the watchdog 
function of the media in liberal democracy. As of 2 January 2020, Trump had 
tweeted 648 times about fake news in his 1,078 days as president, making it his 
third-most tweeted term, according to the online Trump Twitter Archive (2020).
While the related but distinct phenomena of fake news, disinformation, 
and misinformation are not new in and of themselves, one can argue that 
their urgency has increased in the digital communication environment. Digital 
technology has democratised the means of producing media content, and the 
Internet has connected its users to a potential mass audience, with great promise 
for public participation and emancipatory politics (Jenkins, 2006). The digital 
age, however, also provides new tools and infrastructure for the production, 
distribution, and amplification of falsehood in the public sphere. The algorith-
mic sorting in search engines, social media, and personalised media means that 
content that attracts and maintains audience attention will self-perpetuatingly 
propagate in and beyond sub-publics (Dijck et al., 2018). The consequence 
is that the content users engage with stands a good chance of proliferating 
online because it feeds into the psychological mechanisms of a confirmation 
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bias, where there is a tendency to search for, favour, and recall information 
affirming one’s prior beliefs.
Focusing on fake news, disinformation, and misinformation, we address 
in this chapter how the main actors in the political communication process 
(politicians, news media, and citizens) deal with the increasingly complex 
information environment in Scandinavia. The Nordic region has been 
characterised by high social trust, also when it comes to news media, and 
particularly radio and television stations (Syvertsen et al., 2014). This has 
been expressed through some of the highest levels of trust in the world, high 
media literacy, and high voter turnout in the Nordic countries (Strömbäck 
et al., 2008). Nevertheless, various forms of manipulated and even entirely 
fake information in the digital public sphere add to an erosion of the com-
mon grounds by creating confusion and uncertainty about basic facts (Ipsos, 
2017). We identify in this chapter how the main actors involved with fake 
news and political journalism – politicians, news media, and citizens – are 
dealing with public spheres polluted with manipulated and fake information 
in Norway, Sweden, and Denmark. In order to establish a theoretical baseline 
for our discussion, the chapter first outlines the terms fake news, disinforma-
tion, and misinformation. 
Second, we examine how politicians apply the term fake news, in relation 
to both news media and political opponents. Reviewing some examples from 
the Scandinavian countries, we discuss how political actors have dealt with 
the term as well as with the challenges raised by manipulated information. We 
look at examples of politicians accusing others (i.e., political opponents or news 
media) of producing fake news and politicians who are victims of fake news. 
Third, we address how the news media deals with the challenges of fake news 
and disinformation, typically through verification and fact-checking. New media 
actors, often called “alternative media” or “hyperpartisan media” (Kalsnes & 
Larsson, 2019), are challenging the mainstream media’s news values and ethics, 
often accusing mainstream media of being the “lying media” (Figenschou & 
Ihlebæk, 2018: 6). Alternative or hyperpartisan media are also active in the 
three Scandinavian countries under scrutiny here. 
Fourth, we examine how citizens relate to fake news, employing data from 
Reuters Digital News Report (Newman et al., 2018) from the three Scandi-
navian countries. While politicians and the media often talk about fake news 
in terms of Russian propaganda or for-profit fabrications by Macedonian 
teenagers, it is clear that the concerns of citizens are very different, relating 
to different kinds of deceptions largely perpetrated by journalists, politicians, 
and advertisers. The Reuters data from the Scandinavian countries allow us 
to consider whether there are any clear empirical differences between the 
countries, in either attitude and experience with manipulated information, 
or trust towards different media outlets. 
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The Scandinavian situation
Even though the debate about fake news, disinformation, and misinformation has 
mainly focused on the US and Russia, the three communicative phenomena are 
also present in Scandinavia: in Sweden, a local politician from the Swedish Social 
Democratic Party spread fake news aimed at Muslim voters about the Moderate 
Party and the Sweden Democrats (Lindquist, 2018); in Denmark, Mette Thiesen 
from the New Right has been accused of spreading fake news about “armed sharia 
guards” in Copenhagen (Shah, 2018); and in Norway, the national representative 
from the Progress Party, Mazyar Keshvari, accused Aftenposten, one of Norway’s 
biggest newspapers, of producing fake news (Mæland, 2017). By suggesting that 
news cannot be trusted and by labelling it as fake news, politicians deliberately 
undermine trust in journalism and news outlets, one of the core institutions in 
democratic nations based on free speech and a free press. By misappropriating 
the credibility of news, fake news might also undermine the legitimacy of journal-
ism, especially in social media, where the actual source of information is often 
removed, or at least perceived only from a distance.
The news media, on the other side, have responded with increased scrutiny 
and fact-checking initiatives, not only of politicians’ claims (Graves, 2016), 
but also of viral content on social media. In August 2018, more than 150 fact-
checking projects around the world were registered by Duke Reporters’ Lab 
(n.d.) at Duke University, the most comprehensive database for global fact-
checking organisations. Five of these projects are based in Scandinavia: Faktisk 
(Norway), Faktisk (Sweden), Viralgranskaren (Sweden), Detektor (Denmark), 
and TjekDet (Denmark). 
With Nordic countries being some of the most digitised countries in the world 
(Eurostat, 2019a), Nordic citizens have access to a digital marketplace of ideas 
characterised by vast amounts of information of all qualities. The Internet and 
social media platforms have enabled a digital public sphere that is more open 
and democratised than ever before. Nevertheless, as 30–40 per cent of Nordic 
citizens access news weekly on Facebook (Newman et al., 2018), they are also 
vulnerable to the spread of false and manipulated information. Social media 
platforms are “rigged to reward those who can manipulate human emotion and 
cognition to trigger the algorithms that pick winners and losers” (Silverman, 
2017). Social media platforms such as Facebook and Twitter are also identified 
as places where people most frequently see false and manipulated information 
(Medietilsynet, 2017). 
We will now establish a theoretical baseline for our discussion by outlining 
how we apply the term fake news and associated terms such as disinformation 
and misinformation. To give an overview of how the term fake news has been 
applied – within both the research literature and among political actors – we 
will differentiate between what we here call a theoretical approach and an 
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empirical approach. The theoretical approach addresses how the term fake 
news has been defined and applied in the research literature, and the empirical 
approach addresses how political actors have used the term in “the real world”, 
often with strategic intentions. As these approaches do not necessarily align, 
we have divided them into two separate parts. 
Theoretical approach:  
Defining fake news, disinformation, and misinformation
Discussing the different phenomena that are used under the umbrella term of 
fake news, we draw a distinction between fake news, disinformation, and mis-
information (alongside other studies, see, e.g., Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017). 
Fake news has been defined as “articles based on false information packaged 
to look like real news to deceive readers either for financial or ideological gain” 
(Tandoc et al., 2018: 674). Along the same lines, fake news has also been de-
scribed as “information that has been deliberately fabricated and disseminated 
with the intention to deceive and mislead others into believing falsehoods or 
doubting verifiable facts” (McGonagle, 2017: 203).
Fake news was previously applied as a term in the research literature to de-
scribe news parody or news satire such as Rokokoposten in Denmark or The 
Daily Show in the US (see, e.g., Russell, 2011), as well as native advertising, 
propaganda, manipulation, and fabrication (Tandoc et al., 2017). To distinguish 
the terms, researchers suggest differentiating between the degrees of falseness 
and the intention to deceive (Tandoc et al., 2017; Wardle & Derakhshan, 2017). 
While both news satire and content marketing have a high degree of facticity, the 
intention to deceive is different. News satire does not intend to deceive, and the 
audience normally knows that they are watching comedy (it should be noted that 
some people have problems differentiating between news satire and real news, 
according to Garret et al., 2019). Content marketing, on the other hand, looks 
like news but is actually advertisement, and the potential for deception is high. 
We will also include the appearance of news as a way to differentiate between 
various types of problematic information. Fake news cannot be distinguished by 
its form alone, which has caused major concerns for news outlets in general, and 
for political news in particular, since it can undermine the trust in these outlets 
as independent institutions of society. Several of the most shared false stories in 
the American presidential election of 2016 appeared as news stories, but were 
completely false (Silverman & Alexander, 2016). The most shared fake story, 
“Pope Francis Shocks World, Endorses Donald Trump for President, Releases 
Statement”, was originally published by a site called WTOE 5 News, and later 
copied by the now-defunct site called Ending the Fed. On other occasions, 
fake news is presented by fake organisations, such as Norsk Naturinformatikk 
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[Norwegian Nature Informatics], which was exposed by the Norwegian fact-
checker Faktisk for producing a completly false story about the threat of giant 
jellyfish on the Norwegian coast (Skipshamn, 2018).
Recently, fake news has been described as “completely or partly false infor-
mation, (often) appearing as news, and typically expressed as textual, visual or 
graphical content with an intention to mislead or confuse users” (Kalsnes, 2018: 
6). It should be noted that the theoretical and rather prescriptive definitions 
mentioned above are rather different from the way that many have used the term 
fake news in reality, particularly political actors (to which we will soon return). 
The ambiguity of the term fake news has resulted in the rejection of the term 
altogether by many scholars, who have argued that it is inadequate and misleading 
to explain the complexity of the situation (Wardle & Derekshan, 2017).
The European Union report from the independent high-level expert group 
on fake news and online disinformation suggests using the term disinforma-
tion, which can be defined as “false, inaccurate, or misleading information 
designed, presented and promoted to intentionally cause public harm or for 
profit” (HLEG, 2018: 10). Disinformation is a fairly new term which first ap-
peared in an English dictionary in the 1980s on the basis of the Russian word 
“dezinformatsiya” (Taylor, 2016). According to a defector from the Romanian 
secret police, Ion Mihai Pacepa, after World War II, Joseph Stalin constructed 
the word – defined in the Great Soviet Encyclopaedia in 1952 as the “dissemina-
tion (in the press, on the radio, etc.) of false reports intended to mislead public 
opinion” – and suggested that the Soviet Union was the target of such tactics 
from the West (Taylor, 2016). Disinformation is clearly similar to propaganda, 
which is defined as “the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, 
manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers 
the desired intent of the propagandist” (Jowett & O’Donell, 2012: 7). Examples 
of such disinformation in the Scandinavian countries include the creation of 
“cloaked Facebook pages”; that is, Facebook pages that imitate “the identity 
of a political opponent in order to spark hateful and aggressive reactions” 
(Farkas et al., 2018: 1850).
Misinformation, in contrast to disinformation, is understood as “misleading 
or inaccurate information shared by people who do not recognise it as such” 
(HLEG, 2018: 10). The intention to deceive is what distinguishes disinforma-
tion from misinformation (even if it can be difficult to analytically draw such 
a distinction, since intention is a notoriously slippery phenomenon in terms of 
empirical research).
To examine how these phenomena have been covered in the research litera-
ture, this chapter uses the terms fake news, disinformation, and misinformation 
to differentiate between various kinds of problematic information. Table 14.1 
provides an overview of the definitions, differences, and similarities between 
the three concepts.
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Table 14.1 Characteristics of fake news, disinformation, and misinformation
Definition Intention Facticity Appearance
Fake news “Articles based on false 
information packaged 
to look like real news to 
deceive readers either 
for financial or ideolog-








Disinformation “False, inaccurate, or 
misleading information 
designed, presented 
and promoted to inten-
tionally cause public 
harm or for profit” 










Misinformation “Misleading or inaccu-
rate information shared 
by people who do not 
recognize it as such” 












What is common for the three terms is that they challenge trust in information 
and, in this context, trust in news. Trust is often understood as “the confidence 
that a partner will not exploit the vulnerabilities of the other” (Gulati et al., 
2000: 209), and trust is closely connected to news, since reporting is based on 
witnesses of accounts where most people are not present (Kalsnes & Krumsvik, 
2019). The delivery of trustworthy information is at the core of the democratic 
objective of the news, constituting the very foundation of its claim to be an 
institution of democracy. Another more mundane but nonetheless important 
reason why media studies and the industry alike consider trust a central issue 
is that previous research has found that media trust is an important factor in 
news attention decisions (Williams, 2012); media users will probably pay more 
attention to news sources they deem credible than those they are sceptical of. 
Similarly, distrust in media can lead to inattention and the non-consumption 
of news (Kiousis, 2001). We will return to this issue in greater detail later, but 
first, we examine the different ways the term fake news has been applied by 
Scandinavian politicians, as the use of the term by politicians has been of par-
ticular concern, since in several countries they have used it to target political 
opponents or media outlets they dislike. 
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Empirical approach:  
Political actors’ use of the term fake news
Politicians in several countries have used the term fake news to target politi-
cal opponents or media outlets they dislike, and in authoritarian countries in 
particular, we often see draconian laws being introduced with extremely un-
clear definitions of what fake news means (Newman et al., 2018). Politicians 
in some countries are also attempting to seize this opportunity to undermine 
or control the media. American news users in particular are concerned about 
the use of the term fake news (e.g., by politicians) to discredit news media; no 
less than 53 per cent of the respondents in the 2018 Reuters report expressed 
concern about this type of behaviour (Newman et al., 2018). Concern is lower 
in Norway and Denmark, but still substantial. Here, 27 per cent of Norwegians 
(Moe & Sakariassen, 2018) and 29 per cent of Danes (Schrøder et al., 2018) 
are concerned about the use of the term (e.g., by politicians) to discredit news 
media. The lower level of concern is probably to some extent the result of the 
higher degree of trust in society and its institutions found in these countries.
The reason we will look more closely into the way Scandinavian politi-
cians apply the term fake news is that they have a unique position in society 
in general, but particularly in relation to news media – both journalists and 
politicians are engaged in the “negotiation of newsworthiness” (Cook, 1998: 
90). The close but complex relationship between journalists and politicians is 
typical in many countries, including those in Scandinavia (Aelst & Aalberg, 
2011). The relationship between politicians and journalists is characterised by 
mutual dependence:
The relationship between sources and journalists resembles a dance, for sources 
seek access to journalists, and journalists seek access to sources. Although 
it takes two to tango, either sources or journalists can lead, but more often 
than not, sources do the leading. (Gans, 1980: 116) 
Several studies have examined the relationship between news media consump-
tion and political trust (e.g., Avery, 2009), and a longitudinal study from Sweden 
found a positive link between news media use and political trust (Strömbäck 
et al., 2016); thus, the mediation of politics is closely connected to the trust 
in those performing the politics. Fake news is therefore a challenge for both 
political and media institutions. One question is, however, how politicians 
use the term. It should be noted that the term fake news is used in a different 
way in this section about political actors, compared to the more theoretical 
definition introduced in the first part of the chapter. As mentioned earlier, this 
discrepancy between the theoretical definition and the “real world usage” is 
part of the characteristics and the challenge of the term – also in the way the 
term is applied in the news media. Building on a framework developed by 
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Kalsnes (2019: 89–94), we focus on four ways that fake news has been applied 
by Scandinavian politicians. 
Politicians accusing political opponents of fake news 
In 2018, the Danish politician Mattias Tesfaye from the Social Democratic 
Party accused the Danish author Carsten Jensen of spreading fake news. Jensen 
wrote an op-ed in the Swedish newspaper Dagens Nyheter, where he warned 
Swedish politicians and voters against following the Danes and capitulating 
to the right-wing Sweden Democrats. Jensen also argued that Denmark had 
become a country that would not accept foreigners. In an interview with the 
Danish newspaper Ekstra Bladet, Tesfaye asserted, “that is fake news! That is 
not something you can say as an accepted truth. There has never before been as 
many foreigners in Denmark as now [translated]” (Mortensen, 2018: para. 7–8).
Politicians accusing media of producing fake news
In Norway, the national representative from the Progress Party, Mazyar Ke-
shvari, accused the national daily Aftenposten of producing fake news in a 
story about immigration policy (Mæland, 2017). He argued in an op-ed that 
“people, thanks to social media, have woken up and revealed the news media’s 
systematic attempts to create opinions, attitudes, and reactions on false premises 
[translated]” (Keshvari, 2017: para. 15). Keshvari argued that media system-
atically, “through framing, speculation, comments and by selectively choosing 
information, create a false impression among readers [translated]” (para. 10). 
Politicians as victims of fake news
The Swedish government took serious precautions to protect the Swedish na-
tional election in 2018 from fake news and disinformation, mainly from Russia 
(Schori, 2018). Talks with established media and social media platforms took 
place before the election to fight and hinder the flow of fake news during the 
election campaign. It was particularly important to detect disinformation and 
increase the security around Swedish digital infrastructures. Leading up to the 
2019 national election, Danish voters were warned about potential fake social 
media profiles of Danish politicians (Runge, 2019), a problem that had also 
been warned against in Norway in relation to the 2019 local election (Proac-
tima, 2019). On a European level, both Denmark and Sweden also participate 
in and contribute to the European Union’s East StratCom Task Force, which is 
a strategic initiative formed in 2015 to counter Russian disinformation activi-
ties in Eastern Europe.
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Politicians warning against using the term fake news
In 2017, former Norwegian Minister of Culture from the Conservative Party, 
Linda Cathrine Hofstad Helleland, warned other politicians against using the term 
fake news on news items or organisations they did not like. “One should be very 
careful to define fake news based on a dislike of the the premise or the framing of 
a story [translated]”, the minister said, arguing that politicians had a particular 
responsibility to choose their words carefully (Slydal-Jensen, 2017: para. 7–8).
The news media
Just as administrative systems across the Scandinavian countries have taken 
steps to improve digital security, the media sector has implemented a number 
of initiatives to counter fake news, disinformation, and misinformation. On the 
basis of both a high level of education (Eurostat, 2019b) and the existence of 
strong public service media, the Scandinavian countries might be expected to be 
more resistant to the influence of fake news, disinformation, and misinformation 
than many other countries. Despite this, however, the discussion about fake 
news has not gone unnoticed by the media sector, which has responded through 
a number of strategic and editorial initiatives. Some of these initiatives aim at 
debunking false information while others are directed at increasing awareness 
of the value of high-quality information and improving levels of media literacy.
Fact-checking
At the activist end of the spectrum, the last decade has witnessed the rise of 
dedicated fact-checking formats. These fact-checkers are distinguished from 
traditional journalism in that they investigate claims that are already in the 
public domain rather than, as traditional journalistic procedure would do, before 
the claims are made public (Graves, 2016). As one columnist put it, the fact-
checkers are “referee[s] in the mudslinging contest” of public political discussion 
(Poniewozik, 2012: para. 4), as they pass verdicts on the veracity of claims.
The underlying epistemological orientation of the wave of fact-checking 
initiatives resembles what Hammersley (1992) calls “subtle realism”: while ac-
cepting the premise that knowledge is socially constructed and communicated 
through the choices of involved actors, subtle realism insists on an underlying 
existence of objective facts that should not be subject to individual interpreta-
tions or social discussion. In this way, fact-checkers do not challenge the onto-
logical premise that what is in the media is the result of human agency in the 
form of selection and framing, but rather insist that some things are true and 
others are not. In relation to this, an international study found that a sample 
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of mostly Norwegian journalists was ambivalent to such fact-checkers; on the 
one hand, fact-checking was considered a useful tool for improving quality in 
reporting, but on the other hand, there were reservations against relying on a 
single source to assess factuality (Brandtzaeg et al., 2018).
Fact-checking arrived in Scandinavia in 2005, when Dagbladet launched 
Faktasjekken. It was, however, not until the early 2010s that the movement 
accelerated as numerous fact-checkers emerged across Scandinavia, reflecting a 
broader international trend gaining momentum with, in particular, the success 
of the Pulitzer Prize winner PolitiFact. Table 14.2 provides an overview of the 
historical development and types of fact-checkers in Scandinavia.
Table 14.2 Fact-checkers in Scandinavia
Medium Years Organisation
Norway
Faktasjekk online 2005–2009 Dagbladet
Faktasjekk online 2009–2013 Bergens Tidende
Faktisk.no online 2017– Dagbladet, VG, NRK, TV2 + Amedia, Polaris
Detektor television 2017–2017 NRK
Sweden
Faktakollen online 2010–2010 SvD
Lögndetektorn online 2010–2010 Aftonbladet
Detektor radio 2012–2012 Sveriges Radio
Viralgranskaren online 2014– Metro
Faktisk.se online 2018–2018 DN SR, SVT, SvD, KIT
#livekollen online 2015–2015 SVT
Denmark
Detektor television 2011– DR
Detektor radio 2011–2014 DR
Tjek Det online 2016– Mandag Morgen
While these fact-checking initiatives share an ambition to separate fact from 
falsehood, their units of analysis differ; some control the truthfulness of selected 
claims in news items (e.g., the Norwegian Faktisk.no); some fact-check claims 
that “go viral” on social media (e.g., the Swedish Viralgranskaren); and some 
subject specific claims from policy-makers to scrutiny (e.g., the Danish edition 
of Detektor). The latter is the most prevalent and also the one that most ex-
plicitly connects the emergence of fact-checkers with the institutions of politics.
Many of these fact-checkers obviously predate the current discussion of fake 
news, disinformation, and misinformation that followed the Brexit referendum 
and the 2016 American presidential election, but they nonetheless share the 
ambition of sorting facts from falsehood. As Table 14.2 also shows, many of 
these initiatives exist within the context of legacy media organisations – which 
leads us to the question of how these organisations have dealt with the current 
issues of communicative pollution in the public sphere.
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Legacy media
While fact-checkers constitute tangible initiatives to separate facts from false-
hood, the editorial legacy media has also used the fake-news crisis as an occasion 
to remind the public, as well as other stakeholders, that they are important. For 
a number of years, the “old” media organisations have experienced decreasing 
circulation figures, challenged business models, and increasing polarisation and 
mistrust from parts of the population. Legacy media have also been challenged 
and critiqued by a growing subset of hyperpartisan, alternative news sites in the 
Scandinavian countries (Heft et al., 2020; Ihlebæk & Nygaard, Chapter 13), 
such as Samtiden (Sweden), Den Korte Avis (Denmark), and Resett (Norway), 
that claim to offer “an alternative vision to hegemonic policies, priorities, and 
perspectives” (Downing, 2001: v). Research of various countries consistently 
shows that audiences who identify as right-leaning are typically deeply distrust-
ful of the news in general and are therefore more likely to use alternative media 
(Newman et al., 2018). The alternative, hyperpartisan sites are known for 
challenging established news formats (i.e., the clear distinction between news 
and views; see Holt et al., 2019), which is a cornerstone of the legacy media’s 
claim to fact-based reporting (Kovach & Rosenstiel, 2007). Nevertheless, the 
fake-news crisis offers legacy media an opportunity to reassert their importance 
as an institution of democracy, emphasising the value of quality journalism and 
independent reporting that adheres to the professional and ethical standards of 
the “high modernism of journalism” (Hallin, 1992).
This opportunity has been seized. Protecting their position as a democratic 
institution, the editorial news media have responded to the fake-news crisis by 
publicly emphasising both the importance of independent, diverse, and high-
quality journalism on the one hand and, on the other, how they themselves act 
as safeguards of such journalism. One problem is, however, that the practices 
of journalism have been somewhat weaponised and turned against journalism 
by political actors peddling claims of questionable truthfulness. If a politician 
makes a controversial claim, the journalistic instinct will be to report that claim; 
but, if the claim is false, the journalist must strike a delicate balance to not be 
criticised as biased.
Another concrete example is the campaign that TU (the trade organisation 
of the privately owned media in Sweden) launched in 2017. Under the heading 
“Ethics and credibility [translated]”, the organisation strategically communi-
cated how editors and journalists work and signalled how they demonstrate 
higher editorial and ethical standards than the general public might think (TU 
Medier i Sverige, 2019).
A rather unorthodox and activist media initiative to counter fake news 
that also deserves mentioning is the Danish television programme Ultra Snydt 
(Rubin, 2018). Aimed at school children, the weekly programme imitates the 
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serious format of television news and presents its audiences with one true and 
one fabricated news story. Its ambition is to teach critical skills and prompt 
discussions about trust, journalism, and misinformation among young audienc-
es, improving their media literacy. This example illustrates how, when it comes 
to the battle for the hearts and minds of the public, the legacy media will not 
just stand on the sidelines and report what goes on in the public sphere; rather, 
they pursue a more active approach and act accordingly.
Much of the news media’s strategic positioning in response to the fake-news 
scare has, as a matter of fact, explicitly targeted young people and their media 
literacy. When Danish media company JP/Politikens Hus announced the launch 
of Børneavisen (a printed weekly newspaper for 9–12-year-olds) in 2018, editor-
in-chief and director Louise Abildgaard Grøn asserted the following:
Børneavisen will guide the child by the hand in a world where information 
about societal issues increasingly takes place through social media, where 
fake news flourishes, and where children – through their use of social media 
– are presented with much that is difficult to sort through [translated]. (JP/
Pol, 2018: para. 5) 
Striking a similar note, the Norwegian Media Authority produced and published 
materials for teachers “who want [...] to strengthen young people’s critical un-
derstanding of the media and their skills in evaluating media content (source 
criticism) [translated]” (Medietilsynet, 2018: 2).
News media use, trust, and concerns of fake news
Turning to the attitudes and experiences of citizens regarding fake news, ma-
nipulated information, and trust towards different media outlets in Denmark, 
Norway, and Sweden, we use and present data from the Reuters Institute 
Digital News Report (Newman et al., 2018). This empirical material deals 
with news consumption, media trust, and views of fake news. The study was 
commissioned by the Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism to under-
stand how news is being consumed in a range of countries. Research was 
conducted by YouGov, using an online questionnaire, at the end of January 
and beginning of February 2018. The data was weighted to targets based on 
census and industry-accepted data on age, gender, and region, to represent 
the total population of each country. The sample is reflective of the popula-
tion that has access to the Internet, with the following sample sizes: Denmark 
(N = 2,025); Norway (N = 2,027); and Sweden (N = 2,016). 
First, we focus on media use in these Scandinavian countries, where the me-
dia environments are characterised by a mix of strong commercial and public 
service media (Hallin & Mancini, 2004; Syvertsen et al., 2014). The main news 
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sources for Danes, Norwegians, and Swedes include public and commercial 
broadcasters such as DR, TV 2, NRK, and SVT, as well as national quality 
newspapers, national tabloids, and local press. Use of traditional sources such 
as print and television is declining, and online use remains high in Norway 
(87%) and Sweden (87%), although slightly decreasing in Denmark (82%) 
(Newman et al., 2018).
In all three countries, media consumption has thus become more and more 
digital as audiences move online. This development goes hand in hand with 
the use of smartphones – which is increasing – and the majority of audiences in 
these countries use their phones to access news (Newman et al., 2019). Digital 
platforms are playing an increasingly central role in news consumption. Most 
legacy media run their own websites and apps and additionally select news for 
distribution on third-party platforms like Facebook, YouTube, and Twitter. 
Audiences are thus able to consume a mix of news from commercial, public 
service, and other actors on their social media platforms.
In 2018, the top social media platform used for news consumption was 
Facebook, with 40 per cent of Norwegian, 36 per cent of Swedish, and 34 per 
cent of Danish users receiving news from the platform (Newman et al., 2018: 
10). The rising political and public concern with digital dominance – and the 
dominance of particular companies – is thus a concern with user autonomy, 
user agency, and the power of platforms to impact opinions and decision-
making through profiling, information control, and behavioural nudges (Kreiss, 
2016; Tambini & Moore, 2018). There has been a lively debate since 2016 
concerning the political and social implications of the size and dominance of 
two particular players: Facebook and Google. The debate has centred on is-
sues such as fake news, disinformation, misinformation, and the influence of 
Google search results. 
Trust in the media
As Figure 14.1 shows, the public in the Scandinavian countries still express 
trust in legacy media, and in Denmark, the trust score for news in general has 
increased to 56 per cent (+ 6 percentage points since 2017, according to New-
man et al, 2018: 74). This might come as no surprise after the legacy media 
seized the opportunity to reassert the importance of quality journalism and 
the need for source criticism following the fake-news debate. The trust scores 
are generally higher for quality news brands (both public service and commer-
cial), lower for tabloids, and lowest for partisan sites such as Den Korte Avis 
in Denmark, Human Rights Service in Norway, and Fria Tider in Sweden. It 
appears that the public differentiates between competing sources of news and 
that trust is rooted in traditional media actors.
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Source: Newman et al., 2018
Trust scores are even higher for the news sources that individuals use themselves, 
suggesting two factors affecting these scores: first, people are critically assessing 
the news they consume; and second, people who use partisan sites find them 
more trustworthy than non-users. The ambition of many fact-checking initia-
tives is to raise awareness about fake news, disinformation, and misinformation 
and to increase critical skills and media literacy. It is not possible to disentangle 
whether these initiatives have had an effect on the public, but the data presented 
in the Reuters Digital News Report suggests that news consumers are aware 
of the need for media literacy in a digital media landscape. Amid discussions 
about social media polluted with manipulated and fake information, it is not 
surprising that the trust scores are significantly lower for news in social media 
and for news from searches using platforms like Google. 
Public concern with fake news and misinformation
In line with the low trust for news in social media and from search engines, 
the concern about what is real and what is fake in online news ranges from 36 
per cent in Denmark to 49 per cent in Sweden (see Figure 14.2). The concern 
about fake news, disinformation, and misinformation made by journalists, 
politicians, and other actors to push an agenda either for political or commer-
cial reasons differs to some extent depending on who is seen as the perpetrator. 
Overall concerns are lower in Denmark and highest in Sweden. Concern about 
stories where facts are spun or twisted to push a particular agenda are highest 
in Norway (43%) and Sweden (48%), whereas in Denmark, the concern for 
stories that are completely made up for political or commercial reasons is high-









 Denmark Norway Sweden
  Trust in news overall  Trust in news I use  Trust in social media  Trust in news in search 
Figure 14.1 Trust in news and social media (per cent)
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defined as factual mistakes, dumbed-down stories, and misleading headlines or 
clickbait (Newman et al., 2018). It is clear that citizens across the three countries 
are aware of – and concerned about – various types of fake or manipulated 
information they can encounter, especially in an online environment. 












 Denmark Norway Sweden
  Fake news on internet  Poor journalism  Stories to push agenda  
  Fake stories for political or commercial reasons   Use of term fake news to discredit news media
Comments: Respondents who are concerned (very and extremely concerned).
Q1: Please indicate your agreement with the following statement: “Thinking about online news, I 
am concerned about what is real and what is fake on the internet”.
Q2: To what extent, if at all, are you concerned about the following: Poor journalism (factual 
mistakes, dumbed down stories, misleading headlines/clickbait).
Q3: To what extent, if at all, are you concerned about the following: Stories that are spun or twisted 
to push a particular agenda.
Q4: To what extent, if at all, are you concerned about the following: Stories that are completely 
made up for political or commercial reasons.
Q5: To what extent, if at all, are you concerned about the following: The use of the term fake news 
(e.g., by politicians, others) to discredit news media they don’t like.
Source: Newman et al., 2018
When asked if they had personal experience with fake stories, the numbers are 
lower; 24 per cent of the Danes, 33 per cent of the Norwegians, and 41 per 
cent of the Swedes said that they had encountered “stories where facts are spun 
or twisted to push a particular agenda”, and even less encountered “stories 
that are completely made up for political or commercial reasons” (Danes, 9%; 
Norwegians, 14%; Swedes, 22%) (Newman et al., 2018). Self-reported survey 
results do not, however, tell us anything about people’s actual ability to recognise 
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factual news stories or opinion pieces that reflect the beliefs, values, or reasons 
of whoever expresses them. A recent study by Nygren and Guath (2019) shows 
that Swedish youth have a hard time determining the trustworthiness of fac-
tual, biased, and false information online. The inability to determine credibility 
is partly explained by a mindset of overconfidence and ignorance, enhancing 
confirmation bias. In other words, the lack of knowledge in a domain results in 
overconfidence in one’s own ability and the incapacity to judge the performance 
of others. Finally, the study concludes that it is important to learn critical evalu-
ation to support a critical and constructive treatment of digital news.
When it comes to ways of preventing the spread of fake news, the over-
whelming majority of people expect social networking sites, journalists, and 
politicians to be responsible. Across the three countries, the majority of re-
spondents agree with the statements that social media sites, media, journalists, 
and the government should do more to make it easier to separate what is real 
and fake on the Internet (Newman et al., 2018). So far, many different actors 
have initiated fact-checking, information about how to identify fake news for 
audiences, new rules and regulation on social media platforms, and so forth. 
The awareness of the existence and concern for the effects of fake news, dis-
information, and misinformation in digital media seems to be relatively high 
among the Scandinavian public, but the ability to handle this media environment 
is still under-researched.
Conclusion
The phenomenon of fake news has a long history, but the expansion of its po-
litically oriented incarnation is nevertheless recent. Despite high levels of trust 
in societal institutions and the media – and despite traditionally solid politics 
and media institutions – none of the Scandinavian countries are spared from 
worry about manipulated and false information. Fake news, disinformation, 
and misinformation have created concerns about what is real and what is fake 
online – in Scandinavia as elsewhere. Citizens are most concerned with fake 
news in Sweden (49%), followed by Norway (41%), then Denmark (36%) 
(Newman et al., 2018). 
Scandinavian politicians have been both accusers and victims of fake news. 
The temptation to accuse the media of producing fake news when the framing 
disfavours the politician may be hard to resist, as we can see from the examples 
in this chapter. Many political actors also express concern about fake news and 
depict themselves as victims accused by political opponents. However, there 
are also examples of politicians warning against the use of the term fake news 
based on whether someone likes the framing of a story or not, as it may lead 
to reduced trust in editorial media in general.
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Legacy media has seized the opportunity to assert their own role as guardians 
of quality journalism and source criticism, and the many fact-checking initia-
tives appearing in Scandinavia are a response to the chaotic digital information 
ecosystem. Paradoxically, however, legacy media might simultaneously serve 
as an amplification and reverberation channel for fake news narratives as they 
cover fake news and movements that challenge the established information 
order. The increase in the number of fact-checking organisations has thus raised 
questions about how they function and what kind of corrections of disinforma-
tion and misinformation work best and why. Clearly, both media and political 
actors, as well as the public, are concerned about the impact of fake news and 
manipulated information; but, we are still not entirely sure of its scale. We also 
know that an overwhelming majority of people expect social networking sites, 
journalists, and politicians to do their share to make it easier to separate what 
is real and fake online.
We need more research on the scale and scope of the problem of false and 
manipulated information to address different types of fake news, disinformation, 
and misinformation in Scandinavia. We also need to know more about how 
people differentiate between different types of information online (in line with, 
e.g., Nielsen & Graves, 2017) and about people’s actual abilities to recognise 
factual news stories compared to opinions that reflect the beliefs, values, or 
motivations of the author. The potential to produce and disseminate false infor-
mation through social media has motivated many different actors to engage in 
the discussion about the role and the impact of fake news and disinformation. 
The ease of information manipulation in texts, icons, images, videos, and 
sounds have increased the need for new methods to track and detect information 
manipulation. We also need new methods for digital source criticism, verifica-
tion, and media literacy in an information environment suited to the digital 
manipulation of voice and video (so-called deep fakes). From this perspective, 
it is worrying that a number of studies argue that citizens overvalue their ability 
to determine the credibility of digital news (see, e.g., Nygren & Guath, 2019). It 
is also of concern that news users spread fake news and information manipula-
tion even though they know it is fake, because they want to incite the spread 
of misinformation, to “call out” the stories as fake, for the amusement value, 
or for some other reason (Barthel et al., 2016). With the rapid development of 
deep fakes, the issue of media literacy and source criticism becomes even more 
important for future democratic public discussions.
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Chapter 15
Lobbying in Scandinavia
Øyvind Ihlen, Anne Skorkjær Binderkrantz,  
& PerOla Öberg
Abstract
This chapter is a tour of the Scandinavian lobbying landscape providing the 
state of the art for research on a contested and necessary activity. We discuss the 
particular context of the Scandinavian countries and current trends relevant for 
lobbying. Lobbying is often juxtaposed with the corporatist channel which implies 
institutionalised contact patterns between politicians and organised interests. The 
corporatist channel has, however, declined in importance while a number of trends 
have led to more diverse interest group systems, and new actors have assumed a 
more prominent role in Scandinavian lobbying. Besides discussing such trends, 
we also present some of the main findings about strategies and techniques used 
and what similarities and dissimilarities exist between the countries. 
Keywords: lobbying, interest groups, corporatism, professionalisation, diversity
Introduction
Political influence comes in many shapes. It is wielded through votes and engage-
ment in political parties; but lobbying – whether by organised interest groups or 
other actors – is also a prominent source of influence. This type of activity can 
involve meetings to provide views and information to policy-makers but also 
more long-term cultivation of relationships and indirect lobbying, for example, 
in the shape of media campaigns and mobilisation of members (Binderkrantz, 
2005). Lobbying is simultaneously a necessary and contested activity. It is nec-
essary because policy-makers need viewpoints on the consequences of certain 
policies, which makes lobbying an important part of policy advisory systems 
(Craft & Howlett, 2012). It is contested since lobbying is often hidden from 
public scrutiny and might skew the influence of resourceful actors at the expense 
of the principle of “one person, one vote”. It is, however, indisputable that how 
interest groups and other actors use their policy capacity (Daugbjerg et al., 
2018) and how policy advice and interest advocacy is balanced in the political 
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system (Öberg, 2015) have a profound impact on a community’s public policy 
(Thelen, 2019). To put it differently, studies of lobbying illustrate “the edges 
and boundaries of representative democracy” (Scott, 2018: 7).
In this chapter, we discuss the state of the art in Scandinavian lobbying and 
in the literature addressing the role of interest groups and lobbying. Our main 
focus is on a number of important trends changing the contours of the lobby-
ing landscape in the last decades; on this basis, we discuss the present-day use 
of different types of lobbying strategies and the challenges for the literature 
on Scandinavian lobbyism. Reflecting the corporatist tradition, Scandinavian 
research on interest groups historically focused on formal participation in gov-
ernment committees and government agency boards – that is, “corporatism”. 
More recently, there has been growth in the number of studies of lobbying as 
well as related phenomena such as the shift towards different types of group 
mobilisation and new types of actors (Binderkrantz, 2005; Binderkrantz et al., 
2016b; Christiansen et al., 2010). This literature forms the core of the discus-
sion in this chapter. 
Internationally, especially in countries where corporatist elements in the 
political system were always rare, there is a relatively large research literature 
on lobbying (Baumgartner & Leech, 1998; Baumgartner et al., 2009; Dür & 
Mateo, 2016; Godwin et al., 2013; Scott, 2018). While several of the findings 
from this international research have relevance in a Nordic setting, they often 
relate to different political contexts, be it the presidential system in the US (Ho-
jnacki et al., 2015) or the multilevel system of the European Union (Joos, 2016; 
Klüver, 2013). Studying Nordic lobbying requires sensitivity to the political, 
economic, and cultural traditions of the region. 
This chapter focuses on the three monarchies in the region: Denmark, Nor-
way, and Sweden – or Scandinavia, as the trio is called. This choice of focus is 
due to how the Scandinavian countries are relatively similar in the sense that 
they are social-democratic welfare regimes with long democratic traditions 
(Esping-Andersen, 1990). Language-wise, as well as in their choice of govern-
ment model, the Scandinavian countries set themselves apart from Finland and 
Iceland (Arter, 2016; Bengtsson et al., 2014). 
First, we clarify some key terms in this chapter, and then we discuss the 
particular context of the Scandinavian countries and current trends relevant 
for lobbying, lobbying strategies and techniques, and one of the challenges for 
research on lobbying, namely measuring influence. We draw heavily on existing 
research (e.g., Binderkrantz & Christiansen, 2015; Binderkrantz et al., 2014; 
Christiansen & Rommetvedt, 1999; Christiansen et al., 2010; Espeli, 1999; 
Gulbrandsen, 2009; Rommetvedt, 2017a; Öberg et al., 2011) to discuss the 
similarities and differences between the countries. We also contrast them with 
other Western European democracies (e.g., Binderkrantz et al., 2016a; Binder-
krantz & Pedersen, 2017; Bitonti & Harris, 2017) to discuss the merit of the 
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notion of exceptionalism of the Nordic region. The chapter ends with some 
ideas for further research on lobbying in the region. 
Definition of key terms
As stated above, lobbying deals with attempts at political influence, the latter 
defined as an ability to shape a political decision in line with one’s own prefer-
ence (Dür, 2008). In short, lobbying is “an effort designed to affect what the 
government does [emphasis original]” (Nownes, 2006: 5). In the interest group 
literature, lobbying is usually discussed under the term “influence strategies”, 
and scholars distinguish between insider and outsider strategies, or direct and 
indirect strategies (Beyers, 2004; Binderkrantz, 2005). In other literatures, lobby-
ing may be seen as related to terms such as “public affairs” (Harris & Fleischer, 
2017) or “political public relations” (Strömbäck & Kiousis, 2019). Lobbying, 
then, is frequently described as a subset of such overarching approaches. Public 
affairs, for instance, would also include community relations and corporate 
social responsibility (Harris & Fleischer, 2017). Such activities are designed to 
help organisations achieve their goals. In this mix, lobbying is ultimately directed 
at political decision-makers and politicians as well as bureaucrats. The aim of 
lobbying is either to change or maintain policies through direct and indirect 
actions that influence the policy community. Lobbying can involve putting an 
issue on the political agenda, in addition to attempts to influence the decision-
making and implementation phase of politics.
It is often assumed that many lobbyists would prefer to work the back chan-
nels of politics and keep issues away from the public eye (Culpepper, 2011). In 
other instances, however, lobbyists might go in the opposite direction and try 
to influence politicians through media coverage or grassroots initiatives. Such 
indirect lobbying might have a mid-term goal to involve people in advocating a 
cause to political decision-makers (Trapp & Laursen, 2017). Some researchers 
prefer to call this “outside lobbyism” (Kollman, 1998), while others argue for 
a narrow approach, reserving the notion of lobbying for direct contact with 
politicians (Hermansson et al., 1999). We, however, follow the European Com-
mission and others and define lobbying as “all activities carried out with the 
objective of influencing the policy formulation and decision-making processes” 
(Commission of the European Communities, 2006: 5). 
Lobbying may be conducted by any political actor, but special attention has 
been devoted to the lobbying carried out by interest groups, often defined as 
an organised group not seeking public office and not being a public institution 
(Beyers et al., 2008). Together with individual corporations, often included in 
the definition of interest groups by American scholars (Baumgartner & Leech, 
1998), these actors are usually the most active and influential lobbyists (see 
308
ØYVIND IHLEN, ANNE SKORKJÆR BINDERKRANTZ, & PEROLA ÖBERG
below). However, it is also important to keep in mind that there are many 
voluntary associations that refrain from activities aimed at influencing public 
policy (Arvidson et al., 2018b), and that social movements and even temporary 
groups of individuals – for example parents of children in schools under threat 
of closure – can pursue more or less advanced lobbying strategies (Öberg & Uba, 
2014). In addition – and as will be discussed later – new actors, including think 
tanks and public affairs companies, have increased in importance in Scandinavia. 
Political and social context
As argued in the introductory paragraph and reflected elsewhere in this book, 
there are certain political, economic, and cultural traditions that set the Nordic 
countries apart and that are crucial for understanding the political communica-
tion in these countries; we highlight some of these aspects that have particular 
importance for lobbying strategies. Scale is key, since the formation of elites and 
how they interact with each other and with grassroots differs between smaller 
and larger countries (Bengtsson et al., 2014; Katzenstein, 1985; Maktutrednin-
gen, 1990). Many informal connections in small personal networks can open 
up doors for lobbyists (Tyllström, 2017) while simultaneously limiting access 
to policy-makers for citizen groups outside homogenous networks with strong 
elements of elite consensus (Christiansen et al., 2018). In addition, while a 
number of countries have (or are preparing) legislation that regulate lobbying 
activities, the Scandinavian countries have not introduced similar regulation 
(Crepaz et al., 2019). Rather, regulation in Scandinavia is relatively limited with 
a focus on anti-corruption and rules about donation to parties, although stricter 
rules and the introduction of lobbying registers are debated from time to time.
The Scandinavian countries are also comparably decentralised – though less 
so than federal systems with autonomous legislatures at the subnational level 
– and belong to a group of countries that have the highest level of municipal 
autonomy, with extensive fiscal autonomy and control over large policy scopes 
(Ladner et al., 2016). This, of course, has implications for lobbying strate-
gies, for example, within welfare policies where an exclusively national focus 
dominates in other countries (Arvidson et al., 2018b). Closely related to this is 
the fact that Scandinavian countries have a high proportion of publicly funded 
welfare, which makes public policy-makers particularly interesting lobbying 
targets for actors within that sector (Svallfors, 2016). In addition, parallel with 
the development of large welfare states, associations of local authorities have 
assumed central roles both as organising the providers of welfare state services 
and as lobbyists vis-à-vis the central authorities (Blom-Hansen, 2002).
The often-emphasised Scandinavian political culture where consultation, 
cooperation, compromise, and consensus are central values (Arter, 2016) is 
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significant for incentives and strategies of lobbying as well. These values have 
been clearly visualised in the corporatist tradition with the formal involvement of 
interest groups in public policy-making as well as policy concertation involving 
organised labour, trade, and industry (e.g., Christiansen & Rommetvedt, 1999; 
Hermansson et al., 1999; Öberg et al., 2011). It is important to understand 
that the corporatist system provided advantages but also challenges for inter-
est groups engaged in lobbying decision-makers. While corporatism provided 
interest groups with opportunities to influence politics, some scholars argue that 
groups also became part of the established system, limiting their opportunities 
for challenging the system (Eriksen et al., 2003). Over the last decades, the 
corporatist structure has been in a stage of rupture (Öberg et al., 2011), and 
societal pluralisation has increased (Rommetvedt, 2017a), but it is important 
to keep in mind that parts of the old structure still exist (Christiansen et al., 
2010). For example, trade union density and membership rates are still much 
higher than in most other countries (Crouch, 2017). 
Hence, there are several political and social aspects that most certainly con-
dition lobbying in the Scandinavian countries. Still, how and to what extent 
this matters more precisely for lobbying as a particular aspect of political com-
munication is mostly unknown and should be a subject for further research. 
In addition, several new trends impact these factors and create new conditions 
for lobbying in the Scandinavian countries, which is something we elaborate 
on in the next section.
Trends and changes:  
Increasing professionalisation and more diversity
In the last decades, Scandinavian interest representation has changed in nota-
ble ways, from well-organised interest group systems centred along political 
lines of division to present-day politics where news actors have become more 
prominent and traditional interest groups have professionalised and diversified 
their political work. We will discuss some of these trends and how they matter 
for lobbying in the region.
 First, a shift in the dynamics of political representation has affected voting, 
group membership, and patterns of group mobilisation. While workers would 
traditionally join trade unions and vote for left-wing parties, today, voting and 
interest group membership crosscuts traditional social divides. The traditional 
left-wing divide remains strong in Scandinavian politics, but new political 
issues such as environment, immigration, and “law and order” have gained in 
importance (Elgenius & Wennerhag, 2018). In effect, relations between political 
parties and interest groups have gradually weakened. Thus, for both parties and 
interest groups, it is less functional to withhold strong bonds, although trade 
310
ØYVIND IHLEN, ANNE SKORKJÆR BINDERKRANTZ, & PEROLA ÖBERG
unions and business groups have maintained relations to particular parties to 
some extent (Allern & Bale, 2012; Christiansen, 2012). Additionally, there 
is a shift towards a larger role of citizen groups – representing constituencies 
outside the labour market – as citizens increasingly join groups based on new 
political issues. Welfare policies have also given rise to new forms of citizen 
representation vis-à-vis the state since client groups representing patients, for 
example, have proliferated (Amnå, 2006; Fisker, 2013; Lundberg, 2012; Opedal 
et al., 2012). A Danish study thus finds that citizen groups constituted 42 per 
cent of all active interest groups in 2010, compared to 29 per cent in 1975 
(Binderkrantz et al., 2016b).
Second, as politics has become increasingly mediatised, interest groups 
have responded with a general professionalisation. Researchers have observed 
that more and more of society’s institutions value media attention and adapt 
to media logic to meet their goals (Esser & Strömbäck, 2014; Rommetvedt 
et al., 2013; Thorbjørnsrud et al., 2014). Taken together, this creates a new 
situation for organisations seeking political influence. More and more, organ-
isations must pay attention to the media, news cycles, and news values. This 
has accelerated the need for people with particular knowledge about such 
processes, and consequently, all major interest groups have established large 
public relations departments. While groups previously recruited staff based on 
shared political goals, now generalised skills are more important as groups hire 
increasing numbers of professional policy strategists, public relations advisors, 
and communication experts (Öberg & Svensson, 2012).
Third, new types of policy actors have become important. In a comparative 
perspective, traditional interest groups have played a particularly dominant role 
in Scandinavia, and although private corporations, local authorities, and other 
actors have also lobbied (Christiansen & Nørgaard, 2003), their political role 
has been less prominent than in most other countries. More recently, research 
has described how interest group members – such as large businesses – prefer 
lobbying directly rather than mobilising through their group (Drutman, 2015; 
Gulbrandsen, 2009). Also, many municipalities and counties have begun to hire 
public relations agencies to help influence national politicians. Media coverage 
has documented the use of many conventional lobbying tools and techniques in 
this regard (Allern, 2015; Ihlen & Gullberg, 2015). The tendency for the State 
to lobby the State has been noted (and criticised) in Denmark as well (Hegelund 
& Mose, 2013). In present-day politics, think tanks have also become more 
important, as they increase in number and media prominence, particularly in 
Sweden (Blach-Ørsten & Kristensen, 2016). 
Fourth, due to a combination of the trends described above, the so-called 
revolving-doors phenomenon has increased in importance in Scandinavian 
countries. Historically, career shifts from, for example, major trade unions to 
social democratic parties were not uncommon, but in recent years, there are 
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indications that former members of parliament take up positions in a broader 
range of political organisations (Tyllström 2019; Blach-Ørsten et al., 2017). 
With the rise of public relations agencies, the job market for politicians has 
grown as they utilise their political capital and knowledge of the political sys-
tem. Research in Norway has shown how politicians from all political parties 
(except the Green Party) have found jobs in public relations agencies, and that 
all the major agencies have teams where former political rivals work together 
for the interests of the paying client. In the spring of 2015, this included four 
former cabinet ministers and eleven former state secretaries (Allern, 2015). 
Overall, more people are working professionally with lobbying, something 
that is also reflected in the growing number of practical handbooks (e.g., 
Esbensen, 2012; Gramnæs, 2018; Raknes & Solhjell, 2018). Some argue that 
this development has even created a new political class: policy professionals 
(Garsten et al., 2015).
Fifth, increasing globalisation has also opened up new international arenas 
for lobbying by Scandinavian actors. These increasing attempts to influence 
international organisations, for example the European Union, seem to copy 
many of the strategies used on local and national arenas but still call for new 
knowledge of politics and policy and other kinds of alliances, which together 
change the context for lobbying at other levels as well (Dellmuth & Tallberg, 
2016; Johansson et al., 2018; Tallberg et al., 2018). At the same time – but 
still to a limited extent – international actors such as multinational companies 
have made their appearance in Scandinavian politics.
Summing up, a number of trends have led to more diverse interest group 
systems, and new actors have assumed a more prominent role in Scandinavian 
lobbying. Still, there is a very large element of stability. For example, while 
the revolving-doors phenomenon clearly exists, most former members of 
parliament find occupations outside of lobbying (Blach-Ørsten et al., 2017). 
Relatively speaking, public relations agencies still do not have a huge role in 
Scandinavia, and scholars have even remarked that the media attention to these 
agencies belies their influence (Rommetvedt, 2014). Traditional actors such as 
business associations and organisations, trade unions, and organisations of local 
authorities still control the majority of economic and personnel resources, and 
even though union membership has declined, it is still at relatively high levels 
(Binderkrantz et al., 2014). 
Lobbying strategies and techniques
While the previous section focused on change over time, this section presents the 
current state of the art in Scandinavian lobbying. In other words, what do we know 
about lobbying in the political situation that is an effect of the trends identified?
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The international literature points to a range of different strategies and tech-
niques used by lobbyists (Binderkrantz, 2005). Baumgartner and colleagues 
(2009) list inside advocacy (personal contacts with members of parliament, 
dissemination of external research to policy-makers, etc.), outside advocacy 
(public relations campaigns, paid ads, etc.), and grassroots advocacy (mobilis-
ing mass membership, organising a lobby day, etc.). Godwin and colleagues 
(2013) argue that three activities take up most of a lobbyist’s time: monitoring 
what policy-makers are doing, supplying information to policy-makers, and 
building relationships with policy-makers and other lobbyists.
Research in Scandinavia finds that organised interests typically use a com-
bination of many methods – both lobbying politicians and pursuing media 
coverage – while less conventional activities such as protests or demonstrations 
are less widely used (Binderkrantz et al., 2014; Opedal et al., 2012; Thesen & 
Rommetvedt, 2009). There are strong indications in the literature that strategy 
choices are constrained by political opportunity structures as well as by the 
particular identity of the interest group (Arvidson et al., 2018b). For example, 
in a study of Swedish trade unions, Peterson and colleagues show that these 
organisations have only marginally and slowly changed and diversified the rep-
ertoire of actions that they use in the postwar period. Since the main specificities 
of the Scandinavian labour market regime persist, traditional ways to influence 
politics are still the most important (Peterson et al., 2012). 
A finding in both Denmark and Norway is that lobbyists often grasp the 
opportunity to let the politician “shine” in the media even though a proposal 
might be theirs originally (Figenschou & Fredheim, 2019; Kværna, 2011; 
Trapp & Laursen, 2017). With the advent of social media, organisations 
have acquired an additional tool for political influence, although we still 
have limited insight into what extent lobbyists use these and with what ef-
fects. Potentially, organisations are not as reliant on traditional news media 
as previously when they want to influence political decisions. Several recent 
examples show how campaigns are launched and build momentum on social 
media before gaining coverage in legacy media (Ihlen & Gullberg, 2015). One 
might also hypothesise that social media provide initial framing control, and 
hence is a better strategic choice in the initial stage of a lobbying campaign 
compared to using legacy media. The best and most powerful actors, however, 
are able to utilise all arenas (Binderkrantz et al., 2014; Figenschou & Fred-
heim, 2019) – a finding in line with international research (van der Graaf et 
al., 2015). Contrary to claims in American research (i.e., Baumgartner et al., 
2009), resources are indeed important to gain access to the bureaucracy, the 
Parliament, and the media in Denmark (Binderkrantz et al., 2014). Money, 
members, and employees are vital, and resources may even be more important 
in today’s lobbying environment with the focus on professional communica-
tion. At the same time, “citizen groups report a higher level of agenda-setting 
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success and a lower level of decision-making influence than economic groups” 
(Binderkrantz & Pedersen, 2017: 92). 
Research on Norwegian health policy has shown how Twitter is an important 
tool for addressing politicians directly. Lobbyists attempt to get politicians to 
respond to them in public and make promises (Figenschou & Fredheim, 2019). 
When politicians say something publicly that the lobbyist disagrees with, the 
latter might ask for a meeting to present his or her critical arguments in pri-
vate. There is, however, a general feeling that if you use the media to chastise 
politicians, the case is lost since the positions then become firmly established 
and the politicians need to stand their ground, save face, or both (Figenschou 
& Fredheim, 2019; Kværna, 2011). Such findings have a parallel, at least in 
the US, in how efficient lobbyists do not rely on crisis mongering and are less 
inclined to use pathos. Ethos, or credibility, is the most important, since lobby-
ists want to be the ones that politicians seek out for advice (Baumgartner et al., 
2009). In a seminal study, Berry (1977) argued that if you seek confrontation, 
you have accepted that you will not become an insider.
Effective lobbying is seldom performed solely based on the interests of the 
client, as the interests of the politicians must also be taken into account; just 
as any sales person, lobbyists must convey the usefulness of “the product” 
(Kværna, 2011). Lobbyists tend to argue from facts and science, efficiency, 
equity, or a combination (Vining et al., 2005). A staple strategy is to argue 
that a proposal will serve the public interest (Ihlen et al., 2018; Rommetvedt, 
2017a); correspondingly, the use of self-interested arguments has dwindled 
(Uhre & Rommetvedt, 2018). This finding is not peculiar to the Norwegian 
setting. In general, legitimacy is based on the ability to align “the self-interested 
socio-political claims of the organization with a view of the public interest 
held by at least some influential segments of society” (Oberman, 2017: 484). 
A recent study of group appearances in the news media confirms that inter-
est groups often frame their concerns in public terms, although references to 
membership interests are more common among Danish groups than British 
groups (Binderkrantz, 2020).
Still, the notion of the public interest is slippery, and furthermore, “rivals 
are highly likely to counter such arguments by making use of a conflicting 
social value” (Baumgartner et al., 2009: 147). Thus, it becomes important 
for lobbyists to build alliances. The parties in a lobby alliance do not need to 
agree on everything, but the alliance must be sufficiently strong (Rommetvedt, 
2017a). At least two of the practical handbooks argue that the best alliances 
are those that bring together surprising partners – partners usually thought of 
as adversaries (Hegelund & Mose, 2013; Raknes & Solhjell, 2018).
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Differences within and between Scandinavian countries
It is important to acknowledge that while the Scandinavian countries are often 
lumped together as examples of a democratic corporatist model (Hallin & Man-
cini, 2004) – and there are indeed many other similarities – this may obscure 
important differences that also have consequences for lobbying. One of the 
more important dissimilarities is the organisation of state administration, where 
Sweden differs from the other Nordic countries, except for Finland. Sweden has 
an organisational divide between government ministries and central government 
agencies (Ahlbäck Öberg & Wockelberg, 2016); in contrast to countries with 
ministerial rule (like Norway and Denmark), Swedish ministries can only steer 
government agencies through legislation and control of finances and are not 
allowed to interfere in particular cases when agencies exercise public authority. 
The fact that administrative agencies enjoy a high degree of independence and 
discretion means that some decisions that can be influenced through politicians 
in Denmark and Norway must be directed towards civil servants in Sweden. 
The Scandinavian countries are also said to have different versions of cor-
poratist arrangements. For instance, some hypothesise that “more consensual 
roll calls will be found in Denmark as compared to Norway and Sweden” since 
the two latter countries have reduced the number of implementing corporatist 
committees to a larger degree (Christiansen et al., 2010: 36). Governments in 
Sweden and Norway have traditionally been stronger than in Denmark; hence, 
parliament lobbying might be stronger in the latter (Christiansen et al., 2010). 
Another difference is that Norway has stronger localised media systems 
and, together with Sweden, a higher network readiness than Denmark (Baller 
et al., 2016). Thus, local and regional media are likely to be more central 
in lobbying media strategies in Norway than in Denmark and Sweden, and 
accordingly, local and regional media are often used to build an agenda in 
Norway (Figenschou & Fredheim, 2019). In addition, there are differences in 
decision-making competences on various levels (Ladner et al., 2016) and even 
variations within countries. Lobbying on the local level, for example, must be 
adjusted to different civil society regimes in municipalities in the same country, 
based on how local governments integrate civil society in public social welfare 
(Arvidson et al., 2018a).
Challenges to lobbying research:  
Measuring political influence
Depending on the lack of transparency that characterises lobbying, research in 
this field faces several challenges. One of the most important but difficult issues 
is to measure the effects of lobbying, which we often understand as political 
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influence. This is challenging for interest group research in general, but while 
other strands of interest group research can study participation (and assume or 
draw inferences about influence from those observations) and – maybe more 
importantly – policy processes, those options are seldom available, or at least 
more complicated, for lobby researchers.
We do know that Scandinavian politicians are, in general, positive towards 
lobbying (Rommetvedt, 2014; Strömbäck, 2011). It is easy to get access to poli-
ticians, and anecdotal evidence suggests that this often comes as a surprise for 
organisational representatives from abroad. Furthermore, the lobbying system 
ensures that a wider range of interests are heard compared to those represented 
in the corporatist system (Rommetvedt, 2014). Still, the Norwegian members 
of parliament do think that the most resourceful organised interests have too 
much influence compared to weaker interest groups (Rommetvedt, 2014). It is, 
however, necessary to be critical towards sources based on the involved actors. 
Politicians are biased because it is pivotal for trust in politicians that they make 
decisions based on their own judgement and not on skewed information they 
coincidentally found, or even worse, was provided by interest groups. Hence, 
politicians tend to view lobbying as unproblematic and providing important 
or even essential policy advice. They often “welcome all information”, since 
they – according to themselves – have the ability to process information from 
interest groups and take policy positions after serious deliberation (Hermans-
son et al., 1999). This picture might be true, but it might also be a natural way 
for politicians to legitimate themselves (intentionally or not). Simultaneously, 
lobbyists, especially public relations agencies, are often secretive about whom 
they represent, what they do, how they do it, and what they have achieved, 
often referring to customer confidentiality or enterprise secrets. When they 
are asked general questions about lobbying and democracy (Hermansson et 
al., 1999), their answers are similar to those of politicians, but the lobbyists 
frequently emphasise successes of political influence. Again, it might be a true 
picture, but it might also be biased towards promoting the service from which 
they make their living. A similar mechanism is present and might produce bias 
when member-based organisations are studied; how can you recruit members 
for your organisation unless you argue that you are excellent and professional 
in influencing politics and policy and are generally successful?
The challenge of measuring the influence of lobbying has been discussed 
by many, and important advances have been made, for example, by mapping 
access to political arenas or linking group preferences to political outcomes 
(Bernhagen et al., 2014; Dür, 2008; Pedersen, 2013; Klüver & Mahoney, 
2015). Still, as Helboe Pedersen (2013) argues, we are probably left with 
getting at certain aspects of influence through correlation and triangulation 
of methods.
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Conclusion
Much international attention has been lavished on the Nordic region due to 
the seemingly social and economic success built on strong democracies, welfare 
states, and high trust. The notion of exceptionalism has been debated in this 
regard, with some scholars arguing that the Nordic countries as a whole are 
not much different from any other Western European democracy (Bengtsson et 
al., 2014). They are, for instance, certainly not the only small, stable countries 
with welfare systems. These authors do, however, agree that the Scandinavian 
countries have high levels of trust, voter turnout, and satisfaction levels among 
citizens. A Scandinavian model of corporatism might have been a fitting de-
scription in the 1960s and 1970s, but even then, substantial differences existed 
(Rommetvedt, 2017b). Others have pointed to a Scandinavian model built on 
high work effort, small wage differentials, high productivity, and a generous 
welfare state (Barth et al., 2015). By and large, however, it is argued by others 
that the myth of exceptionalism is typically journalist driven (Arter, 2016). Even 
the often-mentioned value of egalitarianism, especially touted in Norway, has 
been described as a myth (Korsnes et al., 2014).
Still, there is a need for more research that would describe the similarities and 
differences between the Scandinavian countries themselves and the similarities 
and differences with countries outside the region. A hypothesis could be that 
lobbying in the Scandinavian countries is not that much different from other 
small welfare states. In many such states, the economy is open and the elite tend 
to know each other. As indicated above, there are even some lobbying techniques 
that seem to be staples in many countries. The existence of the public interest 
argument might function as “exhibit A” (Ihlen et al., 2018).
Research has concluded that the lobbying styles in the US and Europe differ, 
but this is mostly due to the dissimilar institutional contexts (Hanegraaff et al., 
2017). Still, it would be worthwhile to explore, for instance, the political and 
cultural values that lobbyists might be able to draw on in their communicative 
construction of the public interest. In the Norwegian setting, the application of 
the seminal work of Rokkan (1967) seems obvious. That is, his work described 
the political landscape with a model of political cleavages. The original lines of 
cleavage in the Norwegian system were “territorial and cultural: the province 
opposed the capital, the peasantry fought the officials of the King’s adminis-
tration, the defenders of the rural cultural traditions spoke against the steady 
spread of urban secularism and nationalism” (Rokkan, 1967: 437). Interesting 
research could be conducted focusing on how lobbyists are able to frame and 
utilise these cleavages – that is, if they are still relevant. An expectation is that 
regional politics and interests are more important in Norway than in Sweden 
and Denmark and that this will be an important element in the framing of 
lobbyists. Jobs in the district are a trump card in many Norwegian political 
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discussions, while the centralisation processes have been much stronger in 
Denmark and Sweden. A particularly interesting question that remains is how 
these cleavages are holding up against the mentioned trends, especially the new 
international arenas for lobbying.  
In fact, most of the mentioned trends do merit more research. A case in point 
is the rise of new policy actors as well as the professionalisation of lobbying and 
the role of public relations agencies. Such agencies are sometimes considered to 
constitute “hired guns” working for individual corporations, local authorities, 
or even traditional interest groups, and the work of such agencies is generally 
less transparent than the lobbying of organised interests (Allern, 2015; Helges-
son & Falasca, 2017; Tyllström, 2013). The latter point is troubling from a 
normative democratic perspective.
Another example where more research is needed concerns the mentioned use 
of social media. How widespread is this use? What influence does it have? The 
mentioned Norwegian study channels (Figenschou & Fredheim, 2019) stem 
from the health sector, but we do not have much knowledge from other sectors 
and policy fields. Similarly, with only a few exceptions (e.g., van der Graaf et 
al., 2015), research has not really addressed the democratic implications. Is 
social media yet another tool for those who have influence? Or, is it the “poor 
person’s” lobbying channel? 
Other unanswered questions relate to studies of “knowledge use” in politics 
more generally (Lundin & Öberg, 2014). There are, for example, formal and 
informal rules which regulate access for lobbyists to decision-makers. Some 
politicians instruct their assistants to sort between the actors who try to con-
tact them. How do these and other obstacles for lobbyists vary and work in 
practice? While politicians often argue that they have the ability to evaluate 
information from lobbyists, there is scarce knowledge about how this is done 
and the conditions for deliberation over these policy advices. How important is 
it that politicians have resources to produce or find information on their own? 
Does it make a difference if their ways of organising services for parliamentar-
ians differ? Is it more difficult for politicians with strong and clear ideological 
positions to evaluate information from lobbyists? Are professional or more 
experienced politicians less susceptible to biased information than amateur 
politicians? Do different ways of inviting advisories and advocates, for exam-
ple to public hearings, mitigate an otherwise biased, selected, or fragmented 
flow of information from lobbying actors trying to influence policy decisions, 
or are they only window dressing, and a waste of time in that regard? While 
research has progressed, we still need more explorations of how the edges and 
boundaries of representative democracy impact politics and policies. 
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Public bureaucracies
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Abstract
Public bureaucracies have mostly been invisible in research on political com-
munication, but more recently, there has been an increasing interest in their 
communicative efforts. In this chapter, we review the literature and synthesise the 
scholarship on Nordic public bureaucracies in relation to political communication. 
Three research areas are put to the fore: 1) Mediatisation: how and to what extent 
bureaucracies prioritise the media and what consequences it has for activities, 
routines, and resource allocations across organisational contexts; 2) Reputation 
management: why and how bureaucracies make use of communication to build, 
maintain, and protect their reputation; and 3) Crisis communication: public ac-
tors’ abilities to provide information and support to citizens and communities 
before, during, and after crises. Although highly interconnected in practice, these 
strands of literature have largely been three separate academic discussions. We 
therefore suggest that a first step to consolidate research on communication and 
public bureaucracies would be to combine the knowledge research has gained in 
terms of media management, reputation management, and crisis communication. 
Such an effort would provide a much broader, but also detailed, knowledge on 
the motives, organising, content, and consequences of public bureaucracies and 
their communicative efforts. 
Keywords: public bureaucracies, mediatisation, crisis communication, reputation 
management, strategic communication 
Introduction
A faceless system inhabited by introverted, grey pedants, governed by rules, 
laws, and paragraphs and providing incomprehensible technical accounts. Public 
bureaucracies are often understood as anonymous, but reliable, neutral experts 
behind media-oriented politicians and leaders. They have mostly been invisible in 
research on political communication (Salomonsen et al., 2016), as scholars primar-
ily have focused on party politics in general and party leaders, prime ministers 
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or presidents, and prominent members of parliament in particular. In a similar 
manner, scholars from public administration have largely emphasised reforms of 
politico-administrative systems, with changing organisational values, structures, 
and policy processes in their research, without explicitly studying the role of 
media and communication in these processes (Christensen & Lægreid, 2006).
More recently, there has been an increasing interest in the communicative 
efforts made by public bureaucracies. To some extent, this research focuses 
on bureaucracies when they act as instruments for the political executive, and 
accordingly, become involved in government communication (Johansson & 
Nygren, 2019). But it is also research highlighting the use of communication 
among bureaucracies when they give voice to their own interests as “players 
in politics” (Moe, 1995: 131) to realise and cultivate their own interests. In 
this chapter, we review this literature and synthesise the scholarship on Nordic 
public bureaucracies in relation to political communication. 
Public bureaucracies: Actors and institutions
By public bureaucracies, we mean central government entities such as ministries 
and agencies, as well as regional and local bodies. What they all have in com-
mon is their embeddedness in a public service ethos in which regulations and 
norms of transparency, accountability, and privacy protection are paramount. 
Civil servants are expected to act with integrity and impartiality (Olsen, 2008), 
and compared to other types of organisations analysed in this anthology, it is 
evident that public bureaucracies encounter certain formal constraints, which, 
arguably, make communication more challenging (Fredriksson & Pallas, 2016a).
For instance, decisions in public bureaucracies are regulated by law, official 
statute, or decree. Civil servants are expected to contribute with policy advice, 
loyally execute policy decisions set by political majorities (evaluate the conse-
quences and the costs and benefits, as well as the implementation of these), and 
provide public services including often unending or unsolvable problems (e.g., 
unemployment, conditions of the poor, and protecting consumer rights). Today, 
an active public demands efficient public services and gives direct responses to 
public organisations in real time (Canel & Luoma-aho, 2019). Consequently, 
public bureaucracies (particularly large, service-delivering public agencies) often 
become subject of intense media attention (Boon et al., 2018), which brings 
them into blame games (Hood, 2011). 
Another peculiarity is that public bureaucracies’ communication is guided by 
information and communication mandates defined and constrained by freedom 
of information laws and public service codes of conduct (Laursen & Valentini, 
2015), with an emphasis on neutral, factual, and comprehensive information. To 
ensure that public bureaucracies conduct their activities according to appropri-
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ate rules ensuring predictability and accountability, their activities are morally 
and legally bound to be open and transparent. The purpose of bureaucratic 
communication can thus be seen as providing citizens with the information 
they need as citizens and voters. In most cases, this means that the public and 
other interest groups (including media) ought to be given general access to 
documents and acts received or drawn up by public agencies and ministries 
(Hood & Heald, 2006). 
In addition to this, we also have to add that public bureaucracies operate 
in increasingly complex communication environments (Canel & Luoma-aho, 
2019), interacting with an extensive number of stakeholders – ranging be-
tween politicians, other public sector organisations, citizens, corporations, 
unions, media, industry organisations, experts, and lobby organisations. The 
communication landscape of public bureaucracies has become more uncertain 
and unstable as public bureaucracies have become complex organisations after 
multiple reforms (Christensen et al., 2007), the media landscape has changed 
dramatically (Chadwick, 2013), and more stakeholders are employing a greater 
range of media platforms in more sophisticated ways to gain political influence 
(Figenschou, 2020; Kuhn & Nielsen, 2014). For public bureaucracies, these 
stakeholders often represent divergent (and sometimes competing) interests, as 
they are expected and even legally bound to take all interests under consider-
ation and realise them without favouring one over another (Salomonsen, 2013). 
In many ways, these circumstances are general and unavoidable, but it is 
worth noting that various actors and departments within these organisations 
hold different communicative mandates and agendas which all impact their 
strategic communication. 
The Nordic politico-administrative systems
As with media systems, the politico-administrative systems in Denmark, Finland, 
Iceland, Norway, and Sweden share a number of features. They are all unitary 
states, with varying degrees of power delegated to regional and local levels of 
government (Knutsen, 2017), and they are parliamentary democracies often 
governed by coalition governments (Lægreid, 2017). While Denmark, Norway, 
and Sweden are constitutional monarchies, Finland and Iceland are presidential 
systems. In all countries, there is a strong legal basis of the state, combined with 
a strong étatist, state-welfare, and deep-seated democratic orientation (Painter 
& Peters, 2010). 
However, there are some important differences amongst the countries, po-
tentially affecting political communication in public bureaucracies. First, the 
ministerial responsibility differs. In Sweden, there is a constitutional ban on in-
dividual ministerial decisions; instead, all cabinet decisions are made collectively 
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(Lindbom, 1997). In Finland as well, all ministers are collectively responsible 
for cabinet decisions. In Denmark, Iceland, and Norway, the principle of min-
isterial rule applies, meaning that individual ministers make decisions and are 
responsible for their own ministries and their subordinate agencies (Greve et al., 
2016). These differences raise the question of how the promotion of individual 
ministers is balanced against promotion of the cabinet agenda.
Second, there is variation in the politicisation of ministries, understood here 
as the number of political appointees. While Danish and Icelandic ministers 
only have one special advisor each (Kristinsson, 2016), there are over five or six 
different political appointees for each minister in Sweden. Norway and Finland 
lie somewhat between (Kolltveit, 2016; Shaw & Eichbaum, 2018; Sundström, 
& Lemne, 2016). The differences in ministerial entourage raise the questions of 
how much civil servants are involved in helping promote their media-oriented 
ministers and how they potentially shield the civil servants from engaging in 
party-political work (Figenschou et al., 2020).
Third, in Sweden and Finland, ministerial rule is prohibited, creating a dual 
system with formally autonomous agencies (Sundström & Lemne, 2016). This 
means that agencies in the Nordic countries are formally accountable to different 
“types” of governments bodies. This dual versus integrated structure raises the 
question of how ministry-agency relations play out, for instance, during crises 
and reputational threats.
Fourth, while the Nordic countries are sometimes referred to as cautious 
friends of new public management (NPM) (Pollitt & Bouckaert, 2011), they 
have differed somewhat in their NPM reform trajectories. Sweden and Fin-
land have applied NPM reforms – such as privatisation of government-owned 
corporations and management by objectives and results – more eagerly than 
Denmark, Iceland, and Norway (Lapsley & Knutsson, 2016). Amongst other 
things, the NPM reforms have affected the autonomy of agencies. While subor-
dinate agencies in countries like Denmark and Norway have gained (de facto) 
autonomy following NPM reforms and structural changes, ministers have 
regained some of the political control through widespread use of management 
by objectives and results (Christensen & Lægreid, 2006). At the same time, 
international research shows that most systems experience increasing levels of 
political interventions (Peters & Pierre, 2004). 
Central approaches and theories
The policies and practices of communication in public bureaucracies have been 
prioritised and professionalised over time. Communication experts have become 
a natural and prominent part of public bureaucracies as communication units 
have expanded in recent years (Falasca & Nord, 2013; Jakobs & Wonneberger, 
329
16. PUBLIC BUREAUCRACIES
2017; Sanders et al., 2011; Wonneberger & Jakobs, 2016). Moreover, com-
munication units in public bureaucracies are increasingly placed directly under 
the central command, working across the departments and the traditional hi-
erarchical organisational structures in public bureaucracies (Thorbjørnsrud et 
al., 2014), as a testament to the increased emphasis on communication. 
Partly, this runs parallel to the development of new governance structures 
and political ambitions to turn bureaucracies into “proper” or “complete” 
organisations (Brunsson & Sahlin-Andersson, 2000). That way, the idea of 
strategic communication has become essential, as it offers strategies, work mod-
els, and routines adapted from business organisations to legitimise and support 
the transformation of public administrations alongside the NPM rationales 
(Fredriksson & Pallas, 2016b). But it is also a development that takes place 
in the light of a general growth of communication experts and an increase of 
policy professionals across parliaments, ministries, parties, and bureaucracies 
(Garsten et al., 2015). Within ministries, these policy professionals have been 
known as ministerial advisors (Hustedt et al., 2017; Shaw & Eichbaum, 2018). 
Taken together, these developments have boosted the importance of strategic 
communication and political public relations within ministries and public 
agencies (Fredriksson & Pallas, 2016a; Strömbäck & Kiosis, 2019). 
On this background, research projects have been initiated in Finland, Nor-
way, Sweden, and Denmark from the late 2000s onwards. Over time, three main 
bodies of research have developed, including research on media management 
and mediatisation, reputation management, and crisis communication. In each, 
key contributions in the international literature originate from Nordic schol-
ars and scholarly networks, building on rich empirical data and contributing 
conceptual debates.
Media management and mediatisation
A substantial literature has studied how public bureaucracies deal with the 
news media. Since media management in public agencies was largely uncovered 
terrain, the first strand of studies was exploratory in asking: How do public 
bureaucracies meet media requests and criticism? How do they present policy 
in the news media? To what extent is media visibility important for public bu-
reaucracies? And if, and how, does media management impact on organisational 
priorities, routines, and practices? 
Broadly, studies of media management distinguish between reactive media 
strategies (how media requests are logged, dealt with, and responded to) and 
proactive media strategies (how the organisation takes initiative towards the 
media to inform and promote). Based on empirically grounded research projects, 
the following key characteristics of media management have been emphasised 
in a Nordic context.
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First, studying how public bureaucracies deal with the news media in a time 
with rolling deadlines, continuous critical news coverage, and media-oriented 
political leaders, studies found that government ministries and agencies have 
routinised reactive media management: they monitor media coverage; the com-
munication desk operates a 24/7 press service; and media requests are dealt 
with in designated meetings. The communication staff take the media requests 
to the other departments to prepare background and talking points, which are 
edited by communication experts and presented in the media by agency leaders 
or designated spokespersons. These internal processes involve disagreements, 
negotiations, and compromises between the different professions and depart-
ments in the organisation (Johansson & Nygren, 2019; Pallas et al., 2016; 
Thorbjørnsrud et al., 2014).  
Second, asking whether and how media management impact on organisa-
tional priorities, routines, and practices, studies find that public bureaucracies 
strive to adapt to the rhythm and format of the news media (Thorbjørnsrud 
et al., 2014), as news stories are “always” prioritised and largely set internal 
agendas (Figenschou et al., 2019). Public servants experience that the media’s 
agenda-setting also impacts on resource allocation and case decisions – under 
certain conditions such as massive media pressure, broad popular and political 
mobilisation, and the government politicians’ priorities (Figenschou et al., 2019; 
Ihlen & Thorbjørnsrud, 2014b; Kunelius & Reunanen, 2012).
Third, analysing when public bureaucracies are challenged by the media and 
how they deal with critical coverage, another strand of literature has emphasised 
the dilemmas and limits of reactive media management. In recent years, when 
individual citizens suffer the consequences of failed policies and poor services, 
they increasingly raise their case in the news media or social media (Canel & 
Luoma-aho, 2019). The negative coverage represents a burden for many public 
servants. To manage such a coverage, public bureaucracies employ a number of 
strategies (Ihlen & Thorbjørnsrud, 2014a) and changes in policies (Knudsen, 
2016). For government ministries and their leaders, balancing the need to be 
visible and demonstrate agency in the media (Figenschou et al., 2017) with 
institutional constraints and the formal delegation of responsibility limits the 
communication repertoire available, and often results in a standard type of 
unconvincing media performance (Thorbjørnsrud & Figenschou, 2018).
Fourth, studies find a new and growing emphasis on proactive media 
management in public bureaucracies as a result of changing journalist–public 
bureaucracy relations, intense media pressure, and increasing awareness of repu-
tation and strategic communication in the public sector (Malling, 2019). Civil 
servants justify such proactive pitches of news stories from government agencies 
to selected journalists and media outlets as a necessary counter-strategy to set 
the agenda otherwise dominated by “critical” and “hostile” media campaigns 
(Figenschou & Thorbjørnsrud, 2015). Internal discussions often concern when 
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and where to pitch policies and how to follow up, with expert bureaucrats 
constituting an internal buffer and communication experts and politicians 
driving proactive initiatives. Fundamental proactive media strategies employed 
by communication experts include involving the minister (personalisation of 
ministerial communication) and offering exclusivity (Figenschou et al., 2017). 
Overall, this new emphasis on selective proactive leaks and pitches exemplifies 
the trend towards a more professional, yet more informal, government com-
munication (Malling, 2019). 
Together, these studies build on and contribute to the theorisation of me-
diatisation (e.g., Lundby, 2014), an area where Nordic scholars have been 
internationally leading (see, e.g., Asp, 2014; Hjarvard, 2008; Lundby, 2009; 
Strömbäck, 2008). In short, mediatisation refers to the institutionalisation of 
media and how ideas regarding media’s functionalities, values, work methods, 
and effects are widely distributed across sectors and fields and eventually inter-
vene with the organisations’ activities, decisions, and communication. Broadly, 
mediatisation comprises both how different institutions and organisations adapt 
to and adopt media logics, and how they use these to promote and secure the 
organisations’ values and aims. Nordic scholars have predominantly studied 
these processes on the meso-level, employing mixed methods, case studies, and 
comprehensive ethnographic data, which have arguably enabled some important 
theoretical contributions.
Conceptualising how public bureaucracies adapted to, and adopted, a news 
logic, Thorbjørnsrud and colleagues (2014) elaborated the news logic concept 
and positioned this research within a neo-institutional approach to news 
journalism (Cook, 1998), stressing that the news logic largely works as a logic 
of appropriateness – self-evident, given, natural, and hence not the object of 
deliberation (March & Olsen, 2006). Insights that the media-first approach is 
largely practice-driven, tacit knowledge, and often not formalised in existing 
communication plans and policies represent a key contribution here. Overall, 
the resources spent on media work and the prioritisation of media requests are 
perceived as necessary, important, and self-evident (although there are varia-
tions between different professions and parts of the organisation), and these 
priorities are thus difficult to change or challenge (Figenschou et al., 2017; 
Thorbjørnsrud et al., 2014). 
How the (news) media logic is embedded in and translated into particular 
contexts (Pallas et al., 2016) and the need to understand mediatisation within 
the distinct type of organisation (public bureaucracies) (Fredriksson & Pallas, 
2020) represent a second key contribution to mediatisation literature. This ap-
proach illuminates how logics are translated locally, and hence do not always 
collide with or colonise other organisational logics (Pallas et al., 2016) and 
challenge strict perceptions of a media logic versus political and administrative 
logics (Kunelius & Reunanen, 2012). 
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Reputation management
Over the last decade, the concept of reputation has resurfaced in research on 
bureaucracies (Carpenter, 2010; Carpenter & Krause, 2012; Maor, 2007, 2010, 
2011; Maor & Wæraas, 2015), and it has attracted broad scholarly attention 
from scholars studying communication, management, political science, and 
others (Barnett & Pollock, 2012; Chun, 2005; Fomnrun & Van Riel, 2004). 
“Reputation” has been defined as the “set of beliefs about an organisation’s 
capacities, intentions, history, and mission that are embedded in a network of 
multiple audiences” (Carpenter, 2010: 34), and in this context, bureaucracies 
build, maintain, and protect their reputation to generate public support and 
to accrue autonomy and discretion from politicians (Carpenter, 2002). Thus, 
bureaucracies face a complex web of reputational concerns regarding how they 
are conceived by multiple audiences prioritising different dimensions of their 
work (Carpenter, 2010). 
Research on bureaucratic reputation often refers to the framework of Car-
penter (2001, 2002) and asks how regulatory agencies balance the various 
reputation elements related to performance (does the agency do its job?); mo-
rality (does the agency protect the interests of its clients?); technical expertise 
(does the agency have the skills and capacity required?); and procedures (does 
the agency follow accepted rules and norms?). In their comparative study of 
agencies in the societal security sector in Denmark, Germany, Norway, Sweden, 
and the UK, Christensen and Lodge (2016) find several differences across the 
studied cases. For instance, autonomy is emphasised across the Swedish agen-
cies, reflecting their long tradition of agency autonomy, and Sweden also scores 
higher on individual moral symbols than Norway, something Christensen and 
Lodge say might reflect a higher level of adoption of NPM-related themes in 
Sweden. In a similar study of Norwegian regulatory agencies, Christensen and 
Gornitzka (2019) find that agencies tend to emphasise outputs and outcomes 
of their activities (performance), with increasing emphasis on professional and 
technical aspects, as well as moral values, over time. In Christensen and Gor-
nitzka’s study, reputation is explained by the age of the agency, as well as the 
audience that the agency is trying to reach. Sector and tasks are less relevant.
Carpenter’s (2001, 2002) framework attributes some relevance to commu-
nication but it is sub-oriented to decision-making and other activities (Maor, 
2015). Among Nordic scholars, communication has been put at the fore and 
accordingly much more attention has been paid to reputation management – 
that is to say, a recipe for how organisations are to organise, allocate resources, 
distribute responsibilities, and perform communication activities to create and 
maintain a strong reputation (Byrkjeflot, 2015). Studies from Denmark (Nielsen 
& Salomonsen, 2012), Norway (Wæraas et al., 2011), and Sweden (Fredriksson 
& Pallas, 2016a) show that the recipe has gained wide distribution in public 
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sector organisations. Wæraas and colleagues (2011) have made an extensive 
contribution to Nordic research, and within this scholarship, the branding 
and reputation management of local government has received considerable 
attention. Wæraas and colleagues (2014) find that Norwegian municipalities 
brand themselves as places, organisations, and political institutions, with all 
three branding strategies being almost equally important. In her longitudinal 
study of reputation projects in two Norwegian municipalities, Bjørnå (2016) 
finds that the mayor or chief executive functions as a reputational agent, with 
different motives and politically conscious strategies. Lockert and colleagues’ 
(2019) recent study targeted mayors and other persons responsible for strate-
gic communication in Norwegian and Danish municipalities. They found that 
local government responses to reputation reform depended on the size of the 
municipality and the type of actors involved. The larger the municipality, the 
more the administration was involved. Further on, the more administrative 
actors were involved, the more the strategies targeted organisational reputation.
The application of reputation management is not without problems, how-
ever; among other things, it challenges (legal) requirements for openness and 
transparency (Wæraas, 2008). Reputation management promotes autonomy, 
consistency, and organisational control, whereas openness is related to collec-
tive welfare, governance, and accountability, and consequently, bureaucracies 
must handle tensions between the two ideas. To do this, agencies make use of 
several different strategies – all of them contributing to the transformation and 
hybridisations of both reputation management and what it means to be “open” 
(Fredriksson & Edwards, 2019).
Concerning the empirical focus of Nordic studies, a considerable body of 
research has focused on certain sectors, especially within higher education 
and universities (Christensen et al., 2018; Sataøen, 2015; Sataøen & Wæraas, 
2016), within the health sector and hospitals (Sataøen, & Wæraas, 2015), and 
the police (Christensen & Lægreid, 2015). Much emphasis has also been put 
on subordinate agencies and municipalities, whereas ministries have received 
little attention. However, Salomonsen and colleagues (2016) find that perma-
nent civil servants in Danish ministries to some degree are involved in strategic 
communication to accommodate the realisation of political goals. Concerning 
the methods used in the Nordic studies, a wide variety exist. Some have used 
content analysis of web pages (Christensen et al., 2018; Sataøen & Wæraas, 
2016), others have used interviews with communication managers (Sataøen 
& Wæraas, 2015), and still others have used surveys (Lockert et al., 2019).
The scholarship on reputation management in the Nordic countries is well 
established and growing. What seems to be missing, however, are studies on 
how reputation management is actively used by subordinate agencies to accrue 
more autonomy and discretion from politicians (Carpenter, 2002). As underlined 
by Luoma-Aho (2007), public sector organisation does not necessarily need a 
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strong reputation, as this might demand a lot of resources and become a bur-
den. A neutral reputation is sufficient and enables a critical operating distance 
from interference from the political masters (Luoma-Aho, 2007). Further on, 
reputation management in central government entities, such as ministries, has 
received limited attention. Although ministries, to a lesser extent than agencies, 
might be autonomy seeking, reputation management is still highly important 
towards external stakeholders, for instance when their unique reputation as 
trustworthy developers of public policies is under threat. 
Crisis communication
A third stream of Nordic research focuses on bureaucracies’ crisis communi-
cation. In the wake of social unrest caused by the welfare state’s inability to 
fulfil the promises of general welfare, security, and equal civil rights (Voss & 
Lorenz, 2016), scholars and bureaucrats alike have showed increased interest 
for its applicability. Public agencies are central players in the welfare state, 
and it is evident that bureaucrats in general, and communicators working for 
agencies in particular, often get significant responsibilities for communication 
in large-scale crises (Olsson, 2014). Accordingly, crisis communication has 
become a central component in their communication repertoires. Scholars 
have followed suit, not least because of the extensive funding governments 
and agencies offer, and today, crisis communication is an expansive theme in 
the Nordic countries, especially in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden (Frandsen 
& Johansen, 2016). 
The interest in public organisations distinguishes Nordic scholars from 
international colleagues, who largely give precedence to corporations. This 
also means that the interest for organisational reputation, vital to much inter-
national research, is less prominent among Nordic scholars (cf. Christensen & 
Lægreid, 2015). In the Nordic context, much more attention has been given 
to resilience and public actors’ abilities to provide information and support to 
citizens and communities, not just to manage the acute phases of a crises, but 
also to help and support actors to recover after a crises and to restore trust 
in institutions and public organisations (Olsson, 2014). This, in turn, means 
that much research has focused on the interactions between agencies, news 
media, and the public.
Given the strong connections between practice and research, a significant 
amount of the work on bureaucracy and crisis communication has been des-
ignated to find solutions to the problems and challenges agencies and public 
bodies encounter. Consequently, many publications are reports or articles 
written by scholars commissioned by government organisations, often with an 
extraordinary event as a point of departure, such as the 2008 financial crisis 
(Johansson & Nord, 2011), the eruption of Eyjafjallajökull in 2010 (Bird et 
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al., 2018), or the terrorist attack in Norway in 2011 (Socialstyrelsen, 2012). It 
also means that research on public agencies and crisis communication, rather 
than a field or theory, is a problem or theme studied in a number of different 
disciplines, including media and communication studies, political science, tourist 
studies, volcanology, and others. The diversity is also evident when it comes to 
topics. There are examples of studies focusing on what crisis communication 
can imply for the public’s trust in bureaucracies (Christensen & Lægreid, 2015; 
Nord & Shehata, 2013), what it means to communicate to heterogeneous 
audiences (Olofsson, 2007) or certain audience groups (Sjöberg, 2018), and 
what rhetoric agencies make use of in crises (Johansson & Odén, 2018). Two 
themes are prominent, however.
The first prominent theme is how agencies organise, plan, manage, and 
perform their communication activities before, during, and after crises. Among 
other things, studies have shown limitations in how agencies organise and set 
up their routines to make sure that they are notified when something happens 
or is about to happen – events that are, or can develop into, a crisis. Studies 
covering Finland and Sweden (Kivikuru & Nord, 2009) showed the difficulties 
agencies had when they were set to master the situation after the tsunami in the 
Indian Ocean in 2004. The time (Christmas) and the place (South East Asia) 
were contributory factors, but overall, agencies showed obvious inabilities 
to act and provide information, support, and responses to those who posed 
questions. The tsunami event led to several investigations and commissioned 
research projects, and Frandsen and Johansen (2016) suggest that governments 
and civil services in all Nordic countries have learned a lot from the events. The 
question is not settled, however, and there are several examples of more recent 
studies showing that the problem still exists, for instance, during the terrorist 
attack in Norway in 2011 (Christensen & Lægreid, 2015) and the wildfires in 
Sweden in 2014 (Odén et al., 2016).
A second prominent theme is agencies’ abilities to get their messages through. 
Historically, this has primarily been a question of media relations and news 
coverage. Scholars (and bureaucrats) have shown extensive interest in how news 
media report and to what extent citizens can rely on media reporting when they 
encounter a crisis (Kivikuru, 2006). The interest for news media is still evident 
both among bureaucrats (Odén et al., 2016) and scholars (Nord & Olsson, 
2013), but the focus has shifted, and today, online communication and social 
media are frequent topics in research (Odén et al., 2016). What digital media is 
said to offer is an ability for agencies and bureaucrats to communicate directly 
with citizens and provide relevant and impartial information. Eriksson (2014a) 
also argues that digital media offer opportunities for situational adaptations 
and adjustments of messages to different platforms or target groups. They are 
also mobile and offer opportunities for prompt reactions, although there are 
notable limitations: the use of digital media in a crisis situation seems to be 
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higher among agencies and bureaucrats compared to the general public, even 
in a Nordic context where Internet penetration is relatively high (Eriksson & 
Olsson, 2016); agencies’ messages seem to disappear in the steady stream of 
updates from other sources (Odén et al., 2016); and agencies have difficulty 
attracting followers outside the groups they reach in other ways (Olsson & 
Eriksson, 2016). The overall impression is, therefore, that agencies’ focus on 
social media tends to amplify an already prominent line in society between 
those who get information and those who do not (Rasmusson & Ihlen, 2017).
Research beyond the techno-administrative approach is limited, and there 
are few attempts to develop theory or gain richer understandings of crisis com-
munication as ideology, system, or practice. This is not characteristic of Nordic 
scholars nor for research on public agencies, but something typical for research 
on crisis communication in general. There are some notable examples of Nordic 
studies offering other perspectives; some have made calls for more creativity 
and improvisation, both in research and practice (Eriksson, 2014b; Falkheimer 
& Heide, 2010), whereas others have shown that we cannot expect too much 
as the (institutionalised) idea of crisis communication is strongly supported 
by conceptions of planning, organising, and routinising (Fredriksson, 2014; 
Fredriksson et al., 2014). The role of institutions is also evident in the work 
of Frandsen and Johansen (2009; see also Frandsen et al., 2016), who have 
been trying to understand the mobilising factors for crisis communication and 
how we can understand its condition when its emergency logic (represented by 
emergency officers) is challenged by a new crisis management logic (represented 
by communicators and managers). Others have shown that similar tensions 
are evident when agencies try to adapt to the logic of social media (Olsson & 
Eriksson, 2016), and that public agencies, due to their multi-professionality, 
are particularly exposed for internal tensions (Heide & Simonsson, 2015).
Conclusion
For bureaucrats involved in communication activities in one way or another, 
media management, reputation management, and crisis communication are 
interrelated and overlapping responsibilities and concerns. The day-to-day 
encounters with journalists are believed to be of certain relevance when public 
organisations are set to create and maintain their trust and reputation. In times 
of crisis, the importance of the two is enhanced, and agencies’ performance 
during a major crisis can be seen as a test of their abilities to communicate in 
general and their ability to handle media in particular. It is also well known 
that agencies’ abilities to uphold and secure autonomy is put to test during 
crisis, as ministers have a tendency to make political interventions in times of 
heavy media scrutiny (Kolltveit, 2019). At the same time, agencies’ ability to 
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reach out during a major crisis builds on their already established reputation 
and trustworthiness in the existing networks and through existing channels.
Although highly interconnected in practice, these strands of literature (with 
their separate models, concepts, and references) have largely been three separate 
academic discussions (notable exceptions include Christensen & Lægreid, 2015). 
Moreover, they tend to follow disciplinary divides – with journalism and me-
dia scholars contributing to mediatisation and media management discussions 
as well as research on crisis communication, whereas political scientists and 
organisation scholars tend to dominate the literature on bureaucratic reputa-
tion. These divides are by no means absolute, but it is evident that they have 
had consequences for the three strands of literature and contribute to some of 
their limitations.
One of the shortcomings is the media-centrism in journalism and media 
research on mediatisation (for critical discussions, see Figenschou et al., 2020; 
Fredriksson & Pallas, 2017). Here, developments in the media landscape are 
often used to explain changing communication regimes in public bureaucracies 
(both empirically and analytically), whereas non-media drivers to mediatisation 
have often been left unexplored (developments in the political system, structural 
changes in public bureaucracies, etc.). Another shortcoming is the tendency 
among reputation scholars to oversee media or to reduce it to a channel for 
communication or an arena for other actors involved in the reputational game. 
Developments in the media landscape and what consequences they have for 
agencies’ interactions with their principals as well as other stakeholders are of-
ten set aside. Consequently, scholars disregard many of the contexts where the 
reputation of agencies is shaped, negotiated, or questioned. Research on crisis 
communication shows similar shortcomings. Even if media is a central theme in 
research, there is a strong tendency to handle it as a source providing informa-
tion to different actors involved or affected by the crisis. There are studies of 
the interactions between journalists and bureaucrats and what the two groups 
think of each other; less is known, however, about how mediatisation affects 
crisis communication (for an analysis of this in terms of social media, see Olsson 
& Eriksson, 2016). In line with this, research on crisis communication tends to 
oversee the variety in motives for agencies to communicate throughout crises. 
Public information and how to get the message through have been a returning 
question, even if it is evident that communication in public administrations is 
mobilised by different principles and that reputation management often outdoes 
civic communication (Fredriksson & Pallas, 2016b).
To combine the knowledge research has gained in terms of media manage-
ment, reputation management, and crisis communication, a first step would be 
to consolidate research on communication and public administration. With this, 
we would get much broader, but also detailed, knowledge about the motives, 
organising, content, and consequences of government agency communication. 
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In addition to this, there are other questions lacking answers, and from our 
point of view, future research would make an extensive contribution if it paid 
more attention to the following themes.
First, there is a lack of comprehensive analysis of the political, organisational, 
and democratic consequences of the professionalisation of communication in 
public bureaucracies. How does this affect policy-making processes, resource 
allocation, and prioritisation over time? One area that needs more investigation 
is if and how the ongoing professionalisation of communication contributes to 
and magnifies politicisation of public bureaucracies (Hustedt & Salomonsen, 
2017; Thorbjørnsrud, 2015). The increased presence of ministerial advisors 
(special advisors, political advisors, or state secretaries) in Nordic government 
ministries has spurred a growing interest in politicisation of public bureaucra-
cies (Christiansen et al., 2016; Hustedt et al., 2017); future research on how 
professionalisation of communication inside ministries – with an outspoken 
focus on strategic and proactive communication – impacts political processes 
requires more empirical emphasis. Newer studies indicate that the professional-
isation of communication in Northern governments blurs the borders between 
different actors inside governments (Johansson & Nygren, 2019) and leads to 
more informal communication (off-the-record conversations, pitches, leaks, 
etc.) (see, e.g., Malling, 2019), and that the use of new digital platforms in 
particular alters the communication of public bureaucracies towards political 
promotion and campaigning (Brekke & Thorbjørnsrud, 2018), which are all 
trends that call for further analysis. 
Second, more scholarly attention is needed pertaining to how the new hy-
brid, networked media landscape will impact on public sector communication. 
Citizens today raise questions, concerns, and complaints directly to government 
agencies and they expect quick, clear answers from public authorities (Canel 
& Luoma-aho, 2019). Moreover, interest groups and advocacy campaigns 
increasingly use social media to raise awareness for their causes; mobilise 
for policy change; and target responsible public authorities and politicians in 
government (Vromen, 2017). For public bureaucracies, networked media both 
amplify and intensify ongoing mediatisation processes and pose new opportu-
nities and fundamental challenges related to format, speed, accessibility, and 
resources. Existing studies of the use of social media in Nordic government 
communication have raised a number of issues calling for future studies; the 
adaptation of social media has had an ad-hoc character resulting in hasty im-
plementation (experimentation, poor guidelines, and unclear responsibilities), 
which evoke numerous ethical dilemmas and challenge the balance between 
political promotion and neutral, factual information (Brekke & Thorbjørnsrud, 
2018; Johansson & Nygren, 2019; Olsson & Eriksson, 2016). Particularly, 
interactivity and real-time dialogue – which are stressed as key dimensions in 
building public trust as well as reputation (Canel & Luoma-aho, 2019) – are 
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perceived as complicated and resource-demanding by government agencies 
(Figenschou, 2019).
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Chapter 17
Political media effects in a Nordic perspective
Audun Beyer, Erik Knudsen, Kim Andersen,  
& Adam Shehata
Abstract
In this chapter, we focus on one of the most central issues within the scholarly 
literature on political communication: political media effects. We centre our dis-
cussion on the role played by the Nordic context for political media effects and 
focus on media effects on political learning and knowledge gaps; agenda-setting, 
priming, and framing effects; and media effects on voting and other political be-
haviours. Because much of the research and theories that have shaped the political 
communication literature on media effects emanate from the US, we discuss how 
differences between the American and the Nordic contexts may influence how 
well the theories of political media effects emanating from an American perspec-
tive fit the Nordic countries. We pay particular attention to studies related to the 
different theories that have been conducted in the Nordic context.
Keywords: political media effects, agenda-setting, framing, political learning, 
effects on political behaviour
Introduction
In the scholarly field of media and communication research, the study of media 
effects is one of the most central (Nabi & Oliver, 2009). Studies of media ef-
fects span various research fields, such as health communication and science 
communication, but are particularly prominent in the field of political com-
munication. Within this field, the study of media effects has moved from being 
labelled “one of the most notable embarrassments of modern social science” 
(Bartels, 1993: 267) to having “a major impact in political science and com-
munications scholarship” (Iyengar, 2010: 190). As such, it is by now clear that 
the media play an important role in shaping people’s political beliefs, attitudes, 
and behaviours.
In this chapter, we focus on media effects on political learning and knowledge 
gaps; agenda-setting, priming, and framing effects; and finally, media effects on 
348
AUDUN BEYER, ERIK KNUDSEN, KIM ANDERSEN, & ADAM SHEHATA
voting and other political behaviours. These are some of the most prominent 
theories and areas of interest within media effects research (Neuman & Guggen-
heim, 2011), and they are especially well suited for the purpose of this chapter, 
namely to illustrate the role played by the Nordic context for political media 
effects. Much of the research and theories that have shaped the study of these 
central media effects within political communication emanate from the US. We 
will therefore ask and discuss how traits highlighting the differences between the 
American and the Nordic contexts (e.g., the status of public service broadcast-
ing) may influence how well the theories of political media effects emanating 
from an American perspective fit the Nordic countries. This is, of course, not 
to say that important research has not been done outside the US or the Nordic 
countries. However, to limit the scope of the chapter, we refrain from including 
other contexts – such as Germany or the Netherlands, for example – where a 
lot of research on political media effects has also been done.
We will argue that for theories relating to the human psychology, as, for example, 
framing, priming, and agenda-setting, there are few reasons to expect differences 
between different contexts, such as the US and the Nordic countries. However, 
when it comes to more contextual-dependent theoretical perspectives – such as 
the knowledge gap hypothesis or how different media types may or may not fos-
ter feelings of cynicism and apathy – there is reason to believe that there can be 
differences between the Nordic and the American contexts. Such differences may 
be due to the nature of the media systems with, for example, smaller distinctions 
between quality and tabloid newspapers and strong public service broadcasters.
We start by discussing the context of political media effects in the Nordic 
countries. We then proceed with discussions concerning political learning and 
knowledge gaps; agenda-setting, priming, and framing; and finally, effects on 
voting and other political behaviour. Lastly, we summarise our discussions and 
provide some concluding remarks concerning the state of media effects research 
in the Nordic region. Throughout the chapter, we pay particular attention to 
studies related to the different theories that have been conducted in the Nordic 
context. We limit ourselves to political media effects on public opinion gen-
erally, and individuals more specifically, but it is, of course, also possible to 
study effects of political communication on the macro level, such as on political 
culture and institutions (see Potter, 2012). For instance, the macro level theory 
of mediatisation is one of the most studied in the Nordic context but will not 
be included in our discussions. 
Political media effects in the Nordic countries
Even though the media effects considered in this chapter are typically studied 
from a micro-level perspective, various institutional and contextual factors play 
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an important role. The idea that macro-level characteristics condition opinion 
dynamics and media effects at the individual level is widely recognised in the 
field and one reason behind the growing interest in cross-national political com-
munication research (Aalberg & Curran, 2012; Hallin & Mancini, 2004). More 
generally though, the importance of macro-level factors in media effects has also 
been highlighted by the vast media environmental transformations in the last 
decades. A range of classic political media effects, such as agenda-setting, prim-
ing, framing, and learning, are conditioned upon the wider socio-technological 
contexts that have characterised Western democracies at different points in 
time (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008; Prior, 2007). A changing media environment 
(macro-level) influences patterns of individual media consumption and effects 
(micro-level). As such, macro-level influences vary across both time and space.
Macro-level influences on media effects are well captured by the so-called 
O-M-A (i.e., opportunities, motivations, and abilities) framework, which is 
developed specifically to explain the interplay between structural and individual 
factors (Delli Carpini & Keeter, 1996; Luskin, 1990). Accordingly, media 
system characteristics influence the information opportunities citizens have. 
Opportunities typically refer to the number and character of different media 
available to citizens in a given society. With better opportunities to select among 
various media with diverse content (supply-side), personal motivations and 
abilities will have a greater influence on what content people are exposed to 
(demand-side). Cross-national variations in media environmental opportunity 
structures are therefore highly important for understanding differential media 
effects across countries.
As such, research on comparative media systems highlights important insti-
tutional characteristics that distinguish the Nordic countries. Historically, the 
Nordic media systems have belonged to the “democratic corporatist model”, 
characterised – among other things – by strong journalistic professionalism, 
high newspaper circulation, and strong public service broadcasting institutions 
(Brüggemann et al., 2014; Hallin & Mancini, 2004). Although media systems are 
constantly changing, and distinct characteristics between models may gradually 
disappear, some of these characteristics are highly relevant today.
Compared to the American media system, where most media effects research 
has been conducted, the Nordic countries therefore provide different opportunity 
structures for selective media exposure with important implications for a variety 
of media effects, such as the ones discussed in this chapter. A long tradition of 
research into selective exposure has shown that people have a tendency to seek 
out attitude-consistent media content, without necessarily avoiding the other 
side (Garrett, 2009; Stroud, 2011). The extent to which citizens can engage in 
selective exposure is, however, dependent on opportunity structures for selec-
tive exposure at the country level. The concept of opportunity structures for 
selective exposure refers to the “availability of different media, media formats, 
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media genres, and media content, and the ease with which citizens can select 
media and media content based on their personal preferences” (Skovsgaard et 
al., 2016: 4; see also Castro-Herraro et al., 2018). While the current American 
media system provides significant opportunities for citizens to select media based 
on both a general interest in politics (current affairs vs. entertainment) as well as 
political preferences (partisan media), this is not the case in the Nordic countries. 
Even though entertainment options have grown dramatically in the Nordic 
countries as well, allowing citizens who are not particularly interested in politics 
to tune out from news and current affairs, partisan media outlets are much less 
prevalent. As such, the structural opportunities – although gradually expand-
ing in the online environment – for citizens to select media content based on 
partisan or ideological preferences are generally lower. In the Nordic countries, 
legacy media and public service broadcasters have transitioned into the online 
sphere quite successfully, further curbing the development of partisan, online 
media. This is not to say that that selective exposure to ideologically congruent 
sources does not occur in the Nordic countries (see, e.g., Knudsen et al., 2018; 
Knudsen & Johannesson, 2018; Johannesson ® Knudsen, 2020), but that it is 
much less prevalent than in the American media system. The extent to which 
media systems are fragmented and politically polarised significantly influences 
how individual-level media effects translate into aggregate-level outcomes. The 
fact that Nordic media environments are less fragmented politically and tradi-
tional news organisations continue to play a significant role, sets the stage for 
a variety of media effects to play out differently here (Aalberg & Curran, 2012; 
Dahlgren, 2019; Djerf-Pierre & Shehata, 2017; cf. Knudsen, 2020). 
Political learning and knowledge gaps
As most citizens experience politics through the media, the media play a central 
role for citizens learning about politics and current affairs. Whether people learn 
from the media will depend on both individual and structural factors, however. 
According to the “knowledge gap hypothesis” (Tichenor et al., 1970), people 
with higher socioeconomic status (SES) tend to learn faster and more from the 
media than people with lower SES. The mass media contributes to creating a 
knowledge gap because of a range of factors that differ between persons with 
higher and lower SES. These factors include learning habits, information-
processing skills, social networks, communication skills, perceived relevance 
leading to selective exposure, and, finally, that the media are “geared toward 
people with high SES with the result that low SES may have difficulty under-
standing the news” (McCombs et al., 2011: 94). This will eventually create a 
Matthew Effect where the rich get richer and the poor get poorer in terms of 
political knowledge. 
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Just as the O-M-A framework helps explain differences in selective expo-
sure, as we described above, it also helps explain differences in political learn-
ing from the media (Prior, 2007). In line with the knowledge gap hypothesis, 
the framework posits that political learning depends on people’s motivations 
and abilities to process information from the media. In addition, however, the 
framework also highlights that the influence of these individual factors will be 
conditioned by the structural opportunities to get information. When people 
have more opportunities to access different types of information (both political 
and non-political), their motivation for processing such information becomes 
more important for their political learning. Such information opportunities 
vary both across time and cross-nationally. 
From a time perspective, Prior (2007) shows how Americans’ preferences 
have become more important for their news use and political learning in to-
day’s high-choice media environment compared to the earlier time’s low-choice 
environment where only a few media sources were available. Consequently, 
the amount of accidental exposure or incidental exposure, where people are 
exposed to news while using the media for other purposes, has decreased. Similar 
results are found in the Nordic context. In a study from Sweden, Strömbäck 
and colleagues (2013) show how the number of both news avoiders and news 
seekers have increased over time, and how political interest has become a more 
important predictor for news consumption. Comparative studies by Norwegian 
researchers indicate that such trends are taking place across most European 
countries (Aalberg et al., 2013; Blekesaune et al., 2012). However, a recent 
study of news avoidance in Norway, spanning a 20-year period, only finds a 
small, incremental increase in total news avoidance of about 0.1 per cent per 
year (Karlsen et al., 2020). The same study also finds that the decrease in news 
exposure from traditional news media is largely compensated for when one 
takes into account news exposure from online and social media.
From a cross-national perspective, the O-M-A framework can be used to 
explore how differences in opportunity structures for selective exposure affects 
political learning. In the Nordic countries, public service broadcasting ensures 
a better opportunity structure for being accidentally exposed to political infor-
mation in the news media. For example, research from Denmark shows how 
scheduling the entertainment show The X Factor before and after the public 
service television news leads more people, especially younger people and those 
with lower news interest, to watch the news (Andersen et al., 2019). As a 
natural consequence, research from Sweden has shown that especially people 
with low interest learn about politics from public service news (Shehata et al., 
2015). Likewise, the importance of context is underlined by research showing 
that public service media provide more hard news and that people therefore 
know more about politics in the Nordic countries compared to the US (Curran 
et al., 2009; Iyengar et al., 2010).
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With the rise of the Internet and social media, researchers have debated 
whether such media platforms help or hinder incidental exposure to news and 
political information. On social media, people often stumble upon news – shared 
by friends, suggested by algorithms, or sponsored by news companies – while 
doing other things (Bergström & Belfrage, 2018; Fletcher & Nielsen, 2018). 
However, the people most likely to be accidentally exposed to and engage 
with news on social media are those who already have an interest in news and 
politics (Kümpel, 2020). Just as the knowledge gap hypothesis and the O-M-A 
framework highlight, this is likely to cause a Matthew Effect, where the rich 
get richer while the poor get poorer. Even if social media benefits the poor, it 
will likely be to a lesser extent than for the rich. 
Related, researchers have also examined whether social media facilitate po-
litical knowledge. Research has shown that news use through traditional media 
like newspapers facilitates political learning to a larger degree than reliance on 
social media news use. In fact, several recent studies have shown that social 
media news use may be negatively related to political knowledge. Recently, 
this has been documented in a Nordic context, where Karlsen and colleagues 
(2020) show that what they label passive news use in social media is related to 
less political learning. In other words, the more reliant one is on getting news 
through social media, the less likely one is to be politically knowledgeable. 
The absence of political learning effects from using social media has also been 
documented in three separate panel surveys conducted in Sweden, all showing 
that traditional news media use is a stronger predictor of political and current 
affairs knowledge than social media news use (Dimitrova et al., 2014).
In sum, although changes in the media environment have given people more 
opportunities to turn their backs to the news media, with consequences for the 
political knowledge, this seems to happen to a larger extent in the US than in 
the Nordic countries. One main reason for this is the presence of strong public 
service broadcasters securing better opportunity structures for being exposed 
to political information. However, these positive learning effects are, in general, 
challenged by news consumption moving to social media sites.
Agenda-setting and priming effects
Learning factual knowledge concerning, for example, who is in power and 
how the political spectrum is defined, is one important way in which the media 
contribute to political communication effects. However, the media are also 
able to play a role for political communication by focusing attention towards 
some issues while ignoring others. Three important – and by many scholars 
considered related – theories in this regard are agenda-setting, priming, and 
framing. 
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Agenda-setting’s core tenet is that there is a transfer of salience from the 
media agenda to the public agenda. This means that, on average, issues that 
receive much attention by the media are also considered as more important by 
the public. Agenda-setting is one of the most studied perspectives and theo-
ries in communication science, and it has been strengthened through literally 
hundreds of studies, all over the world for the last 50 years. Agenda-setting 
was first established as a concept by Walter Lippman about 100 years ago and 
reiterated by Cohen (1963) almost 60 years ago. However, it only received a 
proper empirical test by the now seminal Chapel Hill study in the US (McCombs 
& Shaw, 1972). The Chapel Hill study, followed by a range of agenda-setting 
studies over time and in different contexts, found strong support for the origi-
nal assumption; the more salient an issue was on the media agenda, the more 
important that issue was perceived to be by the public.
Public agenda-setting has also been studied in the Nordic countries. For 
example, it has been studied in Sweden, both during election campaigns (She-
hata, 2010; Shehata & Strömbäck, 2013) and over longer time spans (Djerf-
Pierre & Shehata, 2017; Shehata & Falasca, 2014). Findings from these studies 
lend support for the basic hypothesis, but also highlight the significance of 
individual-level moderators conditioning agenda-setting effects. There is also 
not much evidence that agenda-setting influence of traditional news media in 
Sweden has become weaker during the transition from a low- to high-choice 
media environment (Djerf-Pierre & Shehata, 2017). Regarding intermedia 
agenda-setting between traditional and online news media and social media, 
Harder and colleagues (2017) conclude that online media can indeed alter 
agenda-setting processes by significantly setting the agenda for other media to 
follow. However, they also show, in line with Djerf-Pierre and Shehata (2017), 
how slower media, such as printed newspapers, are still highly important.
Perhaps the closest relative to agenda-setting is priming. While priming 
has been known in the field of psychology for many years, it was first used in 
a media and communication setting a little over thirty years ago (Iyengar & 
Kinder, 1987). Priming is said to be the case when the media focus attention 
on an issue (similar to agenda-setting), and that issue then becomes important 
in individuals’ later judgments. Concerning the mechanism behind priming, it 
“occurs when a given message activates a mental concept, which for a period 
of time increases the probability” that this mental concept comes to mind 
again (McLeod et al., 2009: 230). Priming has often been studied with regards 
to presidential evaluations in an American context. When judging how well a 
president is doing, people seem to place more weight on the issue on which they 
had been primed with beforehand than on other issues. This means that a presi-
dent’s overall approval rating is highly contingent on how well they are doing 
on the most salient issue of the day. For instance, Pan and Kosicki (1997) show 
that the overall evaluations of the first President Bush were highly dependent 
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on the media coverage of first the Gulf War, leading to a higher overall rating, 
and then the economy, leading to a lower overall rating. 
Priming has also been studied in the Nordic context. In Denmark, de Vreese 
(2004) shows how the news media’s coverage of the euro referendum primed 
voters in their evaluation of politicians. Likewise, in Denmark, Kalogeropoulos 
and colleagues (2017) show how exposure to news about the economy primes 
people’s government evaluation. A Swedish study also documented priming 
effects of economic issues on government approval during the financial crisis, 
although these effects were conditioned by voters’ attributions of responsibility 
(Shehata & Falasca, 2014). In Norway, studies conducted as part of the Nor-
wegian National Election Studies have also shown the occurrence of priming 
effects during an election campaign (Jenssen & Aalberg, 2004).
Although studies suggest that agenda-setting and priming effects persist in the 
Nordic countries, the gradual fragmentation of media environments certainly 
challenge these classic mass communication theories. As citizens’ opportunities 
for media choice increase, with personal values and preferences becoming more 
important for explaining media usage, the idea of a homogenous media agenda 
influencing all citizens becomes less viable (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008; Chaffee & 
Metzger, 2001). With a more heterogenous supply of news, selective exposure 
and reinforcing spirals may better explain the formation of fragmented public 
agendas (Slater, 2015; Stroud, 2011). 
Framing effects
While agenda-setting and priming effects often deal with larger issues, and 
how the salience of those issues in the media affect judgments concerning issue 
importance and issues as standards for evaluations, framing is concerned with 
the nature of the coverage of specific news items. This means that agenda-
setting and priming are concerned with what the media cover, while framing is 
concerned with how an issue is covered. When choosing, whether deliberately 
or not, a perspective from which to tell a news story, the journalist frames the 
story. What it means to frame something has received a lot of scholarly atten-
tion over the years, but the most cited definition is the version that Entman 
provided in his seminal 1993 article. Here, Entman (1993: 52) argues that to 
frame is to choose some elements of a phenomenon over others in such a way 
that it promotes “a particular problem definition, causal interpretation, moral 
evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation”. If a frame can define something, 
name the causes of the problem, how to evaluate it, and how to fix it, these 
elements may in turn come to influence how people respond to, think about, 
and behave towards the problem at hand. For instance, if climate change is 
mainly framed in terms of the problems it creates for businesses that have to 
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stop polluting, rather than something that may cause serious weather problems 
with even more severe economic consequences (McCombs et al., 2011), these 
are two very different problem definitions that may lead to equally different 
causal claims and remedies. 
In the framing literature, scholars have often distinguished between two 
main types of frames: issue-specific and generic. Issue-specific frames pertain 
to a particular issue, and in themselves are not transferable to different issues. 
For example, a budget deficit can be framed as a political scandal, where the 
responsible politician is forced to leave office, or can be framed as a conse-
quence of long-term developments focusing on macro-economic factors. Ge-
neric frames “transcend thematic limitations and can be identified in relation 
to different topics, some even over time and in different cultural contexts” (de 
Vreese, 2005: 5). Examples of generic news frames are human-interest fram-
ing, which focuses on individuals and cases, or the framing of politics as a 
game or a dispute over an issue. The game framing of politics focuses on the 
horse-race element of election campaigns, it employs language of winning and 
losing, and deals with election polls to a large degree (see Beyer, 2012; Cappella 
& Jamieson, 1997; de Vreese, 2005). Such frames also construe politicians 
as strategic actors in a battle for power. Effects of such frames are increased 
cynicism and apathy among the electorate and lower levels of political efficacy 
(Cappella & Jamieson, 1997). 
Framing effects have also been found in the Nordic context. In Denmark, de 
Vreese and Semetko (2002) show how exposure to news that relies on strategy 
framing leads to an increase in political cynicism. The effects of the strategic 
game frame on cynicism and trust towards both political actors and the media 
themselves have also been documented in election campaign studies in Sweden 
(Hopmann et al., 2015; Shehata, 2014). Likewise, in Norway, Beyer (2012) 
shows that people who rely on a commercial broadcaster rather than a publicly 
funded broadcaster – and thereby are exposed more to strategic framing – show 
higher levels of both cynicism and apathy towards politics. Studies have also 
been conducted on the use of human-interest framing. In Denmark and Norway, 
studies have shown how including a case in news stories affects both people’s 
political opinions (Hopmann et al., 2017; Knudsen, 2016) and their intention 
to participate politically (Andersen et al., 2017).
In sum, agenda-setting, priming, and framing effects, similar to those 
originally identified in the US, have been identified in the Nordic countries. If 
such effects should differ across some contexts, it should therefore be a result 
of differences in media content – for example, the extent to which a topic is 
framed in a specific manner – rather than differences in how people react to 
such content.
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Voting, turnout, and other behavioural effects
Concerning political behaviours, voting is clearly the most central activity that 
has been explored in research on political communication effects. Voter turnout 
is perhaps the most-studied variable in relation to the election process, and 
also the variable that all scholars (and others) view as normatively beneficiary, 
per se. Research has shown that different forms of mediated political commu-
nication can have both positive and negative effects on turnout. For instance, 
negative advertising and campaigning is often shown to increase turnout, but 
can, however, also alienate voters by creating cynicism and apathy that leads 
to demobilising in parts of the electorate (for a discussion, see McLeod et al., 
2009). Generally, attention to and use of traditional forms of news media, 
such as newspapers, seem to be positively related to turnout, but the direction 
of causation between news use, political discussion, and turnout at the ballots 
remains unclear (Norris, 2000; McCombs et al., 2011). 
Studies have also examined the effects of the publication of public opinion 
polls on both turnout and changes in party choice. Some studies propose a 
bandwagon effect (Miller, 2000), where parties that are leading the race gain 
additional momentum because some voters seem to prefer being on the win-
ning side. Other studies propose an underdog effect (Fleitas, 1971), where the 
opposite happens, as parties that are behind on the polls may mobilise voters 
that otherwise would not have decided to turn up on election day to secure that 
a party is represented in parliament. The concern for these types of effects has 
caused several countries to have restrictions on the publication of opinion polls 
in different lengths of time prior to an election, and the World Association for 
Public Opinion Research conducts regular studies of countries that maintain 
different forms of such restrictions.
In their book on how the media affect civic life, McCombs and colleagues 
(2011) review scholarship that has extended our understanding of how the news 
media affect not only voting behaviours, but also other forms of participation. 
Such behaviours include going to political meetings, signing petitions, contact-
ing public officials, protesting, boycotting, volunteering for organisations, and 
being a member in civic organisations. Taken together, the evidence suggests 
that engaging with news media is positively related to most forms of such 
participation in political and civic life. However, some forms of news media 
use may also disengage citizens and raise levels of cynicism. In addition, some 
scholars argue that general television viewing limits and decreases political 
participation by lowering social capital (see, e.g., Putnam, 2000). 
Research from the Nordic context also shows how the media influence 
political participation. In Denmark, for example, Andersen and colleagues 
(2016) show how use of hard news in general is positively related to political 
participation by increasing knowledge and efficacy, while the use of soft news is 
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negatively related. In another study, however, Andersen (2019) shows how soft 
news have the ability to mobilise people with a low political interest. Also in 
Denmark, Ohme (2019) shows how exposure to political information on social 
media can foster campaign participation. In Sweden, Dimitrova and colleagues 
(2014) likewise show how social media use has a positive effect on political 
participation. In Norway, Beyer and colleagues (2014) report two experiments 
that show the potential for media saliency to change vote intention, in line with 
issue ownership literature and expectations.
With respect to behavioural effects, the changing media environment may 
similarly lead to polarisation between groups of citizens. As citizens can seek 
out whatever content they prefer – following generally their interests as well 
as political values – political inequalities and gaps might increase. Personalised 
communication flows stemming from a combination of self-selection and algo-
rithms are typically assumed to reinforce differences in political participation and 
polarise attitudes between groups (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008; Prior, 2007). So 
far, however, the empirical evidence for such polarisation remains inconclusive.
Conclusion
In this chapter, we outlined some of the most central theories for political 
media effects, focusing on media effects on political learning and knowledge 
gaps; agenda-setting, priming, and framing effects; and finally, media effects on 
voting and other political behaviours. Throughout the chapter, we highlighted 
studies from the Nordic countries that are relevant to the theories discussed, 
and we argued why political media effects in the Nordic context are similar to 
or different from other contexts. The study of political media effects has been 
strongly dominated by US-based scholars who tend to draw on empirical data 
from the American political and media context. This may represent a bias in 
the study of political media effects, as the American system, both politically and 
with regards to the media, differs in important respects from many European 
countries, and particularly the Nordic countries (see Esping-Andersen, 1990; 
Hallin & Mancini, 2004). At the same time, the research on political media 
effects in the Nordic countries has been limited compared to US-based research, 
albeit with several noteworthy contributions as highlighted in this chapter. This 
means that there is a limited pool of studies to draw on if we wish to explore 
possible differences in political media effects between the Nordic countries and 
other contexts, such as the US.
Theoretically, however, one can assume both substantial similarities and 
differences between the Nordic countries and other contexts, such as the US. Re-
garding the former, we believe that for theories and mechanisms that are clearly 
rooted in human psychology, such as framing, priming, and agenda-setting, 
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there is little reason to expect large differences across contexts. For instance, 
when individuals participate in controlled experiments examining framing ef-
fects across countries, people tend to react similarly to stimuli (e.g., Aarøe & 
Petersen, 2014). Thus, if there are real-world differences across contexts in, for 
example, framing effects, it is likely to be a consequence of differences in media 
coverage, rather than individuals in the Nordic countries reacting differently to 
stimulus compared to individuals from other contexts. This is of course not to 
say that the media in different societies are creating similar pictures in people’s 
heads, but merely that people from different contexts respond similarly, for 
example, when exposed to the same frame.
This interpretation is, of course, a simplification of a more complex real-
ity. However, it serves the purpose of highlighting that it is important to take 
contextual factors into account when studying such media effects. Contextual 
factors are particularly important regarding more context-dependent theories, 
such as selective exposure and the knowledge gap hypothesis, or when looking 
at effects of real-world media coverage. The importance of different political 
media effects may very well differ across different contexts that, for example, 
have different opportunity structures for news consumption (Esser et al., 2012). 
Thus, we argue that a key factor in explaining why political media effects, such 
as differences in political learning from the media, play out differently in the 
Nordic context compared to the American context, is differences in the op-
portunity structures for exposure to political information in these contexts. In 
other words, the underlying individual mechanisms in political media effects 
are likely to be similar in the Nordic context compared to other contexts, but 
the context in which these effects unfold differs.
Scholars of media effects in the Nordic countries are increasingly providing 
valuable knowledge on how some media effects are similar to, and other media 
effects are different from, the effects identified in other contexts. Both types of 
evidence are important, as both point to the potential limits or universality of 
communication theories. As with the study of individual differences and simi-
larities in media effects (Oliver & Krakowiak, 2009), contextual similarities 
and differences can enrich our understanding of when, how, and for whom 
political media effects apply. Importantly, one of the core developments of 
media effects research, since the fields earliest work, is the understanding that 
media effects are not “one-size-fits-all” (Oliver & Krakowiak, 2009). Rather, 
researchers are likely to find heterogeneous differences in media effects. Because 
media effects can play out differently across contexts due to differences in op-
portunity structures, evidence on media effects from the Nordic context have 
contributed with bringing the field closer to a general understanding of when, 
how, and for whom different types of media influence individuals politically. For 
that reason, it is important that Nordic political communication scholars not 
only continue to, but also increase their effort to, engage with the international 
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literature on political media effects to explore and explain how different types 
of such effects play out in the Nordic countries. Only by testing theories, and 
further developing them with data from the Nordic context, can the field start 
to move away from a possible theoretical bias and blind spots that arise from 
focusing on one, or just a few, contexts. 
As exposure to information online is increasingly determined by interactions 
between humans and algorithms, the task of reliably measuring media effects 
is increasingly hard to accomplish (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008). Algorithms in-
creasingly determine the selection of items shown to each user on social media 
and the order and presentation of news on online news sites. This means that 
individuals are now more likely than ever before to receive different “treatments” 
in terms of which news and news framing they receive (Helberger, 2019). If 
individuals receive different “treatments”, then media effects are also likely to 
be increasingly individualised. Thus, the challenge for future media effects re-
search is not only to study and understand differences across time and countries, 
but also across platforms and personalised online news sites and social media 
news feeds. Only by rising to this challenge and developing new methods and 
theoretical concepts that can help explain and account for individualised and 
personalised information can the field continue to reliably estimate different 
forms of media effects in the future. 
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Abstract
Rhetorical research in the three Scandinavian countries has made contributions 
to the study of political communication, representing approaches that are not 
often found in research coming from the social sciences or from more systemic, 
theory-based orientations. Rhetoric, both as an ancient tradition and as a modern 
discipline, tends to emphasise close study of actual pieces of communication – 
verbal, visual, or otherwise. This rarely leads to quantitative, generalisable find-
ings, but instead to observations and conceptualisations of phenomena – which 
may then be studied from quantitative and empirical angles. Often, rhetorical 
studies will have a normative tilt, based on notions of democracy, deliberation, 
and the public sphere – often with an eye for malfunctions and possible remedies. 
A growing literature of studies in Sweden, Denmark, and Norway tend to share 
some of these characteristics. At the same time, rhetorical scholars in Scandinavia 
recognise the value of empirical observation and have made contributions of their 
own in that regard, for example, in the field of reception studies.
Keywords: political debate, speechmaking, political rhetoric, Scandinavia, visual 
rhetoric
Introduction
Political rhetoric in Scandinavia is characterised by an informal style under-
girded by egalitarianism and authenticity. Compared to the ideological style 
and frequent hostility found in, for instance, the US, Scandinavian politicians’ 
rhetoric is mostly pragmatic, plain, and less polarising – for reasons of national 
cultures and democratic systems. This goes for traditional genres such as debates 
and speeches as well as for visual and online communication.
Before we describe this in more detail, we preface our account with remarks 
on what we might call the epistemology of rhetorical research, in other words, 
the kinds of insights rhetorical scholars typically seek. Rhetoric is historically 
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a humanistic discipline emphasising close, qualitative study of texts and other 
artifacts, considered singly or in small corpora. Such studies typically emphasise 
observations of significant phenomena that are then described and theorised. 
Quantitative claims of prevalence, causation, or effect are not typical, but the 
observations and concepts presented may invite and enable quantitative study. 
Also, rhetorical work often includes normative perspectives, for example on 
whether the phenomena observed are conducive to or inimical to a healthy 
democracy. Thus, rhetorical scholars’ research results, while different from 
typical empirical findings in the social sciences, may inspire and complement 
them, and conversely.
Most rhetoric researchers in Scandinavia practice rhetorical criticism, analy-
ses of rhetorical practice in political communication, and historical studies (e.g., 
Berge, 2014a). Their work is generally pragmatic about methodological purity, 
integrating several theories and methods and combining them with methods 
adapted from neighbouring fields, such as discourse analysis or linguistic 
pragmatics. Methods, in any given case, are chosen in order to best answer the 
research question. Textual analyses focusing on argumentation, ethos, gender, 
attitudes, or political debate all call for different tools.
Recently, scholars have turned towards work rooted in political science and 
deliberative theory. They increasingly realise that they not only have distinctive 
insights to offer on political rhetoric themselves, but also something to learn 
from disciplines using empirical, systemic, and quantitative approaches. 
Scandinavian research differs from contemporary American rhetorical research 
published in journals such as Quarterly Journal of Speech and Rhetoric Society 
Quarterly, which generally appears more theoretical and often reflects political 
engagement on behalf of groups considered disenfranchised or marginalised. 
Scandinavian rhetoricians usually seek to communicate to a broader audience, 
even in research journals. This is considered part of a scholarly ethos, but 
also a public duty. Thus, alongside academic publications, rhetorical scholars 
regularly discuss political rhetoric in print, broadcast, and online media aimed 
at general audiences.
This chapter discusses the practice of political rhetoric in use as well as the 
study of it. We point briefly to some contextual determinants of Scandinavian 
political rhetoric before highlighting key traits in contemporary practice: 
egalitarianism, attempted authenticity, and a turn towards populism and 
increased polarisation. Then follows a short discussion of political rhetoric 
in different genres. Finally, we highlight a few emerging research trends in 
the study of political rhetoric in Scandinavia.
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The framework for Scandinavian political rhetoric:  
Media system and political system
The three Scandinavian countries – Sweden, Denmark, and Norway – have 
closely related languages and cultures and similar political systems (see Chap-
ters 2–6), hence the political rhetoric is rather similar, and that is also true of 
research fields, objects, and methods (Kjeldsen, 2012; Kjeldsen & Grue, 2011).
The Scandinavian countries are established parliamentary democracies with 
high levels of social welfare. As elsewhere, political rhetoric is mainly performed 
in the media, and the media system creates important rhetorical constraints. The 
Scandinavian media system – with dominant public broadcasters and relatively 
small populations – has fostered shared national public spheres with a high 
degree of newspaper reading and dominant public broadcasters. In practice, 
there is a marked proximity between politicians and the public: politicians, 
including party leaders, cabinet members, and prime ministers, regularly par-
ticipate in the public sphere with comments, interviews, and debate pieces, and 
especially in broadcast political debates.
Because Scandinavian countries have multi-party systems and proportional 
party representation (see Hopmann & Karlsen, Chapter 11), both “catch-all” 
rhetoric and bi-partisan hostility is less prevalent than in the “winner-takes-all” 
systems of the UK and the US. Because Scandinavian voters have several alterna-
tive parties to pick from, voters may turn their backs on both the attacker and 
the attacked. Thus, traditionally, party political polarisation in these countries 
is low; politics in Scandinavia is generally oriented towards compromise or, if 
possible, consensus.
The party-centred focus of election campaigns and the collegiality between 
politicians emphasise the prime minister’s character (ethos) and abilities less 
and the party’s policies more. The prime minister routinely meets opponents in 
public debates or interviews, so he or she tends to – and is expected to – excel at 
live debate, confidently displaying command of government policy and skilfully 
countering opponents’ arguments. Compared to the US, Scandinavian politi-
cians are in much more direct rhetorical contact with the public, continuously 
engaged in rhetorical exchanges – with the electorate watching.
The Scandinavian rhetoric of egalitarianism and authenticity
The political rhetoric of Scandinavia – especially in Norway and Denmark – 
reflects an ideology emphasising egalitarianism and authenticity. We see this in 
visual rhetoric in print ads (in Denmark; Kjeldsen, 2008), in video adverts (in 
Norway; Iversen, 2018a), in speechmaking (Johansen, 1999, 2002; Kjeldsen & 
Johansen, 2011), and online (Krogstad, 2013, 2014). Politicians do not want 
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to appear as rising above ordinary people. The lowering of the political hero’s 
status reflected in television (e.g., Meyrowitz, 1985), weeklies, and popular 
culture has made the ethos of “the ordinary” central in political communica-
tion. This phenomenon, of course, goes beyond Scandinavia: In the US, for 
instance, we have witnessed the casual fireside chats of Franklin D. Roosevelt 
and the colloquial styles of Ronald Reagan and George W. Bush. In Denmark 
and Norway, appearing ordinary and unassuming matters even more. A Dan-
ish study of public spokespersons found that in addition to credibility (ethos) 
and charisma, public communicators were evaluated according to “one-of-us” 
appeal, subsuming qualities like sensitivity, warmth, folksiness, and capability 
of admitting mistakes (Hansen & Kock, 2003).
In Norway, Johansen has defined authenticity in political communication 
as expressing yourself with a “lack of style and form in the traditional sense” 
(Johansen, 1999: 162; see also Johansen, 2002). Already in 1966, the American 
social scientist Harry Eckstein described the particular authority and legitimacy 
of a Norwegian politician, displaying a style still prevalent in Scandinavian poli-
tics – especially in Norway and Denmark: Prime ministers “cultivate equality 
more than primacy” (Eckstein, 1966: 156f). Such observations suggest, we claim, 
a general Scandinavian appreciation of equality, uniformity, and artlessness in 
advertising and speeches, television debates, and online presence. We find such 
rhetoric exemplified in Danish prime minister Anders Fogh Rasmussen’s New 
Year’s speech on 1 January 2002, which called out “chartered arbiters of taste 
who determine what is good and right”: 
There are tendencies towards a tyranny of experts, which risks suppressing 
free popular debate. The population should not put up with the wagging 
fingers of so-called experts who think they know best. (Rasmussen, 2002) 
Print and television ads (Kjeldsen, 2008) depict “ordinary Danes” or something 
typically “Danish”, such as the Danish countryside. Advertisements showing 
politicians mostly address viewers as equals through eye contact, normal per-
spective, and small conventional portrait photos, refraining from conspicuous 
statements or symbols, presenting politicians as friendly, ordinary persons. 
Compared to France, the UK, or the US, Scandinavian ads lack appeals to leader-
ship capabilities or international experience. Another study suggests that while 
female French politicians seek to project effortless superiority, their Norwegian 
counterparts demonstrate conspicuous modesty (Krogstad & Storvik, 2012).
The rhetoric of populism, hostility, and polarisation
While political rhetoric in Scandinavia is generally less hostile and polarised than 
in many other European countries – and especially the US – the last 20 years 
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have shown right-wing movements using increasingly hostile and aggressive 
rhetoric. In Denmark and Norway, populist parties have used anti-elitist and 
anti-immigration rhetoric since the 1970s. The important year in Sweden was 
as late as 2010, when the nationalist Sweden Democrats (SD) began morphing 
from a neo-Nazi organisation and entered parliament with 5.7 per cent of the 
vote. In 2011, they redefined themselves as a social-conservative nationalist 
party, reaching 17.5 per cent in 2018. They display strong anti-immigration 
– often anti-Muslim – rhetoric, especially in less formal communication (e.g., 
Mral & Oja, 2013).
The growth of SD gave more space in the media for political discourse that 
had been absent from mainstream media, leading to a general change of tone in 
debates. SD’s representatives engaged freely in offensive generalisations, personal 
attacks, and confrontations, especially in social media and blogs. SD leaders 
have denounced and excluded members who use explicitly racist language. At 
the same time, prominent politicians from the centre and right-wing parties 
have also adopted a more hostile tone. The distinction between alternative 
and mainstream media has been blurred, and fake claims, personal attacks, 
insinuations, and name-calling have become integral parts of much political 
communication (e.g., Ihlebæk & Nygaard, Chapter 13).
In Denmark, there has also been a slide toward hostile, uninhibited rhetoric 
about certain population segments and those holding divergent views (Krogh 
& Zuleta, 2017; Institut for Menneskerettigheder, 2017). Politicians increas-
ingly turn to social media, avoiding independent journalism in favour of direct 
communication to the public or to carefully targeted segments, using sharp, 
slogan-like rhetoric, visuals, and mediated oratory.
In tone and rhetorical style – especially in the immigration debate – Norway 
stands between Denmark and Sweden (Hovden & Mjelde, 2019): Denmark 
exhibits the harshest rhetoric, Sweden the most restraint (Gripsrud, 2018). 
In Denmark, new right-wing anti-immigration and anti-Muslim parties have 
emerged, and in Norway, new right-wing populist news sites take more con-
frontational political stands, attacking the “elite”, the left, and especially Islam 
(e.g., Document and Resett). Still, the populist appeals of most Scandinavian 
parties are subdued compared to European counterparts. Studies have found, for 
instance, that the traditional high/low distinction and the “bad manner” trait of 
populism either does not apply, or applies in different ways (Villadsen, 2019).
Studies of online debates (Andersen, 2019, 2020) demonstrate how an issue 
like immigration facilitates personal engagement and expression, strong emo-
tions, and conflict, but sidelines argumentation and issue-oriented deliberation.
All-out hostility in populist rhetoric is dampened by dominant, shared 
public spheres. Shaming is notable in debate on moral issues like immigration 
(Villadsen, 2018). While shaming can function as a society’s moral correction 
of immoral behaviour, it may also suppress deviant views, leading to increased 
370
JENS E. KJELDSEN, CHRISTIAN KOCK, & ORLA VIGSØ
polarisation. A common response by those shamed for being xenophobic is the 
populist accusation that the elite supresses ordinary people (Kjeldsen, 2019b). 
Analyses of rhetorical dissent, shaming, and hostility have shown that the vic-
tims of such attacks often have the rhetorical agency to fight back (Villadsen, 
2017). Mral (2019), for instance, demonstrates how rhetorical attempts are 
used to silence women through verbal threats in social media, but also demon-
strates how women’s resistance strategies – showing outspoken but calm and 
demonstrative personal deportment – can discredit attackers.
The main genres
In general, the most explored political genres in rhetorical studies in Scandi-
navia have traditionally been speechmaking, broadcast debates, and visual 
party rhetoric. As in other parts of the world, online rhetoric and social media 
communication are now becoming dominant.
Political speechmaking
The study of political speechmaking in Scandinavia has two dominant trends: 
historical accounts (e.g., Johannesson, 1996; Johansen, 2019) and criticism or 
case studies of individual speakers or speeches (e.g., Kjeldsen, 2013; Kock & 
Villadsen, 2017). Since such humanistic studies are interpretive and hermeneutic 
in nature, reductive accounts of “results” are inappropriate. Analysis provides 
insight into genres, their rhetorical appeals, and the historical development of 
speechmaking. Historically, it is clear that political speechmaking has changed in 
content and even more so in form. With the expansion of broadcast and online 
media, speeches moved from an oratorical style to a more informal and personal, 
conversational style (Johansen, 2002; Kjeldsen et al., 2019; Lund, 2020). Political 
speeches no longer address a live audience exclusively – or even primarily – but 
rather composite media audiences. Political convention speeches and election 
night speeches, for instance, have become staged media events celebrating the 
party and the party leader, somewhat shifting attention from party and policy to 
leader and ethos (Lund, 2020). Traditional political speechmaking has converged 
with contemporary media forms, image staging, and visual rhetoric.
While political speeches are traditionally expected to be deliberative (weigh-
ing arguments for and against issues), research shows that they often do not 
primarily deliberate, but deal with praise and blame, promoting and negotiating 
shared values: they are epideictic (Kjeldsen, 2019a; Kjeldsen, 2020; Lund & 
Tønnesson, 2017; Tønnesson & Sivesind, 2015; Vatnøy, 2015). 
Most studies of speechmaking have been historical. While such studies 
have often focused on “great speeches by great men” (e.g., Jørgensen, 2009), 
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scholarship has also highlighted female leaders in political movements (Mral, 
1999, 2013; Mral et al., 2009; von der Lippe & Tønnesson, 2013). In Sweden, 
The Labour Movement and Language project mapped out the development of 
a specific rhetoric, with influences from both foreign agitators and domestic 
religious movements (e.g., Johannesson, 1996; Åsard, 1996).
Argumentation studies have played an important role in the study of politi-
cal rhetoric and speechmaking. Studies have examined the “between-the-lines” 
argument (Sigrell, 2001), demonstrated the importance of narratives (Dahlin, 
2008), scrutinised uses of implicature and innuendo (Kock, 2016), and investi-
gated situations where politicians face an internal but divided audience (Bruhn, 
2018). Such studies point to the different strategies used by politicians in order 
to persuade and meet the demands of the situation, especially the contexts – 
ranging from the party-internal opposition via the parliamentary situation to 
large scale international politics.
In general, studies of political speech genres show that the political has 
always been an integrated part of epideictic genres, and conversely. Political 
speechmaking can be seen as rhetorical seismographs for disputes and disagree-
ments that simultaneously divide the nation and hold it together. Even in an 
age of the Internet and social media, speechmaking offers a unique rhetorical 
possibility for the public to look to leaders for direction, especially in times of 
distress and confusion (e.g., Johansen, 2019; Kjeldsen, 2020; Lund & Tønnes-
son, 2017; Vatnøy, 2015; Villadsen, 2020).
Visual political rhetoric:  
Posters, advertisements, and online communication
Another prominent object of Scandinavian rhetorical studies is visual political 
rhetoric. Mostly, this research deals with advertisements, posters, and online 
communication.
A genre more prominent in Scandinavia – especially Sweden and Denmark – 
than in, for instance, the US, is the election poster. Parties use posters in public 
spaces and print advertisements in newspapers. Studies have noted a general 
absence of negative campaigning in Scandinavia, placing the countries in a 
special position. A general tendency is increased personalisation (Håkansson et 
al., 2014), but means of depicting the ethos of candidates stay within a narrow 
range (Vigsø, 2017), creating a conformity which may add to a public weariness 
of political campaigns. A comparative study of political ads in Germany and 
Sweden (Holtz-Bacha & Johansson, 2017) shows that positive appeals dominate 
the poster campaigns in both countries, using “soft sell” rhetoric for indirect 
critique and implied comparisons rather than direct attacks.
Political print ads are also extensively studied in Scandinavia (e.g., Carlson 
et al., 2017; Dahl, 2015; Johansson & Odén, 2013; Kjeldsen, 2008). A study 
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of Danish ads emphasises Scandinavian egalitarianism and authenticity (Kjeld-
sen, 2008): the design is typically plain, often featuring shortlists, contrasts, 
and antitheses, seeing politics as a matter of simple choices. This aligns with a 
“documentary” style, apparently presenting reality unadorned. Conspicuous 
artfulness appealing to voters’ decoding abilities, as in commercial advertis-
ing, would contradict “plain talk” egalitarianism and risk being regarded as 
manipulative – a visual equivalent of a speaker flaunting their eloquence. Scan-
dinavian politicians seldom gain by portraying themselves as brilliant, proudly 
competent, or even visionary. 
Similar trends are apparent in political television advertising and political 
online communication. Political television advertising is prohibited in Denmark 
and Norway. It was prohibited in Sweden as well, until it finally appeared on 
Swedish terrestrial television for the first time during the 2006 elections, and 
had its breakthrough with the European Parliament election in 2009 and the 
general election in 2010 (Johansson, 2017; e.g., Iversen, 2018b). In style, the 
rhetoric of Swedish political television commercials is similar to that in com-
mercial ads, and it favours the use of humour and irony. As in much of Scan-
dinavian political rhetoric, direct attacks are rare. Instead, “the parties criticize 
policy consequences of the opposing parties by direct or indirect comparison 
to highlight their own policy or ideology” (Johansson, 2017: 274).
Other studies look at political video ads shown in movie theatres and videos 
on party homepages and sites like YouTube and Facebook (e.g., Iversen, 2018a, 
2018b). Much of this research suggests that this visual rhetoric in advertising is 
often epideictic: instead of offering arguments for policies, it displays image and 
values (Kjeldsen, 2000; Krogstad & Storvik, 2012; cf. Nilsen, 2013). However, 
research also shows how visual political rhetoric communicates arguments 
indirectly and perhaps more efficiently, because its implicit (“enthymematic”) 
character involves audiences in the cognitive construction of arguments meant 
to persuade them (Kjeldsen, 2007, 2015).
 Political broadcast debates and interviews
Despite changes in political broadcast debates since the beginning of the 1960s, 
for years this genre left politicians in charge of the set-up and the principles 
of participation. Without moderator interference, every speaker could go on 
undisturbed during their carefully allotted minutes, looking into the camera 
and appealing directly to viewers at home (Allern, 2011).
This began to change in the 1970s, as control moved from politicians to 
journalists. The public broadcasting corporations – SVT (Sweden), NRK 
(Norway), and DR (Denmark) – increasingly curated debate programmes, but 
not until the mid-1980s did they achieve full control over the most important 
genre: the party leaders’ final election debate.
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In Norway, for instance, the use of a stopwatch to ensure that everybody got 
precisely the same amount of talking time was abandoned in the 1980s. The 
debates were now divided into distinct themes, with more active questioning by 
the journalists (Allern, 2011). Such changes were partly caused by the introduc-
tion of new commercially funded public channels that broke the broadcasting 
monopolies in Sweden and Denmark in 1988 and in Norway in 1992. Debates 
became even more firmly controlled by journalists, and the demand for more 
entertainment value rose. 
One important result of the research in televised political debates – and in 
political argumentation in general – is the distinction between vote-gathering 
and vote-shifting (Jørgensen et al., 1994, 1998). Vote-gatherers are ideological, 
categorical, and polarised, use attention-getting devices reminiscent of popular 
journalism, and tend to be “telegenic”. They tend to be favoured by television 
and other popular media. Vote-shifting rhetoric, by contrast, is focused, offers 
specific instantiation, and tends to clearly demarcate claims. Generally, vote-
shifters are moderate and polite verbally and nonverbally, less sprightly than 
vote-gatherers, but more earnest and insistent. Vote-gathering rhetoric seems 
to be best at winning undecided voters and energising believers; vote-shifting 
seems better at winning votes from the opposition. The Rhetoric that Shifts 
Votes project studied 37 televised town hall debates over a period of ten years, 
finding that debate winners were more likely to be typical vote-shifters. Effec-
tive debaters generally use both strategies, but vote-shifting rhetoric tends to 
be more effective in a bipartisan debate, since votes won from the opposition 
count twice – down for “them”, up for “us”. 
Unlike the massive Rhetoric that Shifts Votes project, some studies indicate 
that vote-gathering, image-oriented rhetoric may be more persuasive than 
issue-oriented rhetoric (Krogstad, 2001). However, more recently, the appeal 
of vote-shifting rhetoric has been supported by studies demonstrating that a 
rhetorical style of moderate self-assertion (acclaim) and few, but precise attacks 
generate the most positive evaluations in the media (Krogstad, 2006). In egali-
tarian Scandinavia, excessive self-assertion and personal bragging will mostly 
be viewed negatively. Rhetorical reception studies (see more below) have also 
supported the power of vote-shifting rhetoric, showing that television audiences 
become involved when debate participants are allowed to give well-formulated, 
structured comments (Vatnøy et al., 2020); when debaters heckle and interrupt 
each other, viewers’ attention falters and is drawn away from the argument, 
towards the politicians’ appearance and the programme format (Vatnøy et al., 
2020). While moderators and journalists seem to fear prepared and uninter-
rupted remarks from politicians, the study shows audiences reacting positively 
to coherent and well-reasoned mini speeches.
In contrast to other kinds of political communication research, studies of 
rhetoric do not shy away from being normative (e.g., Berge, 2014b). In many 
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studies, it is an explicit aim that research should not only study how debates, 
political interviews, and other types of political rhetoric are carried out and what 
consequences they may have, but rhetorical research should also help improve 
political and public discourse. Lantz (2013), for instance, proposes an empiri-
cally based model for the most useful way to moderate political debate. This 
normative aspect is also present in a line of research examining how political 
debates and election interview programmes meet the electorate’s need for political 
information. Studies point to several ways political debates and interviews might 
improve. One challenge is media bias and differential treatment of participants. 
There is some evidence indicating that conservative parties are confronted with 
more critical questions and horse-race speculations (Haug et al., 2010; Vatnøy, 
2010). Generally, though, unequal treatment appears to occur most in critical 
questioning of political incumbents (Svennevig et al., 2014). However, textual 
analyses indicate that equally important factors are journalistic practices framing 
the debate climate and the moderators’ personal styles (Kamsvåg, 2013; Sandvik, 
2016). While international, especially American, research provides some evidence 
that female politicians both communicate differently and are treated differently 
than male politicians, studies of the rhetoric of gender in Scandinavia tend to 
indicate that differences are small or inconsequential (Gomard & Krogstad, 
2001; Krogstad, 1999; Mral, 2013; Mral et al., 2009; Sandvik, 2004).
A line of research examines rhetorical practices that mislead, obfuscate de-
bates, and dodge counterarguments (e.g., Andersen, 2016; Kock, 2011a). Among 
others, Gabrielsen and colleagues (2020) have observed and conceptualised 
how politicians evade critical questions by means of “shifting” strategies. They 
identify three subcategories: time-shifts, agent-shifts, and level-shifts. Like much 
rhetorical research, such studies seek to improve public discourse on behalf of 
citizens. For example, knowledge of shifting strategies could enable journalists 
to quickly detect shifts and react appropriately.
Even though research points to a range of challenges, the general picture 
is that Scandinavian political debates and interviews serve the electorate well 
in providing both information and clarity about policies. Several studies, for 
example, suggest that reporters’ questioning style has shown slightly less coun-
terproductive aggressiveness in the period from the 1990s to the middle of the 
2010s (e.g., Sandvik, 2014; Vatnøy et al., 2016).
In general, rhetorical research demonstrates how hostile rhetoric and per-
sonal attacks may undermine public discourse, but the research also contributes 
to a qualified understanding of why and how reasonable disagreement and 
agonistic (rather than antagonistic) rhetoric is an essential component of a 
well-functioning democracy. For example, research by Jørgensen (e.g., 1998, 
2011) has conceptualised the genre of public political debate on a speech-act-
theoretical and normative basis, emphasising that disagreement is part of the 
essential nature of debates, while hostility is not.
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New directions for rhetorical political research
Recent research in Scandinavian political rhetoric has three notable trends: 1) 
rhetorical citizenship and deliberation; 2) philosophical understanding of the 
political; and 3) rhetorical reception.
A dominant trend is a move towards work rooted in political science and 
deliberative theory. Public debate has always been a central object of study 
for Scandinavian rhetoricians. The public debates and arguments regarding 
nuclear power plants and waste disposal in Sweden, for instance, have been 
analysed by Mral and Vigsø (2013; see also Hansson-Nylund, 2016), as has 
the communication and press coverage during the Fukushima nuclear acci-
dent in Japan, involving a comparison between German and Swedish media. 
One important aspect of this is the analysis of how public debate develops in 
relation to the constraints of the situation and the format of the discussion 
(Vigsø, 2009). Danish scholars have looked at public debate on prostitution 
as a case study in productive versus unproductive political argumentation 
(Jørgensen, 2011; Kock, 2011b; Onsberg, 2011). The affinities with work on 
deliberative democracy is evident in Kock’s work (e.g., 2009, 2017), proposing 
a view of rhetorical argumentation as essentially deliberative: It is centrally 
concerned with collective action and does not allow for deductive or compel-
ling demonstration of the right action to choose. It nevertheless posits rules 
and requirements for proper arguments in regard to the parameters of “rel-
evance” and “weight”, but recognises that these have subjective components. 
Relevant and weighty reasons regarding some issue may moreover belong to 
multiple different “dimensions”, and hence be “incommensurable”, leading 
to “reasonable disagreement”. 
In Norway, the rapprochement between political science, media studies, and 
rhetoric is apparent in the Centre for Political Communication (POLKOM) at 
the University of Oslo. Many issues addressed there are rhetorical, including 
questions of power, media, and politics (Ihlen et al., 2015). Ihlen has published 
extensively on strategic communication, public relations, and framing, among 
other things, in relation to lobbying, immigration, and environmental issues 
(e.g., Dan et al., 2019; Ihlen et al., 2015, 2018).
A crosscutting concept developed in recent years thematises “rhetorical cit-
izenship”, in other words, the ways citizenship is constituted and enacted not 
just by legal rights and duties but also discursively. This notion, proposed by 
Kock and Villadsen (2012, 2014, 2015), is a conceptual frame and invitation 
to cross-disciplinary work, rather than a theory; however, it has begun to gain 
currency in academic work in all Nordic countries, as well as among scholars 
abroad. Among these studies in rhetorical citizenship, Villadsen’s (2007, 2013, 
2014) close readings of official apologies has revealed how these are potentially 
powerful forces in shaping social norms and the conditions of citizenship.
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A different approach to political rhetoric, representing a more philosophical 
understanding of the political, uses philosophical theories – including those of 
Ernst Cassirer, Cornelius Castoriadis, and Slavoj Žižek – and examines several 
questions such as, What is the political in rhetorical terms? What is the rela-
tion between the political and the creation of social meaning? How can we use 
rhetoric to study the formation of contemporary ideas about social relations? 
(e.g., Bengtsson, 2019; Buhre, 2019; Rosengren, 2016, 2018; Stagnell, 2020).
Another new direction is rhetorical audience and reception research. This 
approach aims at studying not only rhetorical text and context, but also how 
empirical audiences accept, negotiate, or reject political rhetoric (Kjeldsen, 2016, 
2018). The approach acknowledges the impact of rhetoric but rejects a simple 
transmission model of communication. The aim is to understand the interac-
tion between the rhetorical situation, the characteristics of the utterances, and 
the audience’s uptake and negotiation of them. Instead of moving conjecturally 
from textual traits to assumed effect, reception studies allow researchers to move 
from response to text and point to rhetorical traits that may have shaped the 
response. Studies deal with press photographs (Kjeldsen & Andersen, 2018), 
Facebook (Vatnøy, 2018), political advertising (Iversen, 2018a, 2018b), and 
television debates (Vatnøy et al., 2020). In Denmark, similar approaches have 
been used to examine political commentary (Bengtsson, 2018) and how political 
debate in online media is curated by journalists (Rønlev, 2018).
Conclusion
Describing the varieties of political rhetoric in Scandinavia is not easily done. 
Sweden, Denmark, and Norway are different countries, with varying rhetorical 
traditions and styles. However, compared to other countries – and especially 
the US – these three countries share an informal type of rhetoric undergirded 
by egalitarianism and authenticity. While the political rhetoric in Scandinavia 
is certainly confrontational, it is rarely explicitly ideological, hostile, or vile. 
Instead, it is marked more by a compromising, plain, and pragmatic style that 
is less polarising, compared with two-party, winner-takes-all political systems. 
It is probably safe to say that the notion of a public sphere comes to mind more 
easily when looking at Scandinavian political rhetoric than is the case in large 
countries like Germany, France, Italy, Britain, or the US. 
This goes for the political rhetoric coming from political actors as well 
as for the academic study of it. Politicians and other political debaters are 
rhetorically very present in the public eye because they constantly contribute 
opinion pieces, appear in news programmes and media interviews, and make 
live public appearances as speakers or debaters. They cannot retain the posi-
tion they seem to hold in many other countries: as distant figures moving in a 
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sphere of their own. The media and the public are constantly calling them to 
account, and they have to respond – which, in turn, has fostered a proliferation 
of defensive and diversionary techniques such as dodgy answers, parroting of 
talking points, and so on.
Practically all leading politicians nowadays have blogs, and larger parties 
have their own media outlets, aiming to have an apparent, ongoing dialogue 
with the population while evading the scrutiny of the mainstream media. 
While these are obviously more important than ever in the contemporary situ-
ation, it is arguable that over-zealous media monitoring of politicians tends 
to overemphasise a quasi-forensic approach to political coverage: politicians’ 
alleged wrongdoings, misstatements, or past broken promises may then come 
to overshadow a more truly deliberative debate about what is to be done in 
the future.
In rhetoricians’ study of political rhetoric – as well as in their public 
analyses in non-academic outlets – the idea of a public sphere is strongly, 
while implicitly, present. Rhetorical scholars looking at political rhetoric in 
their respective countries often more or less explicitly emphasise the potential 
democratic function and usefulness of their objects of study in an approach 
more inherently normative than studies more tilted towards political science 
and most journalistic commentary. There, the emphasis is more often on a 
purely “rhetor” angle – second-guessing politicians’ possible strategic motives 
for whatever they do or say – and studies within the political science tradition 
tend to be more quantitative and purely descriptive on a “systemic” level – 
with hardly any textual analysis and little or no normativity relying on notions 
of democracy or deliberation. But, if the latter are desiderata in the study of 
political communication, then it is appropriate and fortunate they are among 
the contributions rhetorical research aims to provide.
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Conclusion  
Nordic political communication between  
change and continuity
Lars Nord, Eli Skogerbø, & Nete Nørgaard Kristensen
Abstract
The overall conclusion that can be drawn from the contributions in this anthol-
ogy is that it is hardly relevant to talk about a clear-cut Nordic model of political 
communication that highly contrasts other democratic states and their political 
communication systems. Global trends such as digitalisation and commercialisa-
tion of media systems and blurring lines between national and global political 
issues influence political communication. Still, there are many observations that 
confirm the existence of prevailing Nordic system peculiarities, such as compara-
bly higher levels of voter turnout and political trust and relatively strong private 
and public news media. While these merging characteristics exist, it is relevant to 
look more carefully upon factors in the Nordic countries that seem to contribute 
to continuity and stability in political communication systems. In our view, it is 
particularly interesting to pay attention to relevant factors in the Nordic countries 
that may contribute to resilience in these societies. So far, the Nordic countries 
have shown considerable ability to embrace international political communication 
trends without jeopardising essential nation-specific distinctive features. Whether 
this resilience will prevail in the future remains an open question.
Keywords: power, political communication, change, continuity, resilience, Nordic 
countries
Introduction
The intention of this anthology on political communication in the Nordic 
countries has been to go beyond the usual existing generalisations and percep-
tions about this region in order to be able to paint more nuanced and insightful 
pictures of what is actually happening from political communication perspec-
tives today. Does the Nordic model still stand out from the rest of the mature 
democracies in the world? Do political systems and media systems deviate so 
much from international trends that it is reasonable to continue talking about 
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a Nordic political communication model? And if so, what is it and how does it 
impact on the development and resilience of the Nordic countries?
There is of course not a single simple answer to such broad questions, 
but this anthology has intended to focus on current important developments 
by bringing together leading media and communication scholars and politi-
cal scientists from the Nordic countries to offer valuable insights from both 
country-based and comparative perspectives. The main objective has been to 
supplement established images of societal conditions in the Nordic countries 
with theoretically driven assumptions and empirically based conclusions about 
political communication realities in these countries today.
In the following sections of this chapter, we address political, media, and 
voter perspectives, as well as possible shifting power relations between politi-
cal communication actors in the Nordic countries. The final section focuses on 
the relevance of a Nordic model of political communication and the dynamic 
interplay between change and continuity in the process of political communi-
cation developments.
A new political landscape
Politically, the once very stable Nordic countries have experienced considerable 
transformations of their formerly rather enduring party systems. The single 
most radical change is the successes of rightwing populist parties in national 
elections and the significant impact they have had on politics in the four biggest 
Nordic countries, as discussed in the chapters on media and politics in the five 
Nordic countries (chapters 2–6) and in Herkman and Jungar’s contribution. 
The Danish Peoples’ Party, the Finns Party, the (Norwegian) Progress Party, 
and the Sweden Democrats have all become well-established political actors in 
the national parliaments, and, with their presence and increased importance 
in the national assemblies, changed basic conditions for coalition-building 
and government formation. Populist parties have been part of governments 
in Finland (2015–2017) and Norway (2013–2020) and have been politically 
influential in Denmark. The Sweden Democrats have so far been more isolated 
in the parliament, even if collaborations with other parties to the right have 
started to grow recently.
The most obvious effect of the rise of populist parties in the Nordic countries 
is probably the declined importance of long withstanding ideological left-right 
conflicts in politics, even if they still exist to some extent. Besides this traditional 
economy-based conflict dimension, a rising disagreement is now very apparent 
between supporters of global, urban, and liberal values, and people more loyal 
to national, traditional, and authoritarian principles (the so-called GAL-TAN 
dimension). The new conflict dimension could also be described as a conflict be-
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tween post-industrial, ecological perspectives and industrial, materialistic values. 
The change is not only evident with regard to political ideologies, but can also 
be noted by changing political agendas, where economic and welfare issues are 
now challenged by immigration, law and order, and cultural issues. International 
unexpected events can be added to the picture. The migration waves from the 
Middle East and Africa that affected Europe, especially in the autumn of 2015, 
have also contributed to the transformation of political agendas and political 
party policy positions in all Nordic countries, even if not in exactly the same way. 
Additionally, the global coronavirus crisis in 2020 and its deep consequences 
for economy and welfare will influence Nordic societies for many years, even 
if it is too early to pinpoint what the long-term political consequences will be.
Modern democracies are associated with an increasing role for professional 
pressure groups and lobbyists. This is also true for the Nordic countries, but 
the role of public relations professionals seems to be a bit overestimated in the 
Nordic political communication context, at least compared to the communica-
tive resources of big organisations (Ihlen et al., Chapter 15). At the same time, 
the phenomenon of so-called revolving doors, where politicians now move more 
frequently between the political arena and the public relations industry, calls 
for more studies of how lobbying develops within this context.
The transformations of Nordic party systems and the increased strength of 
right-wing populist parties are similar to political trends observed worldwide, 
and particularly in Europe. However, these changes are taking place within 
political structures that can still be described as more consensus-oriented and 
corporatist than in most other countries.
The hybrid media ecosystem
Parallel to the political systems in the Nordic countries, media systems have 
undergone considerable transformations. During recent years, the financing 
model for public service media has changed in the four biggest Nordic coun-
tries from a traditional licence fee model to a new tax-based system. Even if 
the main reason is digital media development, fear has been expressed by some 
political and media actors that this change challenges the established “arms 
length principle” and will make public service media more vulnerable for 
political pressure. This discussion has initially been most intense in Denmark, 
where substantial budget cuts in public service media have also been decided 
(Kristensen & Blach-Ørsten, Chapter 2). However, the intensified and polarised 
debate on public service media impartiality indicates that similar debates – as 
well as political actions – may follow everywhere (Allern et al., Chapter 7).
Despite political controversies, public service media have remained strong 
in Nordic media markets. Public service radio channels have the biggest audi-
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ence market share everywhere, and public service channels also maintain their 
positions in the much more competitive television market. Furthermore, public 
service media in the Nordic countries have been successful in developing new 
services on digital platforms.
The digitalisation of Nordic media markets is an overall trend with significant 
influences on both public and commercial media performances. Many chapters 
(see Chapters 2–8) in this anthology refer to the emergence of so-called hybrid 
media ecosystems, where traditional news media logics and social media log-
ics are blended and where media users develop more individual usage patterns 
based on their own interest and taste preferences. Overall, media use is more 
fragmented than ever, on national, regional, and local levels. Online and mobile 
communications have turned out to be the main channels for news consumption 
(Newman et al., 2019). Older generations are still relatively high consumers 
of printed papers and broadcast news, while younger generations to a large 
extent rely on digital and social media platforms. At the same time, new media 
formats like hyperlocals, freesheets, and alternative media add to the already 
complex media landscape in the Nordic countries (Lindén et al., Chapter 8; 
Ihlebæk & Nygaard, Chapter 13).
The hybrid media system certainly puts traditional news media in a less 
favourable position than previously but does not necessarily mean the end of 
news media as overall political communication expands and becomes more 
inclusive (Chadwick, 2013). Legacy media still play a fairly important role 
for many people, but more citizens tend to spend their limited time for media 
consumption on other media outlets in the expanding digital ecosystem. To put 
it simply, the hybrid media system offers previously unseen opportunities for 
individual choices, but at the same time, the high-choice media environment 
distorts conditions for well-functioning public spheres based on equal access 
and equal information capacities, and polarises public opinion (Prior, 2007). 
Even if more outlets mean greater media pluralism, the weakening of legacy 
news media and the increasing reliance on algorithm-driven digital media 
platforms seem to facilitate fragmentation and polarisation of the public in 
most European countries today (Davis, 2019). Thus, the connections between 
citizens, media, and political institutions have been described as increasingly 
“disrupted” (Bennett & Pfetsch, 2018).
The Nordic countries do still have comparably strong national media 
companies. Newspapers face increasing economic problems, but their reach is 
comparably high, and public service media continue to be central in people’s 
media diets, particularly so in crisis situations. Local and regional media are 
relatively strong but operate in increasingly fragmented media landscapes 
(Lindén et al., Chapter 8). Media use is increasingly based on individual and 
socioeconomic predicators such as age, gender, class, ethnicity, and cultural 
values (Harrie, 2018). The continuous fragmentation is often perceived as a 
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problem, but previous research on media effects in the Nordic countries indicates 
that social media may have potential to increase political mobilisation in parts 
of the electorate, especially among people normally less interested in politics 
(Beyer et al., Chapter 17).
The volatile electorate
To a large extent, Nordic citizens vote. Election data show that voter turnout 
in the Nordic countries is high in an international comparison (Hopmann & 
Karlsen, Chapter 11). In some cases, the trend also indicates increasing figures. 
National elections attract more voters than do local or European Parliament 
elections, even though voter turnout in European Parliament elections increased 
in Denmark, Finland, and Sweden in 2019. Local elections in Sweden have sig-
nificantly higher levels of voter participation than in neighbouring countries due 
to the electoral system where elections on different political levels take place on 
the same day (Nord & Grusell, Chapter 6). It is also important to note that vot-
ing turnout figures differ in various parts of each country in the Nordic region.
Despite the fact that voter turnout seems to be relatively stable over time, 
voters tend to be more volatile. The general trend of declining party identifi-
cation continues, and voters make their decisions late during the campaigns. 
On average, about half of the electorate in the Nordic countries report that 
they make their voting decisions during the campaign (Hopmann & Karlsen, 
Chapter 11). The relatively huge number of swing voters and uncertain voters 
make election campaigning more intense and the election outcome less easy to 
predict. Additionally, issue voting has become more important when examining 
reasons for voters’ preferences during election campaigns. Even if most Nordic 
voters can still refer to their position on a left-right–wing political scale, single 
issues like immigration, environment, education, or healthcare are becoming 
more decisive for the final selection of political party or candidate.
However, voter turnout is not the only indicator of a healthy democracy. 
Political trust is a cornerstone in contemporary sustainable and transparent 
societies. At the same time, a significant consequence of current media transfor-
mations in these societies is increasing problems of locating trust and reliable 
information in the complex communication environment. The Nordic countries 
are all faced with these challenges, and political trust has gradually become 
more polarised in Nordic societies, but trust in political institutions and political 
actors as well as trust in the media remain comparably high in relation to other 
mature democracies in the world. A comparison of trust in news media in the 
Nordic countries in 2019 showed that the highest figure is in Finland (59%) 
and the lowest in Sweden (39%) (Newman et al., 2019). Sweden also stands 
out as the country where trust in public service media is most polarised, and 
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the place where concern about the diffusion and effects of fake news are most 
articulated (Kalsnes et al., Chapter 14).
On the supply side, election campaign communications are becoming more 
diverse than ever, with parties using a wide range of channels to maximise 
public attention and electoral support. Political parties are able to use new 
digital tools, and voters can reach tailored political messages on many more 
platforms than before. News media, social media, and direct communication 
are more equally and innovatively used in order to target different parts of the 
electorate with individually based messages (Allern et al., Chapter 7; Bolin & 
Falasca, 2019; Magin et al., 2017). However, the degree of professionalisation 
of party election campaigning in the Nordic region seems to reflect differences 
between parties rather than differences between countries. Innovations and new 
campaign tools are also, to a large extent, influenced by practices and experi-
ences from countries outside Northern Europe.
Nordic electorates are becoming more volatile, and party identification is 
going down, as in many other Western democracies. Election campaigns are 
increasingly influenced by external trends. At the same time, elections are tak-
ing place in a continued Nordic context of comparably high voter turnout and 
public trust in political institutions and news media.
To conclude, the last decades have seen both remarkable changes in the 
relations between political communication actors in the Nordic countries and 
strong signs of continuity with regard to basic political communication struc-
tures. In the next section of this chapter, we discuss the importance of change 
and continuity of political communication systems in the Nordic region. To 
what extent are power relations in society affected, and to what extent is it still 
relevant to talk about a Nordic model of political communication?
Power shifts and “outside-election” contexts
Political communication studies are not simply a static overview of the exist-
ing relations between politics, media, and citizens. Political communication is 
basically a study of power dynamics within society with a specific interest in 
which actors dominate in the public sphere and influence political agendas, the 
framing of political issues, and peoples’ perceptions of reality. Political com-
munication is, to a large extent, a matter of power struggles, not only between 
groups with different political ideas and policies, but also between political 
parties and other institutions with considerable opinion-formation capacities, 
such as legacy news media, social media, alternative media, pressure groups 
and lobbyists, non-governmental organisations, and grassroot movements. 
Power is gained and power is lost in the continuous development of political 
communication relations.
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When analysing political communication power relations in the Nordic 
countries today, it is obvious that existing political and media conditions are 
under pressure. Leading political parties – both to the left and to the right – face 
increasing problems with maintaining dominance in national parliaments. The 
former big parties are not that big anymore (even though social democracy is 
still stronger than in the rest of Europe). National party systems have generally 
seen a more even distribution of voter support in recent elections, and govern-
ment formation processes have become more complex. In the spring of 2020, 
both Denmark and Sweden were ruled by minority social democratic–led gov-
ernments, while both Finland and Norway had newly reshuffled governments 
after internal government crises. 
A similar pattern can be observed in Nordic media systems. Main actors 
such as daily newspapers and public service broadcasters are still important 
and reach relatively large audiences in the Nordic countries (as seen in the 
country-specific chapters 2–6 of this anthology). But their historically dominat-
ing role in agenda-setting, priming, and framing processes is not that evident 
in the evolving digital media landscape that characterises the Nordic countries 
today. As the time most people in the North spend with media consumption 
every day is more or less the same as before, competition for public attention 
has increased dramatically and generated more complex, fragmented, and indi-
vidual media-use diets. Generally speaking, online and mobile media and social 
media have become more relevant for people in the Nordic countries, while 
national, regional, and local newspapers, as well as public service radio and 
television stations, are facing difficulties with decreased commercial revenues 
and weakening audience market shares, respectively. 
However, the picture is not completely black and white. Some specific news 
organisations (such as Amedia, DR, and Schibsted) have been remarkably suc-
cessful on digital media platforms. But in an overall perspective, media power 
in the Nordic countries has definitely become more difficult to define as the 
expanding media system also makes every single media outlet less powerful.
Power relations in political communication studies have traditionally often 
been examined within an election-campaign context strictly focusing on the three 
key actors of political parties, news media, and voters. For several reasons, it 
seems relevant to widen this perspective and also reflect upon power structures 
outside the limited campaign timeframe, as well as to include perspectives outside 
the usual suspects in the political communication ménage à trois.
Political communication activities are not isolated to the final four weeks 
before election day. On the contrary, political positions and declarations need 
to be officially articulated and motivated at any occasion. Communications 
must continuously be coordinated and effectively managed in this permanent 
campaign context. Political parties in governing positions must communicate 
in a way that maximises their possibilities of remaining in power after the next 
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election, and opposition parties need to do their best to communicate and lay 
ground for an alternative electoral outcome. Generally, political communica-
tion between elections is well suited for the sitting governments, as they often 
have the upper hand when communication resources and skills are compared 
(Sanders & Canel, 2013).
But there are definitely political “between-election” situations where power 
plays out differently. This is particularly true during societal crises and political 
scandals. In such dramatic situations, the political communication playground 
is less specifically defined and the evolving processes less easy to predict. If less 
cleverly managed by governments, these situations can shift the initiatives and 
framing of the story from the government to the political opposition and the 
media. 
The global outbreak of the coronavirus in the spring of 2020 had the po-
tential to be a political communication game changer in the Nordic countries, 
as well as everywhere else. In this unexpected and extreme situation, national 
governments imposed heavy restrictions and regulations of almost wartime 
character in order to decrease death tolls and improve health care capacity to 
handle the Covid-19 disease. The extraordinary situation changed the political 
agenda completely, and usual day-to-day political conflicts almost disappeared. 
As is normally the case in stressful situations, the initial stages of this crisis 
also resulted in increased support for political parties in the government and 
especially for prime ministers in the Nordic countries. In the long run, opposi-
tion parties, media, and public perceptions of capability and accountability 
may play out differently, but in initial times of crisis, ruling parties generally 
strengthen their position.
The possible effects of political scandals are also difficult to predict. Com-
parative studies of political scandals in the Nordic countries confirm that their 
number has increased in all countries (Allern & Pollack, 2012). This kind of 
dramatic and disruptive events normally have great news value and attract 
large audiences. Scandals and crisis processes deviate from the more structured 
campaign context and thus have significant potential to shift existing power 
relations. But as is the case in other crisis situations, skilled crisis management 
and carefully selected response strategies may work in favour of the exposed 
political party or candidate.
Finally, it is relevant to consider cultural dimensions of political communi-
cation processes. As the traditional left-right–wing political scale has become 
slightly less important in the Nordic region, conflict patterns rooted in cultural 
perspectives and values prove to be useful for understanding development of 
public opinion and debate. As concluded by Kristensen and Roosvall in this 
anthology, cultural journalism in the Nordic countries obviously matters for 
political opinion. This is particularly true for topics that do not follow estab-
lished political conflict patterns. A typical example is the global debate on sexual 
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harassment initiated by the so-called #metoo movement in 2017 that, to a large 
extent, was driven by cultural journalists and followed up by news departments 
and political journalists. The issue remained on top of the political agenda for 
a long time – especially in Norway and Sweden – and had considerable impact 
on public life. For example, such scandals related to the Royal Swedish Acad-
emy were the reason why no Nobel Prize in literature was declared in 2018.
Change and continuity factors
The above discussion on politics, media, and voter power relations brings us 
back to the basic – and in Nordic political communication research, often re-
peated – question of whether a Nordic model of political communication exists 
today or not. The overall conclusion that can be drawn from the contributions 
in this anthology is that it is hardly relevant to talk about a clear-cut Nordic 
model of political communication that highly contrasts other democratic states 
and their political communication systems. To a considerable extent, global 
trends such as the digitalisation and commercialisation of media systems and 
blurring lines between national and global political issues influence and affect 
political communication conditions in the Nordic countries. Thus, it makes 
sense to assume that transnational factors are becoming increasingly important 
when analysing contemporary developments and changes in Nordic societies.
Still, there are many observations in previous chapters that point in other 
directions and actually confirm the existence of prevailing Nordic system pe-
culiarities. The Nordic region is somewhat of a democratic role model with 
comparably higher levels of voter turnout and political trust, relatively strong 
private and public news media, and an audience still willing to pay for news 
(Newman et al., 2019). Lobbying works within another political context, fake 
news concerns are not referred to as a main problem, and local journalism is 
still characterised by professional values, just to mention some of the conclu-
sions from chapters in this anthology that support the idea of a more specific 
Nordic political communication model (see the country-specific Chapters 2–6; 
Lindén et al., Chapter 8; Kalsnes et al., Chapter 14; and Ihlen et al., Chapter 15). 
So most correctly, international transformation driving changes and na-
tional distinctive features supporting continuity seem to merge when political 
communication systems are developing in the Nordic countries, as well as in 
other democracies. This mixture of external influences and internal conditions 
is also often referred to in political communication research literature (Esser 
& Pfetsch, 2004; Norris, 2002; Syvertsen et al., 2014). In contrast, the simple 
idea of a strong convergence of political communication systems all over the 
world is criticised. Calls are issued for more sophisticated hypotheses about 
possible changes (Hallin & Mancini, 2014). Previous systematic analyses of 
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political communication in Scandinavia have also observed the dynamic inter-
play between global convergence processes and national political culture, media 
systems, and traditions (Aagard & Blach-Örsten, 2018; Ihlen et al., 2015; Nord 
& Strömbäck, 2018).
While this cautious conclusion of merging characteristics makes sense, it is 
relevant to look more carefully upon factors in the Nordic countries that seem 
to contribute to continuity and stability in political communication systems 
and with potential to limit the effects of external influences. In our view, it is 
particularly interesting to pay attention to relevant factors in the Nordic coun-
tries that may contribute to resilience in these societies. 
The notion of resilience is not much discussed in political communication, 
despite its potential to explain how and why some societies are successful as 
inclusive, innovative, and secure societies, also in times of crises and change. 
Social resilience can be defined as “the capacity of groups of people bound to-
gether in an organization, class, racial group, community, or nation to sustain 
and advance their well-being in the face of challenges to it” (Hall & Lamont, 
2013: 2). Resilience is the capacity of a society to deal with issues such as the 
above, and being stable democracies, the Nordic countries have a good track 
record in handling societal challenges. While processes of globalisation might 
be said to contribute to convergence, it has also been argued that a certain 
national resilience can be found and attributed to both tradition and culture 
(Pfetsch & Esser, 2012).
For example, a comparative study of 18 countries concluded that a consensual 
cluster of countries, including the Nordic countries, showed a higher resilience 
to online disinformation. Within this cluster, countries were marked by a lower 
level of polarisation and populism communication, high levels of media trust 
and shared news consumption, and strong public service media. These countries 
seemed to be well equipped to face the challenges of the digital information 
age because they have stable, trusted institutions that enable citizens to obtain 
independent information and uncover manipulation attempts. The countries in 
this cluster are not yet affected to a large extent by the problem of online dis-
information. However, it is possible that this will change in the future and that 
online disinformation will become a greater threat (Humprecht et al., 2020).
The various contributions to this anthology do suggest some possible factors 
that may be central for the understanding of resilience in the Nordic countries. 
Basic democratic indicators such as voter turnout and public trust are com-
parably high, public service media have a strong position in national media 
systems, and there is an inclusion of ethnic and cultural groups in decision-
making structures. 
International comparisons of how “democratic” different nations are have 
also reflected on other characteristics of the Nordic countries: they are small and 
wealthy states with long-established democratic traditions. Electoral systems are 
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more consensual than majoritarian, and taxes and welfare state expenditures 
are relatively high with some state intervention in the economy. Even if there 
is not one single perfect democratic model, one author states that “it might 
be tentatively argued that the odds of a strong democracy enduring might be 
improved if following the Scandinavian template” (Davis, 2019: 212).
So far, the Nordic countries have shown considerable ability to embrace 
international political communication trends without jeopardising essential 
nation-specific distinctive features. Whether this resilience will prevail in the 
future remains an open question and depends on the further strength of global 
democratic changes, the magnitude of future crises and challenges in modern 
societies, and their implications for existing power relations and political com-
munication systems in the North.
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POWER, COMMUNICATION, AND POLITICS IN THE NORDIC COUNTRIES 
The Nordic countries are stable democracies with solid infrastructures for political dia-
logue and negotiations. However, both the “Nordic model” and Nordic media systems 
are under pressure as the conditions for political communication change – not least due 
to weakened political parties and the widespread use of digital communication media. 
In this anthology, the similarities and differences in political communication across the 
Nordic countries are studied. Traditional corporatist mechanisms in the Nordic countries 
are increasingly challenged by professionals, such as lobbyists, a development that has 
consequences for the processes and forms of political communication. Populist polit-
ical parties have increased their media presence and political influence, whereas the 
news media have lost readers, viewers, listeners, and advertisers. These developments 
influence societal power relations and restructure the ways in which political actors 
communicate about political issues. 
This book is a key reference for all who are interested in current trends and develop-
ments in the Nordic countries. The editors, Eli Skogerbø, Øyvind Ihlen, Nete Nørgaard 
Kristensen, and Lars Nord, have published extensively on political communication, and 
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